Summary — How the Mathematician Differs from the Natural Philosopher and Why There Is No Falsehood in Those Who Abstract

Analytical Synopsis & Core Theses of Phys. II, lect. 3

Argument Summary

Aquinas examines how mathematics and natural philosophy can treat the very same geometric realities—points, lines, surfaces, and solid bodies—without collapsing into a single science. Beginning with two aporiae (that natural bodies possess surfaces, solidities, lengths, and points, and that astronomy simultaneously belongs to mathematics and demonstrates the shapes of natural celestial bodies), Aquinas resolves the difficulty through the distinction of formal perspectives (rationes considerandi). Whereas the physicist investigates surfaces, lines, and points precisely insofar as they are boundaries of a mobile natural body endowed with sensible qualities, the mathematician considers them apart from motion and sensible matter. Grounding this epistemic capacity in the ontological order of accidents inhering in substance, Aquinas shows that dimensive quantity accrues to corporeal substance prior to sensible qualities (such as hot, cold, white, or heavy) and the motions rooted in them. Because what is prior in nature does not include what is posterior in its intelligible definition, the intellect can understand quantity and figure with intelligible matter (substance as subject to pure extension) while leaving sensible matter out of consideration—confirming that there is no falsehood in those who abstract, since non-consideration of sensible qualities is not a false judgment of ontological separation.

From this principle Aquinas diagnoses Plato‘s twofold error—reifying both mathematicals and natural species into separate Ideas by confusing intellectual abstraction with separate existence—and confirms his solution through two decisive signs. First, natural definitions always resemble the snub (simum), which includes a determinate sensible subject (the nose) in its essence, whereas mathematical definitions—even and odd, straight and curved (curvum), number, line, and figure—prescind from any sensible subject. Second, the sciences intermediate between mathematics and physics (optics, harmonics, and astronomy) invert pure mathematical abstraction by applying abstract geometric and arithmetic theorems back to visual rays, audible sounds, and celestial spheres. Because a science takes its denomination from its terminus, these intermediate sciences are more natural than mathematical, explaining why both the physicist and the astronomer prove that the earth is spherical, yet through distinct middle terms: the physicist from the symmetric downward tendency of heavy parts toward the center, and the astronomer from the curved shadow cast in lunar eclipses and the shifting horizon of visible stars.

Key Theses

  • Mathematics and physics investigate the same extended realities (points, lines, surfaces, and bodies) under distinct formal perspectives: physics treats them as boundaries of mobile natural bodies, whereas mathematics abstracts them from motion and sensible matter.

  • Dimensive quantity inheres in substance prior to sensible qualities and physical motions; therefore quantity encloses intelligible matter (substance subject to extension) in its notion without enclosing sensible matter.

  • There is no falsehood in those who abstract (abstrahentium non est mendacium), because considering geometric magnitude apart from sensible qualities does not assert that mathematical objects subsist outside sensible bodies, as Plato mistakenly supposed.

  • Natural definitions follow the model of the snub by incorporating sensible matter (flesh and bone, though not individual flesh and bone), whereas mathematical definitions follow the model of the curved by excluding sensible matter entirely.

  • Sciences intermediate between mathematics and physics (optics, harmonics, astronomy) apply pure geometric and arithmetic principles to sensible matter, sharing conclusions with physics while demonstrating them through formal quantitative middle terms.