Question V, Article 4 — Whether Divine Science Treats of What Exists Without Matter and Motion¶
Quaestio V, Articulus 4 — Utrum divina scientia sit de his quae sunt sine materia et motu
f. q. 5, a. 4[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the fourth article. It seems that divine science does not treat of things separated from motion and matter. For divine science seems above all to treat of God. Yet we cannot arrive at the knowledge of God except through visible effects, which are constituted in matter and motion, according to Romans 1: For the invisible things of him, and so forth. Therefore divine science does not abstract from matter and motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2] Furthermore, that to which motion in some manner belongs is not altogether separated from motion and matter. Yet motion belongs in some manner to God; hence it is said in Wisdom 7 of the Spirit of Wisdom that it is mobile and more mobile than all mobile things. Moreover, Augustine says in Book VIII On Genesis that God moves himself without time and place, and Plato posited that the first mover moves itself. Therefore divine science, which determines concerning God, is not altogether separated from motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3] Furthermore, divine science ought to consider not only God, but also angels. Yet angels are moved both according to choice, inasmuch as from being good they became evil, and according to place, as is evident in those who are sent. Therefore the things that divine science considers are not altogether separated from motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 4] Furthermore, as the Commentator seems to say at the beginning of the Physics, everything that exists is either pure matter, or pure form, or a composite of matter and form. Now an angel is not pure form, because then he would be pure act, which belongs to God alone; nor again is he pure matter. Therefore he is composed of matter and form. And consequently divine science does not abstract from matter.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 5] Furthermore, divine science, which is set down as the third part of speculative philosophy, is the same as metaphysics, whose subject is being, and principally that being which is substance, as is evident in Book IV of the Metaphysics. Now being and substance do not abstract from matter; otherwise no being would be found that possessed matter. Therefore divine science does not abstract from matter.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 6] Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Posterior Analytics, it pertains to a science to consider not only its subject, but also the parts and proper attributes of its subject. Now being is the subject of divine science, as has been said. Therefore it pertains to it to consider all beings. Yet matter and motion are certain beings. Therefore they pertain to the consideration of metaphysics, and consequently divine science does not abstract from them.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 7] Furthermore, as the Commentator says in Book I of the Physics, divine science demonstrates through three causes, namely the efficient, the formal, and the final. Yet an efficient cause cannot be considered without considering motion, nor likewise can an end, as is said in Book III of the Metaphysics; hence in mathematical objects, because they are immobile, no demonstration is given through causes of this sort. Therefore divine science does not abstract from motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 arg. 8] Furthermore, in theology determinations are made concerning the creation of heaven and earth, the acts of men, and many things of this kind that contain matter and motion within themselves. Therefore theology does not seem to abstract from matter and motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 s. c. 1] On the contrary is what the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Metaphysics: that first philosophy is concerned with things separable—namely from matter—and immobile. Now first philosophy is divine science, as is said in the same place. Therefore divine science is abstracted from matter and motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 s. c. 2] Furthermore, the noblest science treats of the noblest beings. Now divine science is the noblest science. Since, therefore, immaterial and immobile beings are the noblest, divine science will treat of them.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 s. c. 3] Furthermore, the Philosopher says at the beginning of the Metaphysics that divine science treats of first principles and causes. Now things of this sort are immaterial and immobile. Therefore divine science treats of such things.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 co. 1] I answer that for the clarification of this question we must know which science ought to be called divine science. It must indeed be known that whichever science considers some subject-genus must consider the principles of that genus, since science is brought to perfection only through the knowledge of principles, as is evident through the Philosopher at the beginning of the Physics. Yet there are two genera of principles. Some are both complete natures in themselves and nonetheless principles of other things, just as celestial bodies are certain principles of lower bodies and simple bodies are principles of mixed bodies. Consequently, these are considered in the sciences not only insofar as they are principles, but also insofar as they are certain things in themselves; and on account of this they are treated not only in the science that considers the things principled by them, but also have a separate science of their own—just as there is a certain part of natural science treating of celestial bodies distinct from that in which lower bodies are determined, and one treating of the elements distinct from that in which mixed bodies are treated. Other principles, however, are not complete natures in themselves, but are solely principles of natures—such as the unit of number, the point of a line, and the form and matter of a physical body; hence principles of this sort are treated only in the science in which the things principled are treated.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 co. 2] Now just as every determinate genus has certain common principles that extend to all the principles of that genus, so too all beings, insofar as they share in being, have certain principles that are principles of all beings. And according to Avicenna in his Sufficientia, these principles can be called common in two ways: in one way by predication, as when I say that “form” is common to all forms because it is predicated of each; in another way by causality, as we say that the sun, which is one in number, is a principle for all generable things. Now there are common principles of all beings not only in the first way—which the Philosopher in Book XI of the Metaphysics expresses by saying that all beings have the same principles according to analogy—but also in the second way, so that there are certain things, numerically the same, existing as principles of all things: namely insofar as the principles of accidents are reduced to the principles of substance, and the principles of corruptible substances are reduced to incorruptible substances, and thus in a certain grade and order all beings are reduced to certain first principles. And because that which is the principle of being to all things must be maximally being, as is said in Book II of the Metaphysics, principles of this sort must be most complete, and therefore must be maximally in act, so as to have nothing or the least possible of potency, since act is prior to and more powerful than potency, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics. On account of this, they must exist without matter, which is in potency, and without motion, which is the act of that which exists in potency. And of this sort are divine things: for if the divine exists anywhere, in such a nature—namely immaterial and immobile—it above all exists, as is said in Book VI of the Metaphysics.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 co. 3] Divine things of this sort, therefore, because they are principles of all beings and are nonetheless complete natures in themselves, can be treated in two ways: in one way, insofar as they are common principles of all beings; in another way, insofar as they are certain things in themselves. Yet although first principles of this sort are maximally known in themselves, our intellect nevertheless stands to them as the eye of an owl to the light of the sun, as is said in Book II of the Metaphysics, so that by the light of natural reason we can arrive at them only insofar as we are led to them through their effects. And it was in this way that the philosophers arrived at them, as is evident from Romans 1: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made. Hence divine things of this sort are treated by the philosophers only insofar as they are principles of all things; and therefore they are treated thoroughly in that doctrine wherein are set forth the attributes common to all beings, which has for its subject being insofar as it is being; and among them this science is called divine science. There is, however, another mode of knowing things of this sort: not insofar as they are manifested through effects, but insofar as they manifest themselves. And the Apostle sets forth this mode in 1 Corinthians 2: The things that are of God no one knows except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is from God, that we may know. And in the same place: To us, however, God has revealed them through his Spirit. And in this mode divine things are treated insofar as they subsist in themselves, and not solely insofar as they are principles of things.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 co. 4] Thus, therefore, theology or divine science is twofold. There is one in which divine things are considered not as the subject of the science, but as the principles of its subject, and such is the theology that the philosophers pursue, which by another name is called metaphysics. There is another, however, which considers divine things themselves for their own sake as the subject of the science, and this is the theology handed down in Sacred Scripture. Both, indeed, treat of things that are separated from matter and motion according to being, yet in diverse ways, according as something can be separated from matter and motion according to being in two ways. In one way, such that it belongs to the very notion of the thing called separated that it can in no way exist in matter and motion, as God and the angels are said to be separated from matter and motion. In another way, such that it does not belong to its notion that it exist in matter and motion, but it can exist without matter and motion, even though it is sometimes found in matter and motion. And in this way being, substance, potency, and act are separated from matter and motion, because they do not depend on matter and motion according to being, as mathematical objects did—which can never exist except in matter, even though they can be understood without sensible matter. Philosophical theology, therefore, determines concerning things separated in the second way as its subjects, and concerning things separated in the first way as the principles of its subject. The theology of Sacred Scripture, on the other hand, treats of things separated in the first way as its subjects, although certain things existing in matter and motion are treated in it insofar as the manifestation of divine things requires.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that things assumed into a science solely for the manifestation of something else do not pertain per se to that science, but only as it were per accidens. For in this way certain mathematical truths are assumed into natural inquiries; and in this manner nothing prevents certain things existing in matter and motion from being present in divine science.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 2] To the second it must be said that being moved is not attributed to God properly, but as it were metaphorically, and this in two ways. In one way, insofar as the operation of intellect or will is improperly called motion, according to which someone is said to move himself when he understands or loves himself. And in this way the saying of Plato can be verified, who said that the first mover moves itself because, namely, it understands and loves itself, as the Commentator says in Book VIII of the Physics. In another way, insofar as the very efflux of caused things from their causes can be named a procession or a certain motion of the cause into the thing caused, inasmuch as a likeness of the cause is left in the effect itself, and thus the cause, which previously existed in itself, afterward comes to be in the effect through its likeness. And in this way God, who has imparted his likeness to all creatures, is in a certain respect said to move through all things or to proceed toward all things—a manner of speaking that Dionysius frequently employs. And in this way too seems to be understood what is said in Wisdom 7, that wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things, and that she reaches mightily from end to end. Yet this is not being moved properly speaking, and therefore the argument does not follow.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 3] To the third it must be said that divine science received through divine inspiration does not treat of angels as its subject, but solely as things assumed for the manifestation of its subject; for Sacred Scripture treats of angels just as it does of other creatures. In the divine science handed down by the philosophers, however, angels—whom they call Intelligences—are considered under the same aspect as the first cause, which is God, insofar as they too are secondary principles of things, at least through the motion of the spheres, while to the Intelligences themselves no physical motion can belong. Now motion according to choice reduces to that mode wherein the act of intellect or will is called motion, which is an improper expression taking motion for operation. Moreover, the motion whereby they are said to be moved locally is not according to local circumscription, but according to the operation that they exercise in this or that place, or according to some other relation that they bear to place, wholly equivocal with respect to the relation that a located body bears to place. Hence it is evident that motion does not belong to them in the sense in which natural things are said to exist in motion.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that act and potency are more common than matter and form; and therefore in angels, even though composition of form and matter is not found, potency and act can nevertheless be found in them. For matter and form are parts of a composite of matter and form, and consequently composition of matter and form is found only in things whereof one part stands to the other as potency to act. Now what is able to be is also able not to be; hence it is possible for one part to be found both with the other and without the other, and therefore, according to the Commentator in Book I of On the Heavens and Book VIII of the Metaphysics, composition of matter and form is found only in things that are by nature corruptible. Nor is it an obstacle that some accident may be perpetually preserved in some subject, such as figure in the heaven; for a celestial body cannot exist without such figure, and all accidents follow upon substance as upon their cause, so that a subject stands to its accidents not only as passive potency, but also in a certain manner as active potency, and therefore certain accidents are naturally perpetuated in their subjects. Matter, however, is not in this way the cause of form, and therefore every matter underlying some form is also capable of not underlying it, unless perhaps it be restrained by an extrinsic cause—just as we hold that by divine power even certain bodies composed of contraries are incorruptible, such as the bodies of the risen. Now the essence of an angel is by its nature incorruptible, and therefore there is in it no composition of form and matter. Yet because an angel does not have being from himself, he stands in potency to the being that he receives from God, and thus the being received from God stands to his simple essence as act to potency. And this is what is meant by saying that they are composed of that which is and that whereby it is, taking the act of being itself as that whereby it is and the nature of the angel itself as that which is. Even if angels were composed of matter and form, however, they would still not be composed of sensible matter, from which mathematical objects must be abstracted and metaphysical objects separated.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that being and substance are called separated from matter and motion not because it belongs to their notion to exist without matter and motion—in the way it belongs to the notion of an ass to exist without reason—but because it does not belong to their notion to exist in matter and motion, even though they sometimes exist in matter and motion, just as animal abstracts from reason even though some animal is rational.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 6] To the sixth it must be said that the metaphysician also considers individual kinds of beings, not according to their proper notions whereby they are such or such a being, but insofar as they participate in the common notion of being; and in this way matter and motion also pertain to his consideration.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 7] To the seventh it must be said that acting and being acted upon do not belong to beings insofar as they exist in consideration, but insofar as they exist in reality. Now the mathematician considers things that are abstract in consideration alone; hence it does not belong to those things, insofar as they fall under the mathematician’s consideration, to be the principle and end of motion, and therefore the mathematician does not demonstrate through efficient and final causes. The things that the divine philosopher considers, however, exist separated in the nature of things, and are such as can be the principle and end of motion; hence nothing prevents him from demonstrating through efficient and final causes.
[pars 3 q. 5 a. 4 ad 8] To the eighth it must be said that just as faith, which is as it were the habit of the principles of theology, has for its object the First Truth itself, and yet certain other things pertaining to creatures are contained in the articles of faith insofar as they touch upon the First Truth in some way, in the very same manner theology treats principally of God as its subject, while assuming many things concerning creatures as his effects or as bearing a relation to him in any way whatsoever.