Question VI, Article 1 — Whether One Must Proceed Rationally in Natural Things, Disciplinably in Mathematics, and Intellectually in Divine Things¶
Quaestio VI, Articulus 1 — Utrum oporteat versari in naturalibus rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinaliter et in divinis intellectualiter
f. q. 6, a. 1[pars 3 q. 6 pr.] Next we inquire concerning the modes which he attributes to the speculative sciences. And concerning this, four points are asked.
[pars 3 q. 6 pr. 1] First: Whether one must proceed rationally in natural things, disciplinably in mathematical things, and intellectually in divine things.
[pars 3 q. 6 pr. 2] Second: Whether in divine things the imagination must be altogether relinquished.
[pars 3 q. 6 pr. 3] Third: Whether our intellect is able to behold the divine form itself.
[pars 3 q. 6 pr. 4] Fourth: Whether this can come about by way of any speculative science.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the first article. It seems that one ought not to proceed rationally in natural things. For rational philosophy is divided over against natural philosophy. Now to proceed rationally seems to pertain properly to rational philosophy. Therefore it is not fittingly attributed to natural philosophy.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2] Furthermore, in the Physics the Philosopher frequently distinguishes between rational and physical procedures leading to certain conclusions. Therefore it is not proper to natural science to proceed rationally.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3] Furthermore, what is common to all the sciences ought not to be appropriated to one alone. Yet every science proceeds by reasoning, advancing discursively either from effects to causes, or from causes to effects, or from certain signs. Therefore this mode ought not to be appropriated to natural science.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 4] Furthermore, in Book VI of the Ethics the ratiocinative part of the soul is distinguished by the Philosopher over against the scientific part. Now natural philosophy pertains to the scientific part. Therefore proceeding rationally is not fittingly attributed to it.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 s. c. 1] On the contrary is what is said in the book On Spirit and Soul, namely that reason is concerned with the forms of bodies. Now to consider bodies pertains above all to the natural philosopher. Therefore proceeding rationally is fittingly attributed to him.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 s. c. 2] Furthermore, in Book V of The Consolation of Philosophy Boethius says: Reason, when it looks upon something universal, making use of neither imagination nor sense, nevertheless comprehends things imaginable and sensible. Now to comprehend things imaginable and sensible pertains to the natural philosopher alone. Therefore a rational procedure is fittingly attributed to the natural philosopher.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 11] Further, it seems unfitting to say that mathematics proceeds disciplinably—that is, by way of learning. For discipline seems to be nothing other than the reception of science. Yet in every part of philosophy science is received, since all proceed demonstratively. Therefore to proceed disciplinably is common to all parts of philosophy, and consequently ought not to be appropriated to mathematics.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 12] Furthermore, the more certain something is, the easier it seems to be for there to be learning concerning it. Now natural things seem to be more certain than mathematical objects, because they are grasped by sense, from which all our cognition takes its origin. Therefore this mode belongs rather to the natural philosopher than to the mathematician.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 13] Furthermore, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics, the starting point in the sciences is that from which easier learning comes about. Now the starting point of learning is taken from logic, which must be learned prior to mathematics and to all the other sciences. Therefore the disciplinary mode belongs to logic more than to the other sciences.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 14] Furthermore, the modes of natural science and of divine science are taken from powers of the soul, namely from reason and intellect. Similarly, therefore, the mode of mathematics ought also to be taken from some power of the soul; and thus its mode is unfittingly set down as proceeding disciplinably.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 s. c. 11] On the contrary, to proceed disciplinably—by way of learning—is to proceed demonstratively and with certitude. Now as Ptolemy says at the beginning of the Almagest, the mathematical genus alone, if one devotes diligent inquiry to it, will yield to its students firm and unshakable conviction in knowledge, as through demonstration wrought by indubitable paths. Therefore to proceed disciplinably is most proper to the mathematician.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 s. c. 12] Furthermore, this is evident through the Philosopher, who in many places in his books names the mathematical sciences “disciplines.”
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 21] Further, it seems that proceeding intellectually is not a fitting mode for divine science. For according to the Philosopher, understanding is of principles, whereas science is of conclusions. Yet not all the truths handed down in divine science are principles, since some are also conclusions. Therefore proceeding intellectually is not fitting for divine science.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 22] Furthermore, in matters that exceed every intellect we cannot proceed intellectually. Yet divine things exceed every intellect, as Dionysius says in Chapter 1 of On the Divine Names and the Philosopher in the Book of Causes. Therefore they cannot be treated intellectually.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 23] Furthermore, Dionysius says in Chapter 7 of On the Divine Names that angels possess intellectual power insofar as they do not gather divine cognition from sensible things or from divided realities. Yet this is beyond the power of the soul, as is added in the same place. Since, therefore, the divine science now under discussion is a science belonging to the human soul, it seems that its proper mode is not to treat its objects intellectually.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 24] Furthermore, theology seems chiefly to treat of things pertaining to faith. Yet in things pertaining to faith, understanding is the end; hence it is said in Isaiah 7 according to another reading: Unless you believe, you shall not understand. Therefore proceeding intellectually concerning divine things ought to be posited not as the mode of theology, but as its end.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 s. c. 21] On the contrary is what is said in the book On Spirit and Soul, namely that intellect deals with created spirits, whereas intelligence deals with God himself. Now divine science treats chiefly of both of these. Therefore proceeding intellectually seems to be proper to it.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 s. c. 22] Furthermore, the mode of a science ought to correspond to its matter. Now divine things are intelligible in themselves. Therefore the mode fitting to divine science is to proceed intellectually.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 1] I answer to the first question that a procedure followed in the sciences is called rational in three ways. In one way, on the side of the principles from which one proceeds, as when someone proceeds to prove something from the works of reason—of which sort are genus, species, opposite, and intentions of this kind that logicians consider. And thus a procedure will be called rational when in some science one employs propositions handed down in logic, namely insofar as we use logic as a teaching science within the other sciences. Yet this mode of proceeding cannot properly belong to any particular science, in which error arises unless one proceeds from proper principles. This happens properly and fittingly, however, in logic and in metaphysics, inasmuch as both sciences are common and treat in a certain manner of the same subject.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 2] In a second way, a procedure is called rational from the term at which one stops in proceeding. For the ultimate term to which the inquiry of reason ought to lead is the understanding of principles, into which we resolve when judging; and when this indeed comes about, the procedure or proof is not called rational, but demonstrative. Sometimes, however, the inquiry of reason cannot be brought all the way to the aforesaid term, but comes to rest in the inquiry itself—namely when a path toward either side of a contradiction still remains open to the inquirer; and this happens when one proceeds through probable reasons, which by nature produce opinion or belief rather than science. In this sense, a rational procedure is divided over against a demonstrative one; and in this way one can proceed rationally in any science whatsoever, so that from probable arguments the way may be prepared for necessary proofs. And this is another mode in which we employ logic in the demonstrative sciences—not indeed as teaching, but as logic in use. In both of these two ways a procedure is denominated rational from rational science, for in these ways logic, which is called rational science, is employed in the demonstrative sciences, as the Commentator says in Book I of the Physics.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 3] In a third way, a procedure is called rational from the rational power, namely insofar as in proceeding we follow the proper mode of the rational soul in knowing; and in this sense a rational procedure is proper to natural science. For natural science in its procedures observes the proper mode of the rational soul in two respects. First, in that just as the rational soul receives the knowledge of intelligible things—which are more known by nature—from sensible things—which are more known with respect to us—so natural science proceeds from things that are more known with respect to us and less known by nature, as is evident in Book I of the Physics, and demonstration through a sign or an effect is above all employed in natural science. Second, because since it belongs to reason to advance discursively from one thing to another, this is observed above all in natural science, wherein from the knowledge of one thing one arrives at the knowledge of another thing, as from the knowledge of an effect to the knowledge of its cause. Nor does one proceed merely from one thing to another according to notion while not distinct in reality, as if one proceeded from animal to man. For in the mathematical sciences one proceeds solely through things that belong to the essence of the thing, since they demonstrate solely through the formal cause; and therefore in them nothing is demonstrated of one thing through another thing, but through the proper definition of that thing itself. For even if certain demonstrations are given concerning the circle from the triangle or conversely, this occurs only insofar as the triangle exists potentially in the circle and conversely. In natural science, however, wherein demonstration takes place through extrinsic causes, something is proved of one thing through another wholly extrinsic thing. And thus the mode of reason is observed above all in natural science, and on account of this natural science among the others is most conformed to the human intellect. Proceeding rationally is therefore attributed to natural science, not because it belongs to it alone, but because it belongs to it preeminently.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that that argument proceeds concerning a procedure called rational in the first way; for in that sense a rational procedure is proper to rational science and divine science, though not to natural science.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 2] To the second it must be said that that argument proceeds concerning a procedure called rational in the second way.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 3] To the third it must be said that the mode of reason is observed in all the sciences to the extent that one proceeds from one thing to another according to notion, yet not to the extent that one proceeds from one reality to another; rather, this latter is proper to natural science, and thus proceeding rationally is attributed to it, as has been said.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that the Philosopher there sets down the ratiocinative and the opinative as the same, whence it is evident that this pertains to the second mode assigned above. Now to the ratiocinative or opinative faculty the Philosopher in the same place attributes human doable actions, of which moral science treats, by reason of their contingency. Hence it may be gathered from what has been said that the first mode of rationality is most proper to rational science, the second to moral science, and the third to natural science.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 11] To the second question it must be said that proceeding disciplinably—by way of learning—is attributed to mathematical science not because it alone proceeds disciplinably, but because this belongs to it preeminently. For since to learn is nothing other than to receive science from another, we are said to proceed disciplinably when our procedure leads to certain knowledge, which is called science; and this indeed happens above all in the mathematical sciences. For since mathematics stands midway between natural and divine science, it is more certain than either. It is more certain than natural science because its consideration is freed from motion and matter, whereas natural consideration is engaged with matter and motion. Now from the fact that natural consideration deals with matter, its cognition depends upon more factors—namely upon the consideration of matter itself, of form, of material dispositions, and of the properties that follow upon form in matter. Yet wherever one must consider more factors in order to know something, cognition is more difficult; hence in Book I of the Posterior Analytics it is said that that science is less certain which exists by way of addition, as geometry is less certain than arithmetic. Moreover, from the fact that its consideration deals with mobile things that do not behave uniformly, its cognition is less firm, because its demonstrations hold for the most part, inasmuch as things sometimes happen otherwise. Consequently, the closer any science approaches to singulars—such as operative sciences like medicine, alchemy, and moral science—the less certitude they are able to possess, on account of the multitude of factors that must be considered in such sciences, the omission of any one of which entails error, and on account of their variability.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 12] Furthermore, the procedure of mathematics is more certain than the procedure of divine science, because the realities of which divine science treats are further removed from sensible things, from which our cognition takes its start—both with respect to separate substances, toward the knowledge of which what we receive from sensible things leads insufficiently, and with respect to the attributes common to all beings, which are maximally universal and thus maximally removed from the particulars falling under sense. Mathematical objects themselves, however, fall under sense and underlie the imagination, such as figure, line, number, and the like. Consequently, the human intellect, receiving from phantasms, grasps the knowledge of these things more easily and more certainly than that of some separate Intelligence, or even than the quiddity of substance, act and potency, and other things of this kind. Thus it is evident that mathematical consideration is easier and more certain than natural and theological consideration, and much more so than the other, operative sciences; and therefore mathematics above all is said to proceed disciplinably. And this is what Ptolemy says at the beginning of the Almagest: One might call the other two genera of theoretical inquiry opinion rather than scientific conception: the theological on account of its unmanifest and incomprehensible character, and the physical on account of the instability and obscurity of matter; the mathematical genus alone will yield to its students firm and unshakable conviction in inquiry, as assuredly through demonstration wrought by indubitable paths.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 11] To the first objection on this point, therefore, it must be said that although learning is received in every science, nevertheless in mathematics it is received more easily and more certainly, as has been said.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 12] To the second it must be said that although natural things underlie sense, nevertheless on account of their fluidity they do not possess great certitude once they pass outside actual sensation, such as mathematical objects possess—which exist without motion and yet exist in sensible matter according to being, and thus are able to fall under sense and the imagination.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 13] To the third it must be said that in learning we begin from what is easier, unless necessity requires otherwise. For sometimes in learning it is necessary to begin not from what is easier, but from that upon the knowledge of which the knowledge of subsequent matters depends. And for this reason in learning one must begin from logic—not because it is easier than the other sciences, for indeed it involves the greatest difficulty since it treats of second intentions, but because the other sciences depend upon it insofar as it teaches the mode of proceeding in all the sciences. Now one must know the mode of science before science itself, as is said in Book II of the Metaphysics.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 14] To the fourth it must be said that the mode of the sciences is taken from the powers of the soul by reason of the mode in which the powers of the soul act. Hence the modes of the sciences correspond not simply to the powers of the soul, but to the modes in which the powers of the soul can proceed, which are diversified not by the powers alone, but also by the objects; and thus the mode of every science need not be denominated from some power of the soul. Nevertheless, it can be said that just as the mode of physics is taken from reason insofar as it receives from sense, and the mode of divine science from intellect insofar as it considers something nakedly, so too the mode of mathematics can be taken from reason insofar as it receives from the imagination.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 21] To the third question it must be said that just as proceeding rationally is attributed to natural philosophy because in it the mode of reason is observed above all, so proceeding intellectually is attributed to divine science because in it the mode of intellect is observed above all. Now reason differs from intellect as multitude from unity. Hence Boethius says in Book IV of The Consolation of Philosophy that reason stands to intelligence in the same way as time stands to eternity and a circle to its center. For it is proper to reason to be diffused around many things and out of them to gather one simple cognition. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter 7 of On the Divine Names that souls possess rationality insofar as they discursively circle around the truth of existing things, and in this they fall short of the angels; yet insofar as they roll many things together into one, they are in a certain manner made equal to the angels. Intellect, conversely, considers first one simple truth and within that grasps the knowledge of a whole multitude, just as God, by understanding his own essence, knows all things. Hence Dionysius says in the same place that angelic minds possess intellectuality insofar as they uniformly understand the intelligibles of divine realities.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 co. 22] Thus it is evident that rational consideration terminates at intellectual consideration according to the way of resolution, insofar as reason gathers one simple truth out of many. Conversely, intellectual consideration is the principle of rational consideration according to the way of composition or discovery, insofar as the intellect comprehends a multitude within one unity. That consideration, therefore, which is the term of all human ratiocination is supremely intellectual consideration. Now the entire consideration of resolving reason across all the sciences terminates at the consideration of divine science. For reason, as was said earlier, sometimes proceeds from one thing to another in reality, as when demonstration takes place through extrinsic causes or effects: by composing when one proceeds from causes to effects, and as it were by resolving when one proceeds from effects to causes, inasmuch as causes are simpler than effects and abide more immobily and uniformly. The ultimate term of resolution along this path, therefore, is reached when one arrives at the highest and simplest causes, which are the separate substances. At other times, however, reason proceeds from one thing to another according to notion, as when the procedure follows intrinsic causes: by composing when one proceeds from the most universal forms to more particularized ones, and by resolving when one proceeds conversely, inasmuch as what is more universal is simpler. Now the maximally universal principles are those that are common to all beings; and therefore the ultimate term of resolution along this path is the consideration of being and of the attributes belonging to being insofar as it is such. Now these—namely separate substances and what is common to all beings—are the very realities that divine science considers, as was said above. Hence it is manifest that its consideration is supremely intellectual. And from this it also follows that it bestows principles upon all the other sciences insofar as intellectual consideration is the principle of rational consideration, on account of which it is called first philosophy; and nonetheless it is learned after physics and the other sciences insofar as intellectual consideration is the term of rational consideration, on account of which it is called metaphysics, as it were beyond physics, because it presents itself after physics along the path of resolution.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 21] To the first objection on this point, therefore, it must be said that proceeding intellectually is attributed to divine science not as though it did not reason by proceeding from principles to conclusions, but because its ratiocination is closest to intellectual consideration, and its conclusions closest to its principles.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 22] To the second it must be said that God is above every created intellect with respect to comprehension, though not above the uncreated intellect, since in understanding himself he comprehends himself. With respect to the cognition whereby it is known what he is, however, he is above every intellect of a wayfarer in this life, though not with respect to the cognition whereby it is known that he exists; whereas by the blessed it is also known what he is, because they see his essence. Moreover, divine science treats not of God alone, but also of other realities that do not exceed the human intellect even in the state of this present life with respect to knowing what they are.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 23] To the third it must be said that, as was stated above, human consideration with respect to its term attains in a certain manner to angelic cognition—not by equality, indeed, but by a certain assimilation. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter 7 of On the Divine Names that souls, by rolling many things together into one, are counted worthy of intellective acts equal to those of the angels, so far as is proper and possible to souls.
[pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 ad 24] To the fourth it must be said that the cognition of faith also pertains preeminently to the intellect; for we do not receive those truths through the investigation of reason, but hold them by a simple acceptance of the intellect. Yet we are said not to understand them insofar as the intellect does not possess full cognition of them—which indeed is promised to us as our reward.