Summary — Against Those Who Deny Demonstration or Posit Circular Demonstration

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of Lib. I, lect. 6

Argument Summary

In Lecture 6, Aquinas establishes the epistemic asymmetry that renders both infinite regress and circular demonstration impossible (which Aristotle explicitly refutes immediately thereafter on this very basis): the immediate principles of a demonstration must be not merely foreknown, but more known and more firmly believed than the demonstrated conclusion. Explaining Aristotle’s qualification either all or some, Aquinas notes that proximate geometric premises—such as Euclid I.16, that the exterior angle of a triangle equals the two opposite interior angles—are initially just as unknown as the conclusion (Euclid I.32) until resolved back into immediate principles, whereas first principles are immediately better known upon being proposed.

Aquinas expounds Aristotle’s two proofs of this epistemic superiority. First, by direct causal proportionality (propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis): because we know and believe conclusions on account of principles, just as fire is hotter than what it heats (or the sun possesses a worthier causal power than terrestrial heat), we must know and believe the principles more than the conclusion. Second, by reduction to impossibility: if principles were not better known than a conclusion not yet known, the knower—or even one better disposed than a scientific knower, namely one possessing understanding (intellectus) of principles—would believe the unknown equally with or more than the known. Moreover, scientific certitude demands unshakeable adherence (incredibilem non esse), requiring that nothing be more certain to the demonstrator than the falsity of the principles’ opposites.

Key Theses

  • Immediate principles must be known better and believed more firmly than any conclusion demonstrated through them, precluding circular proof.

  • Proximate theorems (such as the exterior-angle property of a triangle) require prior proof, whereas primary axioms are immediately better known as soon as their terms are grasped.

  • By the causal principle that on account of which each thing is such is itself more so, cognitive certitude belongs pre-eminently to first principles and derivatively to conclusions.

  • Unshakeable scientific certitude requires absolute conviction that the opposites of first principles are false, excluding all fear of the contrary.