Book I, Lecture 17 — That No Particular Science Demonstrates Its Own Proper Principles, Which Belong to First Philosophy

Liber I, Lectio 17 — Quod nulla scientia particularis demonstrat sua principia propria, sed philosophia prima

That No Particular Science Demonstrates Its Own Proper Principles, Which Belong to First Philosophy

[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 1] Above, the Philosopher had shown that demonstration does not proceed from extraneous principles; here, however, he shows that it does not proceed from common principles alone. And concerning this he does two things: first, he proves his proposition; second, he draws a certain conclusion from what has been said, at Now if this is manifest, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he states his intention, saying that because it is manifest that it is impossible to demonstrate each thing through anything whatsoever, rather demonstration must proceed from the principles of each thing in such a way that what is demonstrated belongs to it insofar as it is that thing—that is, the principles of demonstration must belong per se to that which is demonstrated; if, I say, this is so, then in order for something to be scientifically known it does not suffice that it be demonstrated from true and immediate premises, but it must furthermore be demonstrated from proper principles.

[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 2] Second, at For it is possible to demonstrate thus, et cetera, he proves his proposition, namely, that it does not suffice to demonstrate something from true and immediate premises alone, because in that case it would be possible to demonstrate something in the manner in which Bryson demonstrated the tetragonism, that is, the squaring of the circle, showing that some square is equal to a circle through certain common principles in the following way: in whatever genus one can find something greater than and something less than a given thing, in that same genus one can also find something equal to it; now in the genus of squares one can find some square less than a circle—namely, one inscribed within the circle—and some square greater than the circle, within which the circle is inscribed; therefore one can find some square equal to the circle. Now this proof proceeds according to something common: for equal, greater, and less extend beyond the genus of quadrangle and circle. Hence it is clear that arguments of this sort demonstrate according to something common, because the middle term belongs to something wider than that of which the demonstration is made; and therefore arguments of this sort apply to other things as well, and do not belong to those things concerning which they are given as proximate principles. Consequently it is clear that one who knows through arguments of this sort does not know a thing insofar as it is what it is—that is, per se—but only per accidens: for if the demonstration were per se, it would not apply to another genus. For we know each thing per accidens whenever we do not know it insofar as it arises from its own principles, that is, insofar as it arises from per se principles—just as having three angles equal to two right angles belongs per se to a triangle, that is, insofar as it arises from its own principles. Wherefore, if the middle term assumed belonged per se to the conclusion, it would necessarily stand in the same proximity—that is, be proximate in genus—to the conclusion.

[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 3] Third, at Even if it is not so, et cetera, he removes a certain doubt. For sometimes it happens that the middle term of a demonstration is not in the same genus as the conclusion. How this happens he shows by saying: if the middle term is not in the same proximity to the conclusion, but stands as when something in harmonics, that is, in music, is demonstrated through arithmetic, it is indeed true that things of this sort are likewise demonstrated. For a demonstration is made in a lower science through the principles of a superior science, as has been shown, just as in the superior science through the principles of the superior science. Yet there is this difference: it belongs to the one science—namely, the lower—to know the that (quia) alone, for the subject-genus of the lower science is other than the subject-genus of the superior science from which the principles are taken; whereas to know the reason why (propter quid) belongs to the superior science, to whose subject those proper attributes belong per se. For since the proper attribute inheres in the subject on account of the middle term, that science will consider the reason why to which the middle term pertains, of which the proper attribute demonstrated holds per se. If, however, the subject pertains to another science, that science will not possess the reason why, but only the that, nor will the proper attribute demonstrated of such a subject belong to it per se, but through an extraneous middle term. If, on the other hand, both the middle term and the subject pertain to the same science, then it will belong to that science to know both the that and the reason why. Once this doubt has been removed, he goes on to draw the conclusion chiefly intended, saying that from what has been said it is clear that one cannot demonstrate each thing unqualifiedly—that is, in just any manner—but only insofar as it is demonstrated from the proper principles of each thing; even though the proper principles of the individual sciences have something common that is prior to them.

[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 4] Next, when he says, Now if this is manifest, et cetera, he draws a certain conclusion following from what has been said. And concerning this he does three things. First, he introduces the conclusion, saying that if this is true—namely, that demonstrations in the individual sciences are not made from common principles alone, and moreover that the principles of the sciences have something prior to them that is common—it is manifest that it does not belong to each particular science to demonstrate its own proper principles. For those prior principles through which the proper principles of the individual sciences could be proved are the common principles of all things; and that science which considers common principles of this sort is proper with respect to all—that is, it stands to the things common to all just as the other, particular sciences stand to the things proper to each. For just as arithmetic, since its subject is number, considers the attributes proper to number, so too first philosophy, which considers all principles, has for its subject being, which is common to all things, and therefore considers the attributes proper to being—which are common to all—as proper to itself.

[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 5] Second, when he says, For indeed he who knows from higher causes, et cetera, he shows the pre-eminence of this science which considers common principles—namely, first philosophy—over the others. For that through which something is proved must always be more scientifically known or better known. For he who knows something from higher causes must understand those causes more deeply, because he knows from things that are prior unqualifiedly, inasmuch as he does not know causes from their effects: for when someone knows causes from effects, he does not understand from things prior and better known unqualifiedly, but from things better known and prior in relation to us. When, however, the principles of a lower science are proved from the principles of a higher science, one does not proceed from effects to causes, but conversely. Hence such a process must be from things prior and better known unqualifiedly. Therefore what belongs to a higher science, from which what belongs to a lower science is proved, must be more scientifically known; and that through which all other things are proved while it itself is not proved from anything prior must be most scientifically known of all. Consequently, a higher science will be science to a greater degree than a lower one, and the supreme science, namely, first philosophy, will be science in the highest degree.

[lib. 1 l. 17 n. 6] Third, at Yet demonstration, et cetera, he returns to the principal conclusion, saying that demonstration does not cross over into another genus except in the way already stated, namely, as geometric demonstration extends to lower sciences—whether mechanical arts, which employ measurements, or speculative sciences, such as the sciences that treat of vision, like optics, which treats of the visual line—and similarly with arithmetic in comparison to harmonics, that is, music.