Book II, Lecture 16 — On Sound in Act and Potency and Its Fluent Mode of Being in Motion

Liber II, Lectio 16 — De sono secundum actum et potentiam ac de eius esse fluenti in motu

On Sound in Act and Potency and Its Fluent Mode of Being in Motion

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 1 · Marietti #438] After the Philosopher determined concerning the visible, here he determines concerning the audible, that is, concerning sound. And this is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines concerning sound in general; in the second, he determines concerning a certain species of sound, namely voice, at Voice, however. The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, concerning the differences of sounds, at Now the differences of sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning sound; in the second, he raises a certain doubt regarding what has been previously determined, at Whether, however, there sounds. The first is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the generation of sound; in the second, concerning the alteration of hearing by sound, at Now the void. Now if it be asked why he determines here concerning the generation of sound, whereas above he did not determine concerning the generation of color, but only concerning the alteration of the sense and the medium by color, it must be said that color, odor, flavor, and tangible qualities have a permanent and fixed being in their subject. Hence there is one consideration of those qualities in themselves, and another insofar as they alter the sense; and on account of this each belongs to a distinct inquiry. Accordingly, the Philosopher determines concerning the generation of color, flavor, and odor in the book On Sense and the Sensible, and concerning tangible qualities in the book On Generation and Corruption, and as regards certain aspects in the Meteorology. In this book, however, he does not intend to determine concerning sensibles except insofar as they are alterative of the sense. Sound, by contrast, is caused by motion, and does not have a fixed and resting being in a subject, but consists in a certain alteration; whence it is determined simultaneously both insofar as it is generated in its own species and insofar as it alters the sense. Now the first part is divided into two: in the first, he determines concerning the primary generation of sound; in the second, concerning the secondary generation of sound that takes place by reflection, at Echo, however, occurs. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that sound is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency; second, he shows how sound comes to be in act, at Now it comes to be according to act.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 2 · Marietti #439] He says, therefore, first, that before determining concerning touch and taste, we must speak of sound and smell—and first of sound, because it is more immaterial, as was shown above. Now sound is spoken of in two ways: for sound is spoken of in act, and sound in potency. For we say that something has sound both when it actually sounds and when it has the potency of sounding—as when we say, ‘This bell sounds well,’ even though it is not sounding in act. And according to this manner we say that certain things have no sound because they do not have the potency of sounding, such as a sponge and soft things of this sort; whereas certain things are said to have sound because they are able to sound, such as bronze and other flat and smooth things of this sort. Thus, therefore, it is clear that sound is sometimes spoken of according to potency, and sometimes according to act.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 3 · Marietti #440] Yet that sound comes to be in act pertains both to the medium and to hearing. For every sensible is said to be in act in two ways. In one way, when it is actually sensed, that is, while its species is in the sense; and thus sound is in act insofar as it is in hearing. In another way, insofar as it possesses its proper species through which it can be sensed, as existing in its subject; and thus other sensibles come to be in act as they exist in sensible bodies, such as color as existing in a colored body, and odor and flavor as existing in an odoriferous and flavorful body. Yet it is not so with sound. For in the sounding body sound exists only in potency, whereas in the medium that is moved by the striking of the sounding body, sound comes to be in act. And on account of this it is said that sound in act belongs to the medium and to hearing, and not to the resonant subject.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 4 · Marietti #441] Next, when he says Now it comes to be, he shows how sound comes to be in act. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how many factors concur in order that sound be constituted in act; second, he shows of what sort they must be, at Now just as we have said. He says, therefore, first, that for sound to come to be in act, three factors must concur. For it always comes to be of something, and against something, and in something; and therefore if there is one thing alone, it cannot produce sound. And the reason or sign of this is that percussion is the cause of sound; there must therefore be something—that is, that which strikes—and something struck. And on account of this he says that sound is of something against something, that is, of that which strikes against that which is struck. For what produces sound must touch something, and when it has touched it by its blow, sound is then generated. Now the blow of that which strikes does not occur without local motion, and local motion is not without a medium. Hence it remains that there must also be a medium in order that sound come to be in act. And this is what was said, namely, that sound must be not only of something and against something, but also in something.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 5 · Marietti #442] Next, when he says Now just as, he shows of what sort the things required for the generation of sound must be. First, he shows of what sort that which strikes and that which is struck must be; second, of what sort the medium must be, at Furthermore, moreover. He says, therefore, first, that just as has been said above, sound does not arise from the striking of just any bodies whatever. For it was stated above that hairs, sponges, and soft things of this sort do not have the potency of sounding, whence they produce no sound even if they are struck. The reason for this is that soft things yield to that which strikes them; hence air is not forcefully expelled by the percussion so that sound could be formed in it from the blow of the striker and the resistance of what is struck. Yet if soft things of this sort are compressed so that they acquire some hardness and resist the striker, a sound ensues, albeit a dull sound. Bronze, however, and smooth and hollow bodies produce sound by their percussion. For it is necessary that the bodies from whose percussion sound is given forth be hard, so that the air may be expelled—which expulsion is indeed the cause of the generation of sound. It is also required that they be smooth, so that the air may remain one, as will be stated below.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 6 · Marietti #443] Hollow bodies too, when struck, give forth sound well, because air is enclosed within them. And when the air first set in motion cannot immediately escape, it strikes other air, and thus from the repercussion many blows occur and the sound is multiplied. And on account of this as well, bodies that have well-disposed air in their composition are highly resonant, such as bronze and silver; whereas those in whose composition air is not well disposed are not very resonant, such as lead and other things of this sort, which are more drossy and earthy.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 7 · Marietti #444] Next, when he says Furthermore, it is heard, he shows of what sort the medium is in which sound is generated; and he says that the medium in which sound is heard is air and water, though it is heard less in water than in air; whence the most proper medium, both in the generation of sound and in hearing, is air. And because the medium in every sense lacks the sensible qualities pertaining to that sense so that it may be able to receive them all, it is manifest that neither air nor water has a proper sound of its own; rather, it is necessary for the generation of sound in air or water that certain firm or solid and hard bodies strike one another and strike the air.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 8 · Marietti #445] Now that the striking of solid bodies against one another—and consequently sound and the striking against the air—occurs simultaneously happens when the air remains in its integrity so that it can be struck, and is not divided prior to the percussion. And on account of this we see that if something touches another with a slow motion, it makes no sound, because the air withdraws and disperses before the contact of the solid bodies takes place. Yet if the percussion is swift and forceful, then sound occurs; because for sound to occur, the motion of the striker must forestall the division of the air, so that the air while still united or gathered together can be struck, and sound be generated in it. And it is similar to when something borne swiftly can strike a heap of stones before it scatters, which does not happen if it is moved slowly. And on account of this too, when something is borne swiftly through the air itself, it produces sound by its motion, because the air itself, while still united, stands in the role of that which is struck and not solely that of the medium.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 9 · Marietti #446] Next, when he says Echo, however, he determines concerning the secondary generation of sound, which takes place by reverberation—which sound is called an echo. First, therefore, he determines how it is generated; second, he shows how it is diversified in its generation, at Now it seems. Concerning the first, it must be noted that the generation of sound in air follows upon the motion of the air, as has been said. Now it happens with the alteration of air in the generation of sound just as with the alteration of water when something is cast into water. For it is manifest that certain circular ripples arise around the water that has been struck. Near the place of percussion these ripples are small and the motion is strong, whereas at a distance the circles are large and the motion weaker, and finally the motion vanishes altogether and the ripples cease. Yet if before the motion ceases those circular ripples encounter some obstacle, a circular motion arises in the contrary direction, and all the more vehemently the closer they are to the initial percussion.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 10 · Marietti #447] Thus, therefore, it must be understood that upon the percussion of sounding bodies the air is moved in circles and sound is diffused in every direction. Near at hand the circular waves are smaller, yet the motion is stronger, whence the sound is perceived more strongly; whereas at a distance the circular waves are larger, the motion weaker, and the sound is heard more faintly; and at last the whole dies away. Yet if before circular waves of this sort die away there occurs a reverberation of the air thus moved and carrying the sound against some body, the circular waves will turn back in the contrary direction, and thus the sound is heard as though from the opposite side. And this is called an echo.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 11 · Marietti #448] This occurs chiefly when the obstacle against which the moved air rebounds is some hollow body, like a vessel bounding and enclosing the air in its unity and thereby preventing it from dispersing. For then that air, thus united and set in commotion, because it cannot extend its motion any further on account of the obstructing body, strikes back against the air by which it was struck, and a motion arises in the contrary direction—just as happens when someone throws a ball, which is here called a sphere, and upon encountering an obstacle it rebounds.

[lib. 2 l. 16 n. 12 · Marietti #449] Next, when he says Now it seems, he shows how an echo occurs in diverse ways; and he says that an echo seems always to occur, though it does not always occur as distinct, that is, manifestly perceptible. And he shows this by a likeness. For he says that it happens with sound just as with light. For light is always reflected, yet sometimes the reflection of light is manifest and sometimes not. The reflection of light is indeed manifest when it is reflected from some shining body, so that the reflection of light takes place with a certain brightness, in a manner similar to the primary emission of light. On the other hand, the reflection of light is unmanifest when it is reflected from some opaque body, because a reflection of this sort occurs without brightness and emission of rays. For unless a reflection of the sun’s rays took place from opaque bodies, light would not occur everywhere—that is, in every part of the air of the upper hemisphere—but everywhere outside the sun, that is, outside the places reached directly by the solar rays, there would be darkness. Nevertheless, light is not reflected from opaque bodies in the same way as from water or bronze or any among smooth and polished bodies, from which reflection occurs with brightness and emission of rays. And therefore, because the reflection that takes place from opaque bodies is not similar to the reflection that takes place from shining bodies, the reflection that takes place from opaque bodies produces darkness—that is, shadow—on that side where the manifest light resulting from the direct emission of solar rays is bounded. In a similar way, when the reflection of sound takes place against a hollow body in which sound is naturally suited to be multiplied, a distinct echo occurs, that is, one manifestly comprehensible; whereas when the reverberation of sound takes place against other bodies that are not naturally suited to multiply sound, no manifest echo occurs.