Commentaries on Physics and On the Heavens

In octo libros Physicorum et In libros De caelo et mundo expositio (c. 1268–1273)

St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (1225–1274 · Doctor Communis)

In octo libros Physicorum & In libros De caelo et mundo expositio (c. 1268–1273)
6 Unabridged Lectiones & Articles · Critical Multi-Track Edition
Diplomatic Latin Texts from the Leonine, Marietti, and Decker Editions
With Facing English Translation, Analytical Summaries & GEOMETOR Notes

Executive Thesis

Across his mature commentaries on Aristotle‘s Physics and De Caelo (c. 1268–1273), Thomas Aquinas articulates a unified ontology and noetics of continuous quantity that bridges natural philosophy and pure geometry without collapsing either into Platonic separatism or empiricist atomism. The cornerstone of this synthesis is laid down in In II Physicorum, lectio 3: because dimensive quantity inheres in corporeal substance prior in the order of nature to sensible qualities and physical motion, the intellect can grasp points, lines, surfaces, and solids together with their per se attributes while leaving sensible matter out of consideration. Consequently, there is no falsehood in those who abstract (abstrahentium non est mendacium): the geometer does not judge that lines exist apart from physical bodies, but considers in isolation what is intelligibly prior to heat, weight, and resistance, retaining intelligible matter—the homogeneous three-dimensional extension that individuates congruent figures—while leaving behind sensible matter (unlike physical definitions, which resemble the snub in enclosing a determinate sensible subject, whereas mathematical definitions resemble the concave or curved). Conversely, the sciences intermediate between mathematics and physics—optics, harmonics, and astronomy—descend from pure mathematical demonstrations back to sensible matter, demonstrating physical conclusions through formal quantitative middle terms.

This abstractive hierarchy rests on the deeper categorial and topological architecture developed in Physics III, IV, and VI. In In III Physicorum, lectio 5, resolving how a single continuous motion realizes both action (as from the agent) and passion (as in the patient), Aquinas derives all ten Aristotelian categories from modes of predicating proportional to modes of being (modi essendi): substance predicates essence; quantity and quality predicate intrinsic accidents following matter and form respectively (with figure founded as a quality upon quantitative boundaries); relation predicates an intrinsic respect toward another; and the remaining six categories arise by extrinsic denomination from efficient causality (action and passion), extrinsic cosmic measures (when from time, where and position from place), and human rational equipment (having). Within this framework, In IV Physicorum, lectio 7 demonstrates how immobile place becomes known through local translation—the succession of bodies within an invariant containing boundary—and adopts Themistius‘s solution for the outermost celestial sphere: a rotating homogeneous continuum requires no external container as a whole because its intrinsic parts, consecutive to one another around the circle, exist in place in potency. Crucially, as In VI Physicorum, lectio 1 proves with geometric rigor, no continuum—neither magnitude, motion, nor time—can ever be composed of or resolved into indivisibles. Because partless points have no extremes distinct from a remainder, two points can be neither continuous (sharing one common extreme), nor contiguous (having distinct extremes together without coinciding in position), nor consecutive (since a divisible line always intervenes between any two distinct points); points exist strictly as indivisible boundaries, cuts, and intersections of prior continua.

Finally, in In De Caelo I, lectio 2 and II, lectio 2, Aquinas integrates the topological completeness of three-dimensional extension with the constructive imagination of classical geometry. Body is the sole perfect magnitude because three mutually orthogonal dimensions exhaust divisibility every way (omniquaque), uniting the formal definition of the continuum (parts joined at a common boundary) with its material definition (divisible into things always further divisible). When geometers state that a moving point generates a line, a moving line a surface, and a moving surface a solid, Aquinas explains that they employ an imaginative and genetic mode of speaking (modus loquendi geometrarum) that traces dimensional priority by defect from the complete three-dimensional solid rather than positing physical locomotion of partless atoms. Likewise, In II De Caelo, lectio 2 distinguishes intrinsic biological and dynamical orientations (above and below, before and behind, right and left) from positional directions in inanimate bodies and mathematical figures, which hold no absolute internal principle of motion and acquire directional orientation solely by relational position (positio / situs) relative to a chosen frame or observer—anticipating the invariance of Euclidean figures under rigid translation, rotation, and reflection.

Key Scholastic & Mathematical Concepts

Latin Term

English Rendering

Primary Locus

Doctrinal & Geometric Significance

abstrahentium non est mendacium

there is no falsehood in those who abstract

Phys. II, lect. 3

Epistemological principle guaranteeing the exact truth of geometry: considering dimensive quantity without sensible qualities commits no error because the geometer abstracts by non-consideration rather than asserting separate existence.

materia sensibilis / materia intelligibilis

sensible matter / intelligible matter

Phys. II, lect. 3

Ontological ground of mathematical abstraction: quantity precedes sensible qualities in substance, allowing the intellect to abstract geometric magnitudes from sensible matter while retaining substance under pure extension as intelligible matter.

simum / curvum (concavum)

the snub / the concave or curved

Phys. II, lect. 3

Paradigmatic contrast of definitions: natural definitions resemble the snub by including a sensible subject (a nose) in their essence, whereas mathematical definitions resemble the curved by prescinding from every sensible subject.

scientiae mediae

sciences intermediate between mathematics and physics

Phys. II, lect. 3

Disciplines such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy that apply abstract geometric and arithmetic demonstrations to sensible matter, remaining formally mathematical in their middle terms yet terminally natural in their subject.

modi essendi / modi praedicandi

modes of being / modes of predicating

Phys. III, lect. 5

Architectonic principle of Aquinas’s derivation of the ten categories: being is divided analogically rather than univocally because the fundamental ways predicates are affirmed of a subject mirror the ways reality inheres in or denominates substance.

actio ut ab hoc / passio ut in hoc

action as from this / passion as in this

Phys. III, lect. 5

Resolution of the unity of motion with the duality of causal categories: numerically one continuous motion in the mobile is denominated action as proceeding from the agent and passion as received in the patient.

locus immobilis

immobile place

Phys. IV, lect. 7

The innermost immobile boundary of the containing body, first revealed to the intellect through local translation when distinct bodies successively occupy the same surrounding limit without interpenetrating dimensions.

in loco per partes in potentia

in place through parts in potency

Phys. IV, lect. 7

Themistius’s solution, endorsed by Aquinas against Averroes and Avicenna, explaining rotational motion of an uncontained continuous sphere: while the whole does not change place in subject, its potentially divisible parts succeed one another circularly.

continuum, contiguum (contactum), consequenter se habens

continuous, contiguous, consecutive

Phys. VI, lect. 1

Topological triad governing spatial and temporal order: continuous things share one common extreme, contiguous things have distinct extremes together, and consecutive things have nothing of the same genus intervening between them.

indivisibilia

indivisibles

Phys. VI, lect. 1

Partless boundaries—such as points on a line or nows in time—that possess position or order as extremes of division, but can never touch, overlap partially, or be summed to compose an extended continuum.

continuum divisibile omniquaque

continuum divisible every way

De Caelo I, lect. 2

Definition of three-dimensional body as the complete and perfect genus of magnitude, exhausting all mutually perpendicular directions of continuous extension so that no transition into a fourth spatial genus occurs.

punctus motus facit lineam

a moving point makes a line

De Caelo I, lect. 2; II, lect. 2

The kinematic mode of speaking of geometers (modus loquendi geometrarum), whereby constructive imagination traces higher-dimensional magnitudes from lower-dimensional boundaries to express generative priority without physical atomism.

differentiae positionum

differences of position

De Caelo II, lect. 2

The six directional poles (above and below, before and behind, right and left), which belong intrinsically only to animate self-movers and apply to inanimate bodies and geometric figures purely by relational orientation (quoad nos).


Table of Contents

Physics Book II, Lecture 3 — How the Mathemat Phys. II, lect. 3 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

How the Mathematician Differs from the Natural Philosopher and Why There Is No Falsehood in Those Who Abstract

[lib. 2 l. 3 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown what nature is and in how many ways it is spoken of, here he consequently intends to show what things natural science considers. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how the natural philosopher differs from the mathematician; in the second, he shows how far the consideration of natural science extends, at Since, however, nature, etc. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he raises the question; second, he sets forth arguments bearing on the question, at For indeed planes, etc.; third, he resolves the question, at Concerning these things, therefore, he treats, etc. He says first, therefore, that after it has been determined in how many ways nature is spoken of, one must consider wherein the mathematician differs from the natural philosopher.

Physics Book III, Lecture 5 — On Action and P Phys. III, lect. 5 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Action and Passion and the Division of Being into Ten Categories Proportional to Modes of Predicating

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown that motion is the act of the mobile and of the mover, he now raises a certain doubt concerning what has gone before. And first, he raises the doubt; second, he resolves it, at Yet neither is it absurd that the act, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he premises certain points toward the doubt; second, he pursues the doubt, at Since, therefore, both, etc.

Physics Book IV, Lecture 7 — On the Definitio Phys. IV, lect. 7 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On the Definition of Immobile Place from Local Translation and Themistius’s Solution

[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 1] After the Philosopher has defined place, here he shows how something is in place. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how something is simply in place, and how not; second, he shows how that which is not simply in place is in place in a qualified respect, at Whence also if water were made, etc.

Physics Book VI, Lecture 1 — That No Continuu Phys. VI, lect. 1 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

That No Continuum (Line, Time, or Motion) Can Be Composed of Indivisible Points

[lib. 6 l. 1 n. 1] After the Philosopher has made determinations concerning the division of motion into its species, and concerning the unity and contrariety of motions and rests, in this sixth book he intends to determine the things that pertain to the division of motion according as it is divided into quantitative parts. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows that motion, like every continuum, is divisible; in the second, he shows in what manner motion is divided, at Now it is necessary that the now itself, etc. The first part is again divided into two: in the first, he shows that no continuum is composed of indivisibles; in the second, he shows that no continuum is indivisible, at It is manifest from what has been said, therefore, etc. And this first part is again divided into two: in the first, he shows that no continuum is composed of indivisibles; in the second part (because the proofs premised seem to pertain rather to magnitude), he shows that the same account holds concerning magnitude, motion, and time, at Now it belongs to the same account, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he resumes certain definitions laid down above, which he now employs to demonstrate what is proposed; second, he proves what is proposed, at For neither are their extremes one, etc.

On the Heavens Book I, Lecture 2 — On the Per De Caelo I, lect. 2 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On the Perfection of Three-Dimensional Body and the Geometers’ Mode of Speaking of a Moving Point

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown by way of prologue that bodies and magnitudes must be treated in natural science, here he begins to pursue his principal purpose. And because, as was said above, in this work Aristotle principally intends to make determinations concerning the corporeal universe and its principal parts, which are the simple bodies—chief among which is the celestial body—this work is divided into three parts: in the first, he treats of the corporeal universe; in the second, he treats of the celestial body, and this in Book II, at That the whole heaven, therefore, was neither generated, etc.; in the third part, he treats of the other simple bodies, namely the heavy and the light, in Book III, at Concerning the first heaven, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the perfection of the universe; second, he determines certain conditions or properties of it, at Yet since it is manifest concerning these things, etc. Concerning the first he again does two things: first, he shows the perfection of the universe; second, he shows out of what parts its perfection is integrated, at Concerning the nature of the whole, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the perfection that the universe possesses according to the common notion of its genus, namely insofar as it is a body; second, he proves its own proper perfection, at Of partial bodies, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he makes plain the definition of body, which he uses to show what is proposed; second, he proves what is proposed, at Therefore, since all and whole, etc.; third, he shows what can be manifest from the premises, at Whichever magnitudes, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he defines the continuum, which is the genus of body; second, he makes plain the definition of body, at A body, however, etc.

On the Heavens Book II, Lecture 2 — On Positi De Caelo II, lect. 2 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

On Positional Directions in Natural Bodies and How They Are Considered by Position in Mathematical Figures

[lib. 2 l. 2 n. 1] After the Philosopher has made determinations concerning the perpetuity of the heaven, here he treats of the diversity of its parts. And first, he treats of the diversity of the parts of the heaven taken according to diversity of position within the same heaven; second, of the diversity of parts taken according to the order of the celestial bodies to one another, at Since, however, there is no contrary motion, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he treats of the diversity of positional parts of the heaven according to the opinion of others; second, according to his own opinion, at For us, however, since it has been determined, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he proposes what he intends; second, he makes plain what is proposed, at Now it has indeed been determined, therefore, etc. He says first, therefore, that because certain thinkers—namely the Pythagoreans, who posited right and left in all things—say that a certain part of the heaven is right and a certain part left, it seems we must consider whether the matter stands in the way they state, or whether these are rather to be attributed to the heaven otherwise than they state, if indeed one ought to apply these principles, namely right and left, to the body of the whole world inasmuch as they belong to the celestial body that contains the whole world. And this seems worthy of consideration because right from the outset it occurs to anyone that, if right and left exist in the heaven, much more and with greater priority must the prior principles—namely above and below, before and behind—be judged to exist in the heaven.