Summary — Whether One Must Proceed Rationally in Natural Things, Disciplinably in Mathematics, and Intellectually in Divine Things

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of q. 6, a. 1

Argument Summary

Organized as a triple disputation with twelve objections and six sed contra authorities, Question VI, Article 1 examines Boethius‘s appropriation of three cognitive modes to the three theoretical sciences: proceeding rationally (rationabiliter) in physics, disciplinably (disciplinabiliter / disciplinaliter) in mathematics, and intellectually (intellectualiter) in divine science. Regarding physics, Aquinas distinguishes three senses of a rational procedure: arguing from logical second intentions (logica docens, proper to logic and metaphysics as common sciences), arguing dialectically from probable premises (logica utens, preparatory in all sciences and characteristic of contingent moral inquiry), and following the native discursive rhythm of the rational soul—advancing from sensible signs and effects better known to us toward extrinsic causes better known by nature—which belongs preeminently to natural philosophy, in contrast to mathematics, which demonstrates solely through intrinsic formal definitions.

Regarding mathematics, Aquinas explains that proceeding disciplinably—by way of learning (discere), generating unshakable scientific conviction—belongs preeminently to mathematics because it occupies the epistemic golden mean between physics and theology: freed from the flux, variability, and multifactorial complexity of sensible matter (with arithmetic even simpler and more certain than geometry, which exists ex additione), yet directly accessible to sense and spatial imagination through phantasms of line, figure, and number, mathematics surpasses both natural and divine science in human certitude, just as Ptolemy observed in the Almagest. Regarding divine science, Aquinas contrasts discursive ratio (circling around multiplicity like circumference around center or time around eternity) with unifying intellectus (grasping multitude within one simple truth). Because all human reasoning terminates via resolutio either extrinsically at the supreme separate substances or intrinsically at ens commune, metaphysics stands closest to pure intellectual intuition, serving simultaneously as the last science learned by analytical resolutio and the prima philosophia supplying synthetic principles along the via compositionis vel inventionis.

Key Theses

  • Natural philosophy proceeds rationally (rationabiliter) by mirroring the human soul’s native discursive movement from sensible effects to ontologically distinct extrinsic causes.

  • Mathematics demonstrates purely through the formal cause; even when proving properties of a circle through a triangle, it actualizes figures potentially intrinsic to the quantitative continuum.

  • Mathematics proceeds disciplinably (disciplinaliter) with supreme human certitude because its objects are both immutable—unlike physical flux—and directly imaginable—unlike separate substances.

  • Logic must be learned before mathematics and the other sciences not because it is easier—being hardest as a science of second intentions—but because all sciences depend on its method.

  • Divine science proceeds intellectually (intellectualiter) as the ultimate terminus of both causal (extrinsic) and formal-universal (intrinsic) resolutio, gathering multiplicity into simple unity.