On the Heavens Book I, Lecture 2 — On the Perfection of Three-Dimensional Body and the Geometers’ Mode of Speaking of a Moving Point

In I De Caelo, Lectio 2 — De perfectione corporis in tribus dimensionibus et modo loquendi geometrarum de motu puncti

On the Perfection of Three-Dimensional Body and the Geometers' Mode of Speaking of a Moving Point

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1] After the Philosopher has shown by way of prologue that bodies and magnitudes must be treated in natural science, here he begins to pursue his principal purpose. And because, as was said above, in this work Aristotle principally intends to make determinations concerning the corporeal universe and its principal parts, which are the simple bodies—chief among which is the celestial body—this work is divided into three parts: in the first, he treats of the corporeal universe; in the second, he treats of the celestial body, and this in Book II, at That the whole heaven, therefore, was neither generated, etc.; in the third part, he treats of the other simple bodies, namely the heavy and the light, in Book III, at Concerning the first heaven, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the perfection of the universe; second, he determines certain conditions or properties of it, at Yet since it is manifest concerning these things, etc. Concerning the first he again does two things: first, he shows the perfection of the universe; second, he shows out of what parts its perfection is integrated, at Concerning the nature of the whole, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the perfection that the universe possesses according to the common notion of its genus, namely insofar as it is a body; second, he proves its own proper perfection, at Of partial bodies, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he makes plain the definition of body, which he uses to show what is proposed; second, he proves what is proposed, at Therefore, since all and whole, etc.; third, he shows what can be manifest from the premises, at Whichever magnitudes, therefore, indeed, etc. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he defines the continuum, which is the genus of body; second, he makes plain the definition of body, at A body, however, etc.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 2] Concerning the first, one must consider that the continuum is found defined by the Philosopher in two ways. In one way by a formal definition, according as it is stated in the Categories that a continuum is that whose parts are joined at one common boundary: for the unity of a continuum is as it were its form. In another way by a material definition, which is taken from the parts, which have the character of matter, as is stated in Physics II; and thus it is defined here that a continuum is that which is divisible into things always further divisible. For no part of a continuum can be indivisible: because no continuum is composed of indivisibles, as is proved in Physics VI. And quite fittingly this definition is set down here, while the other is set down in the Categories: because the consideration of the natural philosopher deals with matter, whereas the consideration of the logician deals with intelligible notion and species.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 3] Then when he says, A body, however, etc., he defines body. And first he proposes the definition, saying that a body is a continuum that is divisible every way, that is, toward every part, or according to every dimension. Second, at Now of magnitude, etc., he proves the proposed definition by the following argument. A body is divided according to three dimensions; now what is divided according to three dimensions is divided according to all dimensions; therefore a body is divisible according to all dimensions. First, therefore, he makes plain the minor premise, as it were by division. For among magnitudes there is one that is divided in one direction, and this is called a line; another that is divided in two directions, and this is called a plane, that is, a surface; and another that is divided according to three dimensions—and since such a magnitude is neither a line nor a surface, it follows that it is a body. The major premise he sets forth at And besides these, etc. And first he states it: saying that besides these magnitudes or dimensions there is no other magnitude or dimension, on account of the fact that three possesses the character of being all, because it possesses the character of a certain totality; and what is threefold seems to be every way, or altogether, that is, according to every mode.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 4] Second, at For just as, etc., he proves what he had stated in three ways. First, indeed, according to the reasoning of the Pythagoreans, who said that what is called whole and all is determined by the ternary number. For beginning and middle and consummation, that is, end, possess the number that belongs to the whole and the all: for in divisible things the first part does not suffice for the integrity of the whole, which is constituted through an ultimate term, to which one arrives from the beginning through a middle. Now these—namely beginning, middle, and end—have the ternary number: and thus it is clear that the ternary number belongs to the all and the whole.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 5] Second, at Wherefore taking from nature, etc., he proves the same thing through what is observed in divine worship. For we employ this number, namely the ternary, for the sanctifications of the gods (whom, namely, the Gentiles worshiped), that is, in their sacrifices and praises, as though having received from nature its own laws and rules: so that, namely, just as nature perfects all things by the ternary number, so those who instituted divine worship, wishing to attribute to God everything that is perfect, attribute to Him the ternary number.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 6] Third, at Moreover, we assign, etc., he proves the same thing through the common usage of speech. And he says that we also assign words to things according to the aforesaid manner, namely that perfection belongs to the ternary. For if things are two, we say both, and two men we call both; we do not say all of them, but first use this word concerning three. And all of us in common follow this manner of speaking on account of the fact that nature inclines us to this. For the things that are peculiar to individuals in their manner of speaking seem to arise from the private conceptions of each person, whereas what is observed commonly among all seems to arise from natural inclination.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 7] Now it is to be observed that nowhere else is Aristotle found employing Pythagorean arguments to show what is proposed, nor is he elsewhere found concluding anything about things through the properties of numbers; and perhaps he does so here on account of the affinity of numbers to magnitudes, which are treated here. Even so, it seems that this proof is not efficacious: for it seems no more to follow that dimensions are three on account of the ternary being the number of the whole and of all—otherwise it would follow by the same reasoning that there were only three elements, or three fingers on the hand. Yet one must know that, as Simplicius states in his commentary, Aristotle does not proceed here demonstratively, but according to probability; and this mode suffices after demonstrations already premised, or presupposed from another science. Now it is manifest that making determinations concerning the dimensions of bodies insofar as they are such pertains per se to the mathematician, whereas the natural philosopher assumes from the mathematician the things he considers concerning dimensions. And therefore to prove demonstratively that there are only three dimensions pertains to the mathematician—just as Ptolemy proves through the fact that it is impossible for more than three perpendicular lines to meet together at the same point, while every dimension is measured along some perpendicular line. Presupposing the demonstration of this from the mathematician, therefore, Aristotle employs testimony and signs, just as he is accustomed to do after demonstrations introduced by himself.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 8] Then when he says, Therefore, since all, etc., from what has been shown he proceeds to establish his principal point. And he says that these three—all and whole and perfect—do not differ from one another according to species, that is, according to formal notion, because all of them import a certain integrity; rather, if they differ in anything, they differ in matter and subject, insofar as they are predicated of diverse things. For we use the word all in discrete things, as when we say every man, and we also use it in continua that are ready for division, as when we say all the water and all the air. Whole, on the other hand, is spoken of both in these and in solid continua: for we say the whole people and the whole piece of wood. And perfect we speak of both in these and in forms: for we say perfect whiteness and perfect virtue. Because, therefore, all and perfect are the same, it follows that body is perfect among magnitudes: because body alone is determined by three dimensions, and this possesses the character of all, as was shown above; for since it is divisible in three ways, it follows that it is divisible every way, that is, according to every dimension. Among the other magnitudes, however, one is divisible according to two dimensions, namely surface, and another according to one, namely line. For as they have obtained number—that is, according as magnitudes possess the number of dimensions—so do they possess division and continuity: in such a way, namely, that one magnitude is continuous according to one mode, namely line; another is continuous in two modes, namely surface; whereas body is continuous according to every mode. Hence it is clear that body is the perfect magnitude, as possessing every mode of continuity.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 9] Then when he says, Whichever magnitudes, therefore, indeed, etc., he shows what is or is not manifest from the premises, and sets down three points. The first of these is manifest of itself, namely that whichever magnitude is divisible is continuous: for if it were not continuous, it would have the character not of magnitude, but rather of number. The second is the converse of this, namely that every continuum is divisible, just as was placed in its definition. And this indeed is manifest from the things proved in Physics VI, as was stated above; yet it is not manifest from what has just now been said, because here he supposed that a continuum is divisible and did not prove it. The third point is manifest from the premises, namely that there is no transition from body into another genus of magnitude, in the way that there is a transition from length into surface, and from surface into body. And he employs the mode of speaking used by geometers, who imagine that a point moved makes a line, while a line moved makes a surface, and a surface a body. From body, however, there is no transition to another magnitude: because such a going forth, or progression, to another genus of magnitude takes place according to a defect of that from which the transition is made (whence natural motion too is the act of the imperfect). Yet it is not possible that body, which is the perfect magnitude, should fall short according to this character, because it is continuous according to every mode; and therefore no transition can be made from body into another genus of magnitude.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 10] Then when he says, Of partial bodies, indeed, etc., he makes plain the proper perfection of the universe by contrast with particular bodies. And first he sets forth how particular bodies stand with respect to perfection. And he says that each of the particular bodies, according to the common notion of body, is such, that is, perfect, insofar as it possesses all dimensions; yet it is bounded against the next body insofar as it is contiguous with it. And thus each of such bodies is in a certain manner many—that is, perfect insofar as it possesses all dimensions, and imperfect insofar as it has another body outside itself against which it is bounded. Or it is many according to its contact with diverse bodies; or it is many because there are several individuals of one species on account of imperfection—which does not happen in the case of the universe.

[lib. 1 l. 2 n. 11] Second, at The whole, however, etc., he shows how the universe stands with respect to perfection. And he says that the whole, that is, the universe, whose parts are the particular bodies, must of necessity be perfect in every way; and just as the very name universe signifies, every way, that is, in all modes, perfect, and not according to one mode while failing in another: because it both possesses all dimensions and comprehends within itself all bodies.