Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics¶
Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum (c. 1270–1272)
Executive Thesis¶
In his Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum (c. 1270–1272), Thomas Aquinas articulates his mature architecture of demonstrative science (scientia), taking geometry and arithmetic not merely as illustrative examples but as the primary realizations of the most certain mode of demonstration (certissimus modus demonstrationis, Lib. I, lect. 1). Because mathematical entities abstract from sensible matter and motion while retaining intelligible extension or discrete multitude, their demonstrations proceed solely from formal principles in which what is better known in relation to us (quoad nos) coincides with what is prior and better known according to nature (secundum naturam, Lib. I, lect. 4). Within this resolutory (analytica) framework, Aquinas resolves Plato‘s Meno paradox by distinguishing actual scientific knowledge (scire simpliciter) from the virtual pre-existence of conclusions within foreknown principles (praecognitio, Lib. I, lect. 2–3). Every demonstrative science requires three coordinated elements: a subject-genus (genus subiectum, such as continuous magnitude or number, of which both what it is and that it is are supposed), proper attributes (passiones, of which only nominal definitions are initially assumed while their inherence is demonstrated), and common axioms or dignities (dignitates, communes animi conceptiones, applied proportionally to the subject-genus, Lib. I, lect. 18). Crucially, Aquinas identifies Euclid‘s constructive problems—such as constructing an equilateral triangle upon a given finite straight line—as quasi-operative demonstrations (demonstrationes quasi operativae, Lib. I, lect. 2): in the order of construction the figure’s mathematical existence is first demonstrated as a proper attribute of prior spatial elements, after which the constructed figure serves as a secondary subject for subsequent theorems, while singular diagrams such as a figure inscribed in a semicircle immediately yield actual science once recognized under their universal species (Lib. I, lect. 2–3).
Equally foundational is Aquinas’s demarcation of the epistemological status of principles in Lectures 5 and 17–19. Whereas axioms or common conceptions of the mind—such as If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal—are self-evident both in themselves and to every intellect by inward reason alone, positions encompass unprovable nominal or quidditative definitions alongside propositional hypotheses (suppositiones) and postulates (petitiones), which are demonstrable in a higher science (ultimately first philosophy or natural philosophy) yet assumed without middle terms within geometry according to the learner’s epistemic disposition (Lib. I, lect. 5, 17, 19). Against sophistical kind-crossing (metabasis), Aquinas exposes Bryson’s attempted squaring of the circle as pseudo-demonstrative because its middle term exceeds the proximate genus of circle and rectilinear polygon (Lib. I, lect. 17). Against ancient skeptics and modern empiricists alike, he defends the exactitude of geometry in his celebrated analysis of lines drawn in the dust (lineae in pulvere descriptae, Lib. I, lect. 19): when the geometer calls a traced mark straight or one foot long, he utters no falsehood because he demonstrates neither concerning nor from sensible particulars, using visible figures solely as exemplars through which the intellect grasps universal natures existing one in many without needing Platonic separated Forms.
Finally, in the closing lectures of Book I and Book II, Aquinas unifies the downward apodictic hierarchy of mathematical exactitude with the upward inductive-abstractive genesis of first principles. Within the mathematical disciplines—ranked internally in Book I (lect. 41–42) by ontological simplicity from arithmetic’s unit without position (unitas sine positione) to geometry’s point having position (punctus habens positionem)—necessity holds a priori and universally, excluding both fortuitous events (a fortuna) and mere sensory observation (per sensum, Lib. I, lect. 42). Even if an observer stood upon the moon witnessing the earth’s shadow or perceived by sight that a singular triangle’s angles equal two right angles, he would still lack scientia until demonstration revealed the universal per se cause. Yet in Book II, Lecture 20, Aquinas shows that these universal principles are neither innate Platonic reminiscences nor arbitrary formalist conventions: from repeated sensations retained in memory, human collative reason forms experience (experimentum), from which the agent intellect abstracts the universal resting in the soul and awakens understanding (intellectus)—the infallible habit of principles that anchors all demonstrative science.
Key Scholastic & Mathematical Concepts¶
Latin Term |
English Rendering |
Primary Locus |
Doctrinal & Geometric Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
Certissimus modus demonstrationis |
Most certain mode of demonstration |
|
Designates the epistemic primacy of the mathematical sciences among human disciplines: because mathematics abstracts from sensible matter and argues strictly through formal principles, its premises are simultaneously better known to us and prior in nature. |
Praecognitio (quia est / quid est) |
Foreknowledge (that it is / what it is) |
|
Establishes the asymmetric prerequisites of demonstration: principles require foreknowledge that they are true, proper attributes require foreknowledge solely of what their names signify, and primary subjects (such as the unit or magnitude) require foreknowledge of both what they are and that they exist. |
Demonstratio quasi operativa |
Quasi-operative demonstration |
|
Aquinas’s technical characterization of Euclidean constructive propositions (such as Elements I.1 and I.46), which demonstrate the mathematical existence (quia est) of composite figures like the equilateral triangle and square from presupposed lines and circles before proving further attributes of them. |
Dignitates / Communes animi conceptiones |
Axioms / Common conceptions of the mind |
|
First indemonstrable propositions whose terms (such as being, whole, part, and equal) are grasped by all minds; they are evident to inward reason without external syllogism and are employed in geometry and arithmetic proportionally to their respective subject-genera. |
Suppositiones |
Hypotheses / Suppositions |
|
Propositional principles asserting to be or not to be that are assumed without proof within a particular science (though provable by a higher science such as metaphysics or natural philosophy) and are readily assented to as probable by the learner. |
Petitiones |
Postulates |
|
Assumed propositional or constructive principles—exemplified by Euclid’s postulate to draw a straight line from any point to any point—which the demonstrator asks the learner to grant when the learner holds neither prior assent nor contrary opinion. |
Genus subiectum |
Subject-genus |
|
The unified ontological domain of a science—discrete number for arithmetic, continuous magnitude for geometry—whose essential principles ground propter quid demonstrations and forbid illicit kind-crossing (metabasis) from alien genera. |
Passiones (per se accidentia) |
Proper attributes |
|
Properties that flow per se and necessarily from the essence of the subject-genus (such as evenness and oddness in numbers, or commensurability, curvature, and angle-sum equality in magnitudes), defined with essential reference to their subject. |
Lineae in pulvere descriptae |
Lines drawn in the dust |
|
Refutes the empiricist and skeptical charge that geometry rests on false premises because drawn diagrams are neither perfectly straight nor exactly a foot long: sensible figures serve solely as phantasmatic exemplars, not as the logical premises or subjects of geometric proof. |
Unitas sine positione / Punctus habens positionem |
Unit without position / Point having position |
|
Captures the Aristotelian criterion of relative scientific priority by addition (ex additione): whereas the arithmetical unit is indivisible quantity without spatial site, the geometrical point adds determinate position in the continuum, ordering the a priori necessity of the mathematical disciplines. |
Experimentum |
Experience |
|
The collative synthesis of multiple singular memories by human particular reason, forming the indispensable cognitive bridge between transient sensation and the agent intellect’s abstraction of the universal resting in the soul. |
Intellectus (habitus principiorum) |
Understanding (habit of principles) |
|
The supreme, unerring intellectual habit—distinct from discursive scientia—whereby the human mind, illuminated by the agent intellect upon the data of sense and experience, immediately apprehends first indemonstrable principles. |
Table of Contents¶
On the Necessity of Logic and the Most Certain Mode of Demonstration in the Mathematical Sciences
[lib. 1 l. 1 n. 1] As Aristotle says at the beginning of the Metaphysics, the human race lives by art and reasonings: in saying which the Philosopher seems to touch upon a certain property of man whereby he differs from the other animals. For other animals are impelled to their acts by a certain natural instinct, whereas man is directed in his actions by the judgment of reason. And hence it is that various arts serve to bring human acts to completion easily and in an orderly manner. For art seems to be nothing other than a certain ordering of reason as to how human acts may arrive at their due end through determinate means. Now reason is not only able to direct the acts of the lower powers, but is also directive of its own act. For this is proper to the intellective part, that it reflect upon itself: for the intellect understands itself, and similarly reason can reason about its own act. If, therefore, from the fact that reason reasons about the act of the hand there was devised the art of building or of carpentry, through which man can exercise acts of this kind easily and in an orderly manner, by the same reason a certain art is necessary that is directive of the very act of reason itself, through which, namely, man may proceed in the very act of reason in an orderly manner, easily, and without error.
On the Twofold Foreknowledge (That It Is and What It Is) of Subject and Attribute: Unit and Triangle
[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown that all learning comes about from pre-existing knowledge, he now shows what the mode of foreknowledge is. And concerning this he does two things: first, he determines the mode of foreknowledge with respect to those things that must be foreknown in order to obtain knowledge of the conclusion whose scientific knowledge is sought; second, he determines the mode of foreknowledge of the conclusion itself whose scientific knowledge is sought through demonstration, at Before one is led by induction, et cetera. Now in foreknowledge two things are included, namely, knowledge and the order of knowledge. First, therefore, he determines the mode of foreknowledge with respect to the knowledge itself; second, with respect to the order of knowledge, at Now it is possible to know, et cetera.
On Universal Knowledge and Recognizing the Singular Triangle Inscribed in a Semicircle
[lib. 1 l. 3 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown how certain other things must be foreknown before knowledge of the conclusion is acquired, he now wishes to show how it happens that the conclusion itself is foreknown before knowledge of it is acquired through syllogism or induction. And concerning this he does two things. First, he determines the truth of the matter, saying that before induction or syllogism is introduced to produce knowledge of some conclusion, that conclusion is in a certain manner known, and in a certain manner not known: for unqualifiedly it is unknown, yet it is known only in a qualified sense. For instance, if this conclusion is to be proved, A triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, before it was demonstrated, he who receives scientific knowledge of it through demonstration did not know it unqualifiedly, yet knew it in a qualified sense. Hence in a certain manner he foreknew it, though not unqualifiedly. Now the reason for this is that, as has already been shown, the principles must be foreknown prior to the conclusion. And principles stand to conclusions in demonstrative matters just as active causes in natural things stand to their effects (whence in Book II of the Physics the propositions of a syllogism are placed in the genus of efficient cause). Now before an effect is produced in act, it pre-exists in its active causes virtually, though not in act, which is to exist unqualifiedly. And similarly, before a conclusion is deduced from demonstrative principles, in those very foreknown principles the conclusion is foreknown virtually, though not in act: for in this way it pre-exists in them. And thus it is clear that it is not foreknown unqualifiedly, but in a qualified sense.
What Unqualified Scientific Knowledge Is and How Demonstration Proceeds from Primary, True, Immediate Causes
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown the necessity of the demonstrative syllogism, here he now begins to determine the nature of the demonstrative syllogism itself. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the nature of the demonstrative syllogism; in the second, he treats of the middle term from which the demonstrative syllogism proceeds, and this in the second book, at The things we seek are equal in number, et cetera. The first part is divided into two: in the first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism absolutely; in the second, by comparing one demonstration to another, at Since demonstration is in one case universal, et cetera. The first is again divided into two: in the first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism; in the second, he shows that in demonstrations one does not proceed to infinity, at Now every syllogism is through three terms, et cetera. The first is divided into two: in the first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism through which we acquire scientific knowledge; in the second, he shows how a certain ignorance is also acquired in us through syllogism, at Now ignorance not according to negation, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism by showing what it is; second, he treats of the matter of the demonstrative syllogism by showing what and of what sort the premises are from which it is formed, at Since it is impossible, et cetera; third, he treats of its form by showing in which figure it is chiefly constructed, at Of the figures, the most scientific, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows concerning the demonstrative syllogism what it is; second, he explains certain things that are placed in the definition of the demonstrative syllogism, at Now a principle of demonstration is, et cetera; third, he excludes certain errors concerning demonstration that might arise from what has been set down, at Now to some indeed, et cetera.
On the Division of Immediate Principles into Axioms, Hypotheses, and Postulates
[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 1] Because the Philosopher had said above that demonstration proceeds from primary and immediate things, and these had not yet been explained by him, he therefore intends to make them clear. And this part is divided into three sections: in the first, he shows what an immediate proposition is; in the second, he shows that propositions of this sort must be better known than the conclusion, at Since one must believe and know, et cetera; in the third, he excludes certain errors that took occasion from what had been said, at Now to some indeed, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what an immediate proposition is; second, he divides it, at Of an immediate principle, et cetera. Concerning the first he proceeds as follows. First, he resumes what had been said above, namely, that a principle of demonstration is an immediate proposition: for he had also said above that demonstration proceeds from primary and immediate premises.
Against Those Who Deny Demonstration or Posit Circular Demonstration
[lib. 1 l. 6 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown what the immediate principles are, here he determines the nature of our knowledge of them. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that the immediate principles are better known than the conclusion; second, he shows that the falsity of their contraries must also be most certain, at Moreover, not only, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things.
That No Particular Science Demonstrates Its Own Proper Principles, Which Belong to First Philosophy
[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 1] Above, the Philosopher had shown that demonstration does not proceed from extraneous principles; here, however, he shows that it does not proceed from common principles alone. And concerning this he does two things: first, he proves his proposition; second, he draws a certain conclusion from what has been said, at Now if this is manifest, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he states his intention, saying that because it is manifest that it is impossible to demonstrate each thing through anything whatsoever, rather demonstration must proceed from the principles of each thing in such a way that what is demonstrated belongs to it insofar as it is that thing—that is, the principles of demonstration must belong per se to that which is demonstrated; if, I say, this is so, then in order for something to be scientifically known it does not suffice that it be demonstrated from true and immediate premises, but it must furthermore be demonstrated from proper principles.
On the Three Elements Required in Every Demonstrative Science: Subject-Genus, Proper Attributes, and Common Axioms
[lib. 1 l. 18 n. 1] After he has shown that demonstration proceeds not from common principles alone, but from proper principles, here, in order to make clear what has preceded, he determines the nature of proper and common principles. And concerning this he does two things. First, he shows the necessity of this determination, saying that it is difficult to recognize whether we know from proper principles (which alone is truly to know scientifically) or not from proper principles. For many suppose themselves to know scientifically whenever they possess a syllogism drawn from certain premises that are true and primary. Yet this is not true; rather, in order for us to know scientifically, the principles must be proximate to the things that are to be demonstrated (which are here called primary, just as above they were called extremes), or else proximate to the first indemonstrable principles.
On Common Conceptions of the Mind, Hypotheses, Postulates, and Why the Geometer Does Not Demonstrate of Lines Drawn in Dust
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 1] After Aristotle has divided common principles from proper principles, here he distinguishes common principles from one another. And this is divided into three parts: in the first, he sets down the distinction of common principles from one another; in the second, he shows the difference between a definition and a certain kind of common principles, at Terms, therefore, are not, et cetera; in the third, he excludes a certain error, at For Forms to exist, therefore, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he distinguishes common conceptions of the mind from postulates or hypotheses; second, he distinguishes postulates and hypotheses from one another, at Whatever things, therefore, et cetera.
How One Science Is More Certain and Prior to Another: The Unit Without Position and the Point Having Position
[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 1] After the Philosopher has assigned the reason for the unity and diversity of the sciences on the part of the subject-genus and on the part of the principles, here he pursues both further: and first, concerning the subjects of which scientific knowledge is had; second, concerning the principles, at Now whether the principles are the same, et cetera. Concerning the first, it must be considered that above he had laid down two conditions for the genus that serves as the subject of a science: one of which is that it be composed of primary elements, and the other is that its parts and proper attributes belong to it per se. Now one of these conditions is lacking in things that happen by fortune, because they do not come about per se, but per accidens and beside intention, as is proved in Book II of the Physics. The other condition is lacking in the things known through sense, even though they come first in our cognition. And therefore, first, he shows that there is no scientific knowledge of things that happen by fortune; second, he shows that there is no scientific knowledge of things insofar as they are known through sense, at Nor is it possible to know scientifically through sense, et cetera.
On the Origin of the Habit of First Principles (Intellectus) from Sense, Memory, and Experience
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown how that which serves as the principle of demonstration as its middle term—namely, what a thing is and the reason why—becomes known, here he shows how the first common principles of demonstration become known. And first, he states what his intention concerns; second, he carries out what is proposed, at That indeed, therefore, it is impossible, et cetera. First, therefore, he says that from what follows it will become manifest, concerning the first indemonstrable principles, how the knowledge of them comes about in us and by what habit they are known—observing this order, however, that we first raise the difficulties surrounding this matter.