Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 7, a. 2 — That Esse Is the Actuality of All Acts and the Perfection of All Perfections

Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2 — Quod ipsum esse est actualitas omnium actuum et perfectio omnium perfectionum

That Esse Is the Actuality of All Acts and the Perfection of All Perfections

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1] For Damascene says in Book I of On the Orthodox Faith: That God is, indeed, is manifest to us; yet what He is according to substance and nature is altogether incomprehensible and unknown. Now one and the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore the being of God and His substance or essence are not the same.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2] Yet should it be said that what the very being of God is remains unknown to us, just as His substance does—on the contrary: whether it is and what it is are two distinct questions, to one of which we know how to answer, whereas to the other we do not, as is also clear from the aforesaid authority. Therefore that which answers to whether He is regarding God and that which answers to what He is are not the same; now being answers to whether He is, whereas substance or nature answers to what He is.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3] Yet should it be said that the being of God is known not through itself, but through the likeness of a creature—on the contrary: in a creature there is both being and substance or nature; and since it has both from God, it is assimilated to God in respect of both, inasmuch as an agent produces what is like itself. If, therefore, the being of God is known through the likeness of created being, His substance must likewise be known through the likeness of created substance; and thus we would know concerning God not only that He is, but what He is.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 4] Furthermore, each thing is said to differ from another through its own substance. Through that which is common to all things, however, nothing differs from another; hence the Philosopher also says that being ought not to be placed in a definition, because through it the thing defined would be distinguished from nothing. Therefore the substance of no thing distinct from others is being itself, since being is common to all. Now God is a reality distinct from all other things. Therefore His being is not His substance.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 5] Furthermore, things are not diverse unless their being is diverse. Now the being of this thing is not diverse from the being of another insofar as it is being, but insofar as it exists in such or such a nature. If, therefore, there be some being that does not exist in any nature differing from being itself, it will not be diverse from any other being. And thus it follows, if the divine substance is its own being, that God Himself is the being common to everything.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 6] Furthermore, being to which no addition is made is the being common to all things. Now if God be His very own being, He will be being to which no addition is made. Therefore He will be common to all; and thus He will be predicated of each thing, and God will be mingled with all things—which is heretical, and contrary to the Philosopher saying in the Book of Causes that the first cause governs all things without being mingled with them.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 7] Furthermore, to that which is altogether simple nothing predicated in concretion is fitting. Now being (esse) is of this sort, for being seems to stand to essence as white stands to whiteness. Therefore it is unfittingly said that the divine substance is being.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 8] Furthermore, Boethius says: Everything that is participates in that which is to be, in order that it may exist; whereas it participates in something else, in order that it may be something. Now God is. Therefore besides His being there is in Him something else whereby He has it that He is something.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 9] Furthermore, to God, Who is most perfect, that which is most imperfect must not be attributed. Now being is most imperfect, like prime matter: for just as prime matter is determined through all forms, so being, since it is most imperfect, has to be determined through all the proper categories. Therefore, just as prime matter is not in God, so neither ought being to be attributed to the divine substance.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 10] Furthermore, that which is signified after the manner of an effect does not belong to the first substance, which has no principle. Now being is of this sort, for every being has its being through the principles of its essence. Therefore it is unfittingly said that the substance of God is being itself.

[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 11] Furthermore, every proposition in which the same thing is predicated of itself is self-evident. Now if the substance of God be His very own being, the same thing will be in the subject and in the predicate when it is said, “God is.” Therefore it will be a self-evident proposition—which seems to be false, since it is demonstrable. Therefore the very being of God is not His substance.

[q. 7 a. 2 s. c. 1] On the contrary, Hilary says in his work On the Trinity: Being is not an accident in God, but subsistent truth. Now that which is subsistent is the substance of a thing. Therefore the being of God is His substance.

[q. 7 a. 2 s. c. 2] Furthermore, Rabbi Moses says that God is a being not in an essence, and living not in a life, and powerful not in a power, and wise not in a wisdom. Therefore in God essence is not other than His being.

[q. 7 a. 2 s. c. 3] Furthermore, each thing is properly denominated from its own quiddity; for a name properly signifies substance and quiddity, as is held in Book IV of the Metaphysics. Now this name He Who Is is among all others the most proper name of God, as is clear in Exodus IV. Since, therefore, this name is imposed from the act of being (esse), it seems that the very being of God is His substance.

[q. 7 a. 2 co.] I answer that in God His being and His substance are not distinct. For the evidence of this, we must consider that whenever several causes producing diverse effects share in producing one effect alongside their diverse effects, they must produce that common effect by virtue of some higher cause of which it is the proper effect. And the reason for this is that, since a proper effect is produced by a given cause according to its own proper nature or form, diverse causes having diverse natures and forms must have diverse proper effects. Hence if they concur in some one effect, that effect is not the proper effect of any one of them, but of some higher cause in whose power they act. Thus it is evident that things of diverse temperaments concur in heating—such as pepper, ginger, and the like—even though each one of them has its own proper effect distinct from the effect of another; hence the common effect must be traced back to a prior cause of which it is the proper effect, namely fire. Similarly, in celestial motions, the individual spheres of the planets have their own proper motions, and together with these they share one common motion, which must be the proper motion of some higher sphere revolving them all according to the diurnal motion. Now all created causes share in one effect, which is being (esse), even though each has its own proper effects wherein they are distinguished. For heat causes a hot thing to be, and a builder causes a house to be. They concur, therefore, in this: that they cause being; yet they differ in this: that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must, therefore, be some cause higher than all, by whose power all things cause being, and of which being is the proper effect. And this cause is God. Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds from it according to the likeness of its nature. It is necessary, therefore, that being (esse) itself be the substance or nature of God. And on account of this it is said in the Book of Causes that an intelligence does not give being except insofar as it is divine, and that the first of effects is being, and nothing else was created before it.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that being (ens) and to be (esse) are spoken of in two ways, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics. For sometimes esse signifies the essence of a thing, or the act of being; whereas sometimes it signifies the truth of a proposition, even in things that have no being—just as we say that blindness is, because it is true that a man is blind. When Damascene says, therefore, that the being of God is manifest to us, the being of God is taken in the second way, and not in the first. For in the first way the being of God is identical with His substance; and just as His substance is unknown, so also is His being. In the second way, however, we know that God is, because we conceive this proposition in our intellect from His effects.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 2] And through this the solution to the second and third objections is evident.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that the divine being, which is His substance, is not common being, but is a being distinct from every other being. Hence through His very own being God differs from every other being.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that, as is stated in the Book of Causes, the very being of God is distinguished and individuated from every other being by the very fact that it is being subsisting of itself, and not accruing to some nature that is other than being itself. Every other being, however, that is not subsistent must be individuated through the nature and substance that subsists in such being. And in these things it is true that the being of this thing is other than the being of that thing through the fact that it belongs to another nature—just as, if there were a single heat existing of itself without matter or a subject, by that very fact it would be distinguished from every other heat, even though heats existing in a subject are distinguished only through their subjects.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 6] To the sixth it must be said that common being is that to which no addition is made, yet it does not belong to its intelligible nature that no addition can be made to it; whereas the divine being is being to which no addition is made, and it belongs to its very nature that no addition can be made to it; hence the divine being is not common being. Thus likewise in common animal, no addition of the difference rational is made in its own notion, yet it does not belong to its notion that addition cannot be made to it; for that belongs to the notion of irrational animal, which is a specific kind of animal.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 7] To the seventh it must be said that the mode of signifying in the expressions imposed by us upon things follows our mode of understanding; for spoken expressions signify the conceptions of the intellect, as is said at the beginning of On Interpretation. Now our intellect understands being in the manner in which it is found in lower things from which it draws knowledge, in which being is not subsistent, but inherent. Reason, however, discovers that some subsistent being exists; and therefore, even though what is called being (esse) is signified after the manner of concreation, nevertheless the intellect in attributing being to God transcends the mode of signifying, attributing to God that which is signified, yet not the mode of signifying.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 8] To the eighth it must be said that the saying of Boethius is understood of those things to which being belongs by participation, not by essence; for that which exists through its own essence, if we attend to the full force of speech, ought rather to be said to be being itself than to be that which is.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 9] To the ninth it must be said that what I call being (esse) is among all things the most perfect: which is evident from the fact that act is always more perfect than potency. Now any designated form whatever is not understood to exist in act except through the fact that being (esse) is posited. For humanity or fieriness can be considered as existing in the potency of matter, or in the active power of an agent, or even in the intellect; yet by having esse, it is made actually existent. Hence it is evident that what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and on account of this it is the perfection of all perfections. Nor must it be supposed that to what I call esse something is added that is more formal than it, determining it as act determines potency; for esse of this sort is essentially other than that to which it is added in order to be determined. Now nothing can be added to esse that is extraneous to it, since nothing is extraneous to it except non-being, which can be neither form nor matter. Hence esse is not determined by another as potency is determined by act, but rather as act is determined by potency. For even in the definition of forms their proper matters are placed in the stead of a difference, as when it is said that the soul is the act of a physical organic body. And in this way, this being is distinguished from that being insofar as it belongs to such or such a nature. And on account of this Dionysius says that although living things are nobler than merely existing things, nevertheless to be (esse) is nobler than to live: for living things do not merely have life, but together with life they simultaneously have being as well.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 10] To the tenth it must be said that the order of ends corresponds to the order of agents, in such a way that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent, and other ends correspond proportionally in due order to other agents. For if one considers the ruler of a city, the commander of an army, and a single soldier, it is clear that the ruler of the city is first in the order of agents, at whose command the commander of the army goes forth to war; and under him is the soldier, who fights with his hands according to the ordering of the army commander. Now the end of the soldier is to strike down the enemy, which is further ordered to the victory of the army—the end of the commander—and this is further ordered to the good estate of the city or kingdom, which is the end of the ruler and king. Being (esse), therefore, which is the proper effect and end in the operation of the first agent, must hold the place of the ultimate end. Now although the end is first in intention, it is nonetheless last in execution, and is the effect of the other causes. And therefore created being itself, which is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent, is caused through other principles, even though the first being that causes it is the first principle.

[q. 7 a. 2 ad 11] To the eleventh it must be said that a proposition may be self-evident in itself and yet not self-evident to this or that person—namely when the predicate belongs to the intelligible nature of the subject, and yet the nature of the subject is unknown to someone; just as, if someone did not know what a whole is, this proposition, Every whole is greater than its part, would not be self-evident to him, for propositions of this sort become known once their terms are known, as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. Now this proposition, “God is,” so far as concerns itself, is self-evident, because the same thing is in the subject and in the predicate; yet with respect to us it is not self-evident, because we do not know what God is. Hence with us it stands in need of demonstration, though not with those who behold the essence of God.