Summa Theologiae I, q. 7, a. 1 & a. 3; q. 12, a. 4 — Being Itself as Most Formal of All; the Geometer’s Infinite Line; Apprehending Absolute Being¶
Summa Theologiae I, q. 7, a. 1 & a. 3; q. 12, a. 4 — Ipsum esse maxime formale omnium; linea infinita geometrae; apprehensio esse absoluti
[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the first article. It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, since it has the character of part and of matter, as is said in Book III of the Physics. But God is most perfect. Therefore He is not infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2] Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Physics, the finite and the infinite belong to quantity. Now in God there is no quantity, since He is not a body, as was shown above. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3] Furthermore, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere is finite according to place; therefore what is this thing in such a way as not to be another is finite according to substance. Now God is this, and not another—for He is neither a stone nor wood. Therefore God is not infinite according to substance.
[I q. 7 a. 1 s. c.] On the contrary, Damascene says that God is infinite and eternal and uncircumscribable.
[I q. 7 a. 1 co.] I answer that all the ancient philosophers attribute the infinite to the first principle, as is said in Book III of the Physics, and this reasonably, considering that things flow forth from the first principle unto infinity. Yet because certain of them erred concerning the nature of the first principle, it followed as a consequence that they erred concerning its infinity. For because they posited matter as the first principle, they consequently attributed a material infinity to the first principle, saying that some infinite body is the first principle of things. We must consider, therefore, that a thing is called infinite from the fact that it is not finite. Now both matter is in a certain way made finite through form, and form through matter. Matter, indeed, is made finite through form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives a form, is in potency to many forms; whereas when it receives one, it is terminated by that form. Form, on the other hand, is made finite through matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; whereas by being received in matter, it becomes determinately the form of this thing. Now matter is perfected by the form through which it is made finite, and therefore the infinite as attributed to matter has the character of something imperfect; for it is as it were matter not having form. Form, however, is not perfected by matter, but rather its amplitude is contracted through matter; hence the infinite as standing on the side of form not determined by matter has the character of something perfect. Now that which is most formal of all is being itself, as is clear from what was shown above. Since, therefore, the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He Himself is His own subsistent being, as was shown above, it is manifest that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
[I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1] And from this the reply to the first objection is evident.
[I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2] To the second it must be said that the boundary of quantity is like its form, a sign of which is that figure, which consists in the termination of quantity, is a certain form regarding quantity. Hence the infinite that belongs to quantity is the infinite that stands on the side of matter, and such an infinite is not attributed to God, as has been said.
[I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3] To the third it must be said that by the very fact that the being of God is subsisting of itself and not received in anything—insofar as it is called infinite—He is distinguished from all other things, and all others are set apart from Him; just as, if there were a subsistent whiteness, by the very fact that it did not exist in another it would differ from every whiteness existing in a subject.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the third article. It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in the mathematical sciences no falsehood is found, since there is no lie in those who abstract, as is said in Book II of the Physics. Now the mathematical sciences make use of the infinite in magnitude; for the geometer in his demonstrations says, “Let such a line be infinite.” Therefore it is not impossible for something to be infinite in magnitude.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2] Furthermore, what is not contrary to the intelligible nature of a thing is not impossible to belong to it. Now to be infinite is not contrary to the intelligible nature of magnitude; rather, both the finite and the infinite seem to be proper attributes of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3] Furthermore, magnitude is divisible to infinity, for the continuum is defined in just this way—as that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear in Book III of the Physics. Now contraries are naturally suited to arise concerning one and the same thing. Since, therefore, addition is opposed to division, and increase to diminution, it seems that magnitude can grow to infinity. Therefore it is possible for there to be an infinite magnitude.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4] Furthermore, motion and time derive their quantity and continuity from the magnitude over which motion passes, as is said in Book IV of the Physics. Now it is not contrary to the nature of time and motion that they be infinite, since every designated indivisible in time and in circular motion is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither will it be contrary to the nature of magnitude that it be infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 3 s. c.] On the contrary, every body has a surface. Now every body having a surface is finite, because surface is the boundary of a finite body. Therefore every body is finite. And the same can be said of surface and of line. Nothing, therefore, is infinite in magnitude.
[I q. 7 a. 3 co.] I answer that it is one thing to be infinite according to essence, and another according to magnitude. For even granted that there were some body infinite in magnitude, such as fire or air, it would still not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated to a definite species by its form, and to a definite individual by matter. And therefore, once it has been established from the foregoing that no creature is infinite according to essence, it still remains to inquire whether any created thing is infinite according to magnitude. It must be known, then, that body, which is a complete magnitude, is taken in two ways: namely mathematically, insofar as quantity alone is considered in it; and naturally, insofar as matter and form are considered in it. Now regarding a natural body, that it cannot be actually infinite is manifest. For every natural body has some determinate substantial form; since, therefore, accidents follow upon substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents follow upon a determinate form, among which is quantity. Hence every natural body has a determinate quantity, both as to greater and as to lesser. Consequently it is impossible for any natural body to be infinite. This is also clear from motion. For every natural body has some natural motion. An infinite body, however, could not have any natural motion: neither rectilinear, because nothing moves naturally with a rectilinear motion except when it is outside its proper place, which could not happen to an infinite body, since it would occupy all places, and thus every place indifferently would be its place; nor likewise according to circular motion, because in circular motion one part of the body must be transferred to the place where another part was, and in a circular body posited as infinite this could not occur, since two lines drawn from the center stand farther apart from one another the farther they are extended from the center—so that if the body were infinite, the lines would stand infinitely apart from one another, and thus one could never arrive at the place of the other. The same reasoning holds also regarding a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing exists in act except through its form. Hence, since the form of a quantified thing as such is figure, it will have to possess some figure; and thus it will be finite, for figure is that which is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the geometer does not need to assume that some line is actually infinite, but needs to take some actually finite line from which as much can be subtracted as is necessary; and this he calls an infinite line.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2] To the second it must be said that although the infinite is not contrary to the nature of magnitude in general, nevertheless it is contrary to the nature of every single species of it—namely contrary to the nature of a two-cubit or three-cubit magnitude, or of a circular or triangular magnitude, and the like. Now it is impossible for that to exist in a genus which exists in none of its species. Hence it is impossible for there to be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3] To the third it must be said that the infinite that belongs to quantity, as has been said, stands on the side of matter. Now by division of the whole one approaches toward matter, for parts stand in the character of matter; whereas by addition one approaches toward the whole, which stands in the character of form. And therefore the infinite is not found in the addition of magnitude, but in division alone.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that motion and time do not exist as a whole in act, but successively; hence they have potency mingled with act. Magnitude, however, exists as a whole in act. And therefore the infinite that belongs to quantity and stands on the side of matter is repugnant to the totality of magnitude, though not to the totality of time or motion; for to be in potency belongs to matter.
[I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the fourth article. It seems that some created intellect can see the divine essence by its own natural powers. For Dionysius says in Chapter IV of The Divine Names that an angel is a pure, most clear mirror, receiving, if it is lawful to say so, the whole beauty of God. Now anything is seen when its mirror is seen. Since, therefore, an angel understands himself by his own natural powers, it seems that by his own natural powers he also understands the divine essence.
[I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2] Furthermore, that which is supremely visible becomes less visible to us on account of the defect of our sight, whether bodily or intellectual. Now the intellect of an angel suffers no defect. Since, therefore, God in Himself is supremely intelligible, it seems that He is supremely intelligible to an angel. If, then, an angel can understand other intelligible things by his own natural powers, much more can he understand God.
[I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3] Furthermore, bodily sense cannot be elevated to understand incorporeal substance, because it is above its nature. If, therefore, to see God through His essence is above the nature of every created intellect, it seems that no created intellect could ever attain to seeing the essence of God—which is erroneous, as is clear from what was said above. It seems, therefore, that it is natural to a created intellect to see the divine essence.
[I q. 12 a. 4 s. c.] On the contrary, it is written in Romans VI: The grace of God is life everlasting. Now life everlasting consists in the vision of the divine essence, according to John XVII: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and so forth. Therefore to see the essence of God belongs to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.
[I q. 12 a. 4 co.] I answer that it is impossible for any created intellect by its own natural powers to see the essence of God. For knowledge takes place according as the thing known is in the knower. Now the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is according to the mode of its own nature. If, therefore, the mode of being of any thing to be known exceeds the mode of the knower’s nature, the knowledge of that thing must be above the nature of that knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For there are some things whose nature has being only in this individual matter, and of this sort are all corporeal things. There are others whose natures are subsisting of themselves, not in any matter, which nevertheless are not their own being, but are things having being; and of this sort are incorporeal substances, which we call angels. Of God alone, however, is the proper mode of being such that He is His own subsistent being. To know those things, therefore, that have being only in individual matter is connatural to us, because our soul, through which we know, is the form of a certain matter. Yet our soul possesses two cognitive powers: one which is the act of a bodily organ, and to this it is connatural to know things according as they exist in individual matter—hence sense knows only singulars; while its other cognitive power is the intellect, which is not the act of any bodily organ. Hence through the intellect it is connatural to us to know natures which indeed have being only in individual matter, yet not according as they exist in individual matter, but according as they are abstracted from it by the consideration of the intellect. Consequently through the intellect we can know things of this sort in universal, which is beyond the faculty of sense. To the angelic intellect, however, it is connatural to know natures not existing in matter, which is beyond the natural faculty of the intellect of the human soul according to the state of the present life in which it is united to the body. It remains, therefore, that to know subsistent being itself is connatural to the divine intellect alone, and is beyond the natural faculty of any created intellect whatever, because no creature is its own being, but has participated being. The created intellect, therefore, cannot see God through His essence except insofar as God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect as intelligible to it.
[I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that this mode of knowing God is connatural to an angel—namely, that he know Him through His likeness shining forth in the angel himself. Yet to know God through any created likeness is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above. Hence it does not follow that an angel by his own natural powers can know the essence of God.
[I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2] To the second it must be said that the intellect of an angel has no defect if defect be taken privatively, meaning that it lacks what it ought to have. If, however, it be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is found deficient when compared with God, inasmuch as it does not possess that excellence which is found in God.
[I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3] To the third it must be said that the sense of sight, because it is altogether material, can in no way be elevated to anything immaterial. Yet our intellect, or the angelic intellect, because according to its nature it is in some measure elevated above matter, can be elevated beyond its nature by grace to something higher. And a sign of this is that sight can in no way know in abstraction what it knows in concretion, for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this particular nature. Our intellect, however, is able to consider in abstraction what it knows in concretion; for although it knows things having form in matter, nevertheless it resolves the composite into both, and considers the form itself on its own. And similarly the intellect of an angel, although it is connatural to it to know being as concrete in a definite nature, is nevertheless able to separate being itself by its intellect, knowing that it itself is one thing and its being is another. And therefore, since the created intellect by its own nature is naturally suited to apprehend concrete form and concrete being in abstraction by way of a certain resolution, it can by grace be elevated to know separate subsisting substance and separate subsisting being.