Marinus of Neapolis: Commentary (Protheoria) on Euclid’s Data

Epistemology of Givenness (Δεδομένον) — Menge (1896) pp. 234–256

Note

Edition Track (English): Complete literal translation of Marinus of Neapolis's Protheoria (Menge 1896, pp. 234–256) and Euclid's fifteen Definitions (Menge 1896, pp. 2–4), collated with Robert Simson's critical edition (1762 / 1806, pp. 357–360). Switch tabs above for Greek (Menge 1896), Summary, or Notes.


§ 1. Program of the Inquiry (Three Questions)

f. Menge 234 · p. 234

First it is necessary to lay down what the given (τὸ δεδομένον) is; next, to state what the utility of the treatise concerning it is; and third, under what science it is subsumed.

§ 2. Survey of Simple Definitions (Apollonius, Diodorus, Ptolemy & the Elements)

Now people define the given in many ways—the older authorities in one manner, and the more recent in another—wherefore a true account of it has proved difficult to render. Some, indeed, have not even offered any definition of it at all, but tried to discover some distinctive property (ἴδιον) of the given; others combined elements taken from their predecessors and attempted to define it, yet not even these in agreement with one another. Nevertheless, all of them appear to set out from one and the same common notion and supposition in speaking of it: for they supposed the given to be something comprehensible (καταληπτόν). Accordingly, among those who proposed to circumscribe the given more simply and by a single differentia, some called it the ordered (τεταγμένον), as Apollonius does in his treatise On Vergings (Περὶ νεύσεων) and in his General Treatise (Καθόλου πραγματεία); others called it the known (γνώριμον), as Diodorus does—for thus he says that optical rays and angles are given, and everything that has come into some cognizance, even if it should not be expressible (ῥητόν). Still others declared it to be the rational (ῥητόν), as Ptolemy seems to do in the Syntaxis, calling those things ‘given’ whose measure is known either with exactness (πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν) or approximately (τὸ σύνεγγυς). Some, again, have supposed the given to be that which is set out in hypothesis by the proposer of a problem. And in yet another way people speak in the first Elements of ‘the given point’ and ‘the given straight line,’ meaning whatever straight line anyone may mark off and assign. All these usages aim to signify a certain comprehension (κατάληψις); whence those definitions win the highest approval which most clearly manifest comprehensibility, as will become evident to us as we proceed.

§ 3. Composite Definitions & Need to Examine the Four Pairs of Opposites

f. Menge 236 · p. 236

Let us now also set forth the distinctions among those who do not characterize the nature of the given merely by a single bare term, but fashion as it were a formal definition of it. Summarized under main heads, their ways too are easily numbered: for some defined the given to be at once ordered and procurable (τεταγμένον ἅμα καὶ πόριμον); others, at once ordered and known; and certain others, at once known and procurable. All of these likewise clearly define it in the manner stated by looking toward the comprehension—that is, the grasping and finding—of the given. In order that we may bind fast this guiding conception of theirs, and moreover select out of the many handed down to us the true definition of our subject, we must first examine the signification of each of the simple terms and of their opposites—namely the unordered (ἄτακτον), the unknown (ἄγνωστον), the unprocurable (ἄπορον), and the irrational (ἄλογον)—with reference to the geometric matter before us; for such notions extend also to physical realities and to the other mathematical sciences.

§ 4. First Pair: The Ordered (Τεταγμένον) vs. The Unordered (Ἄτακτον)

They sketch the ordered (τεταγμένον), then, as that which always preserves one and the same state in that respect in which it is said to be ordered—whether in magnitude, or in species, or in any other such respect; or, put otherwise, that which cannot come about differently at different times, but exists uniquely (μοναχῶς) in a determinate place. For example, to speak in outline: the straight line drawn through two fixed points ([Post. 1]) is said to be ordered because it cannot be drawn otherwise or unstably; whereas the circular circumference drawn through two points is unordered (ἄτακτος), since it is described in infinitely many ways and unstably, greater and smaller circles being describable ad infinitum through the two points. Conversely, the circumference through three non-collinear points is ordered. Ordered, too, are constructions such as erecting an equilateral triangle on a given straight line ([I.1]): for even if it comes about in two ways, yet on either side of the straight line it is unique and unvarying; and likewise cutting a given straight line in a given ratio ([VI.10]), for this too comes about uniquely on either side of the bisection. Unordered are their opposites, such as constructing a scalene triangle without further specification or cutting a straight line indefinitely. And the qualification ‘in that respect in which it is ordered’ (καθʼ ὃ τέτακται) is added to the definition because one and the same thing can be ordered in one respect and unordered in another: thus an equilateral triangle, insofar as it is equilateral, is ordered (in species), whereas not every equilateral triangle is determinate in magnitude.

§ 5. Second Pair: The Known (Γνώριμον) vs. The Unknown (Ἄγνωστον)

f. Menge 238 · p. 238

The known (γνώριμον) is that which is cognized as evident to us and grasped by our understanding, whereas the unknown (ἄγνωστον) is that which is neither cognized nor grasped by us. For example, the length of a road is said to be known insofar as I have grasped how many stades it is; and of a triangle, that its interior angles are equal to two right angles ([I.32]); and that a binomial straight line (ἡ ἐκ δύο ὀνομάτων, [X.36]) is irrational. Furthermore, truths such as this are also called known: that from a given point outside a spiral (On Spirals) only a single tangent can be drawn to one side of the curve—for if there were another, two straight lines would enclose a space, which is impossible. What is unknown, therefore, is not the irrational, but that which is neither cognized nor grasped by us.

§ 6. Third Pair: The Procurable (Πόριμον) vs. The Unprocurable (Ἄπορον)

f. Menge 240 · p. 240

The procurable (πόριμον) is that which we are already able to produce and construct—that is, to bring into actual conception (εἰς ἐπίνοιαν ἀγαγεῖν). Others again define the procurable as either that which is procured through demonstration, or what is manifest even without demonstration: such as describing a circle with a given centre and distance ([Post. 3]), constructing not only an equilateral triangle ([I.1]) but also a scalene triangle, finding a binomial line ([X.36]) or three rational lines commensurable in square only ([X.28]), and even things arising in infinitely many ways, such as describing a circle through two points. The unprocurable (ἄπορον) is the opposite, such as the squaring of the circle (ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμός): for it is not yet within our constructive means (ἐν πόρῳ), even if it be possible in nature to be procured and be an object of science—for scientific mastery of it has not yet been grasped. Here our discourse concerns what is already within constructive reach, which people strictly call procurable (πόριμον); whereas what is not yet within reach, though capable of being procured, they specifically term procurable-in-principle (ποριστόν). And the unprocurable, as stated, is the opposite of the procurable—namely that whose inquiry remains undecided.

§ 7. Fourth Pair: The Rational (Ῥητόν) vs. The Irrational (Ἄλογον)

The expressible or rational (ῥητόν) is, in a broader sense, that whose magnitude, species, or position we are able to state; that definition, however, is rather loose, whereas strictly and in itself rational is that which we know according to some number relative to an assigned unit measure (μέτρον)—for instance, a palm or a finger-breadth ([X.def.3]).

§ 8. Logical Cross-Comparison I: Ordered vs. Known

f. Menge 242 · p. 242

With these preliminary distinctions established, it will now be easy to examine both the community and the difference among the terms mentioned, and first how the ordered stands toward the known, and their opposites toward each other. These terms neither convert (οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει) nor is one of wider extension than the other. For although they share many instances in common—such as drawing a straight line through two points, a circle through three, and constructing an equilateral triangle—yet squaring the circle is ordered in nature, but unknown to us; and while it is ordered and incapable of being otherwise that a single tangent touches the spiral from a given point, its constructive demonstration was not immediately known. Conversely, cutting a segment ad infinitum and constructing an arbitrary scalene triangle are known, yet no longer ordered. Hence some ordered things are known and some unknown, and conversely some known things are ordered and some unordered—standing to one another as ‘rational animal’ stands to ‘footed animal,’ neither coextensive nor one including the whole of the other.

§ 9. Logical Cross-Comparison II: Ordered vs. Procurable (Archimedes’ Spiral)

In like manner stand the ordered and unordered toward the procurable and unprocurable: they have wide overlap yet differ in the same cross-cutting fashion. For the spiral (On Spirals) is ordered in its nature, yet to geometers before Archimedes it was not procurable. Conversely, things arising in infinitely many and unordered ways are procurable whenever one conceives their construction and setting-out, yet are not ordered: thus to conceive a scalene triangle and lead one’s thought to its construction starting from the equilateral is not difficult, but easily procurable, even though it belongs to the unordered and infinite.

§ 10. Logical Cross-Comparison III: Ordered vs. Rational (Incommensurable Diagonals)

f. Menge 244 · p. 244

So too stand the ordered and unordered toward the rational and irrational. Neither are these coextensive, nor does either include the other: for the binomial ([X.36]) and the other classified irrationals of Book X, as well as the ratio of the square’s diagonal to its side ($\sqrt{2} : 1$), are thoroughly ordered, yet not rational; while many rational magnitudes are unordered, such as figures formed variably and indeterminately—for a scalene triangle can have all its sides measured by an assigned rational unit (e.g. $13, 14, 15$) while remaining unordered as a class.

§ 11. Logical Cross-Comparison IV: Known Strictly Includes Procurable

Between the known and the procurable, everyone can easily perceive the similarity, whereas their difference is subtle to grasp because their natures lie so close as to seem coextensive. Yet to one who looks closely, a genuine difference appears here too: that only one tangent touches the spiral from a single point is manifest and known (by reductio), yet the problem of constructing that tangent is not thereby already procurable before its construction has been mastered. Thus not everything known is procurable, whereas everything procurable is also known; therefore the known is of wider extension (ἐπὶ πλέον) than the procurable.

§ 12. Logical Cross-Comparison V: Known vs. Rational

f. Menge 246 · p. 246

Again, the known and the rational partly overlap and partly differ. For the classified irrationals of Book X are known to the geometer, yet not rational; whereas every number is rational in itself, yet not every number is known to us. Moreover, what is rational is equally rational for all who share the same unit convention, since they refer it to the same measure; whereas the same length may be known to one observer and unknown to another within the very same convention—though overall the known appears wider in extension than the rational.

§ 13. Logical Cross-Comparison VI: Procurable Includes Rational

That the procurable and unprocurable also differ from the rational and irrational is clear from this: some irrationals can be procurable (such as $\sqrt{2}$ or the golden section via [II.11]), whereas nothing rational is irrational; thus the procurable is of wider extension than the rational.

§ 14. Triadic Ontological Summary: Measure, Nature, and Mind

One may also behold the distinction among all these predicates from three relational standpoints: rational and irrational (ῥητὸν καὶ ἄλογον) are predicated by reference to an assigned measure (πρὸς τὸ μέτρον), not relative to our cognition; ordered and unordered (τεταγμένον καὶ ἄτακτον) belong to things considered in themselves and according to their own nature (πρὸς τὴν φύσιν), even when not yet grasped by us—indeed Archimedes subsequently demonstrated many things to be ordered by nature which his predecessors had never perceived to be ordered; whereas known and unknown (γνώριμον καὶ ἄγνωστον) are predicated by reference to us (πρὸς ἡμᾶς).

§ 15. Establishing the True Scientific Definition of the Given (Γνώριμον ἅμα καὶ Πόριμον)

f. Menge 248 · p. 248

Now that the community and difference of these terms have been settled, it remains to determine what the given itself is. Those who suppose the given to be merely what is granted by hypothesis by the proposer miss the mark: for the entire Elements of Data is composed not about what is granted by hypothesis, but about what follows deductively from the first principles. Adopting comprehensibility (τὸ καταληπτόν) as our canon and criterion—since every scientifically sound definition must convert coextensively (ἐξισάζειν ἤτοι ἀντιστρέφειν) with the thing defined—we find that among simple terms only the procurable (τὸ πόριμον) converts exactly with the comprehensible, and this very term Euclid employed throughout in sketching every species of the given (’to which we can procure equals,’ [Data Def. 1]). And among composite definitions, the sole complete and scientifically sound definition is that which defines the given as at once known and procurable (γνώριμον ἅμα καὶ πόριμον), taking the known as analogous to the genus and the procurable as the specific differentia. All other combinations fail by defect or excess: ‘ordered and procurable’ and ‘ordered and rational’ fall short (excluding procurable things that vary in position), while ‘known and ordered’ exceeds the given (including unprocurable problems whose uniqueness is known). Closely allied is the formulation: ‘a given is that which we can procure through the things laid down for us in the first hypotheses and principles.’ One might reasonably fault Euclid only in this: that he did not first define the given in general before defining each of its species immediately, whereas in the geometric Elements he defined ‘line’ in general ([I.def.2]) prior to its species.

§ 16. Second Question: Supreme Utility of the Data for the Treasury of Analysis

f. Menge 252 · p. 252

Having distinguished the given universally, let us next render the utility (τὸ χρήσιμον) of the treatise concerning it. Knowledge of the Data is most indispensable for the so-called Treasury of Analysis (ὁ ἀναλυόμενος τόπος). How great a power the Domain of Analysis wields throughout the mathematical sciences and the cognate sciences of Optics and Harmonics (Κανονική) has been established elsewhere: namely, that analysis is the discovery of demonstration (ἀποδείξεως εὕρεσις), that it guides us to find demonstrations of kindred theorems, and that to acquire analytical power is a far greater thing than to possess many isolated demonstrations of particular propositions (μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ δύναμιν ἀναλυτικὴν κτήσασθαι τοῦ πολλὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἔχειν).

§ 17. Third Question: Subsumption under Universal Mathematics (Καθόλου Μαθηματική)

f. Menge 254 · p. 254

Because the theory of the given is serviceable to all these sciences and contributes mightily to analysis, it should rightly be referred not under a single special science, but under Universal Mathematics (ἡ καθόλου μαθηματική)—the overarching science that treats alike of multitudes, magnitudes, times, velocities, ratios, proportions, and means everywhere. Toward the scientific grasp of this universal theory, Euclid—whom posterity rightly named the Writer of Elements (ὁ Στοιχειωτής), since he composed foundational elements for Geometry in the thirteen books (Elements), for Astronomy in the Phaenomena, and likewise for Music and Optics—wrought the book of the Data as an analytical elementary treatise (στοιχείωσιν ἀναλυτικήν). Being pre-eminently a geometer, he adapted the universal doctrines of the given specifically to geometric magnitudes, just as in Book V of the Elements he treated universal proportions through magnitudes.

§ 18. Internal Architecture of Euclid’s Data & Pappus’s Testimony

Let us conclude by circumscribing the architecture of the book itself. It is a methodical elementary system encompassing the whole science of things given, divided first according to the species of givenness: the first section treats things given in ratio (κατὰ λόγον, Unit 1), the second things given in position (τῇ θέσει, Unit 2), and following these things given in species (τῷ εἴδει, Unit 3–Unit 5)—for things given in magnitude were elementary in themselves and are interwoven throughout, especially within the theory of species—beginning from ratio and position because figures given in species are compounded out of these. Cross-cutting this is a second division according to subject-matter: universal magnitudes (D.1–D.24), straight lines (D.25–D.38), rectilinear plane areas (D.39–D.86), and circular theorems (D.87–D.94), mirrored in the order of the Definitions themselves. And in his mode of instruction here he followed not the order of synthesis, but that of analysis, as Pappus adequately demonstrated in his Commentaries on the Book.