Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6–7 & q. 85, a. 1 — On the Origin of Science from Sensible Things, Turning to Phantasms, and Threefold Abstraction

Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6–7 & q. 85, a. 1 — De origine scientiae ex sensibilibus, conversione ad phantasmata et triplici abstractione

On the Origin of Science from Sensible Things, Turning to Phantasms, and Threefold Abstraction

[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the sixth article. It seems that intellectual knowledge is not received from sensible things. For Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that the pureness of truth is not to be expected from the senses of the body. And he proves this in two ways. In one way, from the fact that everything that bodily sense reaches is changed without any intermission of time, and what does not abide cannot be perceived. In another way, from the fact that all things that we sense through the body, even when they are not present to the senses, nevertheless leave us subject to their images, as in sleep or frenzy; yet by the senses we are unable to discern whether we are sensing the sensible objects themselves or their false images. Now nothing can be perceived that is not discerned from the false. And thus he concludes that truth is not to be expected from the senses. Now intellectual knowledge is apprehensive of truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not to be expected from the senses.

[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2] Furthermore, Augustine says in Book XII of On Genesis According to the Letter: It must not be thought that the body produces anything in the spirit, as though the spirit were subjected in the place of matter to the acting body; for he who makes is in every way more excellent than that thing out of which he makes something. Hence he concludes that it is not the body that makes the image of the body in the spirit, but the spirit itself that makes it within itself. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3] Furthermore, an effect does not extend beyond the power of its cause. Now intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things, for we understand certain things that cannot be perceived by sense. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

[I q. 84 a. 6 s. c.] On the contrary, the Philosopher proves in Book I of the Metaphysics and at the end of the Posterior Analytics that the beginning of our knowledge is from sense.

[I q. 84 a. 6 co.] I answer that on this question there was a threefold opinion among the philosophers. For Democritus held that there is no other cause of any knowledge of ours except when, from those bodies of which we think, images come forth and enter into our souls, as Augustine says in his Letter to Dioscorus. And Aristotle likewise says in the book On Sleep and Waking that Democritus posited knowledge to take place through images and effluxes. And the reason for this position was that both Democritus himself and the other early natural philosophers did not hold that the intellect differs from sense, as Aristotle says in the book On the Soul. Consequently, since sense is modified by the sensible object, they supposed that all our knowledge comes about solely through modification by sensible things—which modification Democritus asserted to take place by effluxes of images. Plato, on the contrary, held that the intellect differs from sense, and that the intellect is indeed an immaterial power making no use of a bodily organ in its act. And because the incorporeal cannot be modified by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge does not take place through a modification of the intellect by sensible things, but through participation in separate intelligible forms, as has been said. Moreover, he held sense also to be a certain power operating of itself. Hence neither is sense itself, since it is a certain spiritual power, modified by sensible things; rather, the organs of the senses are modified by sensible things, and from this modification the soul is in a way aroused to form within itself the species of sensible things. And Augustine seems to touch upon this opinion in Book XII of On Genesis According to the Letter, where he says that the body does not sense, but the soul through the body, which it uses like a messenger for forming within itself what is announced from without. Thus, therefore, according to Plato’s opinion, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor even sensible knowledge wholly from sensible things; rather, sensible things arouse the sensitive soul to sensing, and similarly the senses arouse the intellective soul to understanding. Aristotle, however, proceeded by a middle way. For with Plato he held that the intellect differs from sense. Yet he held that sense does not have its proper operation without the cooperation of the body, so that sensing is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite. And he held the same regarding all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, there is nothing unreasonable in sensible objects outside the soul causing something in the composite, Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this: that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of sensible things upon the sense—not by way of efflux, as Democritus held, but by a certain operation; for Democritus also held every action to take place by an influx of atoms, as is clear in Book I of On Generation and Corruption. The intellect, however, Aristotle held to have an operation without the cooperation of the body. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression upon an incorporeal thing. And therefore, to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the mere impression of sensible bodies does not suffice, but something nobler is required, since the agent is more honorable than the patient, as he himself says. Yet not in such a way that the intellectual operation is caused in us by the mere impression of certain higher beings, as Plato held; rather, that higher and nobler agent which he calls the agent intellect, of which we have spoken above, renders the phantasms received from the senses intelligible in act by way of a certain abstraction. According to this, therefore, on the side of the phantasms the intellectual operation is caused by sense. Yet because the phantasms do not suffice to modify the possible intellect, but must be made intelligible in act by the agent intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a certain way the matter of the cause.

[I q. 84 a. 6 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that by those words of Augustine we are given to understand that truth is not to be expected wholly from the senses. For the light of the agent intellect is required, through which we immutably know the truth in mutable things, and discern the things themselves from the likenesses of things.

[I q. 84 a. 6 ad 2] To the second it must be said that Augustine is speaking there not of intellectual knowledge, but of imaginary knowledge. And because, according to Plato’s opinion, the imaginative power has an operation that belongs to the soul alone, Augustine used the very same reasoning to show that bodies do not impress their likenesses upon the imaginative power, but that the soul itself does so, as Aristotle uses to prove that the agent intellect is something separate—namely because the agent is more honorable than the patient. And beyond doubt, according to this position, it is necessary to posit in the imaginative power not only a passive potency, but also an active one. Yet if we posit, in accordance with the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imaginative power belongs to the composite, no difficulty follows, because the sensible body is nobler than the organ of the animal insofar as it is compared to it as being in act to being in potency, just as the thing colored in act is compared to the pupil, which is colored in potency. Nevertheless it could be said that, although the first modification of the imaginative power occurs through the motion of sensible objects—since imagination is a motion brought about in accordance with sense, as is said in the book On the Soul—there is nonetheless a certain operation of the soul in man which, by dividing and composing, forms diverse images of things, even ones not received from the senses. And with respect to this Augustine’s words may be taken.

[I q. 84 a. 6 ad 3] To the third it must be said that sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is no wonder if intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensitive knowledge.

[I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the seventh article. It seems that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species which it possesses within itself, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made in act through the intelligible species by which it is informed. Now for the intellect to be in act is understanding itself. Therefore intelligible species suffice for the intellect to understand in act, without its turning to the phantasms.

[I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2] Furthermore, imagination depends more upon sense than the intellect depends upon imagination. Now imagination can imagine in act when sensible objects are absent. Much more, therefore, can the intellect understand in act without turning to the phantasms.

[I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3] Furthermore, of incorporeal things there are no phantasms, since imagination does not transcend time and the continuum. If, therefore, our intellect could not understand anything in act unless it turned to the phantasms, it would follow that it could not understand anything incorporeal—which is manifestly false, for we understand truth itself, as well as God and the angels.

[I q. 84 a. 7 s. c.] On the contrary, the Philosopher says in Book III of On the Soul that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm.

[I q. 84 a. 7 co.] I answer that in the state of the present life, in which it is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything in act except by turning to the phantasms. And this is evident from two signs. First indeed because, since the intellect is a certain power making no use of a bodily organ, it would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of any bodily organ if there were not required for its act the act of some power that does use a bodily organ. Now sense, imagination, and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part make use of a bodily organ. Hence it is manifest that for the intellect to understand in act—not only in acquiring knowledge anew, but also in using knowledge already acquired—there is required the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For we see that when the act of the imaginative power is hindered by a lesion of the organ, as in those suffering from frenzy, and likewise when the act of the memorative power is hindered, as in the lethargic, a man is hindered from understanding in act even those things of which he had previously acquired knowledge. Second, because anyone can experience this within himself: that when someone strives to understand anything, he forms certain phantasms for himself by way of examples, in which, as it were, he inspects what he endeavors to understand. And hence it is also that when we wish to make someone else understand anything, we set examples before him, from which he can form phantasms for himself in order to understand. Now the reason for this is that the cognitive power is proportioned to the knowable object. Hence the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is wholly separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body, and through intelligible objects of this sort it knows material things. Of the human intellect, however, which is united to a body, the proper object is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it ascends also to some knowledge of invisible things. Now it belongs to the intelligible character of such a nature that it exist in some individual, which does not occur apart from corporeal matter—just as it belongs to the nature of a stone that it be in this stone, and to the nature of a horse that it be in this horse, and so on with other things. Hence the nature of a stone, or of any material thing whatever, cannot be known completely and truly except insofar as it is known as existing in the particular. Now we apprehend the particular through sense and imagination. And therefore, for the intellect to understand in act its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. If, however, the proper object of our intellect were a separate form, or if the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from particulars as the Platonists held, there would be no need for our intellect always to turn to the phantasms in understanding.

[I q. 84 a. 7 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the species preserved in the possible intellect exist in it habitually when it is not understanding in act, as was said above. Hence for us to understand in act, the mere preservation of the species does not suffice; rather, we must make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which are natures existing in particulars.

[I q. 84 a. 7 ad 2] To the second it must be said that the phantasm itself is already a likeness of a particular thing; hence imagination does not need any further likeness of the particular, as the intellect does.

[I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3] To the third it must be said that incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known by us through comparison with sensible bodies, of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth from the consideration of a thing concerning which we contemplate the truth; God, moreover, as Dionysius says, we know as cause, by way of excess, and by way of removal; and other incorporeal substances as well, in the state of the present life, we cannot know except by way of removal or by some comparison with corporeal things. And therefore, whenever we understand anything concerning things of this sort, we have need to turn to the phantasms of bodies, even though there are no phantasms of those things themselves.

[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the first article. It seems that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms. For any intellect whatever that understands a thing otherwise than as it is, is false. Now the forms of material things are not abstracted from particulars, whose likenesses the phantasms are. If, therefore, we understand material things by the abstraction of species from phantasms, there will be falsehood in our intellect.

[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2] Furthermore, material things are natural things, into whose definition matter enters. Now nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Yet matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore material things cannot be understood by the abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is what it means to abstract intelligible species from phantasms.

[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3] Furthermore, in Book III of On the Soul it is said that phantasms stand to the intellective soul as colors stand to sight. Now vision does not take place by abstracting certain species from colors, but by colors impressing themselves upon sight. Therefore neither does understanding take place by anything being abstracted from phantasms, but by phantasms impressing themselves upon the intellect.

[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4] Furthermore, as is said in Book III of On the Soul, in the intellective soul there are two things, namely the possible intellect and the agent intellect. Now to abstract intelligible species from phantasms does not belong to the possible intellect, whose office is rather to receive species already abstracted. Yet neither does it seem to belong to the agent intellect, which stands to phantasms as light stands to colors—and light does not abstract anything from colors, but rather flows onto them. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstracting from phantasms.

[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5] Furthermore, the Philosopher says in Book III of On the Soul that the intellect understands the species in the phantasms. Therefore not by abstracting them.

[I q. 85 a. 1 s. c.] On the contrary, it is said in Book III of On the Soul that as things are separable from matter, so are they with regard to the intellect. Therefore material things must be understood insofar as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, which are the phantasms.

[I q. 85 a. 1 co.] I answer that, as was said above, the knowable object is proportioned to the cognitive power. Now there is a threefold grade of cognitive power. For one cognitive power is the act of a bodily organ, namely sense. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is form according as it exists in corporeal matter. And because matter of this sort is the principle of individuation, every power of the sensitive part is cognizant of particulars alone. Another cognitive power is one that is neither the act of a bodily organ nor in any way joined to corporeal matter, such as the angelic intellect. And therefore the object of this cognitive power is form subsisting without matter; for even though angels know material things, yet they behold them only in immaterial things, namely either in themselves or in God. The human intellect, however, holds a middle place: for it is not the act of any organ, and yet it is a certain power of the soul, which is the form of the body, as is clear from what was said above. And therefore it is proper to it to know form existing individually in corporeal matter indeed, yet not according as it is in such matter. Now to know what exists in individual matter, not according as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter, which the phantasms represent. And therefore it is necessary to say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we arrive at some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, conversely, angels know material things through immaterial ones. Plato, however, attending solely to the immateriality of the human intellect, and not to the fact that it is in a certain way united to the body, posited separate ideas as the object of the intellect, and held that we understand not indeed by abstracting, but rather by participating in things already abstract, as was said above.

[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that abstracting occurs in two ways. In one way, by way of composition and division, as when we understand that one thing is not in another, or is separated from it. In another way, by way of simple and absolute consideration, as when we understand one thing while considering nothing at all about the other. Now to abstract by the intellect things that are not abstract in reality according to the first mode of abstracting is not without falsehood. Yet according to the second mode, to abstract by the intellect things that are not abstract in reality involves no falsehood, as manifestly appears in sensible things. For if we should understand or declare that color does not inhere in a colored body, or is separated from it, there will be falsehood in the opinion or in the statement. If, however, we consider color and its properties while considering nothing about the colored apple, or even express in speech what we thus understand, this will be without falsehood of opinion or of statement; for the apple does not belong to the intelligible nature of color, and therefore nothing prevents color from being understood without understanding anything about the apple. In like manner, I say that those things which pertain to the nature of the species of any material thing—for instance, of a stone, a man, or a horse—can be considered without the individual principles, which do not belong to the nature of the species. And this is what it is to abstract the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasms: namely, to consider the nature of the species without consideration of the individual principles that are represented by the phantasms. When, therefore, it is said that an intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is, this is true if the word otherwise refers to the thing understood. For the intellect is false when it understands a thing to be otherwise than as it is; hence the intellect would be false if it so abstracted the species of a stone from matter as to understand it not to exist in matter, as Plato posited. What is proposed is not true, however, if the word otherwise be taken on the side of the one understanding. For it is without falsehood that the mode of the one understanding in understanding is other than the mode of the thing in existing, since the thing understood exists in the one understanding immaterially, after the mode of the intellect, and not materially, after the mode of a material thing.

[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 2] To the second it must be said that some have supposed that the species of a natural thing is form alone, and that matter is not a part of the species. Yet according to that view, matter would not be posited in the definitions of natural things. And therefore it must be said otherwise: that matter is twofold, namely common, and designated or individual—common, indeed, such as flesh and bone; individual, however, such as this flesh and these bones. The intellect, therefore, abstracts the species of a natural thing from individual sensible matter, though not from common sensible matter; just as it abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these bones, which do not belong to the nature of the species, but are parts of the individual, as is said in Book VII of the Metaphysics, and therefore the species can be considered without them; whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones. Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only individual, but also common; yet not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual intelligible matter. For sensible matter is called corporeal matter insofar as it underlies sensible qualities, namely hot and cold, hard and soft, and the like; whereas intelligible matter is called substance insofar as it underlies quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity inheres in substance prior to sensible qualities. Hence quantities—such as numbers, dimensions, and figures, which are terminations of quantities—can be considered apart from sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter; yet they cannot be considered without the understanding of substance subject to quantity, which would be for them to be abstracted from common intelligible matter. They can, however, be considered apart from this or that substance, which is for them to be abstracted from individual intelligible matter. Certain things, finally, can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as being, the one, potency and act, and others of this sort, which can also exist without any matter at all, as is plain in immaterial substances. And because Plato failed to consider what has been said concerning the twofold mode of abstraction, he posited all the things we have declared to be abstracted by the intellect as being abstract in reality.

[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 3] To the third it must be said that colors, existing as they do in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existing as the visual power, and therefore they can impress their likeness upon sight. Phantasms, however, since they are likenesses of individuals and exist in bodily organs, do not have the same mode of existing that the human intellect has, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore they cannot by their own power make an impression upon the possible intellect. Rather, by the power of the agent intellect a certain likeness results in the possible intellect from the turning of the agent intellect upon the phantasms, a likeness which is indeed representative of the things of which they are the phantasms solely with respect to the nature of the species. And it is in this way that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms—not that numerically one and the same form, which previously was in the phantasms, afterward comes to be in the possible intellect, in the manner in which a body is taken from one place and transferred to another.

[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that the phantasms are both illuminated by the agent intellect and, further, intelligible species are abstracted from them by the power of the agent intellect. They are illuminated, indeed, because just as the sensitive part is rendered more powerful from its conjunction with the intellective part, so the phantasms by the power of the agent intellect are rendered fit for intelligible intentions to be abstracted from them. Moreover, the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms inasmuch as by the power of the agent intellect we are able to take into our consideration the natures of species without individual conditions, in accordance with whose likenesses the possible intellect is informed.

[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that our intellect both abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and nevertheless understands them in the phantasms, because it cannot understand even the things whose species it abstracts except by turning to the phantasms, as was said above.