Commentary & Notes — That No Particular Science Demonstrates Its Own Proper Principles, Which Belong to First Philosophy

Aristotelian Sources, Euclidean Counterparts, Hoenen’s Noetics, and GEOMETOR Significance

Aristotelian & Scholastic Foundations

Commenting on Posterior Analytics I.9 (75b37–76a30), Aquinas integrates Aristotle‘s prohibition of kind-crossing (metabasis eis allo genos, established in I.7) with the hierarchy of subalternated sciences (harmonics under arithmetic, optics and mechanics under geometry) and the architectural supremacy of first philosophy (Metaphysics IV.1–3, VI.1). Relying on the ancient commentary tradition (Themistius, Philoponus, and pseudo-Philoponus preserved in medieval scholia on Sophistical Refutations 11 and Posterior Analytics I.9), Aquinas reconstructs Bryson of Heraclea’s attempted quadrature of the circle to show why a syllogism built solely from common notions (greater, less, and equal) lacks a proximate middle term per se proportioned to circular curvature.

Euclidean & Classical Geometric Counterparts

Bryson’s fallacy illuminates the profound methodological rigor of Book XII of Euclid‘s Elements (derived from Eudoxus of Cnidus) and Archimedes’ Measurement of a Circle. Unlike Bryson, who leaped illicitly from inscribed and circumscribed squares to an equal square via a purely dialectical appeal to greater and less, Eudoxus and Euclid in Elements XII.2 (grounded in Elements X.1, the Eudoxian-Archimedean exhaustion lemma) remain strictly within the proper principles of continuous magnitude, proving area proportionality through rigorous geometric bisection of arcs and polygons. Meanwhile, Euclid’s Optics and Sectio Canonis exemplify the exact subalternation of visual perspective to geometry and musical intervals to arithmetic described in paragraphs 3 and 6.

Hoenen’s De Noetica Geometriae & Judgment Theory

Hoenen cites In I Anal. Post., lect. 17, no. 4 in Chapter I of De Noetica Geometriae (and develops its consequences across Chapters V–VII) to establish the proper boundary between geometry and metaphysics. On the one hand, against logicism (Frege and Russell‘s Principia Mathematica), Lecture 17 proves that particular mathematical sciences cannot be deduced from purely general logical or ontological axioms alone without proper quantitative principles abstracted from extension—otherwise all mathematics degenerates into Brysonian metabasis. On the other hand, because geometry cannot demonstrate its own first principles within geometry, critical reflection on their ultimate epistemic validity belongs rightfully to noetic metaphysics.

GEOMETOR Constructive & Symbolic Significance

Both halves of Lecture 17 resonate directly with GEOMETOR. First, Bryson’s continuity heuristic—sandwiching a circle between smaller and larger squares without a constructive geometric middle—foreshadows numeric root-bracketing approximations, whereas geometor.model insists on proper compass-and-straightedge algebraic intersections (precisely distinguishing constructible quadratic extensions from transcendental circle-squaring). Second, Aquinas’s account of subalternation—where geometry supplies the propter quid formal causes for optics, mechanics, and harmonics—animates GEOMETOR’s cross-disciplinary reach into botanical phyllotaxis (geometor.phyllotaxis) and harmonic proportion.