Book III, Lecture 8 — On the Object of the Intellect: Flesh and Bone vs. the Continuum, the Snub vs. the Straight, and Reflection upon the Phantasm¶
Liber III, Lectio 8 — De obiecto intellectus: caro et os contra continuum, simum contra rectum et reflexio supra phantasma
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 1 · Marietti #699] After the Philosopher determined concerning the possible intellect, which is in potency to intelligible things, here he shows how it is reduced to act. First, he shows that the intellect sometimes comes to be in act; second, he shows what its proper object is with respect to which it comes to be in act, at Now since magnitude is one thing. He shows, accordingly, how the intellect is reduced to act, saying: it has been stated that the intellective soul is not actually the species themselves, but only in potency; when, however, it thus becomes each of them—that is, is so reduced to the act of intelligible species in the manner in which a knower, namely one possessing the habit of science, possesses species in act—then too it is called the intellect that is according to act. Now this happens as soon as someone is able through himself to operate with the operation of the intellect, which is understanding itself—just as someone possesses any form in act when he is able to exercise the operation of that form.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 2 · Marietti #700] Yet although the intellect is then in a way in act when it possesses intelligible species, just as a knower possesses a habit, it is nevertheless even then in a way in potency—not, however, in the same way in which it was previously in potency before acquiring science through learning or discovery. For before it possessed the habit of science, which is first act, it could not operate whenever it wished, but had to be reduced to act by another; whereas once it already possesses the habit of science, which is first act, it is able, whenever it wishes, to proceed into second act, which is operation.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 3 · Marietti #701] Now from what is said here it is manifest that the opinion held by Avicenna concerning intelligible species, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, is false. For Avicenna posits that species are not preserved in the possible intellect, nor exist in it except when it actually understands; rather, according to him, whenever it actually understands, it must turn toward a separate agent intelligence, from which intelligible species flow forth into the possible intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 4 · Marietti #702] Contrary to this, the Philosopher here manifestly says that the intellect is reduced to the act of species in the manner in which one who knows in act is still potentially understanding. For when the intellect actually understands, the intelligible species exist in it according to perfect act; whereas when it possesses the habit of science, the species exist in the intellect itself in an intermediate manner between pure potency and pure act.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 5 · Marietti #703] And because he had said that when the intellect comes to be in a way in act with respect to each of the things to which it was in potency, it is then able to understand, whereas with respect to itself it was in no way in potency, someone might suppose that once made in act it would not understand itself; and therefore, to exclude this, he adds that the intellect, once made in act, can understand not only other things, but then too is able to understand itself.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 6 · Marietti #704] Next, when he says Now since, the Philosopher shows what the object of the intellect is. To make this clear, it must be known that in the seventh book of the Metaphysics the Philosopher inquires whether the ‘what it is’—that is, the quiddity or essence of a thing, which the definition signifies—is the same as the thing. And because Plato posited that the quiddities of things are separated from singulars, calling them Ideas or Species, he accordingly shows there that the quiddities of things are not other than the things except per accidens: for instance, the quiddity of a white man and a white man are not the same, because the quiddity of man contains within itself nothing save what pertains to the species of man, whereas what I call ‘a white man’ has something within itself beyond what belongs to the human species.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 7 · Marietti #705] Now this happens in all things having form in matter, because in them there is something beyond the principles of the species. For the nature of the species is individuated through matter; hence the individuating principles and the accidents of the individual are outside the essence of the species. And therefore it happens that several individuals are found under one species, which, although they do not differ in the nature of the species, nevertheless differ according to individuating principles. And on account of this, in all things having form in matter, the thing and its ‘what it is’ are not altogether the same: for Socrates is not his humanity. In those things, on the other hand, that do not have form in matter, such as simple forms, nothing can exist beyond the essence of the species, because the form itself is the whole essence. And therefore in such things there cannot be several individuals of one species, nor can the thing and its ‘what it is’ differ in them.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 8 · Marietti #706] It must also be considered that not only natural things have their species in matter, but mathematical things as well. For matter is twofold: namely, sensible matter, from which mathematical things abstract while natural things involve it, and intelligible matter, which mathematical things involve. And this is to be understood as follows. For it is manifest that quantity inheres immediately in substance, whereas sensible qualities are founded upon quantity, such as white and black, hot and cold. Now when what is posterior is removed, what is prior remains; hence, when sensible qualities are removed according to the intellect, continuous quantity still remains in the intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 9 · Marietti #707] Certain forms, therefore, require matter under a determinate disposition of sensible qualities, and of this sort are all natural forms; and therefore natural things involve sensible matter. Certain other forms, however, do not demand matter under a determinate disposition of sensible qualities, yet require matter existing under quantity, such as a triangle, a square, and the like; and these are called mathematical things, and they abstract from sensible matter, though not from intelligible matter, inasmuch as continuous quantity remains in the intellect when abstracted from sensible quality. Thus, therefore, it is clear that just as natural things have form in matter, so too do mathematical things; and on account of this, in both natural things and mathematical things the thing and its ‘what it is’ differ, whence in both there are found several individuals under one species. For just as there are several men of one species, so too there are several triangles under one species.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 10 · Marietti #708] With these points established, therefore, it is plain to gather the meaning from the text of the Philosopher. For he says that magnitude and the being of magnitude are distinct—that is, magnitude and its ‘what it is’ are distinct, for he calls its quiddity ‘the being that belongs to magnitude.’ And likewise water and the being of water are distinct, and so it is in many other things, that is, in all mathematical and natural things. Hence he pointedly set down two examples: for magnitude is something mathematical, whereas water is something natural.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 11 · Marietti #709] Yet not in all things does this occur. For in those things that are altogether separated from matter, the thing and its ‘what it is’ are the same. And because separate substances are unknown to us, he could not name them by proper names as he did mathematical and natural things, but named them under the example of natural things. And this is what he adds, namely, that in certain things ‘to be for flesh’ and ‘flesh’ are the same—by which he does not mean that flesh and its ‘what it is’ are the same. For then he would not say that it is so in certain things, but would say without qualification that flesh and ‘to be for flesh’ are the same. Rather, he means that what are thus spoken of as ‘something’ and ‘to be for something’—such as ‘flesh’ and ‘to be for flesh’—are the same in certain things, that is, in those things that are separated from matter.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 12 · Marietti #710] And because diverse cognitive powers are required for knowing diverse things, he concludes that the soul knows the thing by one power and its quiddity by another, or else by one and the same power, though differently disposed. Now it is manifest that flesh does not exist without matter; rather, the form of flesh is a determinate form in determinate sensible matter, just as the snub also has a determinate sensible subject, namely the nose. This sensible nature, accordingly, the soul knows through sense. And this is what he adds, namely, that by the sensitive power the soul judges the hot and the cold, and other things of this sort, of which flesh is a certain ratio, that is, proportion; for the form of flesh requires a determinate proportion of hot and cold and other things of this sort.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 13 · Marietti #711] Yet another power must discern the being for flesh, that is, the ‘what it is’ of flesh. Now this happens in two ways. In one way, such that flesh itself and the quiddity of flesh are known by powers altogether distinct from one another—for instance, the quiddity of flesh is known by the intellective power, while flesh is known by the sensitive power; and this occurs when the soul knows the singular per se and knows the nature of the species per se. In another way, it happens that both flesh and the ‘what it is’ of flesh are known, not because there is one power and another power, but because one and the same power, in one manner and in another manner, knows flesh and its ‘what it is’; and this must be the case when the soul compares the universal to the singular. For just as was stated above, because we could not sense the difference between sweet and white unless there were one common sensitive power that knew both, so too we could not know the comparison of the universal to the particular unless there were one power that knew both. The intellect, therefore, knows both, though in different ways.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 14 · Marietti #712] For it knows the nature of the species, or the ‘what it is,’ directly by extending itself forth, whereas it knows the singular itself through a certain reflection, inasmuch as it returns upon the phantasms from which the intelligible species are abstracted. And this is what he says: whereas by the sensitive power it knows flesh, by another—that is, by another power—it discerns the being for flesh, that is, the ‘what it is’ of flesh, either by a separate power (for instance, when flesh is known by sense and the being of flesh by the intellect), or by the same power differently disposed: namely, just as a bent line stands to itself, the intellective soul knows flesh; and when it is extended straight, it discerns the being for flesh—that is, it directly apprehends the quiddity of flesh, and by reflection, flesh itself.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 15 · Marietti #713] Next, when he says Again, moreover, what he had stated above regarding natural things he expounds regarding mathematical things, saying that again among things that exist by abstraction—that is, among mathematical things, whose definition abstracts from sensible matter—the straight stands just as the snub does. For these mathematical things have matter, just as natural things also do. For the straight is something mathematical, whereas the snub is something natural; for the definition of the straight is with the continuum, just as the definition of the snub is with the nose. Now the continuum is intelligible matter, just as the snub involves sensible matter. Hence it is manifest that in mathematical things too, the thing and the ‘what it was to be’ are distinct—such as the straight and ‘to be for the straight’—whence the soul must know the ‘what it was to be’ of these things in one way, and the things themselves in another.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 16 · Marietti #714] And let us suppose for the present, by way of example with Plato, that duality is the ‘what it was to be’ of a straight line; for Plato posited that numbers were the species and quiddities of mathematical things—for instance, unity of a line, duality of a straight line, and so with the rest. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul know the mathematical things themselves and their quiddities either by another power, or by the same power differently disposed. Hence, just as through natural things it is shown that the intellect, which knows the quiddities of natural things, is other than sense, which knows singular natural things themselves, so too from mathematical things it is shown that the intellect, which knows their ‘what it is,’ is other than the imaginative power, which apprehends the mathematical things themselves.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 17 · Marietti #715] And because someone might say that mathematical things and natural things are understood in the same way, he adds that just as things are separable from matter, so too do they stand in relation to the intellect. Hence those things that are separated from sensible matter according to being can be perceived by the intellect alone; whereas those things that are separated from sensible matter not according to being, but according to definition, are understood without sensible matter, though not without intelligible matter. Natural things, on the other hand, are understood by abstraction from individual matter, yet not by abstraction from sensible matter altogether: for man is understood as composed of flesh and bones, yet by abstraction from this flesh and these bones. And hence it is that the intellect does not directly know singulars, whereas sense or imagination does.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 18 · Marietti #716] Now from what the Philosopher says here it is apparent that the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing, which is not separated from things as the Platonists posited. Hence that which is the object of our intellect is not something existing outside sensible things, as the Platonists posited, but something existing in sensible things, even though the intellect apprehends the quiddities of things in a manner different from that in which they exist in sensible things. For it does not apprehend them together with the individuating conditions that are joined to them in sensible things. And this can happen without falsehood on the part of the intellect. For nothing prevents one of two things conjoined to each other from being understood without the other being understood—just as sight apprehends color without apprehending odor, though not without apprehending magnitude, which is the proper subject of color. Accordingly, the intellect too can understand some form without its individuating principles, though not without the matter upon which the definition of that form depends: thus it cannot understand the snub without the nose, whereas it can understand the curved without the nose. And because the Platonists failed to draw this distinction, they posited that mathematical things and the quiddities of things are separated in being just as they are separated in the intellect.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 19 · Marietti #717] It is also manifest that the intelligible species by which the possible intellect comes to be in act are not the object of the intellect. For they do not stand to the intellect as that which is understood, but as that by which it understands. For just as the species that is in sight is not that which is seen, but that by which sight sees—whereas that which is seen is the color existing in the body—so too that which the intellect understands is the quiddity existing in things, and not the intelligible species, except insofar as the intellect reflects upon itself. For it is manifest that the sciences treat of the things that the intellect understands; now the sciences treat of things, and not of intelligible species or intentions, save rational science alone. Hence it is manifest that the intelligible species is not the object of the intellect, but rather the quiddity of the thing understood.
[lib. 3 l. 8 n. 20 · Marietti #718] From this it is clear that there is no force in the argument of certain thinkers who wish to show that the possible intellect is one in all men from the fact that the same thing is understood by all, whereas there would have to be numerically several intelligible species if there are several intellects. For the intelligible species is not the very thing understood, but a likeness of it in the soul; and therefore, if there are several intellects possessing the likeness of one and the same thing, it will be the same thing that is understood among them all. And besides this, it is manifest that separate substances also understand the quiddities of natural things that we understand, and yet their intellects are distinct. Hence, if their argument were cogent, the incongruity they infer would not be avoided by positing a single intellect in all men; for they cannot posit a single intellect in all understanding beings.