Book I, Lecture 42 — How One Science Is More Certain and Prior to Another: The Unit Without Position and the Point Having Position

Liber I, Lectio 42 — Quomodo una scientia sit certior et prior alia: unitas sine positione et punctus habens positionem

How One Science Is More Certain and Prior to Another: The Unit Without Position and the Point Having Position

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 1] After the Philosopher has assigned the reason for the unity and diversity of the sciences on the part of the subject-genus and on the part of the principles, here he pursues both further: and first, concerning the subjects of which scientific knowledge is had; second, concerning the principles, at Now whether the principles are the same, et cetera. Concerning the first, it must be considered that above he had laid down two conditions for the genus that serves as the subject of a science: one of which is that it be composed of primary elements, and the other is that its parts and proper attributes belong to it per se. Now one of these conditions is lacking in things that happen by fortune, because they do not come about per se, but per accidens and beside intention, as is proved in Book II of the Physics. The other condition is lacking in the things known through sense, even though they come first in our cognition. And therefore, first, he shows that there is no scientific knowledge of things that happen by fortune; second, he shows that there is no scientific knowledge of things insofar as they are known through sense, at Nor is it possible to know scientifically through sense, et cetera.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 2] First, therefore, he says that demonstrative science cannot be concerned with what happens by fortune, which comes about per accidens. And he proves this as follows. Every demonstrative syllogism proceeds either from necessary propositions or from propositions that are true for the most part. Now from necessary propositions a necessary conclusion follows, as was proved above; and similarly from propositions that are true for the most part there follows a conclusion that is true for the most part—or perhaps even necessary, insofar as what is necessary can follow from what is contingent just as what is true can follow from what is false. Never, however, from propositions that are true for the most part does there follow a proposition that is true only in the minority of cases, because otherwise it would follow that at times the premises would be true and the conclusion false, which is impossible, as was shown above. It is necessary, therefore, that the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism be either necessary or true for the most part. Yet what happens by fortune is neither necessary nor for the most part, but comes to pass in the minority of cases, as is proved in Book II of the Physics. Therefore demonstrative science cannot be concerned with what happens by fortune.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 3] Now it must be considered that there can indeed be demonstration concerning things that happen for the most part, insofar as there is something of necessity in them. Yet the necessary, as is said in Book II of the Physics, exists differently in natural things, which are true for the most part and fail in a minority of cases, and in the disciplines, that is, in mathematical matters, which are always true. For in the mathematical disciplines necessity is a priori; whereas in natural things it is a posteriori (from what is nevertheless prior according to nature), namely, from the end and the form. Hence Aristotle there teaches that one should show the reason why (propter quid) thus: if this is to come to be—for example, that an olive tree be generated—it is necessary that this pre-exist, namely, olive seed; yet from olive seed an olive tree is not generated of necessity, because generation can be hindered through some corruption. Consequently, if a demonstration is framed from what is prior in the order of generation, it will not conclude of necessity—unless perhaps we take this very truth as necessary, that olive seed is generative of an olive tree for the most part, because it accomplishes this in accordance with the property of its nature unless it is impeded.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 4] Next, when he says, Nor through sense, et cetera, he shows that scientific knowledge is not of things insofar as they are known according to sense. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that scientific knowledge does not consist in sense; second, he shows how sense is ordered to scientific knowledge, at Nevertheless certain omissions are reduced, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that scientific knowledge is not through sense; second, he sets scientific knowledge above sense, at Now the universal is precious, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he establishes the truth; second, he excludes the error of certain thinkers, at Yet it is manifest, et cetera.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 5] First, therefore, he says that just as there is no scientific knowledge of things that happen by fortune, so too scientific knowledge does not consist in the cognition that takes place through sense. And he proves this as follows. It is manifest that sense knows something of such a quality, and not this [substance]: for the per se object of sense is not substance and the what-it-is, but some sensible quality, such as hot, cold, white, black, and other things of this sort. Now qualities of this sort affect certain singular substances existing in a determinate place and time; hence it is necessary that what is sensed be a this-something, namely, a singular substance, and exist somewhere and now, that is, in a determinate place and time. From this it is clear that what is universal cannot fall under sense: for what is universal is not restricted to here and now, since otherwise it would no longer be universal; for we call that universal which is always and everywhere.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 6] Now this must not be understood by way of affirmation, as though it belonged to the essence (ratio) of the universal, or of that which is universal, to exist positively always and everywhere. For if it belonged to the essence of that nature which is universal—say, to the essence of man or animal—to exist always and everywhere, then every singular man or animal would have to exist always and everywhere, because the essence of man and of animal is found in every one of the singulars. And if it belonged to the very notion of universality itself, in the way that it belongs to the notion of a genus to contain species under itself, it would follow that nothing would be universal that was not actually found always and everywhere; and according to this, olive tree would not be a universal, because it cannot be found in every land. Rather, this must be understood by way of negation or abstraction, namely, in that the universal abstracts from every determinate time and place. Hence, so far as lies in itself, just as it is found in any given instance at one place or time, so it is suited by nature to be found in all. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the universal does not fall under sense. Since demonstrations, therefore, are chiefly universal, as was shown above, it is manifest that scientific knowledge acquired through demonstration does not consist in the cognition of sense.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 7] Next, when he says, Yet it is manifest that even if, et cetera, he excludes the error of certain thinkers who believed that scientific knowledge consists in the very perception of sense itself—and this argument appears to be directed against those who held that the intellect does not differ from sense, and consequently that there is no cognition other than sensitive cognition, as is recounted in Book III of De Anima and in Book IV of the Metaphysics. To exclude this, he says that even if we could perceive by sense that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, we would still need to seek a demonstration in order to possess scientific knowledge, nor would we scientifically know it through the perception of the senses: because sense is of singulars, whereas scientific knowledge consists in our knowing the universal, as has been shown. And because he had given an example of something that cannot in fact be perceived by sense, for greater clarity he sets down a further example drawn from things that are sensible, namely, an eclipse of the moon, which comes about from the opposition of the earth interposed between the sun and the moon so that the brightness of the sun cannot reach the moon on account of the earth’s shadow, upon entering which the moon is eclipsed. Suppose, therefore, that someone were standing upon the moon itself, and perceived by sense the interposition of the earth through its shadow: he would indeed perceive by sense that the moon was at that moment losing its light because of the earth’s shadow, yet he would not on that account wholly know the cause of the eclipse. For the per se cause of an eclipse is that which causes the eclipse universally. Now the universal is not known by sense; rather, from several singulars that have been seen, in which, after being considered many times, the same thing is found to occur, we receive universal knowledge. And thus through the universal cause we demonstrate something universally, of which there is scientific knowledge.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 8] Next, when he says, Now the universal is more precious, et cetera, he shows that scientific knowledge excels sense. For it is manifest that knowledge through a cause is nobler; now a per se cause is a universal cause, as has just been said, and therefore knowledge through a universal cause, such as scientific knowledge is, is precious. And because it is impossible to apprehend such a universal cause through sense, it follows that scientific knowledge, which manifests the universal cause, is more precious not only than all sensitive cognition, but also than every other intellective cognition—provided it concerns things that have a cause—because to know something scientifically through its universal cause is nobler than to apprehend in any other manner whatever has a cause without knowing its cause. Concerning primary truths, however, which do not have a cause, the case is different: for they are understood through themselves, and such knowledge of them (intelligentia) is more certain than all scientific knowledge, because it is from such understanding that scientific knowledge derives its certitude.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 9] Finally, he concludes his principal proposition, namely, that it is impossible to know anything demonstrable scientifically through sense—unless perhaps someone should use the name sense equivocally, calling demonstrative science sense because demonstrative science is determinately of one thing with certitude, just as sense is; on account of which certain estimations are also sometimes called sciences.

[lib. 1 l. 42 n. 10] Next, when he says, Nevertheless certain omissions in problems are reduced, et cetera, he shows how sense is ordered to scientific knowledge. For certain problematic doubts are traced back, as to their cause, to a failing of sense. For there are certain things about which we would no longer inquire in doubt if we had seen them—not indeed because scientific knowledge consists in seeing, but insofar as from the things seen we grasp, by way of experience (experimentum), the universal with which scientific knowledge is concerned. For instance, if we saw glass perforated throughout, and saw how light passes through the perforations of the glass, we would know the reason why glass is transparent. Here he employs this example in accordance with the opinion of those who held that light is a body and that certain bodies are transparent on account of minute passages called pores, which we cannot discern by sight owing to their smallness, and so we wonder why glass is transparent; and a similar example could be given for any things whatsoever that have a hidden sensible cause. And because he had said that scientific knowledge of such a thing does not consist in the act of seeing itself, he makes clear that this is true: for in seeing we cognize each of the singulars separately, whereas in knowing scientifically we must understand all of them together in the universal, namely, by understanding that the matter stands thus in every instance. For we see one by one in diverse pieces of glass, whereas we acquire scientific knowledge concerning all glass, that it is such.