Book I, Lecture 11 — On Democritus’s Account of Motion and How Geometers Imagine a Moving Point Describing a Line¶
Liber I, Lectio 11 — De motu animae secundum Democritum et quomodo geometrae imaginantur punctum motu suo lineam describere
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 1 · Marietti #168] After the Philosopher refuted the opinion of those who said without qualification that the soul is moved, here he consequently argues against the opinion of Xenocrates, who added something further beyond motion, namely, that the soul is a self-moving number. And this opinion is much more unreasonable than the opinions of the other philosophers that have been mentioned. For many impossibilities attend those who say that the soul is a self-moving number. First, indeed, there are those that arise from being moved, that is, from motion, which also befall all who say that the soul is moved; and there also befall those who speak in this way proper incongruities of their own, namely from the fact that they say that the soul is a number. And on account of this, the Philosopher refutes this definition of the soul given by Xenocrates, and he is arguing not merely against the wording, but against the very intention of the one defining. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows that this definition is incongruous with respect to the soul itself or the substance of the soul; second, with respect to its accidents, at Comprehending them together into one, and so forth. Concerning the first he does two things. For first he demolishes the aforesaid definition of the soul by arguments; second, he shows that upon this definition follow all the incongruities that follow upon the opinions of the other philosophers, at Moreover, there befalls, as we have said, and so forth.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 2 · Marietti #169] Now that the aforesaid definition is incongruous he proves by six arguments, the first of which is as follows. You say that the soul is a self-moving number; now a number consists of units; therefore you say that the soul is units. If you say that the soul is a self-moving number, then you also say that the soul is self-moving units. Yet every self-mover has two parts, as he proves in the eighth book of the Physics, one of which is moving and the other moved; therefore one will have to say that a unit or a point will be divided into two parts, one of which is moving and the other moved. Now this is impossible; therefore it is impossible that the soul be a self-moving number. And that it is impossible for a unit to have one moving part and another moved part, he proves: because in no way can that which is altogether indivisible and undifferentiated be understood to be moved per se in such a way as to have one moving part and another moved part. For in nothing can these two—namely, the motive or moving power and the mobile or moved—exist unless they differ. Since, therefore, a unit is indivisible and undifferentiated, it cannot have parts of this sort, and thus neither can it be moved. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 3 · Marietti #170] He sets down the second argument when he says Furthermore, since, which is as follows. You say that the soul is a number; therefore it is also units, as has been said. Now between a unit and a point there is no difference except that a point has position, for a point is a unit having position. Yet if the soul is a number, such a number of the soul must be somewhere and have position; therefore the soul will be a unit having position. Now things of this sort are points; therefore the soul will be points. Yet according to what the Platonists say, the motion of a point makes a line, while a moved line makes a surface, and a surface a body. Now the soul is a self-moving number, and therefore in the same way a self-moving unit, and consequently it is a self-moving point; yet a moved point makes nothing other than a line; therefore the motion of the soul makes nothing other than a line. And thus the soul by its motion does not cause life, but a line, which is false. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 4 · Marietti #171] He sets down the third argument when he says Furthermore, moreover, which is as follows. If the soul is a number, as you say, it must follow the attributes and nature of number; yet it is established that if someone subtracts any unit from a number, or adds one to it, it changes its species. For if to this number, namely three, you add a unit, it changes its species; for one species belongs to this number four, and another to that which is three. And if you subtract a unit from the same, it becomes two and likewise changes its species. Now it is established that animals take their species from the soul, since each thing attains its species through its form. Therefore, if the soul is a number, upon the subtraction from or addition of something to the soul, there remains a soul of another species; and this is false. For we see in the cuttings of plants and of segmented animals that when divided or cut off they live and retain the same species. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 5 · Marietti #172] He sets down the fourth argument when he says Yet it will seem, which is as follows. You say that the soul is a number; and as has been said, it follows that the soul is units having position, and consequently that it is points. Now according to this, if we consider rightly, it will surely seem to make no difference whether one says that the soul is small and indivisible bodies, as Democritus said, or says that it is units having position. For a one having position is a quantity and indivisible. From this, therefore, I argue thus: the soul, according to your position, is a self-moving number, and consequently self-moving units and points. Now let us suppose that the indivisible bodies posited by Democritus are points—because it makes no difference, as has been said—and let them be quantified, which is necessary because strictly nothing is moved unless it is quantified. Yet points of this sort move themselves, because the soul is a self-moving number. Now in a self-mover, as has been said, there are two elements; therefore there will be within the point itself one element that is moving and another that is moved. Nor does it matter whether they are large or small, provided they have quantity; because in every continuum that moves itself this occurs, namely, that there are two elements there, one as moving and the other as moved. And thus there must be something that moves the units. Now in an animal, that which moves the animal is the soul; therefore in a number too, that which moves the number will be the soul; therefore the soul is not that which is moved, but that which moves. And thus the definition of the soul as a self-moving number is bad; rather, it should be a number moving a moved number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 6 · Marietti #173] He sets down the fifth argument when he says Moreover, it happens, which is as follows. According to the opinion of Xenocrates it happens that this—namely, the soul—is a unit; yet from this it happens that it is points, because if the soul is a unit, it must differ from other units. Yet it will not be able to differ from them except by position. For what is the difference of a solitary point—that is, of an understood unit—except position? Now no unit except one having position is a point; therefore the soul is not a unit, but points. Yet the soul is in a body, and every body has its own points per se. I ask, therefore, whether the points that are the soul are the same as the points of the body, or other. If indeed they are other, then in every part of the body there will be points of the soul, and thus there will be two points of the soul in the same place at once. And if two, why not more, or even infinitely many? For things whose place is indivisible are themselves indivisible as well, whence they do not need a larger place. Hence, if two are posited to be in an indivisible place, consequently infinitely many can be in the same place. If, on the other hand, you say that the points that are in the body are the same as these points that are the soul, it follows that, since every body has points, every body has a soul; yet this is false. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 7 · Marietti #174] He sets down the sixth argument when he says Furthermore, moreover, and it is taken from the preceding one. It is as follows: as has been said, it follows from the position of Xenocrates that the soul is points; yet we see that points are neither separated nor detached from bodies, for lines are not divided from surfaces, nor points from lines. The soul, however, is separated and detached from the body; therefore it is neither points nor a number. It is clear, therefore, that Xenocrates’s definition of the soul is incongruous with respect to the elements placed in the definition.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 8 · Marietti #175] Consequently, when he says Moreover, there befalls, he says that the aforesaid definition is incongruous with respect to the incongruities that follow from it. For from such a definition of the soul follow all the incongruities that follow from the opinions of all the philosophers concerning the soul. For certain thinkers erred concerning the soul and said that it is a body composed of the most subtle parts. From this it followed that, since the soul is wherever sensation is in the body, and sensation is everywhere throughout the body, if the soul is a body, two bodies would be in the same place at once. And this very same thing will follow if the soul is points, as has been said—namely, that two are in the same place at once, and even infinitely many—and this if the points of the soul are other than the points of the body. Yet if there is not made a different number of points of the soul—that is, if the points of the soul do not differ from the points that are in the body—it follows that in every body there is a soul; for in every body points are to be found.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 9 · Marietti #176] Others, however, such as Democritus, erred in saying that the soul is moved, and that the body is moved by the motion of the soul; and since he said that the soul is composed of indivisible spheres and that the body is moved by their motion, it followed that the body would be moved by indivisible bodies. And this very same incongruity follows from the definition of these thinkers—namely, that the animal is moved by a number, and consequently by points; and it makes no difference whether one speaks of small spheres, or of large units, or of any units whatever being moved. For in both cases—that is, in spherical bodies and in units—it is necessary that the soul be moved, inasmuch as they themselves, namely the spherical bodies and the points or units, are moved.
[lib. 1 l. 11 n. 10 · Marietti #177] Consequently, when he says Comprehending them, therefore, he shows the insufficiency of the aforesaid definition on the side of accidents. He says, accordingly, that whenever a definition is adequately assigned, it ought to lead to the knowledge not only of the substance of the thing defined, but also of its accidents. Yet if we weave together into one these two elements that have been placed in the definition of the soul—namely, number and motion—not only do there befall us the incongruities that have been stated concerning the very substance of the soul, but also many others; because it is impossible not only that these two be the definition, that is, the substance of the soul, but it is also impossible that they themselves—namely, number and motion—be accidents of the soul, or lead to the knowledge of its accidents. It is not, therefore, a congruous definition, since it does not lead to the knowledge of the accidents. And that it does not lead to the knowledge of the accidents of the soul is manifest if anyone attempts from a definition of this sort to account for the passions and operations of the soul, such as reasonings, pleasure, sorrow, and the like. For from them—namely, from number and motion—not only will it not be easy to arrive at a knowledge of the accidents and operations of the soul, but we shall not even be able to conjecture anything from them concerning those very passions and operations of the soul.