Book II, Lecture 20 — On the Origin of the Habit of First Principles (Intellectus) from Sense, Memory, and Experience¶
Liber II, Lectio 20 — De generatione habitus primorum principiorum (intellectus) ex sensu, memoria et experimento
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown how that which serves as the principle of demonstration as its middle term—namely, what a thing is and the reason why—becomes known, here he shows how the first common principles of demonstration become known. And first, he states what his intention concerns; second, he carries out what is proposed, at That indeed, therefore, it is impossible, et cetera. First, therefore, he says that from what follows it will become manifest, concerning the first indemonstrable principles, how the knowledge of them comes about in us and by what habit they are known—observing this order, however, that we first raise the difficulties surrounding this matter.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 2] Next, when he says, That indeed, therefore, it is impossible to know scientifically, et cetera, he carries out his purpose. And concerning this he does two things: first, he raises the difficulties; second, he solves them, at It is necessary, therefore, that we possess, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he premises a truth from which the necessity of this inquiry is shown; second, he raises the questions, at Concerning the immediate principles, et cetera; third, he brings forward objections bearing on the question, at Now if indeed, et cetera. First, therefore, he says that it has already been stated above that it is impossible to know anything scientifically through demonstration unless the first immediate principles are foreknown; and therefore, for the science that treats of demonstration, it is useful that it be known how the first principles become known.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 3] Next, when he says, Now regarding the knowledge of the immediates, et cetera, he raises three difficulties concerning the aforesaid knowledge of principles. The first of these is whether the knowledge of all immediate principles is the same or not. The second difficulty is whether there is scientific knowledge (scientia) of all immediate principles, or of none, or scientific knowledge of some and another kind of cognition of others. The third question is whether the habits of these principles come to be in us after not having previously existed in us, or whether they have always been in us while nevertheless remaining hidden from us.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 4] Next, when he says, Now if indeed we possess them, et cetera, he raises objections regarding the last question, to which the others are ordered. And first he objects against the one side, saying that it is absurd to assert that we possess the habits of these principles while this remains hidden from us. For it is manifest that those who possess knowledge of the principles possess a knowledge more certain than the knowledge acquired through demonstration. Yet knowledge acquired through demonstration cannot be possessed in such a way as to escape the notice of its possessor: for it was stated at the beginning of this work that he who possesses scientific knowledge knows that it is impossible for the thing to be otherwise. Much less, therefore, can it happen that someone possesses knowledge of the immediate principles while this escapes his notice—an absurdity that would nevertheless follow if habits of this sort were innate in us and yet hidden from us.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 5] Second, at If, on the other hand, we acquire them, et cetera, he objects against the contrary side. For if someone says that we acquire the habits of the principles anew, not having possessed them previously, there remains the further difficulty of how we could come to know and learn principles of this sort anew without doing so from some pre-existing knowledge: for it is impossible to learn anything except from pre-existing knowledge, just as we said above regarding demonstration. Yet we cannot learn immediate principles from pre-existing knowledge, because pre-existing knowledge is more certain, inasmuch as it is the cause of certitude for the things that become known through it, whereas no knowledge is more certain than the knowledge of principles of this sort. Hence it does not seem possible that we should come to know them without having known them previously.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 6] Third, at It is manifest, therefore, et cetera, he concludes from the two preceding arguments that it is neither possible for us always to possess knowledge of these principles in a way that escapes our notice, nor possible for such knowledge to be generated in us anew when complete ignorance has preceded and no other cognitive habit or power is possessed.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 7] Next, when he says, It is necessary, therefore, et cetera, he solves the aforesaid questions: and first, he solves the last one; second, he solves the first two, at Now since among the habits of thought, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he solves the difficulty; second, he clarifies the solution set down, at Now let us state again what was just said, et cetera. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he proposes that some cognitive power must pre-exist in us; second, he shows what this power is, at Now this clearly seems, et cetera; third, he shows how from this pre-existing cognitive principle the knowledge of principles comes to be in us, at From sense, therefore, et cetera. First, therefore, he says that from the outset there must necessarily exist in us a certain cognitive power that pre-exists the knowledge of the principles—yet not one that excels the knowledge of the principles in certitude. Hence the knowledge of principles does not come about in us from pre-existing knowledge in the same manner as happens in things that are known through demonstration.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 8] Next, when he says, Now this clearly seems to belong, et cetera, he shows what that pre-existing cognitive principle is; and with respect to this he sets down three grades among animals. The first of these is that which clearly belongs in common to all animals: for all of them possess a certain connatural power for judging sensible things, which is called sense, and which is not acquired anew, but follows upon their very nature.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 9] He sets down the second grade at Now although sense belongs to them, et cetera, saying that while sense exists in all animals, in certain of them some sensible impression remains after the sensible object has departed, as happens in all complete animals; whereas in certain others this does not happen, as in certain incomplete animals, such as those that do not move by progressive locomotion. And perhaps it happens in some animals that an impression remains with respect to certain more vehement sensibles, though not with respect to other, weaker ones. In whatever animals, therefore, no impression of sensible things remains at all, such animals possess no cognition except while they are actually sensing; and similarly, those animals in which such an impression is naturally suited to remain cannot possess any cognition beyond the moment of sensing with respect to those sensibles of which no impression remains in them. Animals in which such a retention of the impression does reside, however, are able still to possess a certain cognition in the soul beyond actual sensation; and these are the animals that possess memory.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 10] He sets down the third grade at When many such memories have arisen, therefore, et cetera, saying that while there are many such animals possessing memory, among them there is a further difference: for in some of them a certain reasoning takes place concerning the things retained in memory, as in men, whereas in others it does not, as in brute animals.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 11] Next, when he says, From sense, therefore, comes memory, et cetera, he shows in accordance with what has preceded how the knowledge of first principles comes about in us, concluding from the premises that from sense comes memory in those animals in which a sensible impression remains, as was said above. From memory arising many times concerning the same thing—yet in diverse singulars—comes experience (experimentum); for experience seems to be nothing other than grasping something from many instances retained in memory. Nevertheless, experience requires a certain reasoning about particulars, whereby one instance is compared with another, which belongs properly to reason: for example, when someone remembers that such an herb has many times cured many people of fever, there is said to be experience that such an herb is curative of fever. Reason, however, does not stop at the experience of particulars, but from the many particulars in which one is experienced it grasps one common thing that becomes firmly established in the soul, and considers it apart from the consideration of any of the singulars; and this common thing it takes as a principle of art and of scientific knowledge. For example, so long as the physician considered that this herb cured Socrates when feverish, and Plato, and many other individual men, it is experience; when, however, his consideration rises to the point that this species of herb cures a feverish person unqualifiedly, this is taken as a rule of the art of medicine. This, therefore, is what Aristotle says: that just as experience comes from memory, so too from experience, or still further from the universal resting as a whole in the soul (which is taken as holding in all instances just as has been experienced in certain ones; and this universal is indeed said to be resting in the soul insofar as it is considered apart from the singulars, in which there is motion; and he also calls it one apart from the many—not indeed according to real existence, but according to the consideration of the intellect, which considers some nature, say of man, without looking to Socrates and Plato; and although according to the consideration of the intellect it is one apart from the many, nevertheless according to existence it is one and the same in all the singulars—not indeed numerically one, as though numerically the same humanity belonged to all men, but one according to the intelligible nature of the species: for just as this white thing is like that white thing in whiteness, not as though numerically one whiteness existed in both, so too Socrates is like Plato in humanity, not as though numerically one humanity existed in both)—from this experience, therefore, and from such a universal received through experience, there comes to be in the soul that which is the principle of art and of scientific knowledge. And he distinguishes between art and science just as in Book VI of the Ethics, where it is said that art is the right reason of things to be made; and therefore he says here that if from experience some universal is grasped concerning generation—that is, concerning things that can be made or brought about, such as healing or agriculture—this pertains to art. Science, however, as is said in the same place, concerns necessary things; and therefore if the universal is considered concerning things that always exist in the same way, it pertains to science—for instance, concerning numbers or geometrical figures. And the mode just described holds for the principles of all sciences and arts. Hence he concludes that the habits of principles neither pre-exist in us as determinate and complete from the outset, nor come to be anew from other better-known pre-existing habits in the way that the habit of science is generated in us from the foreknowledge of principles; rather, the habits of principles come to be in us from pre-existing sense. And he illustrates this by the simile of a battle-line reformed when a defeated and routed army turns back to stand: for when one soldier makes a stand—that is, begins to stand fast immovably and ceases to flee—another halts and joins him, and afterward another, until enough gather together to form the beginning of a fresh battle. In the same way, from the sensation and memory of one particular, and again of another and another, one eventually arrives at that which is the principle of art and of scientific knowledge, as has been said.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 12] Now someone might suppose that sense alone, or the memory of singulars, suffices to cause the intelligible knowledge of principles, as certain of the ancients held who did not distinguish between sense and intellect. Therefore, in order to exclude this, the Philosopher adds that together with sense one must presuppose a nature of the soul of such a kind that it can undergo this—that is, is receptive of universal knowledge, which indeed comes about through the possible intellect—and furthermore that can actively bring this about through the agent intellect, which renders things intelligible in act by abstracting universals from singulars.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 13] Next, when he says, Now let us state again what was just said, et cetera, he clarifies what was stated in the preceding solution regarding how the universal is grasped from the experience of singulars, saying that what was stated above—though not with full plainness—namely, how the universal comes to be in the soul from the experience of singulars, must be stated again so that it may be made more plain. For if many singulars are taken which are undifferentiated with respect to some one feature existing in them, that one feature in respect of which they do not differ, once received in the soul, is the first universal—whatever that feature may be, whether it pertains to the essence of the singulars or not. For because we find Socrates and Plato and many others to be undifferentiated with respect to whiteness, we grasp this one thing, namely, white, as a universal that is an accident; and similarly, because we find Socrates and Plato and others to be undifferentiated with respect to rationality, we grasp this one thing in which they do not differ, namely, rational, as a universal that is a specific difference.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 14] How this one feature can be grasped he consequently makes clear. For it is manifest that it is the singular that is sensed properly and per se, and yet sense is in a certain manner also of the universal itself: for it cognizes Callias not only insofar as he is Callias, but also insofar as he is this man, and similarly Socrates insofar as he is this man. And hence it is that, once such a grasp by sense pre-exists, the intellective soul can consider man in both. If, however, it were the case that sense apprehended solely what belongs to particularity, and in no way apprehended along with it the universal nature existing in the particular, it would not be possible for universal knowledge to be caused in us from the apprehension of sense. And he subsequently manifests this very same thing in the ascent from species to genus. Hence he adds that once again among these—namely, in man and horse—the soul halts in its consideration until it arrives at something indivisible in them, which is a higher universal: for instance, we consider such-and-such an animal and such-and-such another, say man and horse, until we arrive at the common nature animal, which is the genus; and in this we do likewise until we arrive at some still higher genus. Since, therefore, we receive our knowledge of universals from singulars, he concludes that it is manifestly necessary for us to come to know the first universal principles through induction: for in this way—namely, by way of induction—sense brings about the universal within the soul, insofar as the singulars are considered.
[lib. 2 l. 20 n. 15] Next, when he says, Now since among the habits of thought, et cetera, he solves the first two questions, namely, whether there is scientific knowledge (scientia) of the first principles or some other habit. Regarding this, he takes from what has gone before that the knowledge of principles pertains to the intellect, to which it belongs to know the universal, since he calls the universal the principle of science. Now connected with the intellect there are two classes of habits bearing some relation to truth: some are always true, whereas others at times admit of falsity, as is clear in the case of opinion and calculative reasoning, which can be either true or false (and there are also erroneous habits, directed toward what is false). Since the principles, however, are supremely true, it is manifest that they pertain neither to habits that are always false nor to habits that sometimes admit of falsity, but solely to the habits that are always true; and of this sort are scientific knowledge (scientia) and understanding (intellectus, the habit of principles). In Book VI of the Ethics a third is added, namely, wisdom (sapientia); yet because wisdom, as is stated there, includes within itself both scientific knowledge and understanding (for it is a kind of science and the head of the sciences), he passes over it here. Setting wisdom aside, therefore, no other kind of cognition except understanding (intellectus) is more certain than scientific knowledge. Yet it is manifest that the principles of demonstrations are better known than the demonstrated conclusions, as was established in Book I; nor can there be scientific knowledge of the principles themselves, because all scientific knowledge comes about through some reasoning—namely, demonstrative reasoning—of which the very principles under discussion are the starting points. Since, therefore, nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge and understanding (for wisdom is included within these), it follows from a consideration of the premises that understanding (intellectus) is properly the habit of first principles. He also proves this by a second argument: namely, that demonstration is not of necessity the principle of demonstration, for otherwise one would proceed to infinity in demonstrations, which was refuted in Book I. Since demonstration causes scientific knowledge, therefore, it follows that neither can scientific knowledge be the principle of scientific knowledge in such a way that the principles of the sciences would be known through scientific knowledge. If, then, apart from scientific knowledge we possess no other kind of cognition that is always true, it remains that understanding (intellectus) will be the principle of scientific knowledge, inasmuch as the principles of the sciences are known through understanding—in such a way, namely, that this understanding, which is the principle of science, is cognitive of the principle from which science proceeds, whereas science as a whole stands in the same manner toward the entire subject matter with which science deals as understanding stands toward the principle of science.