Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul

Sentencia libri De anima (c. 1267–1268)

St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (1225–1274 · Doctor Communis)

Sentencia libri De anima (c. 1267–1268)
5 Unabridged Lectiones & Articles · Critical Multi-Track Edition
Diplomatic Latin Texts from the Leonine, Marietti, and Decker Editions
With Facing English Translation, Analytical Summaries & GEOMETOR Notes

Executive Thesis

In the Sentencia libri De anima (c. 1267–1268), Thomas Aquinas provides the psychological and cognitive complement to the epistemological division of the sciences established in Super Boetium De Trinitate and the demonstrative logic of the Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum. Whereas logic examines how geometric conclusions flow from immediate principles and metaphysics examines the ontological status of continuous quantity, psychology investigates the incarnate acts by which a human soul united to a body abstracts exact mathematical forms without forfeiting contact with spatial extension. Across the three books of the commentary, Aquinas traces an unbroken arc from the critique of Platonic-Pythagorean reifications of points and numbers (Book I, Lecture 11) and the physics of fluent being in sensory media (Book II, Lecture 16) to the mature doctrine of intelligible matter, turning to the phantasms, and the soul as an intellectual instrument analogous to the human hand (Book III, Lectures 8, 12, and 13).

The pivot of this psychological noetics appears in Book III, Lecture 8 (Pirotta nos. 705–716), where Aquinas establishes the structural proportion governing natural and mathematical definitions: flesh and bones stand to the snub just as the extended continuum—which Aquinas identifies as intelligible matter (materia intelligibilis)—stands to the straight. Because quantity inheres immediately in substance prior to sensible matter (qualities such as hot, cold, white, and black), the agent intellect can strip away every sensible quality without falsehood while retaining continuous quantity in the intellect as the individuating substrate of geometric figures. Consequently, just as several men share one specific humanity through diverse parcels of flesh and bones, numerically distinct congruent triangles share one mathematical quiddity through distinct parts of the continuum. Yet because the human intellect directly apprehends only the universal quiddity—like a line extended straight—it knows the singular geometric figure only indirectly by bending back in reflection upon the phantasm (redit super phantasmata).

Lectures 12 and 13 of Book III complete this architecture by demonstrating why turning to the phantasms (conversio ad phantasmata) is not merely a genetic stage in learning geometry, as Avicenna supposed, but a permanent structural requirement of every act of contemplation (Pirotta nos. 770–777, 790–791). Because phantasms stand to the intellective soul as sensible objects stand to external sense, the soul never understands without a phantasm—even when contemplating per se mathematical attributes such as curvature apart from flesh (nos. 780–783). Synthesizing Aristotle‘s comparison of the soul to the hand as the organ of organs (organum organorum) and the intellect as the form of forms (species specierum, nos. 789–791), Aquinas reveals human mathematical reason to be neither an angelic intuition of Platonic Ideas nor an empiricist tally of sensory approximations, but an abstractive insight that beholds universal necessity within the determinate spatial diagram.

Key Scholastic & Mathematical Concepts

Latin Term

English Rendering

Primary Locus

Doctrinal & Geometric Significance

materia intelligibilis

intelligible matter

Lib. III, lect. 8 (nos. 706–707, 713, 715)

Substance considered solely as subject to continuous quantity after all sensible qualities have been mentally removed; provides the intrinsic substrate included in mathematical definitions and the principle multiplying congruent individuals within a single geometric species.

materia sensibilis

sensible matter

Lib. III, lect. 8 (nos. 706–707, 710, 715); lect. 12 (nos. 780–783)

Corporeal matter subject to sensible qualities (hot, cold, white, black, resistant, soft); essential to natural definitions such as flesh or the snub, but excluded from mathematical definitions such as the curved or the straight.

phantasma

phantasm

Lib. III, lect. 8 (no. 712); lect. 12 (nos. 769–780); lect. 13 (nos. 790–793)

A particular likeness of a sensible magnitude preserved and formed in the imaginative power; stands to the intellect as the sensible object stands to sense and contains universal intelligibles in potency.

conversio ad phantasmata (reditus super phantasmata)

turning to the phantasms

Lib. III, lect. 8 (no. 712); lect. 13 (nos. 790–791)

The reflexive return of the intellect upon imaginative representations, required both to know singulars indirectly (like a bent line) and to exercise habitual scientific knowledge in actual contemplation.

carnes et ossa

flesh and bones

Lib. III, lect. 8 (no. 715)

Common sensible matter included universally in the natural definition of man, while individual natural substances require determinate (‘this’) flesh and (‘these’) bones.

simum

the snub

Lib. III, lect. 8 (nos. 710, 713, 716); lect. 12 (no. 781)

Aristotle’s canonical specimen of a natural form-in-matter (‘concavity in a nose’), whose very definition inseparably posits determinate sensible matter.

rectum

the straight

Lib. III, lect. 8 (nos. 713–714)

The paradigmatic mathematical attribute whose definition abstracts from all sensible qualities yet necessarily includes the extended continuum as its intelligible matter.

continuum

continuum

Lib. I, lect. 11 (no. 172); Lib. III, lect. 8 (no. 713)

Unbroken quantitative extension divisible without limit and incapable of being composed from unextended points; serves in geometry as the intelligible matter underlying straightness, curvature, and figure.

esse fluens (contra esse fixum et quiescens)

fluent being

Lib. II, lect. 16 (nos. 438, 440, 446–448)

The successive, motion-dependent mode of existence characteristic of sound and wave propagation in a medium, contrasted with the permanent and resting being (esse permanens et fixum) of static qualities and magnitudes.

unitas positionem habens

unit having position

Lib. I, lect. 11 (nos. 170, 172–173)

The classical definition distinguishing the geometric point—situated within the spatial continuum—from the pure arithmetic unit (unitas intellecta), which lacks site and position.

organum organorum

organ of organs

Lib. III, lect. 13 (no. 789)

Designation of the human hand, which replaces specialized animal appendages by crafting an open-ended array of external instruments; the bodily analogue of the rational soul.

species specierum

form of forms

Lib. III, lect. 13 (nos. 788–789)

Aristotle’s title for the intellect (explicated by Aquinas as the power receptive of all intelligible forms), through which the human soul intentionally becomes ‘in a way all things’ without possessing any material form restricting its scope.


Table of Contents

Book I, Lecture 11 — On Democritus's Account Lib. I, lect. 11 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Democritus’s Account of Motion and How Geometers Imagine a Moving Point Describing a Line

[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 1 · Marietti #168] After the Philosopher refuted the opinion of those who said without qualification that the soul is moved, here he consequently argues against the opinion of Xenocrates, who added something further beyond motion, namely, that the soul is a self-moving number. And this opinion is much more unreasonable than the opinions of the other philosophers that have been mentioned. For many impossibilities attend those who say that the soul is a self-moving number. First, indeed, there are those that arise from being moved, that is, from motion, which also befall all who say that the soul is moved; and there also befall those who speak in this way proper incongruities of their own, namely from the fact that they say that the soul is a number. And on account of this, the Philosopher refutes this definition of the soul given by Xenocrates, and he is arguing not merely against the wording, but against the very intention of the one defining. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows that this definition is incongruous with respect to the soul itself or the substance of the soul; second, with respect to its accidents, at Comprehending them together into one, and so forth. Concerning the first he does two things. For first he demolishes the aforesaid definition of the soul by arguments; second, he shows that upon this definition follow all the incongruities that follow upon the opinions of the other philosophers, at Moreover, there befalls, as we have said, and so forth.

Book II, Lecture 16 — On Sound in Act and Pot Lib. II, lect. 16 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Sound in Act and Potency and Its Fluent Mode of Being in Motion

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 1 · Marietti #438] After the Philosopher determined concerning the visible, here he determines concerning the audible, that is, concerning sound. And this is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines concerning sound in general; in the second, he determines concerning a certain species of sound, namely voice, at Voice, however. The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, concerning the differences of sounds, at Now the differences of sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, he raises a certain doubt regarding what has been previously determined, at Whether, however, there sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the generation of sound; in the second, concerning the alteration of hearing by sound, at Now the void. Now if it be asked why he determines here concerning the generation of sound, whereas above he did not determine concerning the generation of color, but only concerning the alteration of the sense and the medium by color, it must be said that color, odor, flavor, and tangible qualities have a permanent and fixed being in their subject. Hence there is one consideration of those qualities in themselves, and another insofar as they alter the sense; and on account of this each belongs to a distinct inquiry. Accordingly, the Philosopher determines concerning the generation of color, flavor, and odor in the book On Sense and the Sensible, and concerning tangible qualities in the book On Generation and Corruption, and as regards certain aspects in the Meteorology. In this book, however, he does not intend to determine concerning sensibles except insofar as they are alterative of the sense. Sound, by contrast, is caused by motion, and does not have a fixed and resting being in a subject, but consists in a certain alteration; whence it is determined simultaneously both insofar as it is generated in its own species and insofar as it alters the sense. Now the first part is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the primary generation of sound; in the second, concerning the secondary generation of sound that takes place by reflection, at Echo, however, occurs. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that sound is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency; second, he shows how sound comes to be in act, at Now it comes to be according to act.

Book III, Lecture 8 — On the Object of the In Lib. III, lect. 8 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On the Object of the Intellect: Flesh and Bone vs. the Continuum, the Snub vs. the Straight, and Reflection upon the Phantasm

[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 1 · Marietti #699] After the Philosopher determined concerning the possible intellect, which is in potency to intelligible things, here he shows how it is reduced to act. First, he shows that the intellect sometimes comes to be in act; second, he shows what its proper object is with respect to which it comes to be in act, at Now since magnitude is one thing. He shows, accordingly, how the intellect is reduced to act, saying: it has been stated that the intellective soul is not actually the species themselves, but only in potency; when, however, it thus becomes each of them—that is, is so reduced to the act of intelligible species in the manner in which a knower, namely one possessing the habit of science, possesses species in act—then too it is called the intellect that is according to act. Now this happens as soon as someone is able through himself to operate with the operation of the intellect, which is understanding itself—just as someone possesses any form in act when he is able to exercise the operation of that form.

Book III, Lecture 12 — Why the Soul Never Und Lib. III, lect. 12 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

Why the Soul Never Understands Without a Phantasm and How Mathematical Entities Are Understood in Abstraction

[lib. 3 l. 12 n. 1 · Marietti #764] After the Philosopher determined concerning the intellect in itself, here he determines concerning the intellect in comparison with sense. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows of what sort the motion of sense is; second, he likens the motion of the intellect to the motion of sense, at Sensing, therefore, indeed. He says, therefore, first, that the sensible appears to make the sensitive part exist in act from having been in potency. For the sensible does not act upon sense in the way a contrary acts upon its contrary, so as to cast something out from it by transmuting and altering it, but solely reduces it from potency into act. And this is what he adds, namely, that the sensitive power neither undergoes passion nor is altered by the sensible by passion and alteration strictly taken—that is, insofar as this proceeds from contrary into contrary.

Book III, Lecture 13 — How the Soul Is in a W Lib. III, lect. 13 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

How the Soul Is in a Way All Things, the Hand the Organ of Organs, and the Intellect the Form of Forms

[lib. 3 l. 13 n. 1 · Marietti #786] After the Philosopher determined concerning sense and the intellect, now through what has been stated concerning both he shows what ought to be held regarding the nature of the soul. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that the nature of the soul is in a way as the ancients believed, and in a way otherwise; in the second, he shows the dependence of the intellect upon sense, at Now since neither is any thing. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that the soul is in a way all things, as the ancients said; second, he says that it is all things in a manner different from what they said, at Now it is necessary. He says, therefore, first, that now recapitulating the things that have been stated concerning the soul so as to show what is proposed from them, let us say that the soul is in a way all things. For all things that exist are either sensible or intelligible; now the soul is in a way all sensible and intelligible things, because in the soul there are sense and the intellect or science, while sense is in a way the sensibles themselves, and the intellect the intelligibles, or science the knowables.