Summary — Whether the Human Mind Receives Knowledge from Sensible Things and on First Indemonstrable Principles¶
Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of De Ver. q. 10, a. 6
Argument Summary¶
In this masterly disputed question on the mind (De Mente), Aquinas classifies and critiques four historical accounts of the origin of science—two purely extrinsic (Platonic separate Ideas and Avicenna‘s separate intelligentia agens) and two purely intrinsic (Platonic reminiscence from pre-existent souls and radical Augustinian self-formation)—before establishing Aristotle‘s synthesis that human science arises partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco. Toward external sensible things, our mind stands simultaneously as act to potency (via the intellectus agens, whose participated light derives ultimately from God) and as potency to act (via the intellectus possibilis, receptive of determinate species). In the light of the agent intellect, all science is originally implanted in us (originaliter indita) through universal conceptions—first indemonstrable principles arising from sense (sed contra 2)—while in the crucial seventh reply Aquinas formulates the synergy of abstraction: the intellectus agens acts as primary principal agent and the phantasms act as secondary instrumental agent, imprinting species in the possible intellect that are both intelligible in act and determinate likenesses of sensible things.
Key Theses¶
All human science originally consists in the knowledge of first indemonstrable principles, whose cognition arises in us from sense (Posterior Analytics II.19) under the illuminating light of the agent intellect.
Purely extrinsic theories (Plato, Avicenna) fail to explain why the lack of a bodily sense entails the lack of the corresponding science and why injury to the organ of imagination impedes actual consideration; purely intrinsic theories (pre-existence, pure self-expression) violate the natural hylomorphic union of soul and body.
Human science originates partly from within (the participated light of the intellectus agens, wherein universal first principles are immediately known) and partly from without (determinate forms drawn from sensible things).
In intellectual abstraction, the intellectus agens operates as principal and primary agent while the phantasms operate as instrumental and secondary agent (agens instrumentale vel secundarium), leaving an intelligible species in the possible intellect that bears the imprint of both.