Question V, Article 3 — Whether Mathematical Consideration Is Without Motion and Matter Concerning Things That Exist in Matter (On Intelligible Matter)

Quaestio V, Articulus 3 — Utrum mathematica consideratio sit sine motu et materia de his quae sunt in materia (De Materia Intelligibili)

f. q. 5, a. 3
Whether Mathematical Consideration Is Without Motion and Matter Concerning Things That Exist in Matter (On Intelligible Matter)

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the third article. It seems that mathematical consideration is not without matter concerning things that have their being in matter. For since truth consists in the adequation of thing and intellect, there must be falsehood whenever a thing is considered otherwise than it is. If, therefore, mathematics considers without matter things that exist in matter, its consideration will be false; and consequently it will not be a science, since every science is of true things.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2] Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Posterior Analytics, it belongs to every science to consider its subject and the parts of its subject. Now matter is a part of all things that are material in being. Therefore it cannot be that any science considers things existing in matter without considering matter.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3] Furthermore, all straight lines belong to the same species. Yet the mathematician considers straight lines by numbering them; otherwise he would not consider the triangle and the square. Therefore he considers lines insofar as they differ in number while agreeing in species. Now the principle whereby things agreeing in species differ from one another is matter, as is evident from what was said above. Therefore matter is considered by the mathematician.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4] Furthermore, no science that wholly abstracts from matter demonstrates through the material cause. Yet in mathematics certain demonstrations are made that cannot be reduced to anything other than the material cause, as when something is demonstrated of a whole from its parts. For parts are the matter of the whole, as is said in Book II of the Physics. Hence in Book II of the Posterior Analytics the demonstration whereby it is proved that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle, from the fact that each of its two parts is half a right angle, is reduced to the material cause. Therefore mathematics does not wholly abstract from matter.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 5] Furthermore, motion cannot exist without matter. Yet the mathematician ought to consider motion; for since motion is measured according to space, it seems to belong to the same intelligible account and science to consider the quantity of space, which pertains to the mathematician, and the quantity of motion. Therefore the mathematician does not altogether set aside the consideration of matter.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 6] Furthermore, astronomy is a certain part of mathematics, and likewise the science of the moving sphere, the science of weights, and music, in all of which consideration is given to motion and mobile things. Therefore mathematics does not totally abstract from matter and motion.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 7] Furthermore, natural consideration is wholly concerned with matter and motion. Yet certain conclusions are demonstrated in common by the mathematician and the natural philosopher, such as whether the earth is round and whether it is in the middle of the heaven. Therefore it cannot be that mathematics wholly abstracts from matter. And if it should be said that it abstracts only from sensible matter, on the contrary: sensible matter seems to be particular matter, because sense is of particulars, and from this all sciences abstract. Therefore mathematical consideration ought not to be called more abstract than any of the other sciences.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 arg. 8] Furthermore, the Philosopher in Book II of the Physics says that there are three inquiries: the first concerns the mobile and corruptible, the second the mobile and incorruptible, and the third the immobile and incorruptible. Now the first is natural, the third divine, and the second mathematical, as Ptolemy expounds at the beginning of the Almagest. Therefore mathematics treats of mobile things.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 s. c. 1] On the contrary is what the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Metaphysics.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 s. c. 2] Furthermore, there are certain things which, although they exist in matter, nevertheless do not admit matter into their definition, such as the curved, and in this it differs from the snub. Now philosophy ought to consider all beings. Therefore some part of philosophy must treat of things of this sort; and this is mathematics, since it pertains to no other part.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 s. c. 3] Furthermore, those things that are prior according to understanding can be considered without those that are posterior. Now mathematical objects are prior to natural things, which exist in matter and motion; for natural things stand by way of addition to mathematical objects, as is said in Book III of On the Heavens. Therefore mathematical consideration can be without matter and motion.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 1] I answer that for the clarification of this question we must see how the intellect is able to abstract according to its operation. It must therefore be known that, according to the Philosopher in Book III of On the Soul, the operation of the intellect is twofold. One is called the understanding of indivisibles, whereby it knows concerning each thing what it is. The other is that whereby it composes and divides, namely by forming an affirmative or negative enunciation. And indeed these two operations correspond to two principles found in things. The first operation looks to the very nature of a thing, in virtue of which the thing understood holds a certain rank among beings, whether it be a complete thing, such as some whole, or an incomplete thing, such as a part or an accident. The second operation, however, looks to the very act of being of the thing, which results from the union of the principles of a thing in composites, or accompanies the simple nature itself of the thing, as in simple substances. And because the truth of the intellect arises from its conformity to the thing, it is evident that according to this second operation the intellect cannot truly abstract what is conjoined in reality, because in abstracting there would be signified a separation with respect to the very being of the thing—just as, if I abstract man from whiteness by saying, “Man is not white,” I signify that there is a separation in reality. Hence if in reality man and whiteness are not separated, the intellect will be false. By this operation, therefore, the intellect can truly abstract only those things that are separated in reality, as when one says, “Man is not an ass.” According to the first operation, however, it can abstract things that are not separated in reality—yet not all of them, but some. For since each thing is intelligible insofar as it is in act, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics, the nature itself or quiddity of a thing must be understood: either insofar as it is a certain act, as happens with forms themselves and simple substances; or through that which is its act, as composite substances are understood through their forms; or through that which stands to it in the place of act, as prime matter is understood through its relation to form and the void through the privation of a located body. And this is that from which each nature receives its intelligible account. Whenever, therefore, with respect to that whereby the intelligible account of a nature is constituted and through which the nature itself is understood, the nature itself bears an order to and dependence upon something else, then it is manifest that that nature cannot be understood without that other thing: whether they are conjoined by that conjunction whereby a part is conjoined to a whole—as a foot cannot be understood without the understanding of animal, because that from which a foot has the character of a foot depends upon that whereby an animal is an animal; or whether they are conjoined in the manner in which form is conjoined to matter, or one co-part to another, or an accident to its subject—as the snub cannot be understood without nose; or even whether they are separated in reality—as father cannot be understood without the understanding of son, even though these relations are found in diverse things. If, however, one thing does not depend upon the other with respect to what constitutes the intelligible account of its nature, then the one can be abstracted from the other by the intellect so as to be understood without it—not only if they are separated in reality, such as man and stone, but even if they are conjoined in reality: whether by that conjunction whereby part and whole are conjoined, just as a letter can be understood without a syllable, though not conversely, and an animal without a foot, though not conversely; or even if they are conjoined in the manner in which form is conjoined to matter and an accident to its subject, just as whiteness can be understood without man, and conversely.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 2] Thus, therefore, the intellect distinguishes one thing from another differently according to its diverse operations: for according to the operation whereby it composes and divides, it distinguishes one thing from another through understanding that the one does not exist in the other. In the operation whereby it understands what each thing is, however, it distinguishes one from another while understanding what this thing is without understanding anything about the other—neither that it exists with it, nor that it is separated from it. Hence that latter distinction does not properly bear the name of separation, which belongs only to the former. Rather, this distinction is rightly called abstraction, yet only when the things of which one is understood without the other exist together in reality; for animal is not said to be abstracted from stone if animal is understood apart from the understanding of stone. Consequently, since abstraction, properly speaking, can occur only with things conjoined in being, corresponding to the two aforesaid modes of conjunction—namely that whereby part and whole are united, or form and matter—abstraction is twofold: one whereby form is abstracted from matter, and the other whereby a whole is abstracted from its parts. Now that form can be abstracted from some matter whose essential notion does not depend upon such matter; whereas from that matter upon which it does depend according to its essential notion, a form cannot be abstracted by the intellect. Accordingly, since all accidents stand to their underlying substance as form to matter, and the notion of every accident depends upon substance, it is impossible for any such form to be separated from substance. Yet accidents supervene upon substance in a certain order: for first quantity comes to it, next quality, and after that passions and motion. Hence quantity can be understood in the underlying substance before sensible qualities—from which matter is called sensible matter—are understood in it. And thus, according to the notion of its substance, quantity does not depend upon sensible matter, but solely upon intelligible matter. For substance, once accidents have been removed, remains comprehensible by the intellect alone, inasmuch as the sensitive powers do not reach to the comprehension of substance. And of abstracts of this kind treats mathematics, which considers quantities and the properties consequent upon quantities, such as figures and things of this sort.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 3] Nor can a whole be abstracted from just any parts whatsoever. For there are certain parts upon which the intelligible account of the whole depends, namely when to be such a whole consists precisely in being composed out of such parts, as a syllable stands to letters and a mixed body to the elements; and such parts are called parts of the species and of the form, without which the whole cannot be understood, since they are posited in its definition. Certain other parts, however, are accidental to the whole insofar as it is such, as a semicircle stands to a circle. For it is accidental to a circle that two equal or unequal parts of it, or even more, should be taken by division; whereas it is not accidental to a triangle that three lines be designated in it, because by that very fact a triangle is a triangle. In like manner, it belongs per se to man that there be found in him a rational soul and a body composed of the four elements; hence man cannot be understood without these parts, and they must be posited in his definition, so that they are parts of the species and form. Yet finger, foot, hand, and other parts of this kind are posterior to the understanding of man, whence the essential notion of man does not depend upon them, and man can be understood without them. For whether he has feet or not, so long as he is posited as conjoined out of a rational soul and a body mixed from the elements in the proper mixture that such a form requires, he will be a man. And these parts are called parts of matter, which are not posited in the definition of the whole, but rather conversely. And it is in this way that all designated parts stand to man, such as this soul and this body and this nail and this bone and things of this kind. For these parts are indeed parts of the essence of Socrates and of Plato, yet not of man insofar as he is man; and therefore man can be abstracted by the intellect from these parts, and such abstraction is that of the universal from the particular.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 4] And thus there are two abstractions of the intellect. One corresponds to the union of form and matter, or of accident and subject, and this is the abstraction of form from sensible matter. The other corresponds to the union of whole and part, and to this corresponds the abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the abstraction of the whole, wherein some nature is considered unconditionally according to its essential notion, apart from all parts that are not parts of the species, but accidental parts. Conversely, no abstractions opposite to these are found, whereby a part would be abstracted from a whole or matter from form: because a part either cannot be abstracted from the whole by the intellect—if it is one of the parts of matter, into whose definition the whole is placed—or else can even exist without the whole—if it is one of the parts of the species, as a line can exist without a triangle, a letter without a syllable, or an element without a mixed body. Now among things that can be divided in being, separation has place rather than abstraction. Similarly, when we say that form is abstracted from matter, this is not understood of substantial form, because substantial form and the matter corresponding to it depend mutually upon one another, so that the one cannot be understood without the other, inasmuch as a proper act comes to be in its proper matter. Rather, it is understood of the accidental form that is quantity and figure, from which indeed sensible matter cannot be abstracted by the intellect, since sensible qualities cannot be understood unless quantity is presupposed in understanding—as is evident with surface and color—nor can anything be understood to be the subject of motion that is not understood as quantified. Substance, however, which is the intelligible matter of quantity, can exist without quantity; hence to consider substance without quantity pertains rather to the genus of separation than to that of abstraction.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 co. 5] Thus, therefore, a threefold distinction is found in the operation of the intellect. One is according to the operation of the intellect composing and dividing, which is properly called separation; and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics. The second is according to the operation whereby the quiddities of things are formed, which is the abstraction of form from sensible matter; and this belongs to mathematics. The third, according to the same operation, is the abstraction of the universal from the particular; and this belongs also to physics and is common to all the sciences, because in every science what is per accidens is set aside and what is per se is taken. And because certain thinkers did not understand the difference between the last two and the first, they fell into error, so as to posit mathematical objects and universals as separated from sensible things, as did the Pythagoreans and the Platonists.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the mathematician who abstracts does not consider a thing otherwise than it is. For he does not understand a line to exist without sensible matter; rather, he considers the line and its proper attributes without considering sensible matter. And thus there is no dissonance between intellect and thing, because even in reality what belongs to the nature of a line does not depend upon that which makes matter to be sensible, but rather conversely. And so it is evident that there is no falsehood in those who abstract, as is said in Book II of the Physics.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 2] To the second it must be said that “material” is predicated not only of that of which matter is a part, but also of that which has its being in matter; and in this way a sensible line can be called something material. Hence this does not prevent a line from being understood without matter. For sensible matter does not stand to a line as a part, but rather as the subject in which it has being; and the same holds for surface and body. For the mathematician does not consider body that is in the genus of substance, insofar as matter and form are its parts, but body insofar as it is in the genus of quantity, perfected by three dimensions; and as such it stands to body in the genus of substance—of which physical matter is a part—as an accident to its subject.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 3] To the third it must be said that matter is not the principle of numerical diversity except insofar as, being divided into many parts and receiving in each part a form of the same intelligible character, it constitutes several individuals of the same species. Now matter cannot be divided except on the presupposition of quantity, upon the removal of which every substance remains indivisible; and thus the primary ground of diversifying things that belong to one species lies in quantity. And this indeed belongs to quantity insofar as it possesses position as it were as a constitutive difference within its own notion, and position is nothing other than the order of parts. Hence even when quantity has been abstracted from sensible matter by the intellect, it still remains possible to imagine numerically diverse things of one species, such as several equilateral triangles and several equal straight lines.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that mathematical objects are not abstracted from every kind of matter, but solely from sensible matter. Now the parts of quantity, from which a demonstration taken in a certain manner from the material cause seems to be drawn, are not sensible matter, but pertain to intelligible matter, which is indeed found in mathematical objects, as is evident in Book VII of the Metaphysics.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that motion, according to its own nature, does not belong to the genus of quantity, though it participates somewhat in the nature of quantity from elsewhere, insofar as the division of motion is taken either from the division of space or from the division of the mobile thing. Consequently, to consider motion does not pertain to the mathematician, although mathematical principles can be applied to motion. Accordingly, insofar as the principles of quantity are applied to motion, the natural philosopher considers the division and continuity of motion, as is evident in Book VI of the Physics; while the measures of motions are treated in the sciences intermediate between mathematics and natural science, such as in the science of the moving sphere and in astronomy.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 6] To the sixth it must be said that in composite things simple things and their properties are preserved, though in another mode, just as the proper qualities of the elements and their proper motions are found in a mixed body; whereas what is proper to composites is not found in simple things. And hence it is that the more abstract a science is and the simpler the objects it considers, the more applicable its principles are to the other sciences. Consequently, the principles of mathematics are applicable to natural things, though not conversely, on account of which physics proceeds from the supposition of mathematics, and not conversely, as is evident in Book III of On the Heavens. And from this it follows that three orders of sciences are found concerning natural and mathematical things. Some are purely natural, considering the properties of natural things insofar as they are such, like physics, agriculture, and the like. Others are purely mathematical, determining concerning quantities unconditionally, as geometry treats of magnitude and arithmetic of number. Still others are intermediate sciences, which apply mathematical principles to natural things, such as music, astronomy, and the like. Yet these are more akin to mathematical sciences, because in their consideration what is physical is as it were material, whereas what is mathematical is as it were formal; just as music considers sounds, not insofar as they are sounds, but insofar as they are proportioned according to numbers, and the same holds in the others. On account of this, they demonstrate their conclusions concerning natural things, yet through mathematical middle terms; and therefore nothing prevents them from regarding sensible matter insofar as they share with natural science, for insofar as they share with mathematics, they are abstract.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 7] To the seventh it must be said that because the intermediate sciences, of which we have spoken, share with natural science in respect of what is material in their consideration, while differing from it in respect of what is formal in their consideration, nothing prevents these sciences from occasionally having the same conclusions as natural science. Nevertheless, they do not demonstrate through the same middle terms, except insofar as the sciences are intermingled and one occasionally uses what belongs to another—just as the natural philosopher proves the roundness of the earth from the motion of heavy bodies, whereas the astronomer proves it through the consideration of lunar eclipses.

[pars 3 q. 5 a. 3 ad 8] To the eighth it must be said that, as the Commentator says in the same place, the Philosopher does not intend there to distinguish the speculative sciences, since the natural philosopher determines concerning every mobile thing, whether corruptible or incorruptible, whereas the mathematician, insofar as he is such, does not consider anything mobile. Rather, he intends to distinguish the things concerning which the speculative sciences determine, which must be treated separately and in order—although those three genera of things can be appropriated to the three sciences. For incorruptible and immobile beings pertain precisely to the metaphysician. Mobile and incorruptible beings, however, on account of their uniformity and regularity, can be determined with respect to their motions through mathematical principles, which cannot be said of corruptible mobile things; and therefore the second genus of beings is attributed to mathematics by reason of astronomy, while the third remains proper to the natural philosopher alone. And it is in this way that Ptolemy speaks.