Summary — On the Origin of Science from Sensible Things, Turning to Phantasms, and Threefold Abstraction

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of ST I, q. 84, a. 6–7; q. 85, a. 1

Argument Summary

In the Treatise on Man, Aquinas delivers his definitive account of human intellectual cognition. Question 84, Article 6 traces an Aristotelian middle path between Democritus (who reduced intellect to passive sensory effluxes) and Plato (who severed intellect from sense via participation in separate Forms): sense operates in the psychophysical composite, while the incorporeal intellectus agens renders sensory phantasms intelligible in act, making sensible cognition not the total cause of science, but the materia causae. Question 84, Article 7 proves from organ lesions and universal introspection—forming exemplary diagrams whenever we strive to understand or teach—that the embodied intellect cannot understand anything in act, even habitual science, without conversio ad phantasmata to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. Question 85, Article 1 refutes the charge that abstraction falsifies reality by distinguishing abstraction via judgmental separation from abstraction via simple consideration, and articulates the canonical hierarchy of individual/common sensible matter and individual/common intelligible matter across physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.

Key Theses

  • Sensible cognition is neither the total efficient cause of intellectual science (Democritus) nor a mere extrinsic occasion awakening innate Ideas (Plato), but serves as the materia causae rendered intelligible in act by the intellectus agens.

  • Even after acquiring habitual science, the human intellect in this life cannot understand anything in act without conversio ad phantasmata, forming exemplary phantasms in which it inspects the universal nature existing in the particular.

  • Abstraction by simple and absolute consideration involves no mendacity (abstrahentium non est mendacium), because considering specific or quantitative nature apart from individuating conditions reflects the immaterial mode of the knower rather than asserting real separation in the thing.

  • Physics abstracts from individual sensible matter while retaining common sensible matter; mathematics abstracts from all sensible matter and from individual intelligible matter while retaining common intelligible matter (substance subject to quantity); metaphysics abstracts even from common intelligible matter.