Summary — How the Name and Notion of Actuality Are Derived First from Sensible Motion

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of Metaph. IX, lect. 3

Argument Summary

Commenting on Metaphysics Θ.3–4 (1046b29–1047b30), Aquinas first refutes the Megarian thesis that potency exists only when acting—showing that it abolishes habitual art and geometry, resurrects Protagorean subjectivism regarding sensible qualities, and destroys all motion and generation—and then refutes the opposite extreme that everything is possible even if impossible consequences follow, citing the geometric impossibility of the square’s diagonal being commensurable with its side. Between these extremes, he defines the possible as that from whose supposition nothing impossible follows, demonstrates the modal theorem that a possible antecedent in a valid conditional entails a possible consequent, and articulates the foundational epistemological principle that because names signify intelligible conceptions and we name first what we understand first, the name and notion of actus (energeia) were first imposed upon sensible motion and thence derived to form, operation, and existence.

Key Theses

  • Collapsing potency into act abolishes habitual science and art, reduces sensible qualities to Protagorean appearances, and renders all generation and transition impossible.

  • Falsehood differs radically from impossibility: that Socrates stands when seated is contingently false yet possible, whereas the commensurability of a square’s diagonal with its side is both false and intrinsically impossible because positing it entails contradiction.

  • Since spoken names follow the order of human understanding rather than the order of nature, the concept and term actus are first grasped in sensible motion—the actuality most evident to us—and extended analogically to immutable actualities.

  • In any valid conditional if A, then B, taking possible as opposed to impossible, the possibility of the antecedent A necessarily entails the possibility of the consequent B.