Chapter XLVII: Metrical Geometry¶
Part VI — Space (§§ 388–404, pp. 404–418)
Chapter XLVII (Metrical Geometry, §§388–404, pp. 404–418) is the celebrated locus classicus cited by both Fr. Peter Hoenen, S.J. (De Noetica Geometriae, Caput IV) and Sir Thomas L. Heath (Euclid Vol. I, pp. 227, 249). In §§389–391 (pp. 404–407), Russell delivers his incisive critique of Euclid’s tacit appeals to spatial intuition in Prop. I.1 (two-circle intersection) and of the method of superposition in Prop. I.4 (‘strikes every intelligent child as a juggle’), exposing the logical circularity of defining spatial congruence through rigid material bodies (the thermometer by the window and fire) and formulating the exact three-step congruence postulate required to replace motion. Sections 392–404 then build metrical geometry rigorously from stretches, magnitude of divisibility, and angles defined as stretches of rays.
Critique of Euclid, Superposition, and Rigid Bodies
388. The subject of the present chapter is elementary Geometry, as treated by Euclid or by any other author prior to the nineteenth century. This subject includes the usual analytical Geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean; it is distinguished from projective and descriptive Geometry, not by any opposition corresponding to that of Euclid and non-Euclid, but by its method and its indefinables. The question whether its indefinables can, or cannot, be defined in terms of those of projective and descriptive Geometry, is a very difficult one, which I postpone to the following chapter. For the present, I shall develop the subject straightforwardly, in a manner as similar to Euclid’s as is consistent with the requisite generality and with the avoidance of fallacies. Metrical Geometry is logically subsequent to the two kinds which we have examined, for it necessarily assumes one or other of these two kinds, to which it merely adds further specifications. I shall, as a rule, assume descriptive Geometry, mentioning projective Geometry only in connection with points in which it shows important metrical differences from descriptive Geometry. In the former case, all the first twenty-six propositions of Euclid will hold. In the latter, the first, seventh, sixteenth, and seventeenth require modification; for these propositions assume, in one form or another, that the straight line is not a closed series. Propositions after the twenty-sixth—or, with a suitable definition of parallels, after the twenty-eighth—depend, with few exceptions, upon the postulate of parallels, and are therefore not to be assumed generally.
Axioms of Distance, Stretches, and Magnitude of Divisibility
392. Metrical Geometry is usually said to be distinguished by the introduction of quantity. It is sufficient for the characterization of metrical Geometry to observe that it introduces, between every pair of points, a relation having certain properties in virtue of which it is numerically measurable—i.e. such that numbers can be given a one-one correspondence with the various relations of the class in question. The class of relations is called distance, and will be regarded, though this is not strictly necessary, as a class of magnitudes. Some of the properties of distance are as follows.
Angles as Stretches of Rays, Areas, and the Metrical Hierarchy
400. I come now to a more difficult question than distance, namely the question as to the definition of angle. Here, to begin with, we must deal with rays, not with whole straight lines. The ray may be taken either as an asymmetrical relation, or as the half-line on one side of a given point on a line. The latter usage is very convenient, and I shall frequently employ it. Elementary Geometry assumes that two rays starting from the same point determine a certain magnitude, called the angle between them. This magnitude may, however, be defined in various ways. In the first place, we must observe that, since the rays in a plane through a point form a closed series, every pair of rays through a point defines two stretches of rays. Of these, however, one stretch contains the opposites of both rays, while the other stretch contains the opposites of neither—except, indeed, in the one case where the two rays are each other’s opposites. This case is met by Euclid’s postulate that all right angles are equal—a postulate, however, which is now known to be demonstrable . Omitting this case, the angle between two rays may be defined as that stretch of rays through their intersection which is bounded by the two rays and does not contain the opposite of either, i.e. if A, B be the rays, and $\breve{A}$, $\breve{B}$ their opposites, the angle is the class of rays C which are separated from $\breve{A}$ or $\breve{B}$ by A and B. We might also, but for an objection to be mentioned shortly, define the angle as all the points on such rays. A definition equivalent to this last, but simpler in form, and avoiding the mention of the opposite rays, is the following . Let a, b be any two points of the rays A, B, and let c be any point of the stretch ab. Then the class of points c, for all possible positions of a and b on their respective rays, is the angle between A and B. That is, every pair of intersecting rays divides the plane of the rays into two parts: the part defined as above is the angle. Or rather, the part so defined is the angle as a quantity: the angle as a magnitude is the divisibility of this part. But to these latter definitions we shall find fatal objections, and we shall find it necessary to adhere to the definition as a stretch of rays.