Posts tagged 'physica'
How the Mathematician Differs from the Natural Philosopher and Why There Is No Falsehood in Those Who Abstract
[lib. 2 l. 3 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown what nature is and in how many ways it is spoken of, here he consequently intends to show what things natural science considers. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how the natural philosopher differs from the mathematician; in the second, he shows how far the consideration of natural science extends, at Since, however, nature, etc. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he raises the question; second, he sets forth arguments bearing on the question, at For indeed planes, etc.; third, he resolves the question, at Concerning these things, therefore, he treats, etc. He says first, therefore, that after it has been determined in how many ways nature is spoken of, one must consider wherein the mathematician differs from the natural philosopher.
On Action and Passion and the Division of Being into Ten Categories Proportional to Modes of Predicating
[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown that motion is the act of the mobile and of the mover, he now raises a certain doubt concerning what has gone before. And first, he raises the doubt; second, he resolves it, at Yet neither is it absurd that the act, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he premises certain points toward the doubt; second, he pursues the doubt, at Since, therefore, both, etc.
On the Definition of Immobile Place from Local Translation and Themistius’s Solution
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 1] After the Philosopher has defined place, here he shows how something is in place. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how something is simply in place, and how not; second, he shows how that which is not simply in place is in place in a qualified respect, at Whence also if water were made, etc.
That No Continuum (Line, Time, or Motion) Can Be Composed of Indivisible Points
[lib. 6 l. 1 n. 1] After the Philosopher has made determinations concerning the division of motion into its species, and concerning the unity and contrariety of motions and rests, in this sixth book he intends to determine the things that pertain to the division of motion according as it is divided into quantitative parts. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows that motion, like every continuum, is divisible; in the second, he shows in what manner motion is divided, at Now it is necessary that the now itself, etc. The first part is again divided into two: in the first, he shows that no continuum is composed of indivisibles; in the second, he shows that no continuum is indivisible, at It is manifest from what has been said, therefore, etc. And this first part is again divided into two: in the first, he shows that no continuum is composed of indivisibles; in the second part (because the proofs premised seem to pertain rather to magnitude), he shows that the same account holds concerning magnitude, motion, and time, at Now it belongs to the same account, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he resumes certain definitions laid down above, which he now employs to demonstrate what is proposed; second, he proves what is proposed, at For neither are their extremes one, etc.
On the Perfection of Three-Dimensional Body and the Geometers’ Mode of Speaking of a Moving Point
[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown by way of prologue that bodies and magnitudes must be treated in natural science, here he begins to pursue his principal purpose. And because, as was said above, in this work Aristotle principally intends to make determinations concerning the corporeal universe and its principal parts, which are the simple bodies—chief among which is the celestial body—this work is divided into three parts: in the first, he treats of the corporeal universe; in the second, he treats of the celestial body, and this in Book II, at That the whole heaven, therefore, was neither generated, etc.; in the third part, he treats of the other simple bodies, namely the heavy and the light, in Book III, at Concerning the first heaven, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the perfection of the universe; second, he determines certain conditions or properties of it, at Yet since it is manifest concerning these things, etc. Concerning the first he again does two things: first, he shows the perfection of the universe; second, he shows out of what parts its perfection is integrated, at Concerning the nature of the whole, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the perfection that the universe possesses according to the common notion of its genus, namely insofar as it is a body; second, he proves its own proper perfection, at Of partial bodies, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he makes plain the definition of body, which he uses to show what is proposed; second, he proves what is proposed, at Therefore, since all and whole, etc.; third, he shows what can be manifest from the premises, at Whichever magnitudes, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he defines the continuum, which is the genus of body; second, he makes plain the definition of body, at A body, however, etc.
On Positional Directions in Natural Bodies and How They Are Considered by Position in Mathematical Figures
[lib. 2 l. 2 n. 1] After the Philosopher has made determinations concerning the perpetuity of the heaven, here he treats of the diversity of its parts. And first, he treats of the diversity of the parts of the heaven taken according to diversity of position within the same heaven; second, of the diversity of parts taken according to the order of the celestial bodies to one another, at Since, however, there is no contrary motion, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he treats of the diversity of positional parts of the heaven according to the opinion of others; second, according to his own opinion, at For us, however, since it has been determined, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he proposes what he intends; second, he makes plain what is proposed, at Now it has indeed been determined, therefore, etc. He says first, therefore, that because certain thinkers—namely the Pythagoreans, who posited right and left in all things—say that a certain part of the heaven is right and a certain part left, it seems we must consider whether the matter stands in the way they state, or whether these are rather to be attributed to the heaven otherwise than they state, if indeed one ought to apply these principles, namely right and left, to the body of the whole world inasmuch as they belong to the celestial body that contains the whole world. And this seems worthy of consideration because right from the outset it occurs to anyone that, if right and left exist in the heaven, much more and with greater priority must the prior principles—namely above and below, before and behind—be judged to exist in the heaven.