Posts tagged 'summa_theologiae'

Summa Theologiae I, q. 7, a. 1 & a. 3; q. 12, ST I, q. 7, a. 1 & 3; q. 12, a. 4 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

Being Itself as Most Formal of All; the Geometer’s Infinite Line; Apprehending Absolute Being

[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the first article. It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, since it has the character of part and of matter, as is said in Book III of the Physics. But God is most perfect. Therefore He is not infinite.

Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6–7 & q. 85, a. ST I, q. 84, a. 6–7; q. 85, a. 1 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On the Origin of Science from Sensible Things, Turning to Phantasms, and Threefold Abstraction

[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the sixth article. It seems that intellectual knowledge is not received from sensible things. For Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that the pureness of truth is not to be expected from the senses of the body. And he proves this in two ways. In one way, from the fact that everything that bodily sense reaches is changed without any intermission of time, and what does not abide cannot be perceived. In another way, from the fact that all things that we sense through the body, even when they are not present to the senses, nevertheless leave us subject to their images, as in sleep or frenzy; yet by the senses we are unable to discern whether we are sensing the sensible objects themselves or their false images. Now nothing can be perceived that is not discerned from the false. And thus he concludes that truth is not to be expected from the senses. Now intellectual knowledge is apprehensive of truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not to be expected from the senses.

Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 7, De Pot. q. 7, a. 2 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

That Esse Is the Actuality of All Acts and the Perfection of All Perfections

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1] For Damascene says in Book I of On the Orthodox Faith: That God is, indeed, is manifest to us; yet what He is according to substance and nature is altogether incomprehensible and unknown. Now one and the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore the being of God and His substance or essence are not the same.

Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 10, a. 6 — Wh De Ver. q. 10, a. 6 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

Whether the Human Mind Receives Knowledge from Sensible Things and on First Indemonstrable Principles

[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1] For between things that do not share in matter there can be neither action nor passion, as is clear through Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and through the Philosopher in the book On Generation and Corruption. Now our mind does not share in matter with sensible things. Therefore sensible things cannot act upon our mind so that any knowledge from them should be impressed upon our mind.