Question VI, Article 2 — Whether in Divine Things Imagination Must Be Altogether Relinquished (Why Mathematical Judgment Terminates at the Imagination)¶
Quaestio VI, Articulus 2 — Utrum in divinis sit omnino imaginatio relinquenda (Quod Iudicium Mathematicum Terminatur ad Imaginationem)
f. q. 6, a. 2[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the second article. It seems that in divine things one must be led to imaginations. For divine science is never handed down more fittingly than in Sacred Scripture. Yet in Sacred Scripture, when treating of divine things, we are led to imaginations, inasmuch as divine things are described to us under sensible figures. Therefore in divine things one must be led to imaginations.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2] Furthermore, divine things are grasped solely by the intellect, whence one must also proceed intellectually in them, as has been said. Yet there is no understanding without a phantasm, as the Philosopher says in Books I and III of On the Soul. Therefore in divine things one must be led to imaginations.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3] Furthermore, divine things become known to us above all through the illumination of the divine ray. Yet as Dionysius says in Chapter 1 of The Celestial Hierarchy, it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us otherwise than enveloped in a variety of sacred veils; and he calls images of sensible things “sacred veils.” Therefore in divine things one must be led to imaginations.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 4] Furthermore, in dealing with sensible things one must proceed imaginatively. Now we receive our knowledge of divine things from sensible effects, according to Romans 1: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made. Therefore in divine things one must be led to imaginations.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 5] Furthermore, in cognitive matters we are regulated above all by that which is the principle of cognition, just as in natural things we are regulated by sense, from which our cognition begins. Now the principle of intellectual cognition in us is the imagination, since phantasms stand to our intellect in the same way that colors stand to sight, as is said in Book III of On the Soul. Therefore in divine things one must be led to the imagination.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 6] Furthermore, since the intellect makes no use of a bodily organ, the action of the intellect is not impeded by an injury to a bodily organ except insofar as it turns toward the imagination. Yet through an injury to a bodily organ, namely the brain, the intellect is impeded in the consideration of divine things. Therefore the intellect, in considering divine things, is led to the imagination.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 s. c. 1] On the contrary is what Dionysius says in Chapter 1 of Mystical Theology, speaking to Timothy: Do thou, O friend Timothy, in regard to mystical visions, abandon the senses. Now the imagination treats solely of sensible things, since it is a motion produced by sense in act, as is said in Book II of On the Soul. Since, therefore, considerations of divine things are supremely mystical, in them we ought not to be led to imaginations.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 s. c. 2] Furthermore, in the consideration of every science one must avoid that which produces error within it. Yet as Augustine says in Book I of On the Trinity, the primary error concerning divine things belongs to those who endeavor to transfer what they know of corporeal things to divine things. Since, therefore, the imagination treats solely of corporeal things, it seems that in divine things we ought not to be led to imaginations.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 s. c. 3] Furthermore, a lower power does not extend to what is proper to a higher power, as is evident through Boethius in Book V of The Consolation of Philosophy. Now to know divine and spiritual things pertains to intellect and intelligence, as is said in the book On Spirit and Soul. Since, therefore, as is said in the same place, the imagination ranks below intelligence and intellect, it seems that in divine and spiritual things we ought not to be led to the imagination.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 co. 1] I answer that in every cognition two things must be considered, namely its beginning and its term. The beginning pertains indeed to apprehension, whereas the term pertains to judgment, for it is there that cognition is brought to completion. Now the beginning of all our cognition lies in sense, because from the apprehension of sense arises the apprehension of fantasy, which is a motion produced by sense, as the Philosopher says, and from this in turn arises intellective apprehension in us, since phantasms stand to the intellective soul as objects, as is evident in Book III of On the Soul.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 co. 2] Yet the term of cognition is not always uniform: for sometimes it is in sense, sometimes in the imagination, and sometimes in the intellect alone. For sometimes the properties and accidents of a thing that are manifested by sense sufficiently express the nature of the thing, and then the judgment that the intellect makes concerning the nature of the thing must conform to those things that sense manifests concerning the thing. And of this sort are all natural things, which are determined to sensible matter; and therefore in natural science cognition must terminate at sense, namely so that we judge of natural things in the way sense manifests them, as is evident in Book III of On the Heavens; and whoever neglects sense in natural things falls into error. And these are natural things, which are concrete with sensible matter and motion both according to being and according to consideration.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 co. 3] There are other things, however, the judgment of which does not depend upon what is perceived by sense, because although according to being they exist in sensible matter, nevertheless according to their definitive notion they are abstracted from sensible matter. Now the judgment concerning each thing is made above all according to its definitive notion. Yet because according to their definitive notion they do not abstract from every kind of matter, but solely from sensible matter, and once sensible conditions have been removed there remains something imaginable, in such things judgment must be taken according to what the imagination manifests. Now of this sort are mathematical objects. And therefore in mathematical inquiries cognition according to judgment must terminate at the imagination, not at sense, because mathematical judgment surpasses the apprehension of sense. Hence the judgment concerning a mathematical line is sometimes not the same as that concerning a sensible line—for instance, in the truth that a straight line touches a sphere at a single point alone, which belongs to a separate straight line, though not to a straight line in matter, as is said in Book I of On the Soul.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 co. 4] Still other things exceed both what falls under sense and what falls under the imagination, such as those that are altogether independent of matter both according to being and according to consideration; and therefore the cognition of such things according to judgment ought to terminate neither at the imagination nor at sense. Nevertheless, from the things apprehended by sense or imagination we arrive at the knowledge of these realities: either by way of causality, as a cause is gauged from its effect—not as commensurate with the effect, but as surpassing it; or by way of transcendence; or by way of negation, when we separate from realities of this sort everything that sense or imagination apprehends; and Dionysius sets down these modes of knowing divine things from sensible ones in the book On the Divine Names. In divine inquiries, therefore, we can make use of both sense and imagination as beginnings of our consideration, yet not as terms—namely so that we would judge divine things to be such as the things apprehended by sense or imagination are. Now to be led to something is to terminate at it. Consequently, in divine things we ought to be led neither to the imagination nor to sense; in mathematical things, however, to the imagination and not to sense; while in natural things, even to sense. And on account of this, those err who strive to proceed uniformly in these three parts of speculative science.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that Sacred Scripture does not set divine things before us under sensible figures so that our intellect may remain there, but so that from them it may ascend to immaterial realities; hence it even hands down divine truths through figures of lowly things, so as to afford less occasion for remaining in such figures, as Dionysius says in Chapter 2 of The Celestial Hierarchy.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 ad 2] To the second it must be said that in the present state of life the operation of our intellect is never without a phantasm with respect to the beginning of cognition; yet it is not necessary that our cognition always terminate at phantasms—namely so that we would judge what we understand to be such as what fantasy apprehends.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 ad 3] To the third it must be said that that authority of Dionysius speaks with respect to the beginning of cognition, and not with respect to its term.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that that argument holds when the principle of cognition leads sufficiently to that of which knowledge is sought; and sense is such a principle in natural things, though not in divine things, as has been said.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 ad 6] To the sixth it must be said that the phantasm is the principle of our cognition, as that from which the operation of the intellect begins—not as something passing away, but as something permanent, like a certain foundation of intellectual operation, just as the principles of demonstration must remain throughout every process of science—since phantasms stand to the intellect as objects in which it inspects whatever it inspects, either through a perfect representation or through negation. Consequently, when the cognition of phantasms is impeded, the cognition of the intellect must be wholly impeded even in divine matters. For clearly we cannot understand that God is the cause of bodies, or transcends all bodies, or is without corporeity, unless we imagine bodies; yet our judgment of divine things is not formed according to the imagination. And therefore, although the imagination is necessary in every consideration of divine things during the present state of life, one must nevertheless never be led to terminate at it in divine matters.