Physics Book III, Lecture 5 — On Action and Passion and the Division of Being into Ten Categories Proportional to Modes of Predicating

In III Physicorum, Lectio 5 — De actione et passione ac divisione entis in decem praedicamenta secundum modos essendi

On Action and Passion and the Division of Being into Ten Categories Proportional to Modes of Predicating

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown that motion is the act of the mobile and of the mover, he now raises a certain doubt concerning what has gone before. And first, he raises the doubt; second, he resolves it, at Yet neither is it absurd that the act, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he premises certain points toward the doubt; second, he pursues the doubt, at Since, therefore, both, etc.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 2] He says first, therefore, that what has been stated involves a difficulty, that is, a doubt, that is reasonable, that is, dialectical: for there are probable arguments on either side. Toward this doubt, moreover, he premises that there is a certain act of the active principle and a certain act of the passive principle, just as it was said above that there is a certain act both of the mover and of the moved. And the act of the active principle is called action, whereas the act of the passive principle is called passion. And he proves this because that which is the work and end of each thing is its act and perfection: hence, since the work and end of the agent is action, while that of the patient is passion, as is manifest through itself, what has been stated follows—namely, that action is the act of the agent and passion the act of the patient.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 3] Then when he says, Since, therefore, both, etc., he pursues the doubt. For it is manifest that both action and passion are motion: for each is the same as motion. Either, therefore, action and passion are the same motion, or they are diverse motions. If they are diverse, it is necessary that each of them be in some subject: either, therefore, both are in the patient and the thing moved; or one of them is in the agent, namely action, and the other in the patient, namely passion. Whereas if someone should say conversely that what is in the agent is passion and what is in the patient is action, it is manifest that he speaks equivocally: for what is passion he will call action, and conversely. Now he seems to omit a fourth member, namely that both are in the agent; yet he passes over this because it has already been shown that motion is in the mobile, whereby this member—that neither is in the patient, while both are in the agent—is excluded.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 4] Of these two members that he touches upon, therefore, he first pursues the second, at Yet if one says this, etc. For if someone should say that action is in the agent and passion in the patient, while action is a certain motion, as has been said, it follows that motion is in the mover. Now the same account must hold concerning the mover and the moved, namely that in whichever of them motion exists, that thing is moved—or the same account holds concerning the mover and the moved just as concerning the patient and the agent. Yet in whatever thing motion exists, that thing is moved; wherefore it follows either that every mover is moved, or that something possesses motion and is not moved—each of which seems incongruous.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 5] Then when he says, If, however, both, etc., he pursues the other member, saying that if someone asserts that both—namely action and passion, being two motions—are in the patient and the thing moved, just as teaching, which is on the part of the teacher, and learning, which is on the part of the learner, are in the learner, two incongruities follow. The first of these is that action was said to be the act of the agent: if, therefore, action is not in the agent but in the patient, it will follow that the proper act of each thing is not in that of which it is the act. Afterward another incongruity will follow, namely that one and the same thing is moved according to two motions. For action and passion are now supposed to be two motions, and in whatever thing motion exists, it is moved according to that motion; if, therefore, action and passion are in the mobile, it follows that the mobile is moved according to two motions. And this would be the same as if there were two alterations of a single subject terminating in one species, as though one subject were moved by two whitenings—which is impossible. That the same subject should be moved simultaneously by two alterations terminating in diverse species, namely by whitening and heating, is not incongruous. Yet it is manifest that action and passion terminate in the same species: for what the agent enacts and what the patient undergoes are the same.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 6] Then when he says, Yet will there be one act? etc., he pursues the other main alternative. For someone may say that action and passion are not two motions, but one. And from this he draws four incongruities. The first of these is that the same thing would be the act of things diverse in species. For it was said that action is the act of the agent and passion the act of the patient, which are diverse in species: if, therefore, action and passion are the same motion, it follows that the same act belongs to things diverse in species. The second incongruity is that if action and passion are one motion, action would be the same as passion, and teaching, which is on the part of the teacher, would be the same as learning insofar as it stands on the part of the learner. The third incongruity is that to act would be the same as to undergo, and to teach the same as to learn. The fourth, which follows from this, is that every teacher would learn, and every agent would undergo.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 7] Then when he says, Yet neither is it absurd that the act of one, etc., he resolves the aforesaid doubt. Now it is manifest from what was determined above that action and passion are not two motions, but one and the same motion: for according as it is from the agent it is called action, whereas according as it is in the patient it is called passion.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 8] Hence there is no need to resolve the incongruities that follow upon the first part, in which it was supposed that action and passion were two motions, save one that remains to be resolved even when it is supposed that action and passion are one motion: for since action is the act of the agent, as was said above, if action and passion are one motion, it follows that the act of the agent is in a certain manner in the patient, and thus the act of one thing will be in another. Moreover, four incongruities followed from the other side; and thus five incongruities remain to be resolved.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 9] He says first, therefore, that it is not incongruous for the act of one thing to be in another, because teaching is the act of the teacher, yet tending from him into another continuously and without any interruption: hence the same act belongs to this one, that is, the agent, as that from which it proceeds, and yet exists in the patient as received in it. It would be incongruous, however, if the act of one thing existed in another in the very same way in which it is its own act.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 10] Then when he says, Nor is anything prevented from being one act for two, etc., he resolves the second incongruity, namely that the same act would belong to two things. And he says that nothing prevents one act from belonging to two things, provided it is not one and the same according to intelligible notion, though one in reality—just as it was stated above that the distance of two to one and of one to two is the same, and so too of what is in potency to the agent and conversely. For in this way the same act in reality belongs to two things according to diverse intelligible notions: to the agent, indeed, according as it is from it, and to the patient according as it is in it.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 11] To the other three incongruities, of which one was deduced from another, he replies in reverse order—first, namely, to that which was introduced last as the greater incongruity. Thus, therefore, in the third place he replies to the fifth incongruity. And he says that it is not necessary that the teacher learn, or that the agent undergo, even if to act and to undergo were the same, provided we say that they are not the same like things whose definition is one, such as tunic and garment, but like things that are the same in subject and diverse according to intelligible notion, such as the road from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes, as was said earlier. For it is not necessary that all the same attributes belong to things that are in just any way the same, but only to those that are the same both in subject or reality and in intelligible notion. And therefore, even granting that to act and to undergo were the same, since they are not the same in intelligible notion, as has been said, it does not follow that to whatever thing acting belongs, undergoing also belongs.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 12] Then when he says, Yet neither if teaching, etc., he replies to the fourth incongruity. And he says that even if teaching and the learning of the learner were the same, it does not follow that to teach and to learn would be the same: because teaching and learning are spoken of in the abstract, whereas to teach and to learn are spoken of in the concrete. Hence they are applied to the ends or terms according to which the diverse intelligible notions of action and passion are taken. Just as, although we may say that the interval between certain distant things is the same when taken abstractly, nevertheless if we apply it to the terms of the interval, as when we speak of being distant from here to there and from there to here, it is not one and the same.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 13] Then when he says, To state the matter altogether, etc., he replies to the third incongruity by overturning the inference whereby it was concluded that if action and passion are one motion, action and passion are the same. And he says that finally it must be stated that it does not follow that action and passion are the same, or teaching and learning, but rather that the motion in which both of them are found is the same. And this motion, according to one intelligible notion, is action, and according to another intelligible notion is passion. For it is one thing according to intelligible notion to be the act of this as in this, and another to be the act of this as from this. Now motion is called action according as it is the act of the agent as from this, whereas it is called passion according as it is the act of the patient as in this. And thus it is clear that although the motion of the mover and of the moved is the same, on account of the fact that it abstracts from either intelligible notion, nevertheless action and passion differ on account of the fact that they include these diverse notions in their signification. From this it also appears that, since motion abstracts from the intelligible notion of action and passion, it is contained neither in the category of action nor in the category of passion, as certain thinkers asserted.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 14] Yet concerning this a twofold doubt remains. The first, indeed, is that if action and passion are one motion, and do not differ save according to intelligible notion, as has been said, it seems that they ought not to be two categories, since the categories are genera of things. Second, if motion is either action or passion, motion will not be found in substance, quality, quantity, and where, as was stated above, but will be contained solely in action and passion.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 15] To make these points evident, therefore, one must know that being is divided into the ten categories not univocally, as a genus into species, but according to diverse modes of being. Now modes of being are proportional to modes of predicating. For in predicating something of some other thing, we say that this is that: hence too the ten genera of being are called the ten categories. Now all predication takes place in three ways. One mode, indeed, is when there is predicated of some subject that which pertains to its essence, as when I say Socrates is a man, or man is an animal; and according to this the category of substance is taken. A second mode is that whereby there is predicated of something what does not belong to its essence, yet inheres in it. And this either stands on the side of the matter of the subject, and according to this is the category of quantity (for quantity properly follows upon matter: whence Plato also placed the great on the side of matter); or it follows upon form, and thus is the category of quality (whence qualities are also founded upon quantity, just as color is in a surface, and figure in lines or in surfaces); or it stands by way of a respect toward another, and thus is the category of relation (for when I say the man is a father, nothing absolute is predicated of the man, but a respect inherent in him toward something extrinsic). The third mode of predicating, however, is when something extrinsic is predicated of something by way of a certain denomination: for in this way extrinsic accidents also are predicated of substances; yet we do not say that a man is whiteness, but that a man is white. Now to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in one way commonly in all things, and in another way specially in the things that pertain to human beings alone. Commonly, indeed, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic either according to the character of cause or according to the character of measure; for something is denominated as caused and as measured from something exterior. Now since there are four genera of causes, two of these are parts of the essence, namely matter and form: hence the predication that could be made according to these two pertains to the category of substance, as for instance if we say that man is rational and man is corporeal. The final cause, however, does not cause anything apart from the agent: for the end has the character of cause insofar as it moves the agent. There remains, therefore, the agent cause alone from which something can be denominated as from something exterior. Thus, therefore, according as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the category of passion, for to undergo is nothing other than to receive something from an agent; whereas conversely, according as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the category of action, for action is an act proceeding from the agent into another, as was said above. Of measure, moreover, one kind is extrinsic and another intrinsic. Intrinsic measure is like the proper length of each thing and its breadth and depth: from these, therefore, something is denominated as from something intrinsically inhering, whence it pertains to the category of quantity. Exterior measures, however, are time and place: according, therefore, as something is denominated from time, there is the category of when; whereas according as it is denominated from place, there are the categories of where and of position, which adds above where the order of parts in place. Now it was not necessary to add this on the side of time, since the order of parts in time is imported in the very notion of time: for time is the number of motion according to before and after. Thus, therefore, something is said to be when or where by denomination from time or from place. There is, moreover, something special in human beings. For in other animals nature has sufficiently provided the things that pertain to the preservation of life, such as horns for defense, a thick and hairy hide for covering, and hooves or something of the sort for walking without injury. And thus when such animals are said to be armed or clothed or shod, in a certain way they are denominated not from something extrinsic, but from certain parts of their own. Hence in them this is referred to the category of substance: just as if it were said that man is handed or footed. Yet things of this sort could not be given to man by nature, both because they did not suit the delicacy of his bodily constitution, and on account of the manifold variety of works that befit man insofar as he possesses reason, to which determinate instruments could not be fitted by nature; instead of all these, reason is present in man, whereby he prepares exterior things for himself in place of those things that are intrinsic to other animals. Hence when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated from something extrinsic that has the character neither of cause nor of measure: whence it is a special category, and is called having (habitus). Yet one must observe that this category is attributed to other animals as well, not according as they are considered in their own nature, but according as they come into human use: as if we call a horse caparisoned or saddled or armed.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 16] Thus, therefore, it is clear that although motion is one, nevertheless the categories taken according to motion are two, according as categorial denominations are made from diverse exterior things. For the agent, from which as from something exterior the category of passion is taken by way of denomination, is one thing; and the patient, from which the agent is denominated, is another thing. And thus the solution to the first doubt is clear.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 17] The second doubt, moreover, is easily resolved. For the intelligible notion of motion is completed not only through what belongs to motion in the nature of things, but also through what reason apprehends. For in the nature of things, motion is nothing other than an imperfect act, which is a certain inchoation of a perfect act in that which is moved: just as in that which is being whitened, something of whiteness already begins to be. Yet in order that this imperfect reality may possess the intelligible notion of motion, it is further required that we understand it as a kind of medium between two terms: of which the preceding is compared to it as potency to act, whence motion is called an act; whereas the subsequent is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect or as act to potency, on account of which it is called the act of a being in potency, as was said above. Hence whatever imperfect state is taken as not tending into something further that is perfect is called the term of a motion, and will not be a motion according to which something is moved: as for instance if something begins to be whitened and the alteration is immediately interrupted. With respect, therefore, to what belongs to motion in the nature of things, motion is placed by reduction in that genus which terminates the motion, just as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as was said above. With respect, however, to what reason apprehends concerning motion—namely its being a certain medium between two terms—the notion of cause and effect is thereby already implied: for something is reduced from potency into act only by some agent cause. And according to this, motion pertains to the categories of action and passion: for these two categories are taken according to the notion of agent cause and effect, as has been said.

[lib. 3 l. 5 n. 18] Then when he says, What motion is, therefore, indeed, etc., he defines motion in particular: and he says that it has been stated what motion is both in universal and in particular, because from what has been stated concerning the definition of motion in universal, it can become manifest how it is defined in particular. For if motion is the act of the mobile insofar as it is such, it follows that alteration is the act of the alterable insofar as it is such; and similarly with the others. And because it was placed in doubt whether motion is the act of the mover or of the mobile, and it was shown that it is the act of the active principle as from this and of the passive principle as in this, in order to remove every doubt let us say somewhat more clearly that motion is the act of the potentially active and of the potentially passive. And thus we shall also be able to say in particular that building is the act of the builder and of the buildable insofar as it is such; and the case is similar with healing and other motions.