Book I, Lecture 19 — On Common Conceptions of the Mind, Hypotheses, Postulates, and Why the Geometer Does Not Demonstrate of Lines Drawn in Dust¶
Liber I, Lectio 19 — De communibus animi conceptionibus, suppositionibus et petitionibus ac de lineis a geometra in pulvere descriptis
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 1] After Aristotle has divided common principles from proper principles, here he distinguishes common principles from one another. And this is divided into three parts: in the first, he sets down the distinction of common principles from one another; in the second, he shows the difference between a definition and a certain kind of common principles, at Terms, therefore, are not, et cetera; in the third, he excludes a certain error, at For Forms to exist, therefore, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he distinguishes common conceptions of the mind from postulates or hypotheses; second, he distinguishes postulates and hypotheses from one another, at Whatever things, therefore, et cetera.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 2] Concerning the first, it must be considered that common conceptions of the mind have something in common with the other principles of demonstration, and something proper to themselves. What they have in common is that both they and the other principles must necessarily be true per se. What is proper to these principles, however, is that not only must they necessarily be true per se, but it must also necessarily be seen that they are true per se. For no one can inwardly hold the contrary of them in opinion.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 3] He says, therefore, that a principle which not only must necessarily hold through itself, but must furthermore necessarily be seen to do so—namely, a common conception of the mind or axiom (dignitas)—is neither a postulate (petitio) nor a hypothesis (suppositio). And he proves this as follows. A postulate and a hypothesis can be confirmed by outward discourse, that is, by some argumentation. A common conception of the mind, however, is not directed to outward discourse, because it cannot be proved through any argumentation, but is directed to that discourse which is within the soul, because it immediately becomes known by the light of natural reason. That it is not directed to outward discourse is clear from the fact that no syllogism is constructed to prove common conceptions of the mind of this sort. And that principles of this sort are known not through outward discourse, but through inward reason, he proves from the fact that objection can always be raised against outward discourse, whether truly or apparently, whereas against inward reason it is not always possible to raise an objection. And the reason for this is that nothing is so true that it cannot be denied in spoken words: for even that most certain principle, that the same thing cannot simultaneously be and not be, some have denied with their mouths. Yet certain truths are so evident that their opposites cannot be grasped by the intellect; and therefore they cannot be opposed by inward reason, but only by outward discourse, which consists in spoken words. And of this sort are the common conceptions of the mind.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 4] Next, when he says, Whatever things, therefore, et cetera, he distinguishes hypotheses (suppositiones) and postulates (petitiones) from one another. Now it must be known that they have something in common, and in something they differ. What they have in common is that, although they are demonstrable, the demonstrator nevertheless assumes them without demonstrating them—and chiefly because they are not demonstrable through his own science, but through another, as was said above. Hence they are also reckoned among immediate principles, because the demonstrator employs them without a middle term, inasmuch as they have no middle term within that science. Yet they differ from one another: for if such a proposition already seems probable to the learner to whom the demonstration is addressed, it is called a hypothesis (suppositio); and thus a hypothesis is spoken of not unqualifiedly, but relatively to a given learner. If, however, the learner holds neither the same opinion nor the contrary opinion concerning it, the demonstrator must ask him to grant it, and then it is called a postulate (petitio). And if the learner holds the contrary opinion, then it will be a question, concerning which they must first dispute. Nevertheless, it is common to them all that the demonstrator uses each of them without demonstrating it, even though it is demonstrable.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 5] Next, when he says, Terms, therefore, are not, et cetera, he distinguishes definitions from hypotheses (suppositiones) by two arguments, the second of which begins at Furthermore, every postulate, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he sets down the argument, which runs as follows: every postulate or hypothesis asserts that something is or is not; terms, however—that is, definitions—do not assert that anything is or is not; therefore terms, taken by themselves, are neither hypotheses nor postulates. When assumed within propositions, however, they become hypotheses, as when it is said, Man is a mortal rational animal. Yet terms taken by themselves need only be understood; and to understand is not to suppose, any more than to hear is. Rather, those things are supposed from whose being—that is, from whose truth as premises—the conclusion comes about in virtue of the fact that they are, that is, on account of the premises.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 6] Second, at Nor does the geometer, et cetera, he removes a certain objection. For some claimed that the geometer employs a false hypothesis whenever he says that a line is one foot long when it is not one foot long, or that a line drawn in the dust is straight when it is not straight. Yet Aristotle replies that the geometer does not suppose anything false on this account. For since the geometer demonstrates nothing concerning particulars, but only concerning universals, as was said above, whereas these drawn lines are certain particulars, it is manifest that he demonstrates nothing either concerning these lines or from them; rather, he employs them as sensible examples of the universals that are understood through these examples, concerning which and from which he demonstrates.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 7] Next, when he says, Furthermore, every postulate, et cetera, he sets down the second argument, which runs as follows: every hypothesis or postulate holds either of the whole or in part, that is, is either a universal or a particular proposition; definitions, however, are neither of these, because in them nothing is posited or predicated either universally or particularly; therefore definitions are neither hypotheses nor postulates.
[lib. 1 l. 19 n. 8] Next, when he says, For Forms to exist, therefore, et cetera, he shows from what has gone before that it is not necessary to posit Ideas, as Plato did. For it was shown above that demonstrations are concerned with universals, and in this way are concerned with eternal truths. Therefore, in order for demonstration to exist, it is not necessary that there be Forms, that is, Ideas, or any one thing existing apart from the many, just as the Platonists posited separated mathematical objects alongside the Ideas so that demonstrations might concern eternal things. Rather, if there is to be demonstration, it is necessary that there be one in many and predicated of many: because there will be no universal unless there is one predicated of many, and if there is no universal, there will be no middle term of demonstration, and hence no demonstration. And that the middle term of demonstration must be universal is evident from the fact that the middle term of demonstration must be one and the same thing predicated of several things not equivocally, but according to the very same intelligible nature (ratio)—which is the essence of the universal; whereas if it were equivocal, a fallacy could arise in arguing.