Posts tagged 'de_anima'

Book I, Lecture 11 — On Democritus's Account Lib. I, lect. 11 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Democritus’s Account of Motion and How Geometers Imagine a Moving Point Describing a Line

[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 1 · Marietti #168] After the Philosopher refuted the opinion of those who said without qualification that the soul is moved, here he consequently argues against the opinion of Xenocrates, who added something further beyond motion, namely, that the soul is a self-moving number. And this opinion is much more unreasonable than the opinions of the other philosophers that have been mentioned. For many impossibilities attend those who say that the soul is a self-moving number. First, indeed, there are those that arise from being moved, that is, from motion, which also befall all who say that the soul is moved; and there also befall those who speak in this way proper incongruities of their own, namely from the fact that they say that the soul is a number. And on account of this, the Philosopher refutes this definition of the soul given by Xenocrates, and he is arguing not merely against the wording, but against the very intention of the one defining. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows that this definition is incongruous with respect to the soul itself or the substance of the soul; second, with respect to its accidents, at Comprehending them together into one, and so forth. Concerning the first he does two things. For first he demolishes the aforesaid definition of the soul by arguments; second, he shows that upon this definition follow all the incongruities that follow upon the opinions of the other philosophers, at Moreover, there befalls, as we have said, and so forth.

Book II, Lecture 16 — On Sound in Act and Pot Lib. II, lect. 16 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Sound in Act and Potency and Its Fluent Mode of Being in Motion

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 1 · Marietti #438] After the Philosopher determined concerning the visible, here he determines concerning the audible, that is, concerning sound. And this is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines concerning sound in general; in the second, he determines concerning a certain species of sound, namely voice, at Voice, however. The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, concerning the differences of sounds, at Now the differences of sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, he raises a certain doubt regarding what has been previously determined, at Whether, however, there sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the generation of sound; in the second, concerning the alteration of hearing by sound, at Now the void. Now if it be asked why he determines here concerning the generation of sound, whereas above he did not determine concerning the generation of color, but only concerning the alteration of the sense and the medium by color, it must be said that color, odor, flavor, and tangible qualities have a permanent and fixed being in their subject. Hence there is one consideration of those qualities in themselves, and another insofar as they alter the sense; and on account of this each belongs to a distinct inquiry. Accordingly, the Philosopher determines concerning the generation of color, flavor, and odor in the book On Sense and the Sensible, and concerning tangible qualities in the book On Generation and Corruption, and as regards certain aspects in the Meteorology. In this book, however, he does not intend to determine concerning sensibles except insofar as they are alterative of the sense. Sound, by contrast, is caused by motion, and does not have a fixed and resting being in a subject, but consists in a certain alteration; whence it is determined simultaneously both insofar as it is generated in its own species and insofar as it alters the sense. Now the first part is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the primary generation of sound; in the second, concerning the secondary generation of sound that takes place by reflection, at Echo, however, occurs. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that sound is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency; second, he shows how sound comes to be in act, at Now it comes to be according to act.

Book III, Lecture 8 — On the Object of the In Lib. III, lect. 8 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On the Object of the Intellect: Flesh and Bone vs. the Continuum, the Snub vs. the Straight, and Reflection upon the Phantasm

[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 1 · Marietti #699] After the Philosopher determined concerning the possible intellect, which is in potency to intelligible things, here he shows how it is reduced to act. First, he shows that the intellect sometimes comes to be in act; second, he shows what its proper object is with respect to which it comes to be in act, at Now since magnitude is one thing. He shows, accordingly, how the intellect is reduced to act, saying: it has been stated that the intellective soul is not actually the species themselves, but only in potency; when, however, it thus becomes each of them—that is, is so reduced to the act of intelligible species in the manner in which a knower, namely one possessing the habit of science, possesses species in act—then too it is called the intellect that is according to act. Now this happens as soon as someone is able through himself to operate with the operation of the intellect, which is understanding itself—just as someone possesses any form in act when he is able to exercise the operation of that form.

Book III, Lecture 12 — Why the Soul Never Und Lib. III, lect. 12 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

Why the Soul Never Understands Without a Phantasm and How Mathematical Entities Are Understood in Abstraction

[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 1 · Marietti #764] After the Philosopher determined concerning the intellect in itself, here he determines concerning the intellect in comparison with sense. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows of what sort the motion of sense is; second, he likens the motion of the intellect to the motion of sense, at Sensing, therefore, indeed. He says, therefore, first, that the sensible appears to make the sensitive part exist in act from having been in potency. For the sensible does not act upon sense in the way a contrary acts upon its contrary, so as to cast something out from it by transmuting and altering it, but solely reduces it from potency into act. And this is what he adds, namely, that the sensitive power neither undergoes passion nor is altered by the sensible by passion and alteration strictly taken—that is, insofar as this proceeds from contrary into contrary.

Book III, Lecture 13 — How the Soul Is in a W Lib. III, lect. 13 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

How the Soul Is in a Way All Things, the Hand the Organ of Organs, and the Intellect the Form of Forms

[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 1 · Marietti #786] After the Philosopher determined concerning sense and the intellect, now through what has been stated concerning both he shows what ought to be held regarding the nature of the soul. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that the nature of the soul is in a way as the ancients believed, and in a way otherwise; in the second, he shows the dependence of the intellect upon sense, at Now since neither is any thing. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that the soul is in a way all things, as the ancients said; second, he says that it is all things in a manner different from what they said, at Now it is necessary. He says, therefore, first, that now recapitulating the things that have been stated concerning the soul so as to show what is proposed from them, let us say that the soul is in a way all things. For all things that exist are either sensible or intelligible; now the soul is in a way all sensible and intelligible things, because in the soul there are sense and the intellect or science, while sense is in a way the sensibles themselves, and the intellect the intelligibles, or science the knowables.