Posts tagged 'metaphysica'

Metaphysics Book V, Lecture 9 — On the Divisi Metaph. V, lect. 9 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On the Division of Per Se Being into Ten Categories and Being Signified by Propositional Judgment

[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 1 · Marietti #885] Here the Philosopher distinguishes in how many ways being is spoken of. And concerning this he does three things. First, he divides being into being per se and being per accidens. Second, he distinguishes the modes of being per accidens, where he says, According to accident indeed, and so forth. Third, the modes of being per se, where he says, According to itself, however. He says, therefore, that one kind of being is spoken of according to itself, and another according to accident. Yet it must be known that this division of being is not the same as that division whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he afterward divides being according to itself into the ten categories, nine of which belong to the genus of accident. Being, therefore, is divided into substance and accident according to the absolute consideration of being, just as whiteness itself considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But being according to accident, as it is taken here, must be grasped by comparing the accident to the substance. And this comparison is signified by the verb is, when it is said, “a man is white.” Hence this whole, “a man is white,” is a being per accidens. Thus it is clear that the division of being according to itself and according to accident is taken according as something is predicated of something either per se or per accidens. The division of being into substance and accident, however, is taken according to the fact that something in its own nature is either a substance or an accident.

Metaphysics Book VII, Lecture 10 — On Parts o Metaph. VII, lect. 10 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Parts of the Form vs. Parts of Matter: Bronze Circle and Mathematical Circle in Intelligible Matter

[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 1 · Marietti #1482] Because the solution set forth above was not in every respect manifest—for he had not yet shown how parts are prior and posterior, nor again had he distinguished the universal composite from the particular, nor even the species from the form—he therefore here explains in detail the solution set forth above. Now this text is divided into two parts. In the first, he explains the solution set forth above; in the second, he teaches how it is to be applied to the question, where he says, One must meet the interrogation, however. The first is divided into two. First, he solves the question with respect to what was asked concerning the priority of parts; second, with respect to what was asked concerning whether the parts of the thing defined enter into the definition, where he says, But the parts of the formula. The first is divided into two. First, he shows how parts are prior to the whole; second, he makes this manifest by an example, where he says, Since, however. First, therefore, he says that what was stated above in the proposed solution is indeed true in itself, yet must be repeated so that what was said may become more manifest. For it is necessary that the parts of the formula, and those into which the formula is divided, be prior to the thing defined—either all of them or some of them. And this is said because parts of the form sometimes belong not to the necessity of the species, but to its perfection; just as sight and hearing, which are parts of the sensitive soul, do not belong to the integrity or necessity of an animal, for there can be an animal without these senses, yet they belong to the perfection of an animal, because a perfect animal possesses these senses as well. And thus it is universally true that those parts which are placed in the definition of anything are universally prior to it.

Metaphysics Book VII, Lecture 11 — How Mathem Metaph. VII, lect. 11 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

How Mathematical Species Are Defined Without Sensible Matter Yet Not Without Common Intelligible Matter

[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 1 · Marietti #1501] In this part he resolves a certain doubt that could arise from the solution of the preceding question. For in solving the preceding question he had distinguished between the parts of the species and the parts of the individual, which is composed of the species and of matter; and therefore he here inquires which are parts of the species and which are not. This part, accordingly, is divided into three parts. In the first, he resolves this doubt. In the second, he shows what remains to be said, where he says, Whether, however, apart from the matter. Third, he recapitulates the things that have been said, where he says, What indeed, therefore, the what-it-was-to-be is. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he raises the doubt. Second, he solves it, where he says, Whatever things indeed, therefore, and so forth. Third, in manifesting the solution he summarizes it, where he says, Now it is plain, and so forth. First, therefore, he says that since it has been stated that the parts of the species are placed in definitions, whereas the parts of the composite of species and matter are not, it is rightly doubted which are parts of the species and which are not parts of the species, but of the composite taken together, that is, of the individual, in which the nature of the species is taken together with the individuating matter itself.

Metaphysics Book IX, Lecture 3 — How the Name Metaph. IX, lect. 3 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

How the Name and Notion of Actuality Are Derived First from Sensible Motion

[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 1 · Marietti #1795] After the Philosopher has above compared potencies with one another, he here begins to show how potency and act stand in relation to the same subject; and this text is divided into two parts. In the first, he excludes the false opinions of certain thinkers; in the second, he determines the truth, where he says, Now for all potencies. The first part is divided into two. In the first, he excludes the opinion of those who say that nothing is possible except when it exists in act; in the second, he excludes the opinion of those who say conversely that all things are possible even if they do not exist in act, where he says, If, however, what has been said is the possible. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he excludes the aforesaid erroneous position; second, he shows what it is to be possible and what it is to be in act, where he says, Now that is possible. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he sets forth the opinion. Second, he refutes it, where he says, For whom the consequences, and so forth. Third, he concludes his intended thesis, where he says, If, therefore, it is not possible. First, therefore, he says that certain thinkers maintained that something is in potency only when it is in act—for example, that one who is not actually building is not able to build, and is able to build only when he is actually building; and they say the same of other things. And the reason for this position seems to be that they supposed all things to happen of necessity according to a certain combination of causes; and thus, if all things come to pass of necessity, it follows that those things which do not come to pass are not possible to be.

A B / C C' D E (Parallela) Divisio in Actu: Statim Manifestum Est Videnti (Euclides I.32) Metaph. IX, lect. 10 · Inventio Veritatis Geometricae Dividendo

On Discovering Geometric Truth by Dividing Figures in Act (Euclid I.32 and III.31)

[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 1 · Marietti #1883] After the Philosopher has compared act and potency with respect to the prior and the posterior, he here compares them with respect to good and evil; and concerning this he does two things. First, he says that in good things, act is better than potency. And this is manifest from the fact that what is in potency is the selfsame thing existing in potency to contraries: just as that which is able to recover health is able to fall sick, and is simultaneously in potency to both. And this is because there is the selfsame potency for both—for recovering health and for ailing, for resting and for moving, and for other opposites of this sort. And thus it is clear that something is simultaneously capable of contraries, even though contraries cannot exist simultaneously in act. Taken separately, therefore, of the two contraries the one is good, such as the healthy, while the other is evil, such as the sick; for among contraries one always stands as deficient, which pertains to evil.