Book I, Lecture 4 — What Unqualified Scientific Knowledge Is and How Demonstration Proceeds from Primary, True, Immediate Causes¶
Liber I, Lectio 4 — Quid sit scire simpliciter et quomodo demonstratio ex primis, veris et immediatis procedat
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown the necessity of the demonstrative syllogism, here he now begins to determine the nature of the demonstrative syllogism itself. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the nature of the demonstrative syllogism; in the second, he treats of the middle term from which the demonstrative syllogism proceeds, and this in the second book, at The things we seek are equal in number, et cetera. The first part is divided into two: in the first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism absolutely; in the second, by comparing one demonstration to another, at Since demonstration is in one case universal, et cetera. The first is again divided into two: in the first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism; in the second, he shows that in demonstrations one does not proceed to infinity, at Now every syllogism is through three terms, et cetera. The first is divided into two: in the first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism through which we acquire scientific knowledge; in the second, he shows how a certain ignorance is also acquired in us through syllogism, at Now ignorance not according to negation, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he treats of the demonstrative syllogism by showing what it is; second, he treats of the matter of the demonstrative syllogism by showing what and of what sort the premises are from which it is formed, at Since it is impossible, et cetera; third, he treats of its form by showing in which figure it is chiefly constructed, at Of the figures, the most scientific, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows concerning the demonstrative syllogism what it is; second, he explains certain things that are placed in the definition of the demonstrative syllogism, at Now a principle of demonstration is, et cetera; third, he excludes certain errors concerning demonstration that might arise from what has been set down, at Now to some indeed, et cetera.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 2] Concerning the first, it must be known that in all things that exist for the sake of an end, the definition taken from the final cause is the reason for the definition taken from the material cause, and the middle term proving it: for it is on this account that a house must be made of stones and timber, namely, because it is a shelter protecting us from cold and heat. Accordingly, Aristotle here gives two definitions of demonstration: one of which is taken from the end of demonstration, which is to know scientifically (scire); and from this the other is concluded, which is taken from the matter of demonstration.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 3] Hence concerning this he does three things: first, he defines knowing scientifically itself; second, he defines demonstration through its end, which is knowing scientifically itself, at Now we say that we know, et cetera; third, from both definitions he concludes the definition of demonstration that is taken by reference to the matter of demonstration, at If, therefore, to know is as we have posited, et cetera. Concerning the first he does five things. First, he determines what sort of knowing it is that he intends to define.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 4] Concerning this, it must be known that we are said to know something unqualifiedly when we know it in itself. We are said to know something in a qualified sense when we know it in another thing in which it exists—either as a part in a whole, as if, knowing a house, we were said to know the wall; or as an accident in a subject, as if, knowing Coriscus, we were said to know the one approaching; or as an effect in its cause, as was said above when we noted that we foreknow the conclusion in the principles; or in any similar manner. And this is to know per accidens, because when something is known per se, we are said to know that which happens to belong to it in whatever manner. The Philosopher therefore intends to define knowing unqualifiedly, and not knowing per accidens. For this latter mode of knowing is sophistical; indeed, the sophists employ such a mode of arguing: ‘I know Coriscus; Coriscus is the one approaching; therefore I know the one approaching.’
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 5] Second, when he says, When we judge that we know the cause, et cetera, he sets down the definition of knowing unqualifiedly itself. Concerning this it must be considered that to know something scientifically is to know it completely, and this is to apprehend its truth completely: for the principles of a thing’s being and of its truth are the same, as is clear from Book II of the Metaphysics. It is necessary, therefore, that one who knows scientifically, if he knows completely, should know the cause of the thing known. Yet if he knew the cause alone, he would not yet know the effect in act—which is to know unqualifiedly—but only virtually, which is to know in a qualified sense and, as it were, per accidens. And therefore one who knows unqualifiedly must also know the application of the cause to the effect. Moreover, because scientific knowledge is also certain knowledge of a thing, whereas what can be otherwise cannot be known by anyone with certitude, it is further necessary that what is scientifically known cannot be otherwise. Because, therefore, scientific knowledge is complete knowledge, he says: when we judge that we know the cause; because it is actual knowledge through which we know unqualifiedly, he adds: and that it is the cause of that thing; and because it is certain knowledge, he subjoins: and that it is not possible for it to be otherwise.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 6] Third, at It is manifest, therefore, et cetera, he manifests the definition set down from the fact that both those who know and those who do not know, yet suppose themselves to know, take knowing in the manner just stated: for those who do not know, yet suppose themselves to know, opine that they stand thus in their knowing, as has been said, whereas those who truly know genuinely do stand thus. Now this is a right manifestation of a definition. For a definition is the account (ratio) that the name signifies, as is said in Book IV of the Metaphysics; and the signification of a name must be taken from what speakers commonly intend to signify by that name—whence too in Book II of the Topics it is said that names are to be used as the many use them. Moreover, if anyone considers rightly, by this explanation what the name signifies is shown rather than something being directly defined: for he does not explain science (scientia), to which a definition in the strict sense could be assigned inasmuch as it is a species of some genus, but rather explains the act to know (scire) itself. Hence from the very start he said, We suppose ourselves to know, et cetera, and did not say, ‘To know is such and such a thing.’
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 7] Fourth, at Wherefore, that of which, et cetera, he concludes a certain corollary from the definition set down, namely, that that of which scientific knowledge is had unqualifiedly must be necessary, that is, incapable of being otherwise.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 8] Fifth, at Whether indeed, et cetera, he replies to a tacit question, namely, whether there is any other mode of knowing scientifically besides the aforesaid. This he promises to state in what follows: for there is also knowing through an effect, as will become clear below; and we are also said in some manner to know the indemonstrable principles themselves, of which no cause can be taken. Nevertheless, the proper and complete mode of knowing scientifically is the one stated above.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 9] Next, when he says, Now we say that we know, et cetera, he defines the demonstrative syllogism by reference to its end, which is to know scientifically. Concerning this he does three things. First, he sets down that to know is the end of the demonstrative syllogism or its effect, since to know seems to be nothing other than to understand the truth of some conclusion through demonstration. Second, at By demonstration I mean, et cetera, he defines the demonstrative syllogism through this end, saying that demonstration is a scientific syllogism, that is, one producing scientific knowledge. Third, he explains what he had called scientific, at And by scientific I mean, et cetera, saying that a scientific syllogism is one according to which we know scientifically simply by possessing it—lest perhaps someone should understand a scientific syllogism to mean any syllogism that some science might happen to employ.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 10] Next, when he says, If, therefore, to know is, et cetera, he concludes from what has been said the definition of the demonstrative syllogism taken from its matter. And concerning this he does two things: first, he concludes it; second, he manifests it, at Now they must indeed be true, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he sets down the consequence whereby the material definition of demonstration is concluded from what precedes, saying that if to know signifies what we have stated—namely, to know the cause of a thing, et cetera—it is necessary that demonstrative science, that is, knowledge acquired through demonstration, proceed from propositions that are true, primary, and immediate, that is, not demonstrated through any middle term, but manifest through themselves (which are indeed called immediate insofar as they lack a demonstrating middle term, and primary in relation to other propositions that are proved through them); and furthermore from propositions better known than, prior to, and causes of the conclusion.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 11] Second, at For thus the principles will also be, et cetera, he excuses himself from adding another clause that seemed to need appending, namely, that demonstration proceeds from proper principles. For he says that this is already understood through what has been stated: since if the propositions of a demonstration are causes of the conclusion, they must necessarily be its proper principles, for causes must be proportioned to their effects.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 12] Third, at For a syllogism indeed, et cetera, he manifests the necessity of the aforesaid consequence, saying that although a syllogism as such does not require the aforesaid conditions in the propositions from which it proceeds, demonstration nevertheless requires them; otherwise it would not produce scientific knowledge.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 13] Next, when he says, Now they must indeed be true, et cetera, he manifests the definition set down, manifesting at the same time what he had just stated, namely, that unless the aforesaid conditions belonged to demonstration, it could not produce scientific knowledge. First, therefore, he shows that demonstration always proceeds from true premises in order to produce scientific knowledge: because what is not cannot be known—for example, that the diagonal is symmetrical, that is, commensurable with the side of the square (for quantities are called incommensurable when no common measure of them can be taken, and such quantities are those that do not have to one another the ratio of a number to a number, which necessarily occurs in the case of the diagonal of a square and its side, as is clear from Book X of Euclid). Now what is not true, is not: for to be and to be true are convertible. Therefore what is scientifically known must be true. And thus the conclusion of a demonstration, which produces scientific knowledge, must be true, and consequently its premises as well: for what is true cannot be scientifically known from false premises, even though it can be syllogistically concluded from them, as he will show below.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 14] Second, at And from primary and indemonstrable, et cetera, he shows that demonstration proceeds from primary and immediate, or indemonstrable, premises. For no one can possess scientific knowledge unless he possesses a demonstration of those things of which there can be a demonstration—and I say this per se, and not per accidens. He adds this qualification because it would be possible for someone to know some conclusion without having a demonstration of those premises even though they were demonstrable, inasmuch as he might know that conclusion through other principles; and that would be per accidens. Grant, therefore, that some demonstrator syllogizes from demonstrable, or mediated, premises: either he possesses a demonstration of them, or he does not. If he does not have one, then he does not scientifically know the premises, and thus neither does he know the conclusion on account of the premises. If, however, he does have one, then since in demonstrations one cannot proceed to infinity, as he will show below, one will eventually have to arrive at certain immediate and indemonstrable principles. And thus demonstration must proceed from immediate principles, either directly or through certain intermediates. Hence in the first book of the Topics, too, it is said that demonstration proceeds from primary and true things, or from things that have derived their credence through them.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 15] Third, at And they must be causes, et cetera, he proves that the propositions of a demonstration are causes of the conclusion, because we know scientifically precisely when we know the causes. And from this he concludes further that they are prior and better known, because every cause is naturally prior to and better known than its effect. Moreover, the cause of a demonstrative conclusion must be better known not only with respect to the knowledge of what it is, but also with respect to the knowledge that it is: for in order to demonstrate that there is an eclipse of the sun, it does not suffice to know what the interposition of the moon is, but one must also know that the moon is interposed between the sun and the earth. And because prior and better known are spoken of in two ways—namely, in relation to us (quoad nos) and according to nature—he consequently says that the things from which demonstration proceeds are prior and better known unqualifiedly and according to nature, and not in relation to us. And in explanation of this he says that things prior and better known unqualifiedly are those that are remote from sense, such as universals, whereas things prior and better known in relation to us are those closest to sense, namely, singulars, which are opposed to universals either by the opposition of prior and posterior or by the opposition of near and remote.
[lib. 1 l. 4 n. 16] Now the contrary of this seems to be found in Book I of the Physics, where it is said that universals are prior in relation to us and posterior according to nature. But it must be replied that here he is speaking of the order of the singular to the universal unqualifiedly, whose order must be taken according to the order of sensitive and intellective knowledge in us. Now sensitive knowledge is prior in us to intellective knowledge, because intellectual knowledge proceeds in us from sense; hence the singular is prior and better known in relation to us than the universal. In Book I of the Physics, however, the order set down is not that of the universal to the singular unqualifiedly, but that of the more universal to the less universal—for instance, of animal to man—and thus in relation to us the more universal must be prior and better known. For in every generation, what is in potency is prior in time and posterior in nature, whereas what is complete in act is prior in nature and posterior in time; and knowledge of a genus is, as it were, potential in comparison to knowledge of the species, in which all the essentials of a thing are known in act. Hence in the generation of our scientific knowledge, knowing the more common comes prior to knowing the less common. Again, in the book of the Physics it is said that the natural road for us is from things better known to us; therefore demonstration does not proceed from things that are prior unqualifiedly, but from those prior in relation to us. To this it must be replied that here he speaks according as what is in sense is better known in relation to us than what is in the intellect, whereas there he speaks according as what is better known in relation to us is also in the intellect; and demonstrations do not proceed from singulars that are in sense, but from universals alone, which are in the intellect. Or else it must be said that in every demonstration one must indeed proceed from things that are better known in relation to us—not singulars, however, but universals—for nothing can be made known to us except through what is better known to us. Now sometimes what is better known in relation to us is also better known unqualifiedly and according to nature, as happens in mathematics, in which, on account of abstraction from matter, demonstrations are made solely from formal principles; and in such sciences demonstrations proceed from things that are better known unqualifiedly. At other times, however, what is better known in relation to us is not better known unqualifiedly, as happens in natural things, in which the essences and powers of things, because they exist in matter, are hidden from us, yet become known to us through those things that outwardly appear concerning them. Hence in such matters demonstrations are made for the most part through effects, which are better known in relation to us and not unqualifiedly. At present, however, he is speaking not of this latter mode of demonstration, but of the first. Finally, because in this explanation he had also omitted to manifest that demonstration proceeds from proper principles, he consequently adds that this too is obtained from what has already been set down. For by saying that demonstration is from primary things, it is already established that it is from proper principles, just as was also said above. For first and principle appear to be the same: since what is first and greatest in each genus is the cause of all the things that come after, as is said in Book II of the Metaphysics.