Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity (Questions V–VI)

Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate — De Divisione Scientiae Speculativae et Materia Intelligibili (c. 1257–1259)

St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (1225–1274 · Doctor Communis)

Super Boetium De Trinitate (c. 1257–1259)
6 Unabridged Lectiones & Articles · Critical Multi-Track Edition
Diplomatic Latin Texts from the Leonine, Marietti, and Decker Editions
With Facing English Translation, Analytical Summaries & GEOMETOR Notes

Executive Thesis

Composed at Paris between 1257 and 1259 and preserved in part in his own autograph, Thomas Aquinas’s Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate (Questions V and VI) constitutes the most rigorous epistemological treatise of the Latin Middle Ages on the architecture and methodology of the theoretical sciences. Confronting competing Aristotelian, Boethian, Platonic, Avicennian, and Victorine classifications of human knowledge, Aquinas grounds the tripartite division of speculative philosophy—natural science, mathematics, and divine science—not in arbitrary ontological taxonomies, nor merely in subjective psychological faculties, but in the per se differences of speculative objects (speculabilia) precisely insofar as they stand proportioned to an immaterial intellect seeking necessary scientific truth. Because the intellect is immaterial in its power and demonstrative science (scientia) demands immobile necessity in its object, speculative objects are diversified essentially by their grade of removal from matter and motion: physics treats realities that depend upon sensible matter both in being (secundum esse) and in definition (secundum intellectum); mathematics treats realities that depend upon matter in being yet are defined without sensible matter; and divine science treats realities independent of matter and motion in being itself.

The analytical summit of this architecture appears in Question V, Article 3, where Aquinas justifies the truth and objectivity of mathematical abstraction by mapping Aristotle‘s twofold operation of the intellect (On the Soul III.6) onto the real structure of essence and existence. Whereas the intellect’s second operation—composition and division, which regards a thing’s very act of being (ipsum esse)—cannot truly disjoin what is united in reality and therefore exercises separatio only where realities can actually subsist apart from matter (the domain of metaphysics), the first operation—the understanding of indivisibles, which regards quidditative nature—can truthfully consider apart what is conjoined in reality whenever the intelligible account (ratio) of one principle does not depend upon another. Within this first operation Aquinas distinguishes two irreducible modes of abstraction: abstraction of the whole (abstractio totius), whereby a universal specific nature such as man is abstracted from designated matter (materia signata) while retaining common sensible matter (the procedure of natural philosophy and all sciences generally); and abstraction of form (abstractio formae), whereby the accidental form of dimensive quantity and figure is abstracted from sensible matter (tactile and visual qualities and physical motion) while retaining intelligible matter (materia intelligibilis), namely substance apprehended solely by the intellect as the underlying subject of extension. Because accidents accrue to substance in an ontological order wherein dimensive quantity precedes sensible qualities and motion, and because quantity carries position (situs, the order of parts) as a constitutive difference within its own notion, the geometer abstracts without mendacity while retaining the numerical plurality of congruent figures—such as several equal straight lines or several equilateral triangles—required for geometric construction and demonstration.

Question VI completes this ontological division with a corresponding methodology of cognitive procedure and judgmental verification. In Article 1, Aquinas pairs natural philosophy with proceeding rationally (rationabiliter, moving discursively from sensible effects to extrinsic causes), mathematics with proceeding disciplinably (disciplinaliter, demonstrating with supreme certitude and pedagogical clarity through intrinsic formal causality alone), and metaphysics with proceeding intellectually (intellectualiter, gathering multiplicity into unity at the ultimate term of causal and formal resolutio). In Article 2, Aquinas establishes his decisive noetic distinction between the beginning (principium) of human cognition in apprehension and its term (terminus) in judgment. While all human thought in the present life originates in sense and relies upon the phantasm (phantasma) as a permanent foundation, judgment does not terminate uniformly across the three sciences: physical judgment terminates at external sense; metaphysical judgment uses phantasms via causality, transcendence, and negation without ever terminating at sense or imagination; and mathematical judgment uniquely terminates at the imagination (terminari ad imaginationem). Liberated from sensible perturbations yet anchored in imaginable dimensive extension, mathematical judgment attains exact geometric truths—such as a straight line touching a sphere at a single indivisible point—that surpass sensory perception while finding faithful structural verification in constructive spatial intuition.

Key Scholastic & Mathematical Concepts

Latin Term

English Rendering

Primary Locus

Doctrinal & Geometric Significance

Speculabile

Speculative object

q. 5, a. 1

The formal object of theoretical intellect, whose per se differences arise from combining the immateriality of the intellective power with the immobile necessity required by scientific habit (scientia), yielding the three grades of removal from matter and motion.

Materia signata

Designated matter

q. 5, a. 2

Matter considered under determinate spatial and temporal dimensions (hic et nunc, this flesh and these bones), which serves as the principle of individuation and singular mobility and is left behind by every universal science.

Materia sensibilis (communis)

Sensible matter (common)

q. 5, a. 2–3

Corporeal matter endowed with sensible qualities (hot, cold, colored, heavy, mobile), retained universally in natural definitions (flesh and bones in general) through abstraction of the whole, but excluded from mathematical definitions through abstraction of form.

Materia intelligibilis

Intelligible matter

q. 5, a. 3

Substance considered prior to sensible qualities solely as the subject underlying dimensive quantity, together with the homogeneous parts of continuous extension itself; comprehensible by the intellect and represented in pure spatial imagination, grounding both numerical multiplicity and material-part demonstrations in geometry.

Intelligentia indivisibilium vs. compositio et divisio

Understanding of indivisibles vs. composition and division

q. 5, a. 3

The twofold operation of the intellect from On the Soul III.6: simple apprehension grasps quidditative essence (quid est), permitting truthful non-assertoric abstraction of conjoined realities, whereas judgment affirms or denies ipsum esse and therefore requires real separability whenever it disjoins.

Abstractio totius

Abstraction of the whole

q. 5, a. 3

Abstraction of a universal essential whole from accidental and designated material parts (the universal from the particular), corresponding to the union of whole and part; proper to natural philosophy and shared by all sciences.

Abstractio formae

Abstraction of form

q. 5, a. 3

Abstraction of the accidental form of quantity and figure from sensible matter while retaining intelligible matter, grounded in the ontological priority of dimensive quantity over sensible quality and motion in corporeal substance; proper to mathematics.

Separatio

Separation

q. 5, a. 3–4

The negative judgment of the intellect’s second operation declaring that one reality does not depend upon matter and motion in its very act of being (secundum esse), whether positively (God and angels) or neutrally (common being, substance, potency, and act); proper to metaphysics.

Situs

Position (order of parts)

q. 5, a. 3, ad 3

A constitutive difference intrinsic to dimensive quantity consisting in the order of parts in the continuum, enabling the geometer to imagine and number multiple congruent lines or equilateral triangles of a single species even after sensible matter has been abstracted.

Scientiae mediae

Intermediate sciences

q. 5, a. 3, ad 6–7

Disciplines such as astronomy, harmonics (music), optics, mechanics, and the moving sphere that apply formal mathematical principles to sensible natural subjects, remaining formally akin to mathematics because their middle terms of demonstration are quantitative.

Rationabiliter, disciplinaliter, intellectualiter

Rationally, disciplinably (by way of learning), intellectually

q. 6, a. 1

The three cognitive modes appropriated respectively to physics (discursive reasoning from sensible effects to extrinsic causes), mathematics (demonstrative certitude via intrinsic formal causes and imaginable figures), and divine science (synthetic intellectual unity at the term of causal and formal resolution).

Terminari ad imaginationem

To terminate at the imagination

q. 6, a. 2

The verification of mathematical judgment in constructive spatial imagination rather than external sense or pure imageless intellection, anchored by the phantasm (phantasma) functioning as a permanent foundation in which exact quantitative relations are inspected.


Table of Contents

Metaphysica / Theologia (Sine materia et motu) Physica (Cum materia sensibili et motu) Mathematica (In materia intelligibili sine motu) q. 5, a. 1 · Triplex Divisio Scientiae Speculativae

Whether Speculative Science Is Fittingly Divided into Natural, Mathematical, and Divine

[pars 3 q. 5 pr.] Here there is a twofold question. The first concerns the division of speculative science, which he sets down in the text. The second concerns the modes which he attributes to the parts of speculative science. Concerning the first, four points are asked.

Question V, Article 2 — Whether Natural Philo q. 5, a. 2 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

Whether Natural Philosophy Treats of What Exists in Motion and Matter

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the second article. It seems that natural science does not treat of those things that exist in motion and matter. For matter is the principle of individuation. Now no science treats of individuals, but of universals alone, according to the judgment of Plato set down in Porphyry. Therefore natural science does not treat of those things that exist in matter.

Circulus Aeneus (Materia Sensibilis & Mutabilitas) Abstractio Formae radius r Circulus Mathematicus (In Materia Intelligibili) q. 5, a. 3 · Abstractio Formae a Materia Sensibili

Whether Mathematical Consideration Is Without Motion and Matter Concerning Things That Exist in Matter (On Intelligible Matter)

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the third article. It seems that mathematical consideration is not without matter concerning things that have their being in matter. For since truth consists in the adequation of thing and intellect, there must be falsehood whenever a thing is considered otherwise than it is. If, therefore, mathematics considers without matter things that exist in matter, its consideration will be false; and consequently it will not be a science, since every science is of true things.

Question V, Article 4 — Whether Divine Scienc q. 5, a. 4 · Scientia Mathematica et Materia Intelligibilis

Whether Divine Science Treats of What Exists Without Matter and Motion

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the fourth article. It seems that divine science does not treat of things separated from motion and matter. For divine science seems above all to treat of God. Yet we cannot arrive at the knowledge of God except through visible effects, which are constituted in matter and motion, according to Romans 1: For the invisible things of him, and so forth. Therefore divine science does not abstract from matter and motion.

IMAGINATIO INTELLECTUS Iudicium terminari ad q. 6, a. 2 · Iudicium Mathematicum Terminatur ad Imaginationem

Whether in Divine Things Imagination Must Be Altogether Relinquished (Why Mathematical Judgment Terminates at the Imagination)

[pars 3 q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the second article. It seems that in divine things one must be led to imaginations. For divine science is never handed down more fittingly than in Sacred Scripture. Yet in Sacred Scripture, when treating of divine things, we are led to imaginations, inasmuch as divine things are described to us under sensible figures. Therefore in divine things one must be led to imaginations.