Metaphysics Book V, Lecture 9 — On the Division of Per Se Being into Ten Categories and Being Signified by Propositional Judgment¶
In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio 9 — De distinctione entis in decem praedicamenta et esse significato per compositionem iudicii
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 1 · Marietti #885] Here the Philosopher distinguishes in how many ways being is spoken of. And concerning this he does three things. First, he divides being into being per se and being per accidens. Second, he distinguishes the modes of being per accidens, where he says, According to accident indeed, and so forth. Third, the modes of being per se, where he says, According to itself, however. He says, therefore, that one kind of being is spoken of according to itself, and another according to accident. Yet it must be known that this division of being is not the same as that division whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he afterward divides being according to itself into the ten categories, nine of which belong to the genus of accident. Being, therefore, is divided into substance and accident according to the absolute consideration of being, just as whiteness itself considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But being according to accident, as it is taken here, must be grasped by comparing the accident to the substance. And this comparison is signified by the verb is, when it is said, “a man is white.” Hence this whole, “a man is white,” is a being per accidens. Thus it is clear that the division of being according to itself and according to accident is taken according as something is predicated of something either per se or per accidens. The division of being into substance and accident, however, is taken according to the fact that something in its own nature is either a substance or an accident.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 2 · Marietti #886] Next, when he says, According to accident, he shows in how many ways being per accidens is spoken of; and he says that it is spoken of in three ways: the first of which is when an accident is predicated of an accident, as when it is said, “the just is musical.” The second is when an accident is predicated of a subject, as when it is said, “the man is musical.” The third is when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when it is said, “the musical is a man.” And because he has already shown above how a cause per accidens differs from a cause per se, he therefore now consequently makes manifest being per accidens through a cause per accidens.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 3 · Marietti #887] And he says that just as in assigning a cause per accidens we say that the musical builds, because being musical happens to belong to the builder, or conversely—for it is evident that for this to be this, that is, for the musical to build, signifies nothing else than for this to happen to belong to this—so it is also in the aforesaid modes of being per accidens, when we say that a man is musical, predicating an accident of a subject; or that the musical is a man, predicating a subject of an accident; or that the white is musical, or conversely, namely that the musical is white, predicating an accident of an accident. For in all these cases, to be signifies nothing else than to happen to belong. The one indeed, namely when an accident is predicated of an accident, signifies that both accidents happen to belong to the same subject; the other, however, namely when an accident is predicated of a subject, is said to be because to a being, that is, to the subject, the accident happens to belong. Yet we say that the musical is a man because to this, namely to the predicate, there happens to belong the musical, which is placed in the subject. And there is, as it were, a similar account of predication when a subject is predicated of an accident and when an accident is predicated of an accident. For just as a subject is predicated of an accident for the reason that the subject is predicated of that to which the accident placed in the subject happens to belong, so too an accident is predicated of an accident because it is predicated of the subject of the accident. And on account of this, just as it is said, “the musical is a man,” similarly the musical is said to be white, namely because that to which it happens to be musical—that is, the subject—is white.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 4 · Marietti #888] It is clear, therefore, that those things which are said to be according to accident are spoken of in a threefold way: either because both, namely the subject and the predicate, are in the same thing, as when an accident is predicated of an accident; or because that, namely the predicate, such as musical, is in a being, that is, in the subject that is said to be musical, and this is when an accident is predicated of a subject; or because that, namely the subject placed in the predicate, is that in which the accident is present, of which accident that, namely the subject, is predicated. And this, namely, is when the subject is predicated of an accident, as when we say, “the musical is a man.”
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 5 · Marietti #889] Next, when he says, According to itself, he distinguishes the mode of being per se; and concerning this he does three things. First, he divides being that is outside the soul by the ten categories, which is perfect being. Second, he sets down another mode of being, according as it exists only in the mind, where he says, Moreover, to be also signifies. Third, he divides being by potency and act; and being thus divided is more common than perfect being, for being in potency is being only in a qualified sense (secundum quid) and imperfect, where he says, Moreover, to be and being signify. First, therefore, he says that all those things are said to be according to themselves which signify the figures of predication. For it must be known that being cannot be contracted to something determinate in the way in which a genus is contracted to species through differences. For a difference, since it does not participate in the genus, lies outside the essence of the genus. Nothing, however, could lie outside the essence of being so as to constitute some species of being by addition to being; for what is outside being is nothing, and cannot be a difference. Hence in the third book of this work the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 6 · Marietti #890] Hence it is necessary that being be contracted to diverse genera according to a diverse mode of predicating, which follows upon a diverse mode of being; because as many times as being is spoken of, that is, in as many ways as something is predicated, so many times is to be signified, that is, in so many ways is something signified to be. And on account of this, those things into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished according to a diverse mode of predicating. Since, therefore, among the things that are predicated, some signify what a thing is, that is, substance, some of what quality, some how much, and so on with the rest, it is necessary that for each mode of predicating, to be should signify the same: as when it is said, “man is an animal,” to be signifies substance; whereas when it is said, “man is white,” it signifies quality, and so on with the rest.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 7 · Marietti #891] For it must be known that a predicate can stand in a threefold relation to a subject. In one way, when it is that which the subject is, as when I say, “Socrates is an animal.” For Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, which is the particular substance of which all things are predicated.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 8 · Marietti #892] In a second way, according as the predicate is taken from what is in the subject: and this predicate is in it either per se and absolutely as following upon matter, and thus it is quantity; or as following upon form, and thus it is quality; or it is in it not absolutely, but with respect to another, and thus it is relation (ad aliquid). In a third way, according as the predicate is taken from what lies outside the subject, and this in two ways. In one way, so that it lies altogether outside the subject: and if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of habit (habitus), as when it is said, “Socrates is shod or clothed.” If, however, it is a measure of it, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the category is taken either on the part of time, and thus it will be when; or from place, and thus it will be where when the order of parts in place is not considered, whereas when that order is considered it will be position (situs). In another way, so that that from which the category is taken is in some respect in the subject of which it is predicated. And if indeed this is according to its principle, thus it is predicated as acting (agere), for the principle of action is in the subject. If, however, it is according to its term, thus it will be predicated as undergoing (pati), for passion terminates in the undergoing subject.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 9 · Marietti #893] Because, however, certain things are predicated in which the verb is is not manifestly added—lest it be believed that those predications do not pertain to the predication of being, as when it is said, “a man walks”—he therefore consequently removes this doubt, saying that in all such predications something is signified to be. For every verb is resolved into this verb is and a participle. For it makes no difference to say, “a man is recovering,” and “a man recovers,” and so on with the rest. Hence it is clear that in as many ways as predication occurs, in so many ways is being spoken of.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 10 · Marietti #894] Nor is what Avicenna says true, namely that predicates belonging to the genera of accident signify substance principally and accident secondarily, such as what I call white and musical. For white, as is said in the Categories, signifies quality alone. Now this name white signifies a subject consequently, inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the manner of an accident. Hence it must consequently include a subject in its notion, for the being of an accident is to be in (inesse). For although whiteness signifies an accident, yet it does so not after the manner of an accident, but after the manner of a substance, and hence it in no way consignifies a subject. For if white principally signified a subject, then accidental predicates would not be placed by the Philosopher under being according to itself, but under being according to accident. For this whole, “a white man,” is a being according to accident, as has been said.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 11 · Marietti #895] Next, when he says, Moreover, however, he sets down another mode of being, according as to be and is signify the composition of a proposition, which the intellect makes in composing and dividing. Hence he says that to be signifies the truth of a thing; or, as another translation better has it, that to be signifies that some statement is true. Thus the truth of a proposition can be called the truth of a thing through its cause; for according as a thing is or is not, speech is true or false. For when we say that something is, we signify that a proposition is true; and when we say that it is not, we signify that it is not true, and this whether in affirming or in negating. In affirming indeed, as we say that Socrates is white, because this is true; in negating, however, as “Socrates is not white,” because this is true, namely his being non-white. And similarly we say that the diagonal is not incommensurable with the side of the square, because this is false, namely for it not to be non-commensurable.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 12 · Marietti #896] Now it must be known that this second mode is related to the first as effect to cause. For from the fact that something exists in the nature of things, there follows truth and falsity in the proposition, which the intellect signifies by this verb is insofar as it is a verbal copula. Yet because something which in itself is non-being is considered by the intellect as a certain being, such as a negation and the like, therefore to be is sometimes predicated of something in this second mode and not in the first. For blindness is said to be in the second mode, from the fact that the proposition in which something is said to be blind is true; yet it is not said to be true in the first mode. For blindness does not have any being in things, but is rather a privation of some being. Now it is accidental to each thing that something should be truly affirmed of it by the intellect or by the voice; for the thing is not referred to knowledge, but conversely. The being, however, which each thing has in its own nature is substantial. And therefore, when it is said, “Socrates is,” if that is is taken in the first mode, it belongs to a substantial predicate; for being is higher in generality than each individual being, just as animal is with respect to man. If, however, it is taken in the second mode, it belongs to an accidental predicate.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 13 · Marietti #897] Next, when he says, Moreover, to be, he sets down the distinction of being by act and potency, saying that being and to be signify something expressible or utterable in potency, or expressible in act. For in all the aforesaid terms that signify the ten categories, something is spoken of in act and something in potency; and from this it comes about that each category is divided by act and potency. And just as among things that exist outside the soul something is spoken of in act and something in potency, so too among the acts of the soul and privations, which are beings of reason alone. For someone is said to know both because he is able to use scientific knowledge and because he actually uses it; and similarly a thing is called resting both because rest is already present in it and because it is able to rest. And this holds not only in accidents, but also in substances. For Mercury, that is, the statue of Mercury, we say is in the stone in potency, and the half of a line is said to be in the line in potency; for every part of a continuum exists potentially in the whole. And the line is placed among substances according to the opinion of those who posit that mathematical entities are substances, an opinion he had not yet refuted. Grain too, when it is not yet ripe, as when it is in the blade, is said to be in potency. When, however, something is in potency, and when it is not yet in potency, must be determined elsewhere, namely in the ninth book of this work.