Metaphysics Book IX, Lecture 3 — How the Name and Notion of Actuality Are Derived First from Sensible Motion¶
In IX Metaphysicorum, Lectio 3 — Quomodo nomen et ratio actus ex motu sensibili ad alia deriventur
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 1 · Marietti #1795] After the Philosopher has above compared potencies with one another, he here begins to show how potency and act stand in relation to the same subject; and this text is divided into two parts. In the first, he excludes the false opinions of certain thinkers; in the second, he determines the truth, where he says, Now for all potencies. The first part is divided into two. In the first, he excludes the opinion of those who say that nothing is possible except when it exists in act; in the second, he excludes the opinion of those who say conversely that all things are possible even if they do not exist in act, where he says, If, however, what has been said is the possible. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he excludes the aforesaid erroneous position; second, he shows what it is to be possible and what it is to be in act, where he says, Now that is possible. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he sets forth the opinion. Second, he refutes it, where he says, For whom the consequences, and so forth. Third, he concludes his intended thesis, where he says, If, therefore, it is not possible. First, therefore, he says that certain thinkers maintained that something is in potency only when it is in act—for example, that one who is not actually building is not able to build, and is able to build only when he is actually building; and they say the same of other things. And the reason for this position seems to be that they supposed all things to happen of necessity according to a certain combination of causes; and thus, if all things come to pass of necessity, it follows that those things which do not come to pass are not possible to be.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 2 · Marietti #1796] Next, when he says, For whom the consequences, he sets forth arguments against the aforesaid position leading to absurdities, the first of which is as follows. To be a builder is to be one able to build. If, therefore, no one is able to do anything except when he is doing it, no one is a builder except when he is building; and it is similar with the other arts, for all arts are certain potencies, as has been said. It follows, therefore, that no one possesses any art except when he operates in accordance with it.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 3 · Marietti #1797] Yet this is shown to be impossible once two things are presupposed: the first of which is that for one who previously did not possess some art, it is impossible that he should afterward possess it unless he learns it or acquires it in some way, namely by discovery.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 4 · Marietti #1798] The other is that if someone possessed some art, it is impossible for him afterward not to possess the same art unless he loses it in some way—either through forgetfulness, or through some infirmity, or through length of time during which one makes no use of knowledge, which is indeed a cause of forgetfulness. Nor can it happen that someone loses an art through the corruption of its object, as sometimes happens when true cognition is lost because the thing has changed—as when someone truly opines that Socrates is sitting, and upon his rising that true opinion perishes. This, however, cannot be said with respect to an art; for art is knowledge not of that which is, but of that which is to be made. And thus so long as the matter lasts out of which the art can make something, the object of the art always exists. Hence an art cannot be lost through the corruption of its object, but only in the ways stated above.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 5 · Marietti #1799] Now from these two premises the Philosopher argues as follows. If someone does not possess an art except when he uses it, then when he begins to use it he possesses the art anew; therefore he must either learn it or acquire it in some way or other. And similarly, when he ceases to use the art, it follows that he lacks the art; and thus he will lose the art he previously possessed, either through forgetfulness, or through some bodily affection, or through time. Both of these are manifestly false. Therefore it is not true that someone possesses a potency only when he operates.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 6 · Marietti #1800] Next, when he says, And as regards inanimate things, he sets forth the second argument, which proceeds with respect to non-rational potencies existing in inanimate things—namely hot and cold, sweet and bitter, and other things of this sort, which are active principles altering the senses, and thus are certain potencies. If, therefore, a potency is present in something only when it acts, it follows that nothing is hot or cold, sweet or bitter, and the like, except when it is being sensed as altering the sense. Now this is manifestly false. For if this were true, it would follow that the opinion of Protagoras was true, which maintained that all the properties and natures of things consist solely in being sensed and opined; from which it followed that contradictories are simultaneously true, since different people hold contradictory opinions about the same thing—an opinion against which the Philosopher disputed above in the fourth book. It is false, therefore, that potency does not exist without act.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 7 · Marietti #1801] Next, when he says, Moreover, indeed, he sets forth the third argument, which is as follows. Sense is a certain potency. If, therefore, potency does not exist apart from act, it will follow that someone does not possess sense—such as sight or hearing—except when he is sensing. Yet one who does not possess sight, when by nature suited to possess it, is blind; and one who does not possess hearing is deaf. Thus, therefore, on the very same day the same person will repeatedly be deaf and blind, which is manifestly false; for the blind man does not afterward become seeing, nor the deaf hearing.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 8 · Marietti #1802] Next, when he says, Furthermore, if, he sets forth the fourth argument, which is as follows. That which lacks potency is impossible to act. If, therefore, someone does not possess potency except when he acts, it will follow that when someone is not acting, it is impossible for him to act. Yet whoever says that something is or will be which is impossible to come about speaks falsely; and this is clear from the very signification of this word impossible, for the impossible means a falsehood that cannot happen. It follows, therefore, that what is not can in no way come to be. And thus such an account of potency will take away motion and generation, because one who is standing will always stand, and one who is sitting will always sit. For if someone is sitting, he will never afterward stand, because while he is not standing he does not possess the potency of standing; and thus it is not possible for him to stand, and consequently it is impossible for him to rise. And similarly what is not white will be impossible to be white, and thus will not be able to be whitened; and similarly in all other cases.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 9 · Marietti #1803] Next, when he says, If, therefore, he concludes his intended thesis, saying that if the aforesaid absurdities cannot be granted, it is manifest that potency and act are diverse. Yet those who maintain the aforesaid position make potency and act to be the same, inasmuch as they say that something is in potency only when it is in act. From this it is clear that it is no small thing that they seek to abolish from nature, for they take away motion and generation, as has been said. Hence, since this cannot be maintained, it is manifest that it is possible for something to be which nevertheless is not, and possible for something not to be which nevertheless is; and similarly in the other categories, that is, predicaments, because it is possible for someone to walk though he is not walking, and conversely possible for one who is walking not to walk.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 10 · Marietti #1804] Next, when he says, Now that is, he shows what it is to be in potency and what it is to be in act. And first he shows what it is to be in potency, saying that that is said to be in potency from which, if it is posited to exist in act, nothing impossible follows: as if it be said that it is possible for someone to sit, if it be posited that he sits nothing impossible comes about; and similarly with being moved and moving, and other things of this sort.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 11 · Marietti #1805] Second, where he says, Now the name comes, he shows what it is to be in act; and he says that this name act, which is used to signify entelechy and perfection—namely form and other things of this sort, such as operations of whatever kind—comes chiefly from motions as regards the origin of the word. For since names are signs of intelligible conceptions, we first impose names upon those things which we first understand, even though they be posterior according to the order of nature. Now among other acts, motion is most known and apparent to us, since it is sensibly seen by us. And therefore upon it the name act was first imposed, and from motion it was derived to other things.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 12 · Marietti #1806] And on account of this, being moved is not attributed to non-existent things, even though certain other predicates are attributed to non-existent things. For we say that non-beings are intelligible or opinable, or even objects of desire, yet we do not say that they are moved; because, since being moved signifies existing in act, it would follow that things not existing in act would exist in act, which is manifestly false. For even though certain non-beings exist in potency, nevertheless they are said not to be precisely because they do not exist in act.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 13 · Marietti #1807] Next, when he says, If, however, after the Philosopher has refuted the opinion of those who say that nothing is possible except when it exists in act, he here refutes the contrary opinion of those who say that all things are possible; and concerning this he does two things. First, he refutes this position; second, he determines a certain truth concerning the consequence of possibles, where he says, At the same time, however, it is plain. First, therefore, he says that if it is true that something is called possible from what follows upon it—according to what has been stated, that the possible is that from which, if it be posited to be, nothing impossible follows—it is manifest that what certain thinkers say cannot be true, namely that everything whatever is possible even if it will never come to be, in such a way that by this position impossibilities are done away with: as if someone were to say that it is possible for the diagonal of a square to be commensurable with its side, though it will never be commensurable, and were to speak in the same way of other impossibilities, without considering that for the diagonal of a square to be commensurable with its side is impossible. Those who maintain this position, I say, in one respect speak truly and in another respect speak falsely.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 14 · Marietti #1808] For there are certain things of which nothing will prevent one from saying that they are possible to be or to come to be, even though they will never exist and will never come to be; yet this cannot be said of all things. Rather, according to what was said above and what we must now presuppose, those things alone are possible to be or to come to be, even though they are not, upon the positing of which nothing impossible follows. Now if it be posited that the diagonal is commensurable, something impossible follows; and therefore it cannot be said that for the diagonal to be commensurable is possible, for this is not merely false, but impossible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 15 · Marietti #1809] Certain things, on the other hand, are merely false, yet not impossible, such as for Socrates to sit or to stand; for to be false and to be impossible are not the same, just as for you to be standing now is false, yet not impossible. The aforesaid position, therefore, is true with respect to some things, because some things are possible even though they are false; yet it is not true with respect to all things, because some things are both false and impossible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 16 · Marietti #1810] Next, when he says, At the same time, however, because he had said that something is judged possible from the fact that nothing impossible follows from it, he shows how possible consequents stand in relation to their antecedents, saying that from the definition of the possible set forth above not only is the preceding position refuted, but at the same time it is also manifest that if the antecedent of some conditional proposition is possible, the consequent too will be possible: as, if this conditional is true, “if a is, b is,” it is necessary that if a is possible, b is possible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 17 · Marietti #1811] Yet for the understanding of this it must be known that possible is spoken of in two ways. In one way, according as it is divided against the necessary, as when we call those things possible which happen both to be and not to be. And when the possible is taken in this way, what is said here does not hold; for nothing prevents the antecedent from being contingent as to being and non-being while the consequent is nevertheless necessary, as is clear in this conditional: “if Socrates laughs, he is a man.”
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 18 · Marietti #1812] In another way, however, possible is spoken of according as it is common both to things that are necessary and to things that happen both to be and not to be, insofar as the possible is divided against the impossible. And it is in this way that the Philosopher speaks here, saying of the possible that it is necessary for the consequent to be possible if the antecedent was possible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 19 · Marietti #1813] For let this conditional be granted to be true, “if a is, b is,” and let the antecedent, namely a, be granted to be possible. Either, therefore, it is necessary that b be possible, or it is not. If it is necessary, the proposed conclusion is established. If it is not necessary, nothing prevents positing the opposite, namely that b is not possible. Yet this cannot stand. For a is posited to be possible; and when it is posited to be possible, it is simultaneously posited that nothing impossible follows from it, since the possible was defined above as that from which nothing impossible follows. Yet b follows upon a, as was posited, and b was posited to be impossible, since to be impossible is the same as not to be possible. Therefore a will not be possible if b, which was impossible, follows upon it. Let b, therefore, be posited to be impossible: if it is impossible, and when a is posited it is necessary that b be, then both the first and the second, namely a and b, will be impossible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 20 · Marietti #1814] Here it must be observed that it rightly follows that if the consequent is impossible, the antecedent is impossible, yet not conversely; for nothing prevents something necessary from following out of an impossibility, as in this conditional: “if a man is an ass, a man is an animal.” Hence what the Philosopher says here must not be understood as meaning: if the first, that is, the antecedent, was impossible, therefore the second too, namely the consequent, was impossible; rather, it must be understood thus: if the consequent is impossible, both will be impossible. Thus, therefore, it is manifest that if a and b stand in such a relation that when a exists it is necessary for b to exist, it necessarily follows as well that if a is possible, b will be possible. And if b is not possible while a is possible, then a and b will not stand in the relation that was posited, namely that b follows upon a. Rather, when a is possible, it must be necessary for b to be possible, if when a exists it is necessary for b to exist. For when I say, “if a is, b is,” this signifies that it is necessary for b to be possible if a is possible—in such a way, however, that b is possible to be at the same time and in the same manner as a is possible; for it is not possible with respect to just any time whatever and just any manner whatever.