Summary — On the Object of the Intellect: Flesh and Bone vs. the Continuum, the Snub vs. the Straight, and Reflection upon the Phantasm

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of Lib. III, lect. 8

Argument Summary

Lecture 8 (Pirotta nos. 699–718) is Aquinas’s decisive psychological analysis of intellectual habit, mathematical abstraction, and the proper object of the human mind. Beginning with the transition of the possible intellect from pure potency to habitual science (first act) and actual contemplation (second act, nos. 699–703), Aquinas refutes Avicenna‘s claim that intelligible species are never stored in the possible intellect but must be freshly infused from a separate Agent Intelligence whenever we think (nos. 701–702). Moving to the object of the intellect (nos. 704–709), Aquinas invokes Metaphysics VII to distinguish simple immaterial forms—which are identical with their own quiddities—from composite forms in matter, where individuating principles lie outside the specific essence (‘Socrates is not his humanity,’ no. 705). Crucially, Aquinas extends hylomorphic composition from natural things to mathematics by distinguishing sensible matter from intelligible matter (nos. 706–707): because continuous quantity inheres immediately in substance prior to sensible qualities (white, black, hot, cold), the intellect can remove sensible qualities while retaining continuous quantity (continuum), thereby grounding numerically distinct individuals (such as multiple congruent triangles) within a single mathematical species.

Aquinas then maps cognitive powers onto these ontological levels through a double analogy (nos. 710–716). Just as natural definitions include common sensible matter (flesh and bones for man, the nose for the snub) while abstracting from this flesh and these bones, mathematical definitions include intelligible matter (the continuum for the straight and the curved) while abstracting from sensible qualities altogether (nos. 713–716). To compare universal essences with singular instances, one and the same intellective soul knows both in distinct modes, illustrated by Aristotle‘s geometric simile of the bent line (circumflexa, nos. 711–712): extended straight, the intellect directly apprehends the universal quiddity; bent back in reflection upon the phantasms (redit super phantasmata), it indirectly knows the singular. Aquinas concludes by refuting three rival epistemologies at once: Platonic realism, which confuses abstraction in thought with separation in real being (nos. 716); representationalism, since the intelligible species is not what is known (quod) but that by which (quo) the extramental quiddity is known (no. 717); and Averroist monopsychism, since numerically distinct intellects share one understood truth through distinct species representing the same real nature (no. 718).

Key Theses

  • Habitual science (actus primus) preserves intelligible species in the possible intellect midway between pure potency and actual operation (actus secundus), refuting Avicenna’s separate Agent Intelligence (nos. 700–702).

  • Continuous quantity inheres in substance prior to sensible qualities; when sensible qualities are mentally removed, substance under continuous quantity remains in the intellect as intelligible matter (nos. 706–707).

  • The straight stands to the continuum (intelligible matter) just as the snub stands to the nose and man stands to flesh and bones (sensible matter), explaining why multiple triangles exist within a single geometric species (nos. 707, 713, 715).

  • Like a line extended straight and bent back upon itself, the intellect directly apprehends universal quiddities and indirectly knows singulars by reflecting upon the phantasms (nos. 711–712).

  • Intelligible species are the formal medium by which (quo) reality is understood, not the primary object which (quod) is understood, overturning both Platonism and Averroist monopsychism (nos. 716–718).