Summary — Whether Mathematical Consideration Is Without Motion and Matter Concerning Things That Exist in Matter (On Intelligible Matter)¶
Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of q. 5, a. 3
Argument Summary¶
Eight objections challenge the claim that mathematics considers material realities without matter and motion: considering material things without matter seems to violate truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus; every science must consider the parts of its subject, including matter; geometers number multiple straight lines of the same species to form triangles and squares, yet numerical multiplication within a species requires matter; geometry demonstrates via the material cause from quantitative parts (such as proving the angle in a semicircle right from two half-right angles); space measures motion; astronomy, mechanics, harmonics, and spherics study motion; astronomers and physicists prove shared conclusions like the earth’s sphericity; and Ptolemy assigns incorruptible mobile spheres to mathematics.
In the celebrated five-part responsio, Aquinas distinguishes the intellect’s first operation (intelligentia indivisibilium, apprehending quiddity) from its second operation (composition and division, judging ipsum esse). Because judgment asserts real existence or non-existence, it can truly disjoin only what is separable in reality (separatio, founding metaphysics). Simple apprehension, however, truthfully abstracts one conjoined reality from another whenever the essential ratio of the first does not depend upon the second, yielding two distinct abstractions: abstraction of the whole (abstractio totius, abstracting a specific nature from accidental designated parts, common to all sciences and characteristic of physics) and abstraction of form (abstractio formae, characteristic of mathematics). Because accidents supervene upon substance in an intrinsic order—dimensive quantity first, prior to sensible qualities and motion—quantity and figure depend in their intelligible essence not upon sensible matter, but solely upon intelligible matter (materia intelligibilis, substance grasped solely by the intellect as underlying extension, along with homogeneous quantitative parts). The replies vindicate abstrahentium non est mendacium, show that dimensive quantity carries situs (the order of parts) within its own notion to ground the imaginable multiplicity of congruent lines and equilateral triangles, assign part-whole geometric proofs to intelligible matter, and define scientiae mediae as formally mathematical applications of quantitative middle terms to natural subjects.
Key Theses¶
The intellect’s two operations—apprehension of essence and judgment of esse—ground a strict triad of epistemic distinctions: separation (metaphysics), abstraction of form (mathematics), and abstraction of the whole (physics).
Because dimensive quantity inheres in corporeal substance prior to sensible qualities and motion, mathematical forms can be truthfully understood without sensible matter (abstrahentium non est mendacium).
Mathematics does not abstract from all matter absolutely, but retains intelligible matter—substance as pure subject of extension and the homogeneous parts of continuous magnitude.
Dimensive quantity includes situs (the order of parts) as a constitutive difference, enabling the geometer to imagine numerically distinct congruent lines and figures within one species.
Intermediate sciences (scientiae mediae) such as astronomy and harmonics demonstrate conclusions about physical phenomena formally through abstract mathematical middle terms.