Summary — How the Soul Is in a Way All Things, the Hand the Organ of Organs, and the Intellect the Form of Forms

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of Lib. III, lect. 13

Argument Summary

In Lecture 13 (Pirotta nos. 786–793), Aquinas synthesizes the entire noetics of De Anima around two master theses: how the rational soul is intentionally ‘all things,’ and why human intellection depends intrinsically upon sense and imagination even after scientific habits have been acquired. Recapitulating earlier Greek philosophy (nos. 786–788), Aquinas affirms that the soul is ‘in a way all things’—sensible through sense and intelligible through intellect—not materially, as Empedocles imagined (‘knowing stone by an internal stone’), but intentionally through immaterial species (‘a stone is not in the soul, but the species of the stone,’ no. 788). Hence the soul corresponds to the human hand (no. 789): just as nature gave humanity the hand as the organ of organs (organum organorum) in place of fixed claws, horns, or pelts so that humans might fashion universal instruments for every purpose, so the soul is given in place of fixed innate forms as receptive of all sensible and intelligible forms—making the intellect the form of forms (species specierum).

In the second half of the lecture (nos. 790–793), Aquinas forestalls any Platonist or Avicennian inference that this universal receptivity emancipates human thought from bodily magnitudes. Because neither natural attributes nor mathematical abstractions (ea quae dicuntur per abstractionem) subsist outside sensible magnitudes in reality, no human being can either learn science initially or exercise already-acquired science (utens scientia habita) without simultaneously forming and inspecting a phantasm (no. 790). Against Avicenna‘s claim that habitual science dispenses with sense and imagination, Aquinas adduces empirical clinical proof: lesion of the bodily organ of imagination impedes the actual use of previously mastered science (no. 791). Nevertheless, intellectual concepts (primi intellectus) are never reducible to phantasms: imagination neither combines concepts into true or false judgments (no. 792) nor represents universals as such, for phantasms depict singulars and contain universal indivisibles only in potency, not in act (no. 793).

Key Theses

  • The soul is ‘in a way all things’ not materially like Empedocles’s elements, but intentionally by receiving the sensible and intelligible species of things without matter (nos. 786–788).

  • Just as the hand is the organ of organs (organum organorum) enabling man to craft every tool, the soul stands in place of all forms, with the intellect functioning as the form of forms (species specierum) receptive of all intelligibles (no. 789).

  • Because mathematical and natural intelligibles exist ontologically only within sensible magnitudes, both initial discovery and the actual contemplation of habitual science require forming a phantasm (nos. 790–791).

  • Against Avicenna, bodily lesion of the imaginative organ blocks the exercise of already-acquired science, proving permanent dependence on turning to the phantasms (no. 791).

  • Primary intellectual concepts are not phantasms, though never without them: phantasms represent particulars and are universal indivisibles only in potency, while truth and falsehood belong to intellectual judgment alone (nos. 792–793).