Commentary & Notes — How the Name and Notion of Actuality Are Derived First from Sensible Motion

Aristotelian Sources, Euclidean Counterparts, Hoenen’s Noetics, and GEOMETOR Significance

Aristotelian & Scholastic Foundations

Commenting on Metaphysics Θ.3–4 (1046b29–1047b30), Aquinas confronts the Megarian school (Eucleides of Megara and his followers, whom Aristotle names in 1046b29), who collapsed dynamis into energeia out of deterministic convictions. Aquinas sharpens Aristotle’s four reductiones ad absurdum: Megarian actualism would mean an architect or geometer acquires and loses his habitual science every time he picks up or lays down his straightedge, sensible qualities collapse into Protagorean phenomenalism (Metaphysics Γ.5), animals turn blind and deaf dozens of times a day, and all becoming freezes into Eleatic immobility. Equally penetrating is Aquinas’s commentary on modal logic in Θ.4 (Marietti nn. 1810–1814), carefully distinguishing contingency (possibile opposed to necesse) from broad possibility (possibile opposed to impossibile) to validate Aristotle’s modal theorem—if A is possible and A necessarily implies B, then B is possible—and to correct misreadings of contraposition when an impossible antecedent implies a necessary consequent.

Euclidean & Classical Geometric Counterparts

Aquinas twice invokes the touchstone theorem of Greek mathematical impossibility (Marietti nn. 1807–1808): the commensurability of the square’s diagonal with its side. Whereas sitting or standing is contingently false at a given moment without entailing contradiction, supposing the diagonal commensurable with the side entails a formal impossibility—namely, as Aristotle notes in Prior Analytics I.23 (41a26–27) and as preserved in Elements X, Appendix 27, that one and the same integer would be simultaneously odd and even! Thus reductio ad impossibile—one of Euclid‘s primary engines of proof from Elements I.6 and I.7 onward through the method of exhaustion in Book XII—depends directly on the modal law demonstrated in Marietti nn. 1813–1814: when a posited geometric hypothesis (A) entails an impossible consequent (B, such as part equaling whole or odd equaling even), the hypothesis A is itself proved strictly impossible, not merely uninstantiated.

Hoenen’s De Noetica Geometriae & Judgment Theory

Hoenen singles out Marietti nn. 1805–1806 twice in the Appendix to De Noetica Geometriae (citing p. 253 and pp. 270–271, indexed under concordance keys aquinas:met:IX.3.1805 and aquinas:met:9.3.1806) as a master key to the epistemology of actus and esse. Quoting Aquinas verbatim—‘since names are signs of intelligible conceptions, we first impose names upon those things which we first understand, although they be posterior according to the order of nature’—Hoenen shows how human cognition first grasps existential actuality in sensible motus (a fluent esse perceived directly in concrete experience, whence moveri is never attributed to non-beings, n. 1806) and then extends both the notion and the name actus upward to substantial form, intellectual operation, and finally ipsum esse itself, which is prior in nature though posterior in our reflective philosophical analysis.

GEOMETOR Constructive & Symbolic Significance

Both the genetic primacy of motion and the preservation of habitual geometric potency in Lecture 3 resonate across the GEOMETOR ecosystem. In geometor.explorer, animated construction sequences bring geometric dependencies to life through visual motion—respecting Aquinas’s psychological observation in Marietti n. 1805 that human intelligence most readily apprehends actuality through visible movement before abstracting timeless algebraic invariants. At the same time, in geometor.elements and geometor.seer, previously synthesized constructions and verified transformation rules persist as reusable habitual capabilities (active and cognitive potentiae), ready to be deployed across new problem instances without having to be re-learned from scratch at each invocation.