Physics Book IV, Lecture 7 — On the Definition of Immobile Place from Local Translation and Themistius’s Solution¶
In IV Physicorum, Lectio 7 — De definitione loci immobilis ex motu translationis et solutione Themistii
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 1] After the Philosopher has defined place, here he shows how something is in place. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how something is simply in place, and how not; second, he shows how that which is not simply in place is in place in a qualified respect, at Whence also if water were made, etc.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 2] He concludes first from the premises, therefore, that since place is the boundary of the containing body, whatever body has adjacent to it some body containing it externally is in place simply and per se; whereas whatever body does not have adjacent to it some body externally containing it is in no way in place. Now in the world there is only one such body, namely the outermost sphere, whichever sphere that may be. Hence according to this determination it follows that the outermost sphere is not in place.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 3] Yet this seems impossible: because the outermost sphere is moved in place, and nothing is moved in place that is not in place. Now the difficulty of this doubt does not arise for those who hold the opinion concerning space. For there is no necessity for them to say that, in order for the outermost sphere to be in place, it must have a containing body; rather, the space that is understood to penetrate the whole world and all its parts is the place of the whole world and of each of its parts, according to them. Yet this position is impossible: because one must say either that place is nothing over and above the located body, or that there are certain dimensions of space existing per se and nevertheless interpenetrating the dimensions of sensible bodies—both of which are impossible.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 4] Hence Alexander said that the outermost sphere is in no way in place: for not every body is of necessity in place, since place does not fall within the definition of body. And on account of this he said that the outermost sphere is not moved in place, either according to the whole or according to its parts. Yet because every motion must be placed in some genus of motion, Avicenna, following him, said that the motion of the outermost sphere is not motion in place, but motion in position (situs)—contrary to Aristotle, who states in Book V of this work that motion exists only in three genera, namely in quantity, quality, and where. Yet this cannot stand: for it is impossible, speaking per se, for motion to exist in any genus the intelligible notion of whose species consists in an indivisible. For on account of this there is no motion in substance, because the intelligible notion of every species of substance consists in an indivisible, inasmuch as species of substance are not predicated according to more and less; and on account of this, since motion possesses succession, a substantial form is brought into being not through motion, but through generation, which is the term of motion. It is otherwise, however, with whiteness and similar things, which are participated according to more and less. Now every species of position has an intelligible notion consisting in an indivisible, so that if anything is added or subtracted, it is no longer the same species of position. Hence it is impossible that there be motion in the genus of position. And besides, the very same difficulty remains. For position, according as it is posited as a category, imports the order of parts in place, even though according as it is posited as a difference of quantity it imports nothing save the order of parts in the whole. Everything that is moved according to position, therefore, must be moved according to place.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 5] Certain others, however—namely Avempace—said that place is to be assigned in one way to a body moved circularly and in another way to a body moved with rectilinear motion. For because a straight line is imperfect, admitting of addition, a body moved with rectilinear motion requires an externally containing place; whereas because a circular line is complete in itself, a body moved circularly does not require an externally containing place, but a place around which it revolves: whence circular motion too is said to be motion around the center. Thus, therefore, they say that the convex surface of the contained sphere is the place of the first sphere. Yet this is contrary to the common suppositions previously laid down concerning place: namely, that place is what contains, and that place is equal to the located body.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 6] And therefore Averroes said that the outermost sphere is in place per accidens. To make this evident, one must consider that everything that has fixity through another is said to be in place per accidens from the fact that that through which it is fixed is in place, as is clear in the case of a nail fastened in a ship and of a man resting in a ship. Now it is manifest that bodies moved circularly possess fixity through the immobility of the center: hence the outermost sphere is said to be in place per accidens insofar as the center around which it revolves has being in place. That the other lower spheres have per se a place in which they are contained happens accidentally, and does not belong to the necessity of a body moved circularly. Against this, however, it is objected that if the outermost sphere is in place per accidens, it follows that it is moved in place per accidens, and thus motion per accidens is prior to motion per se. Yet to this the reply is made that circular motion does not require that what is moved per se circularly be per se in place, whereas rectilinear motion does require this. Even so, this seems to conflict with the definition that Aristotle laid down above concerning what is in place per accidens. For he said that certain things are or are moved in place per accidens from the fact that that in which they exist is moved; whereas something is not said to be in place per accidens from the fact that something altogether extrinsic to it is in place. Since, therefore, the center is altogether extrinsic to the outermost sphere, it seems ridiculous to say that the outermost sphere is in place per accidens from the fact that the center is in place.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 7] And therefore I more approve the judgment of Themistius, who said that the outermost sphere is in place through its parts. To make this evident, one must consider that, as Aristotle said above, place would not be sought except on account of motion, which demonstrates place from the fact that bodies succeed one another in one place. Hence, although place does not belong to the necessity of a body, it nevertheless belongs to the necessity of a body that is moved according to place. Thus, therefore, to any body moved locally it is necessary to assign a place according as in that motion there is considered a succession of diverse bodies in the same place. Now in things that are moved with rectilinear motion, it is manifest that two bodies succeed one another in place according to the whole: because one whole body leaves the whole place, and into that whole place another body enters. Hence it is necessary that a body moved with rectilinear motion be in place according to its whole self. In circular motion, however, although the whole comes to be in diverse places according to intelligible notion, nevertheless the whole does not change place in subject: for the place remains always the same in subject, and is diversified only according to intelligible notion, as will be stated in Book VI of this work. Yet the parts change place not only according to intelligible notion, but also in subject. In circular motion, therefore, succession in the same place is observed not of whole bodies, but of parts of the same body. Hence to a body that is moved circularly, place is owed of necessity not according to the whole, but according to its parts.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 8] Yet against this there seems to stand the fact that the parts of a continuous body are neither in place nor moved according to place; rather, the whole is moved, and the whole is in place. Now it is manifest that the outermost sphere is a continuous body: therefore its parts are neither in place nor moved according to place. And thus it does not seem true that place is owed to the outermost sphere by reason of its parts. To this, however, it must be said that the parts of a continuous whole, although they are not in place in act, are nevertheless in place in potency, according as the continuum is divisible. For a part, if it be divided off, will exist in the whole as in a place: hence it is in this manner that the parts of a continuum are moved in place. And this appears above all in fluid continua, which are of easy division, as in water, whose parts are found to be moved within the whole mass of water. Thus, therefore, because something is predicated of a whole by reason of its parts, insofar as the parts of the outermost sphere are in place in potency, the whole outermost sphere is in place per accidens by reason of its parts; and being in place in this way suffices for circular motion.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 9] If someone should object that what is in act is prior to what is in potency, so that it seems incongruous that the first local motion should belong to a body existing in place through parts that are in place in potency, it must be said that this accords most fittingly with the first motion. For it is necessary to descend by degrees from the one immobile principle to the diversity found in mobile things. Now the variation that takes place according to parts existing in place in potency is lesser than that which takes place according to wholes existing in place in act. Hence the first motion, which is circular, has less difformity and retains more uniformity, standing closer to immobile substances. Moreover, it is much more fitting to say that the outermost sphere is in place on account of its own intrinsic parts than on account of the center, which lies altogether outside its substance; and this harmonizes better with the mind of Aristotle, as is clear to anyone inspecting what follows, wherein the Philosopher makes plain how the heaven is in place, at Whence also if water were made, etc.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 10] Concerning this he does two things: first, indeed, he makes plain how the outermost sphere is in place; second, he draws a conclusion from what has been said, at Whence it is moved circularly, etc. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he makes plain that the outermost sphere is in place through its parts; second, how its parts are in place, at Now just as was said, some things indeed, etc.; third, how from its parts being in place belongs to the whole, at And some things indeed are per se, etc.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 11] Because, therefore, he had stated that whatever body has nothing outside containing it is not in place per se, he concludes that if some body of this sort not contained by another—such as the outermost sphere—were water (in which what is being said appears more clearly on account of the easy division of its parts), its parts will be moved insofar as they are contained by one another, thus existing in a certain manner in place. Yet the whole water will in one way be moved, and in another way not. For it will not be moved in such a way that the whole simultaneously changes place, as though translated into another place diverse in subject; rather, it will be moved circularly, and this motion requires a place of the parts, and not of the whole. And it will not be moved upward and downward, but circularly; whereas certain other bodies will be moved upward and downward, changing place according to the whole—namely rare and dense, or heavy and light, bodies.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 12] Then when he says, Now just as was said, etc., he shows how the parts of the outermost sphere are in place. And he says that, just as was stated above, some things are in place in act, and others according to potency. Hence when something is a continuum of homogeneous parts, its parts are in place according to potency, just as is the case in the outermost sphere; whereas when the parts are separated and merely contiguous, as happens in a heap of stones, then the parts are in place according to act.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 13] Then when he says, And some things indeed are per se, etc., he shows how from this it follows that the whole sphere is in place. And he says that some things are per se in place, such as every body that is per se moved in place, whether according to change of place or according to growth, as was said above. Yet the heaven, that is, the outermost sphere, is not in place in this way, as has been said, since no body contains it; rather, according as it is moved circularly, with its parts succeeding one another, place is owed to its parts in potency, as has been said, insofar namely as one part of it is adjoining, that is, consecutive to another. Certain things, on the other hand, are in place per accidens, such as the soul and all forms: and in this way too the heaven, that is, the outermost sphere, is in place, insofar as all its parts are in place because each part of it is contained by another around the circle. For in a non-circular body an extreme part remains uncontained and containing only; whereas in a circular body every part is both containing and contained, though in potency. Hence by reason of all its parts a circular body is in place. And this it takes as being per accidens—namely through its parts—just as above, when he said that the parts of a body are moved per accidens in place.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 14] Then when he says, Whence it is moved circularly, etc., he draws a certain conclusion from what has been said. For because he had stated that a body moved circularly need not be in place according to the whole, save only per accidens by reason of its parts, he concludes that the supreme body is moved solely in a circle, on account of the fact that the whole itself is not anywhere: because what is somewhere is itself something, and has something outside itself by which it is contained, whereas outside the whole there is nothing. And on account of this all things are said to be in the heaven as in the ultimate container, because the heaven is perhaps that which contains the whole. Now he says perhaps because it has not yet been proved that nothing exists outside the heaven. Nor is this to be understood in such a way that the very body of the heaven is place; rather, it is a certain innermost surface of it facing us, which is like a boundary touching the mobile bodies that exist within it. And on account of this we say that the earth is in water, which is in air, which is in the aether, that is, fire, which is in the heaven, while the heaven is no further in another.
[lib. 4 l. 7 n. 15] According to the intention of Averroes, however, this text must be expounded otherwise. For the example of water that he first introduces is not, according to him, to be referred to the outermost sphere, but to the whole universe, which indeed is moved insofar as its parts are moved—some circularly, such as the celestial bodies, and others by upward or downward motion, such as the lower bodies. What is introduced afterward, namely that some things are in place in act and others in potency, is not to be referred to what was said before, but must be taken as stated on its own account. For because he had said that some things are in place according to their parts and others according to the whole, he consequently adds that some things are in place according to act and others according to potency; and further, that some things are in place per se and others per accidens. Here it is to be noted that heaven, according to him, is taken here in two ways: for first heaven is taken for the totality of bodies, and chiefly the celestial ones; second, for the outermost sphere. He says, therefore, that those things are per se in place which are moved according to place, whether according to the whole or according to their parts, such as the heaven, that is, the universe; whereas those things are in place per accidens such as the soul and the heaven, that is, the outermost sphere. For one must say that all parts of the universe are in some manner in place: the outermost sphere indeed per accidens, and the other bodies per se, insofar as they are contained by an exterior body. And this he sets forth right to the end.