Preface to Hermodorus: Analysis, Synthesis, and the Thirty-Three Books¶
Synagoge Book VII, Chs. 1–3 (Hultsch II, pp. 634–638) · Original English Translation from Hultsch’s Greek
That body of doctrine which is called the Treasury of Analysis (ὁ καλούμενος ἀναλυόμενος τόπος), my son Hermodorus, is—taken as a whole—a specialized mathematical resource prepared, after the composition of the common Elements, for those who wish to acquire in geometric inquiries the power of discovering solutions to problems set before them; and it was written exclusively for this purpose by three principal men: Euclid the author of the Elements, Apollonius of Perga, and Aristaeus the Elder—proceeding entirely by way of analysis and synthesis.
Analysis (ἀνάλυσις), then, is the path from that which is sought, assumed as if already admitted, through its successive consequences toward something admitted in synthesis. For in analysis, assuming the thing sought as having already come to be (ὡς γεγονὸς ὑποθέμενοι), we examine that antecedent from which this follows, and again the antecedent of that, until by thus retracing our steps (ἀναποδίζοντες) we arrive at something already known or holding the rank of a first principle; and such a procedure we call analysis, as being a solution backward (ἀνάπαλιν λύσις).
In synthesis (σύνθεσις), conversely, reversing our course, we set down as already done that last point apprehended in the analysis, and arranging in their natural order as consequences what had previously been antecedents, and fitting them one to another, we arrive at the final completion of the construction of what was sought; and this we call synthesis.
Now there are two genera of analysis:
The theoretical (θεωρηματικόν), which seeks after truth: assuming what is proposed as existing and true, we advance through its consequences, as though true and existing by hypothesis, up to something admitted. If that admitted endpoint be true, what was sought will also be true, and its proof will be the reverse synthesis; but if we encounter something admitted to be false, what was sought will also be false.
The problematic (προβληματικόν), which seeks to supply something proposed: assuming what is proposed as known, we advance through its consequences, as though true, up to something admitted. If that endpoint is possible and procurable (δυνατόν τε καὶ ποριστόν)—what mathematicians call given (δεδομένον)—then what was proposed will also be possible, and again the proof will correspond inversely to the analysis; if we encounter something admitted to be impossible, the problem will likewise be impossible. That part of the inquiry which specifies beforehand when, how, and in how many ways the problem will be possible is called its diorismos.
The thirty-three books of the Treasury of Analysis up to Apollonius, arranged in curricular order (Hultsch II p. 636), are these:
Euclid's Data (Δεδομένα, 1 book);
Apollonius's Cutting Off of a Ratio (Λόγου ἀποτομή, 2 books);
Apollonius’s Cutting Off of an Area (Χωρίου ἀποτομή, 2 books);
Apollonius’s Determinate Section (Διωρισμένη τομή, 2 books);
Apollonius’s Tangencies (Ἐπαφαί, 2 books);
Euclid's Porisms (Πορίσματα, 3 books);
Apollonius’s Inclinations (Νεύσεις, 2 books);
Apollonius’s Plane Loci (Τόποι ἐπίπεδοι, 2 books);
Apollonius's Conics (Κωνικά, 8 books);
Aristaeus's Solid Loci (Τόποι στερεοί, 5 books);
Euclid's Surface Loci (Τόποι πρὸς ἐπιφανείᾳ, 2 books);
Eratosthenes's On Means (Περὶ μεσοτήτων, 2 books).