Book I, Lecture 5 — On the Division of Immediate Principles into Axioms, Hypotheses, and Postulates

Liber I, Lectio 5 — De divisione principiorum immediatorum in dignitates, suppositiones et petitiones

On the Division of Immediate Principles into Axioms, Hypotheses, and Postulates

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 1] Because the Philosopher had said above that demonstration proceeds from primary and immediate things, and these had not yet been explained by him, he therefore intends to make them clear. And this part is divided into three sections: in the first, he shows what an immediate proposition is; in the second, he shows that propositions of this sort must be better known than the conclusion, at Since one must believe and know, et cetera; in the third, he excludes certain errors that took occasion from what had been said, at Now to some indeed, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what an immediate proposition is; second, he divides it, at Of an immediate principle, et cetera. Concerning the first he proceeds as follows. First, he resumes what had been said above, namely, that a principle of demonstration is an immediate proposition: for he had also said above that demonstration proceeds from primary and immediate premises.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 2] Second, at An immediate proposition is, et cetera, he defines the immediate proposition, saying that an immediate proposition is one to which no other is prior. The reason for this explanation is evident from what has gone before. For it was said above that demonstration proceeds from things that are prior. Whenever, therefore, some proposition is mediated—that is, possesses a middle term through which the predicate is demonstrated of the subject—the propositions from which it is demonstrated must be prior to it: for the predicate of the conclusion inheres prior in the middle term than in the subject, and the middle term likewise inheres prior in the subject than the predicate does. It remains, therefore, that a proposition to which no other is prior is immediate.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 3] Third, at Now a proposition is, et cetera, he shows what a proposition is, since it is placed in the definition of an immediate proposition. And concerning this he does three things. First, he defines a proposition unqualifiedly, saying that a proposition is either part of an enunciation, in which one thing is predicated of one thing. For an enunciation has two parts, namely, affirmation and negation. Now everyone who syllogizes must put forward one of the two, and not both: for putting forward both belongs properly to one who raises a question at the outset; and thus a proposition is distinguished from a problem. Likewise, just as in a single syllogism only one thing is concluded, so too the proposition that serves as a principle of the syllogism must be one; and that proposition is one in which one thing is predicated of one thing. Hence by saying one of one, the Philosopher distinguishes a proposition from an enunciation called multiple, in which several things are predicated of one or one thing of several.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 4] Second, at Dialectical, et cetera, he sets down the difference between a dialectical proposition and a demonstrative proposition, saying that while every proposition takes one part of an enunciation, a dialectical proposition takes either of them indifferently. For dialectic has a path to either part of a contradiction, inasmuch as it proceeds from probable premises; hence in putting forward a premise it takes whichever part of the contradiction is granted, and puts it forward by way of a question. A demonstrative proposition, however, takes one part determinately, because the demonstrator never has a path except to demonstrating what is true; hence in putting forward a premise he always takes the true part of the contradiction. On this account, too, he who demonstrates does not ask, but assumes his premise as something known.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 5] Third, at Now an enunciation, et cetera, he defines the enunciation that is placed in the definition of a proposition, saying that an enunciation comprises either part of a contradiction, as is clear from what has been said. What a contradiction is he consequently shows, saying that contradiction is an opposition of which there is no intermediate in itself (secundum se). For although in privation and habit, and in immediate contraries, there is no intermediate with respect to a determinate subject, nevertheless there is an intermediate unqualifiedly: for a stone is neither blind nor sighted, and whiteness is neither even nor odd. Moreover, whatever immediacy they possess with respect to a determinate subject they possess insofar as they participate somewhat in contradiction: for privation is negation in a determinate subject, and one of two contraries likewise contains something of privation. Contradiction, however, lacks an intermediate unqualifiedly in all things, and it does not have this from another, but of itself; and on this account he says that there is no intermediate of it in itself. Consequently he also explains what each part of a contradiction is: for contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation; hence one part of it is affirmation, which predicates something of something, and the other is negation, which removes something from something.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 6] Next, when he says, Of an immediate principle, et cetera, he divides the immediate principle. And concerning this he does two things: first, he divides it; second, he subdivides it, at Of positions, one kind, et cetera. First, therefore, he says that the immediate principle of a syllogism is twofold. One is what is called a position [or thesis], which cannot be demonstrated—and on this account is called immediate—yet it is not necessary for one who is to be taught, that is, someone who is to be instructed in a demonstrative science, to possess it, that is, to conceive it in his mind or assent to it beforehand. The other is what is called a dignity [or axiom] or maximal proposition, which anyone who is to be taught must necessarily possess in his mind and assent to. And it is manifest that certain principles are of this sort, as is proved in Book IV of the Metaphysics concerning the principle that affirmation and negation are not simultaneously true, the contrary of which no one can inwardly believe in his mind even if he utters it with his mouth. And in the case of such principles we employ the aforesaid name, namely, dignity [or axiom] or maximal proposition, on account of the certitude of principles of this sort for manifesting other things.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 7] For the understanding of this division, it must be known that every proposition whose predicate is contained in the definition (ratio) of its subject is immediate and known through itself (per se nota), so far as it is in itself. Yet the terms of certain propositions are such that they are known to everyone, such as being, and one, and the other attributes that belong to being insofar as it is being: for being is the first conception of the intellect. Hence propositions of this sort must be held as known through themselves not only in themselves, but also in relation to everyone—for instance, that it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be, and that the whole is greater than its part, and the like. Consequently, all sciences receive principles of this sort from metaphysics, to which it belongs to consider being unqualifiedly and the attributes of being. Certain other propositions, however, are immediate, yet their terms are not known to everyone. Hence, although the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject, nevertheless, because the definition of the subject is not known to everyone, it is not necessary that such propositions be granted by everyone. For example, the proposition All right angles are equal, so far as it is in itself, is known through itself or immediate, because equality enters into the definition of a right angle; for a right angle is that which a straight line falling upon another straight line makes in such a way that the angles on either side are rendered equal. And therefore principles of this sort are received with a certain position. There is also another way in which certain propositions are called hypotheses (suppositiones). For there are certain propositions that cannot be proved except through the principles of another science, and therefore they must be supposed in a given science even though they are proved through the principles of another science: just as to draw a straight line from any point to any point is supposed by the geometer and proved by the natural philosopher, who shows that between any two points there lies an intervening line.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 8] Next, when he says, Of position, one kind is, et cetera, he subdivides the other member of the first division, namely, position: saying that one kind of position is that which assumes either part of an enunciation, namely, affirmation or negation—which he signifies when he says, such as I mean that something is or is not. And this kind of position is called a hypothesis (suppositio), because it is supposed as possessing truth. Another kind of position, however, is that which does not signify to be or not to be, namely, a definition, which is simply called a position. For the definition of the unit is posited by the arithmetician as a certain principle, namely, that the unit is that which is indivisible according to quantity. Yet a definition is not called a hypothesis (suppositio): for that alone is properly supposed which signifies what is true or false. And therefore he adds that what the unit is—which signifies neither truth nor falsity—is not the same as that the unit is, which does signify truth or falsity.

[lib. 1 l. 5 n. 9] Yet one might ask: since a definition is not a proposition signifying to be or not to be, how is it placed under the subdivision of the immediate proposition? To this it must be replied that in making the subdivision he does not resume the immediate proposition to subdivide it, but rather the immediate principle; and not only a proposition, but also a definition, can be called a principle of a syllogism. Or else it may be said that although a definition in itself is not a proposition in act, it is nevertheless virtually a proposition, because once the definition is known, it is evident that the definition is truly predicated of its subject.