Content of type 'section'
Critique of Euclid, Superposition, and Rigid Bodies
388. The subject of the present chapter is elementary Geometry, as treated by Euclid or by any other author prior to the nineteenth century. This subject includes the usual analytical Geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean; it is distinguished from projective and descriptive Geometry, not by any opposition corresponding to that of Euclid and non-Euclid, but by its method and its indefinables. The question whether its indefinables can, or cannot, be defined in terms of those of projective and descriptive Geometry, is a very difficult one, which I postpone to the following chapter. For the present, I shall develop the subject straightforwardly, in a manner as similar to Euclid’s as is consistent with the requisite generality and with the avoidance of fallacies. Metrical Geometry is logically subsequent to the two kinds which we have examined, for it necessarily assumes one or other of these two kinds, to which it merely adds further specifications. I shall, as a rule, assume descriptive Geometry, mentioning projective Geometry only in connection with points in which it shows important metrical differences from descriptive Geometry. In the former case, all the first twenty-six propositions of Euclid will hold. In the latter, the first, seventh, sixteenth, and seventeenth require modification; for these propositions assume, in one form or another, that the straight line is not a closed series. Propositions after the twenty-sixth—or, with a suitable definition of parallels, after the twenty-eighth—depend, with few exceptions, upon the postulate of parallels, and are therefore not to be assumed generally.
Definition of Dimensions and Positional Manifolds
351. The discussions of the preceding Parts have been concerned with two main themes, the logical theory of numbers and the theory of one-dimensional series. In the first two Parts, it was shown how, from the indispensable apparatus of general logical notions, the theory of finite integers and of rational numbers without sign could be developed. In the third Part, a particular case of order, namely the order of magnitude, was examined on its own account, and it was found that most of the problems arising in the theory of quantity are purely ordinal. In the fourth Part, the general nature of one-dimensional series was set forth, and it was shown that all the arithmetical propositions obtained by means of the logical theory of finite numbers could also be proved by assuming that the finite integers form a series of the kind which we called a progression. In the fifth Part, we examined the problems raised by endless series and by compact series—problems which, under the names of infinity and continuity, have defied philosophers ever since the dawn of abstract thought. The discussion of these problems led to a combination of the logical and ordinal theories of Arithmetic, and to the rejection, as universally valid, of two connected principles which, following Cantor, we regarded as definitions of the finite, not as applicable to all collections or series. These two principles were: (1) If one class be wholly contained in, but not coextensive with, another, then the one has not the same number of terms as the other; (2) mathematical induction, which is purely ordinal, and may be stated as follows: A series generated by a one-one relation, and having a first term, is such that any property, belonging to the first term and to the successor of any possessor of the property, belongs to every term of the series. These two principles we regarded as definitions of finite classes and of progressions or finite series respectively, but as inapplicable to some classes and some series. This view, we found, resolves all the difficulties of infinity and continuity, except a purely logical difficulty as to the notion of all classes. With this result, we completed the philosophical theory of one-dimensional series.
Definitions of Various Spaces as Classes of Relations
412. In the preceding discussions of different Geometries, I have usually, for the sake of convenience, adhered to the distinction between definitions and indefinables on the one hand, and axioms or postulates on the other. But this distinction, in pure mathematics, has no validity except as regards the ideas and propositions of Logic. In pure mathematics, all the propositions state logical implications containing a variable. This is, in fact, the definition, or part of the definition, of pure mathematics. The implications stated must flow wholly from the propositions of Logic, which are prior to those of other branches of mathematics. Logic and the rest of pure mathematics are distinguished from applied mathematics by the fact that, in it, all the constants are definable in terms of some eight fundamental notions, which we agreed to call logical constants. What distinguishes other branches of mathematics from Logic is merely complication, which usually takes the form of a hypothesis that the variable belongs to some rather complicated class. Such a class will usually be denoted by a single symbol; and the statement that the class in question is to be represented by such and such a symbol is what mathematicians call a definition. That is to say, a definition is no part of mathematics at all, and does not make any statement concerning the entities dealt with by mathematics, but is simply and solely a statement of a symbolic abbreviation: it is a proposition concerning symbols, not concerning what is symbolized. I do not mean, of course, to affirm that the word definition has no other meaning, but only that this is its true mathematical meaning. All mathematics is built up by combinations of a certain number of primitive ideas, and all its propositions can, but for the length of the resulting formulae, be explicitly stated in terms of these primitive ideas; hence all definitions are theoretically superfluous. But further, when Logic is extended, as it should be, so as to include the general theory of relations, there are, I believe, no primitive ideas in mathematics except such as belong to the domain of Logic. In the previous chapters of this Part, I have spoken, as most authors do, of certain indefinables in Geometry. But this was a concession, and must now be rectified. In mathematics, two classes of entities which have internal relations of the same logical type are equivalent. Hence we are never dealing with one particular class of entities, but with a whole class of classes, namely, with all classes having internal relations of some specified type. And by the type of a relation I mean its purely logical properties, such as are denoted by the words one-one, transitive, symmetrical, and so on. Thus for example we defined the class of classes called progression by certain logical characteristics of the internal relations of terms of any class which is a progression, and we found that finite Arithmetic, in so far as it deals with numbers, and not with the terms or classes of which numbers can be asserted, applies equally to all progressions. And when it is realized that all mathematical ideas, except those of Logic, can be defined, it is seen also that there are no primitive propositions in mathematics except those of Logic. The so-called axioms of Geometry, for example, when Geometry is considered as a branch of pure mathematics, are merely the protasis in the hypotheticals which constitute the science. They would be primitive propositions if, as in applied mathematics, they were themselves asserted; but so long as we only assert hypotheticals (i.e. propositions of the form “A implies B”) in which the supposed axioms appear as protasis, there is no reason to assert the protasis, nor, consequently, to admit genuine axioms. My object in the present chapter is to execute the purely formal task imposed by these considerations, and to set forth the strict definitions of various spaces, from which, without indefinables and without primitive propositions, the various Geometries will follow. I shall content myself with the definition of some of the more important spaces, since my object is chiefly to show that such definitions are possible.
First Period: The Synthetic Period
10. When a long established system is attacked, it usually happens that the attack begins only at a single point, where the weakness of the established doctrine is peculiarly evident. But criticism, when once invited, is apt to extend much further than the most daring, at first, would have wished.
Kant’s Transcendental Doctrine of Space
51. We have now traced the mathematical development of the theory of geometrical axioms, from the first revolt against Euclid to the present day. We may hope, therefore, to have at our command the technical knowledge required for the philosophy of the subject. The importance of Geometry, in the theories of knowledge which have arisen in the past, can scarcely be exaggerated. In Descartes, we find the whole theory of method dominated by analytical Geometry, of whose fruitfulness he was justly proud. In Spinoza, the paramount influence of Geometry is too obvious to require comment. Among mathematicians, Newton’s belief in absolute space was long supreme, and is still responsible for the current formulation of the laws of motion. Against this belief on the one hand, and against Leibnitz’s theory of space on the other, and not, as Caird has pointed out , against Hume’s empiricism, was directed that keystone of the Critical Philosophy, the Kantian doctrine of space. Thus Geometry has been, throughout, of supreme importance in the theory of knowledge.
Logical Arguments Against Points and Vindication of Absolute Position
423. It has been an almost universal opinion among philosophers, ever since the time of Leibniz, that a space composed of points is logically impossible. It is maintained that the spatial relations with which we have been concerned do not hold between spatial points, which essentially and timelessly have the relations which they do have, but between material points, which are capable of motion, i.e. of a change in their spatial relations. This is called the theory of relative position, whereas the theory of spatial points is called the theory of absolute position. Those who advocate relative position usually also maintain that matter and spatial relations, on account of certain contradictions supposed to be found in them, are not real, but belong only to the world of appearance. This is, however, a further point, which need not be explicitly discussed in what follows. Apart from this point, the issue between the absolute and relative theories may be stated as follows: The absolute theory holds that there are true propositions in which spatial relations are asserted to hold timelessly between certain terms, which may be called spatial points; the relational theory holds that every true proposition asserting a spatial relation involves a time at which this relation holds between its terms, so that the simplest spatial propositions assert triangular relations of a time and two terms, which may be called material points.
Pasch, Peano, and the Serial Definition of Betweenness
374. The subject which I have called descriptive Geometry is not, as a rule, sharply distinguished from projective Geometry. These two terms, and the term “Geometry of Position,” are commonly used as synonyms. But it seems improper to include in projective Geometry any property which is not unaltered by projection, and it is by the introduction of one such property that I wish to define the subject of the present chapter. We have seen that, in projective space, three points on a line are not such that a definite one of them is between the other two. The simplest possible proposition involving between, in projective Geometry, requires four points, and is as follows: “If a, b, c be distinct collinear points, and d is on ac, but does not belong to the segment (abc), nor yet coincide with a or c, then, with regard to the order abc, c is between b and d.” When we reflect that the definition of the segment (abc) involves the quadrilateral construction—which demands, for its proof, a point outside its own plane, and four pairs of triangles in perspective—we shall admit that the projective method of generating order is somewhat complicated. But at any rate the ordinal propositions which result are unaltered by projection. The elementary sense of between, on the contrary, which is to be introduced in the present chapter, is in general not unaltered by projection .
Pieri’s Projective Postulates, Lines, and Involutions
361. The foundations of Geometry have been subjected, in recent times, to a threefold scrutiny. First came the work of the non-Euclideans, which showed that various axioms, long known to be sufficient for certain results, were also necessary, i.e. that results inconsistent with the usual results but consistent with each other followed from the denial of those axioms. Next came the work of Dedekind and Cantor on the nature of continuity, which showed the necessity of investigating carefully the prerequisites of analytical Geometry. Lastly, a great change has been introduced by the Italian work on closed series, mentioned in Part IV, in virtue of which we are able, given a certain type of relation between four points of a line, to introduce an order of all the points of a line. The work of the non-Euclideans has, by this time, produced probably almost all the modifications that it is likely to produce in the foundations, while the work of Dedekind and Cantor only becomes relevant at a fairly advanced stage of Geometry. The work on closed series, on the contrary, being very recent, has not yet been universally recognized, although, as we shall see in the present chapter, it has enormously increased the range of pure projective Geometry.
Preface & Dedication (1897)
The present work is based on a dissertation submitted at the Fellowship Examination of Trinity College, Cambridge, in the year 1895. Section B of the third chapter is in the main a reprint, with some serious alterations, of an article in Mind (New Series, No. 17). The substance of the book has been given in the form of lectures at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania.
Preface (1903)
The present work has two main objects. One of these, the proof that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that all its propositions are deducible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles, is undertaken in Parts II–VII of this Volume, and will be established by strict symbolic reasoning in Volume II. The demonstration of this thesis has, if I am not mistaken, all the certainty and precision of which mathematical demonstrations are capable. As the thesis is very recent among mathematicians, and is almost universally denied by philosophers, I have undertaken, in this volume, to defend its various parts, as occasion arose, against such adverse theories as appeared most widely held or most difficult to disprove. I have also endeavoured to present, in language as untechnical as possible, the more important stages in the deductions by which the thesis is established.
Projective and Descriptive Metric and the Absolute Quadric
405. In the present chapter I wish to discuss two questions. First, can projective and descriptive Geometry be established without any metrical presuppositions, or even without implying metrical properties? Secondly, can metrical Geometry be deduced from either of the others, or, if not, what unavoidable novelties does it introduce? The previous exposition has already dogmatically assumed certain answers to these questions, but we are now to examine critically the various possible answers.
Psychology and Epistemology: The Problem of the A Priori
1. Geometry, throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, remained, in the war against empiricism, an impregnable fortress of the idealists. Those who held—as was generally held on the Continent—that certain knowledge, independent of experience, was possible about the real world, had only to point to Geometry: none but a madman, they said, would throw doubt on its validity, and none but a fool would deny its objective reference. The English Empiricists, in this matter, had, therefore, a somewhat difficult task; either they had to ignore the problem, or if, like Hume and Mill, they ventured on the assault, they were driven into the apparently paradoxical assertion that Geometry, at bottom, had no certainty of a different kind from that of Mechanics—only the perpetual presence of spatial impressions, they said, made our experience of the truth of the axioms so wide as to seem absolute certainty.
Pure Mathematics as Formal Implication (p implies q)
1. Pure Mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form “p implies q,” where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants. And logical constants are all notions definable in terms of the following: Implication, the relation of a term to a class of which it is a member, the notion of such that, the notion of relation, and such further notions as may be involved in the general notion of propositions of the above form. In addition to these, mathematics uses a notion which is not a constituent of the propositions which it considers, namely the notion of truth.
Refutation of Kant’s Theory of Space and Spatial Intuition
432. In the present chapter I do not propose to undertake a minute or textual examination of Kant’s opinions; this has been done elsewhere, and notably in Vaihinger’s monumental commentary, so well that it need not be done over again here. It is only the broad outlines of the Kantian doctrine that I wish to discuss. This doctrine, more or less modified, has held the field for over a century, and has won a nearly universal acceptance. As my views are, on almost every point of mathematical theory, diametrically opposed to those of Kant, it becomes necessary explicitly to defend the opinions in which I differ from him . In this I shall pay special attention to what Kant calls the transcendental arguments, i.e. those derived from the nature of mathematics.
Relativity of Space and the Form of Externality
180. In the present chapter, we have to discuss two questions which, though scarcely geometrical, are of fundamental importance to the theory of Geometry propounded above. The first of these questions is this: What relation can a purely logical and deductive proof, like that from the nature of a form of externality, bear to an experienced subject-matter such as space? You have merely framed a general conception, I may be told, containing space as a particular species, and you have then shown, what should have been obvious from the beginning, that this general conception contained some of the attributes of space. But what ground does this give for regarding these attributes as à priori? The conception Mammal has some of the attributes of a horse; but are these attributes therefore à priori adjectives of the horse? The answer to this obvious objection is so difficult, and involves so much general philosophy, that I have kept it for a final chapter, in order not to interrupt the argument on specially geometrical topics.
The Nature and Qualitative Postulates of Projective Geometry
102. Projective Geometry proper, as we saw in Chapter I., does not employ the conception of magnitude, and does not, therefore, require those axioms which, in the systems of the second or metrical period, were required solely to render possible the application of magnitude to space. But we saw, also, that Cayley’s reduction of metrical to projective properties was purely technical and philosophically irrelevant. Now it is in metrical properties alone—apart from the exception to the axiom of the straight line, which itself, however, presupposes metrical properties —that non-Euclidean and Euclidean spaces differ. The properties dealt with by projective Geometry, therefore, in so far as these are obtained without the use of imaginaries, are properties common to all spaces. Finally, the differences which appear between the Geometries of different spaces of the same curvature—e.g. between the Geometries of the plane and the cylinder—are differences in projective properties . Thus the necessity which arises, in metrical Geometry, for further qualifications besides those of constant curvature, disappears when our general space is defined by purely projective properties.
The Spatial Continuum, Dedekind Cuts, and Cantor’s Continuum
416. It has been commonly supposed by philosophers that the continuity of space was something incapable of further analysis, to be regarded as a mystery, not critically inspected by the profane intellect. In Part V, I asserted that Cantor’s continuity is all that we require in dealing with space. In the present chapter, I wish to make good this assertion, in so far as is possible without raising the question of absolute and relative position, which I reserve for the next chapter.
Axioms of Distance, Stretches, and Magnitude of Divisibility
392. Metrical Geometry is usually said to be distinguished by the introduction of quantity. It is sufficient for the characterization of metrical Geometry to observe that it introduces, between every pair of points, a relation having certain properties in virtue of which it is numerically measurable—i.e. such that numbers can be given a one-one correspondence with the various relations of the class in question. The class of relations is called distance, and will be regarded, though this is not strictly necessary, as a class of magnitudes. Some of the properties of distance are as follows.
Complex Numbers and Spatial Coordinate Systems
356. There are very many ways of generating multiple series, as there are of generating simple series. The discussion of these various ways is not, however, of great importance, since it would follow closely the discussion of Part IV, Chapter xxiv. Instances will meet us in the course of our examination of the various Geometries; and this examination will give opportunities of testing our definition of dimensions. For the present, it is only important to observe that dimensions, like order and continuity, are defined in purely abstract terms, without any reference to actual space. Thus when we say that space has three dimensions, we are not merely attributing to it an idea which can only be obtained from space, but we are effecting part of the actual logical analysis of space. This will appear more clearly from the applicability of dimensions to complex numbers, to which we must now turn our attention.
Ideal Points, Lines, Planes, and Projective Completion
381. Having successfully defined the plane, we can now advance to solid Geometry. For this we need, to begin with, the axiom: Given any plane, there is at least one point outside the plane. We can then define a tetrahedron exactly as we defined a triangle. But in order to know that two planes, which have a point in common, have a line in common, we need a new axiom, which shows that the space we are dealing with has three dimensions. In projective space, this axiom was simply that a line and a plane always have at least one point in common. But here, no such simple axiom holds. The following is given by Peano (loc. cit. p. 74): If p be a plane, and a a point not on p, and b a point of $a'$p (i.e. a point such that the segment ab contains a point of p, or, in common language, a point on the other side of the plane from a), then if x be any point, either x lies on the plane, or the segment ax contains a point of the plane, or else the segment bx contains a point of the plane. By adding to this, finally, an axiom of continuity, we have all the apparatus of three-dimensional descriptive Geometry .
Logical Constants, Variables, and Relation to Pure Logic
6. Mathematical propositions are not only characterized by the fact that they assert implications, but also by the fact that they contain variables. The notion of the variable is one of the most difficult with which Logic has to deal, and in the present work a satisfactory theory as to its nature, in spite of much discussion, will hardly be found. For the present, I only wish to make it plain that there are variables in all mathematical propositions, even where at first sight they might seem to be absent. Elementary Arithmetic might be thought to form an exception: 1 + 1 = 2 appears neither to contain variables nor to assert an implication. But as a matter of fact, as will be shown in Part II, the true meaning of this proposition is: “If x is one and y is one, and x differs from y, then x and y are two.” And this proposition both contains variables and asserts an implication. We shall find always, in all mathematical propositions, that the words any or some occur; and these words are the marks of a variable and a formal implication. Thus the above proposition may be expressed in the form: “Any unit and any other unit are two units.” The typical proposition of mathematics is of the form “φ(x, y, z, …) implies ψ(x, y, z, …), whatever values x, y, z, … may have”; where φ(x, y, z, …) and ψ(x, y, z, …), for every set of values of x, y, z, …, are propositions. It is not asserted that φ is always true, nor yet that ψ is always true, but merely that, in all cases, when φ is false as much as when φ is true, ψ follows from it.
Möbius Nets, Projective Order, and Duality
367. Given any three different points a, b, c on a line, consider the class of points x such that a and c, b and x are each harmonic conjugates with respect to some pair of points y, $y'$—in other words, a and c, b and x are pairs in an involution whose double points are y, $y'$. Here y, $y'$ are supposed variable: that is, if any such points can be found, x is to belong to the class considered. This class contains the point b, but not a or c. Let us call it the segment (abc). Let us denote the relation of b to x (a and c being fixed) by bQ$_{ac}$x. Then $Q_{ac}$ is symmetrical, and also bQ$_{ac}$x implies aQ$_{bx}$c. We have here a relation of four points, from which, as we saw in Part IV, Chapter xxiv, an order will result if certain further axioms are fulfilled. Three such axioms are required, and are given by Pieri as follows.
Projective Coordinates and the Complete Quadrilateral
111. The two mathematically fundamental things in projective Geometry are anharmonic ratio, and the quadrilateral construction. Everything else follows mathematically from these two. Now what is meant, in projective Geometry, by anharmonic ratio?
Riemann’s Conception of Space as a Manifold
65. I do not wish to deny, however, the great value of the conception of space as a manifold. On the contrary, this conception seems to have become essential to any treatment of the question. I only wish to urge that the purely algebraical treatment of any manifold, important as it may be in deducing fresh consequences from known premisses, tends rather to conceal than to make clear the basis of the premisses themselves, and is therefore misleading in a philosophical investigation. For mathematics, where quantity reigns supreme, Riemann’s conception has proved itself abundantly fruitful; for philosophy, on the contrary, where quantity appears rather as a cloak to conceal the qualities it abstracts from, the conception seems to me more productive of error and confusion than of sound doctrine.
Second Period: The Metrical Period
16. The work of Lobatchewsky and Bolyai remained, for nearly a quarter of a century, without issue—indeed, the investigations of Riemann and Helmholtz, when they came, appear to have been inspired, not by these men, but rather by Gauss and Herbart. We find, accordingly, very great difference, both of aim and method, between the first period and the second. The former, beginning with a criticism of one point in Euclid’s system, preserved his synthetic method, while it threw over one of his axioms. The latter, on the contrary, being guided by a philosophical rather than a mathematical spirit, endeavoured to classify the conception of space as a species of a more general conception: it treated space algebraically, and the properties it gave to space were expressed in terms, not of intuition, but of algebra. The aim of Riemann and Helmholtz was to show, by the exhibition of logically possible alternatives, the empirical nature of the received axioms. For this purpose, they conceived space as a particular case of a manifold, and showed that various relations of magnitude (Massverhältnisse) were mathematically possible in an extended manifold. Their philosophy, which seems to me not always irreproachable, will be discussed in Chapter II.; here, while it is important to remember the philosophical motive of Riemann and Helmholtz, we shall confine our attention to the mathematical side of their work. In so doing, while we shall, I fear, somewhat maim the system of their thoughts, we shall secure a closer unity of subject, and a more compact account of the purely mathematical development. But there is, in my opinion, a further reason for separating their philosophy from their mathematics. While their philosophical purpose was, to prove that all the axioms of Geometry are empirical, and that a different content of our experience might have changed them all, the unintended result of their mathematical work was, if I am not mistaken, to afford material for an à priori proof of certain axioms. These axioms, though they believed them to be unnecessary, were always introduced in their mathematical works, before laying the foundations of non-Euclidean systems. I shall contend, in Chapter III., that this retention was logically inevitable, and was not merely due, as they supposed, to a desire for conformity with experience. If I am right in this, there is a divergence between Riemann and Helmholtz the philosophers, and Riemann and Helmholtz the mathematicians. This divergence makes it the more desirable to trace the mathematical development apart from the accompanying philosophy.
The Antinomy of the Point and Geometrical Order
194. I come now to the second question with which this chapter has to deal, the question, namely: What are we to do with the contradictions which obtruded themselves in Chapter III., whenever we came to a point which seemed fundamental? I shall treat this question briefly, as I have little to add to answers with which we are all familiar. I have only to prove, first, that the contradictions are inevitable, and therefore form no objection to my argument; secondly, that the first step in removing them is to restore the notion of matter, as that which, in the data of sense-perception, is localized and interrelated in space.
The Logical Criterion of Necessity and Experience
5. I shall, therefore, throughout the present Essay, use the word à priori without any psychological implication. My test of apriority will be purely logical: Would experience be impossible, if a certain axiom or postulate were denied? Or, in a more restricted sense, which gives apriority only within a particular science: Would experience as to the subject-matter of that science be impossible, without a certain axiom or postulate? My results also, therefore, will be purely logical. If Psychology declares that some things, which I have declared à priori, are not subjective, then, failing an error of detail in my proofs, the connection of the à priori and the subjective, so far as those things are concerned, must be given up. There will be no discussion, accordingly, throughout this Essay, of the relation of the à priori to the subjective—a relation which cannot determine what pieces of knowledge are à priori, but rather depends on that determination, and belongs, in any case, rather to Metaphysics than to Epistemology.
Angles as Stretches of Rays, Areas, and the Metrical Hierarchy
400. I come now to a more difficult question than distance, namely the question as to the definition of angle. Here, to begin with, we must deal with rays, not with whole straight lines. The ray may be taken either as an asymmetrical relation, or as the half-line on one side of a given point on a line. The latter usage is very convenient, and I shall frequently employ it. Elementary Geometry assumes that two rays starting from the same point determine a certain magnitude, called the angle between them. This magnitude may, however, be defined in various ways. In the first place, we must observe that, since the rays in a plane through a point form a closed series, every pair of rays through a point defines two stretches of rays. Of these, however, one stretch contains the opposites of both rays, while the other stretch contains the opposites of neither—except, indeed, in the one case where the two rays are each other’s opposites. This case is met by Euclid’s postulate that all right angles are equal—a postulate, however, which is now known to be demonstrable . Omitting this case, the angle between two rays may be defined as that stretch of rays through their intersection which is bounded by the two rays and does not contain the opposite of either, i.e. if A, B be the rays, and $\breve{A}$, $\breve{B}$ their opposites, the angle is the class of rays C which are separated from $\breve{A}$ or $\breve{B}$ by A and B. We might also, but for an objection to be mentioned shortly, define the angle as all the points on such rays. A definition equivalent to this last, but simpler in form, and avoiding the mention of the opposite rays, is the following . Let a, b be any two points of the rays A, B, and let c be any point of the stretch ab. Then the class of points c, for all possible positions of a and b on their respective rays, is the angle between A and B. That is, every pair of intersecting rays divides the plane of the rays into two parts: the part defined as above is the angle. Or rather, the part so defined is the angle as a quantity: the angle as a magnitude is the divisibility of this part. But to these latter definitions we shall find fatal objections, and we shall find it necessary to adhere to the definition as a stretch of rays.
Contradictions of Empty Space vs. Real Spatial Order
201. (3) Space is at once relational and more than relational. We have already touched on the question how far space is other than relations, but as this question is quite fundamental, as relation is an ambiguous and dangerous word, as I have made constant use of the relativity of space without attempting to define a relation, it will be necessary to discuss this antinomy at length.
Helmholtz’s Physical Geometry and Rigid Bodies
71. (2) The above argument seems to me to answer satisfactorily Helmholtz’s contention in the precise form which he first gave it. The axiom of Congruence, we must agree, is logically distinguishable from the existence of rigid bodies. Nevertheless some reference to matter is logically involved in Geometry , but whether this reference makes Geometry empirical, or does not, rather, show an à priori element in dynamics, is a further question.
Methodological Forecast of the Work
9. The course of my argument, therefore, will be as follows: In the first chapter, as a preliminary to the logical analysis of Geometry, I shall give a brief history of the rise and development of non-Euclidean systems. The second chapter will prepare the ground for a constructive theory of Geometry, by a criticism of some previous philosophical views; in this chapter, I shall endeavour to exhibit such views as partly true, partly false, and so to establish, by preliminary polemics, the truth of such parts of my own theory as are to be found in former writers. A large part of this theory, however, cannot be so introduced, since the whole field of projective Geometry, so far as I am aware, has been hitherto unknown to philosophers. Passing, in the third chapter, from criticism to construction, I shall deal first with projective Geometry. This, I shall maintain, is necessarily true of any form of externality, and is, since some such form is necessary to experience, completely à priori. In metrical Geometry, however, which I shall next consider, the axioms will fall into two classes: (1) Those common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces. These will be found, on the one hand, essential to the possibility of measurement in any continuum, and on the other hand, necessary properties of any form of externality with more than one dimension. They will, therefore, be declared à priori. (2) Those axioms which distinguish Euclidean from non-Euclidean spaces. These will be regarded as wholly empirical. The axiom that the number of dimensions is three, however, though empirical, will be declared, since small errors are here impossible, exactly and certainly true of our actual world; while the two remaining axioms, which determine the value of the space-constant, will be regarded as only approximately known, and certain only within the errors of observation . The fourth chapter, finally, will endeavour to prove, what was assumed in Chapter III., that some form of externality is necessary to experience, and will conclude by exhibiting the logical impossibility, if knowledge of such a form is to be freed from contradictions, of wholly abstracting this knowledge from all reference to the matter contained in the form.
The Principle of Duality and the Antinomy of the Point
115. Before we can be clear as to the meaning of our principle, we must have some notion as to our definition of points and straight lines. But this definition, in projective Geometry, cannot be given without some discussion of the principle of duality, the mathematical form of the philosophical circle involved in geometrical definitions.
Third Period: The Projective Period
30. The third period differs radically, alike in its methods and aims, and in the underlying philosophical ideas, from the period which it replaced. Whereas everything, in the second period, turned on measurement, with its apparatus of Congruence, Free Mobility, Rigid Bodies, and the rest, these vanish completely in the third period, which, swinging to the opposite extreme, regards quantity as a perfectly irrelevant category in Geometry, and dispenses with congruence and the method of superposition. The ideas of this period, unfortunately, have found no exponent so philosophical as Riemann or Helmholtz, but have been set forth only by technical mathematicians. Moreover the change of fundamental ideas, which is immense, has not brought about an equally great change in actual procedure; for though spatial quantity is no longer a part of projective Geometry, quantity is still employed, and we still have equations, algebraic transformations, and so on. This is apt to give rise to confusion, especially in the mind of the student, who fails to realise that the quantities used, so far as the propositions are really projective, are mere names for points, and not, as in metrical Geometry, actual spatial magnitudes.
Conclusion: The Epistemological Outcome
209. We have now completed our review of the foundations of Geometry. It will be well, before we take leave of the subject, briefly to review and recapitulate the results we have won.
Erdmann’s Axioms and the Epistemology of Mechanics
80. This suggests the fourth and last of the above points, that the qualities of space, even if space could be successfully regarded as a magnitude, would have to be entirely omitted in such a manner of regarding it, and that, therefore, none of its important or essential properties would emerge from such treatment. For to regard space as a magnitude involves, as we saw, a comparison with something qualitatively similar, and an abstraction from the similar qualities. To some extent and by the help of certain doubtful arguments, such a comparison is instituted by Riemann and Erdmann; but when they have instituted it, they forget all about the common qualities on which its possibility depends. But these are precisely the fundamental properties of space, and those from which, as I shall endeavour to prove in Chapter III., the axioms common to Euclid and Metageometry follow à priori. Such are the dangers of the quantitative bias.
Philosophical Outcome: The Indispensable Axioms of Geometry
46. I have now come to the end of my history of Metageometry. It has not been my aim to give an exhaustive account of even the important works on the subject—in the third period, especially, the names of Poincaré, Pasch, Cremona, Veronese, and others who might be mentioned, would have cried shame upon me, had I had any such object. But I have tried to set forth, as clearly as I could, the principles at work in the various periods, the motives and results of successive theories. We have seen how the philosophical motive, at first predominant, has been gradually extruded by the purely mathematical and technical spirit of most recent Geometers. At first, to discredit the Transcendental Aesthetic seemed, to Metageometers, as important as to advance their science; but from the works of Cayley, Klein or Lie, no reader could gather that Kant had ever lived. We have also seen, however, that as the interest in philosophy waned, the interest for philosophy increased: as the mathematical results shook themselves free from philosophical controversies, they assumed gradually a stable form, from which further development, we may reasonably hope, will take the form of growth, rather than transformation. The same gradual development out of philosophy might, I believe, be traced in the infancy of most branches of mathematics; when philosophical motives cease to operate, this is, in general, a sign that the stage of uncertainty as to premisses is past, so that the future belongs entirely to mathematical technique. When this stable stage has been attained, it is time for Philosophy to borrow of Science, accepting its final premisses as those imposed by a real necessity of fact or logic.
Transcendental Deduction of the Projective Axioms
123. From the exclusively mathematical standpoint, as we have seen, projective Geometry discusses only what figures can be obtained from each other by projective transformations, i.e. by the operations of projection and section. These operations, in all their forms, presuppose the point, straight line, and plane , whose necessity for projective Geometry, from the purely mathematical point of view, is thus self-evident from the start. But philosophically, projective Geometry has, as we saw, a wider aim. This wider aim, which gives, to the investigation of projectively equivalent figures, its chief importance, consists in the determination of qualitative spatial similarity, in the determination, that is, of all the figures which, when any one figure is given, can be distinguished from the given figure, so long as quantity is excluded, only by the mere fact that they are external to it.
Lotze’s Mathematical Misunderstandings of Metageometry
90. Lotze’s attack on Metageometry—although it remains, so far as I know, the best hostile criticism extant, and although its arguments have become part of the regular stock-in-trade of Euclidean philosophers—contains, if I am not mistaken, several misunderstandings due to insufficient mathematical knowledge of the subject. As these misunderstandings have been widely spread among philosophers, and cannot be easily removed except by a critic who has gone into non-Euclidean Geometry with some care, it seems desirable to discuss Lotze’s strictures point by point.
The Postulate of Measurement and Motion
141. We have now reviewed the axioms of projective Geometry, and have seen that they are à priori deductions from the fact that we can experience externality, i.e. a coexistent multiplicity of different but interrelated things. But projective Geometry, in spite of its claims, is not the whole science of space, as is sufficiently proved by the fact that it cannot discriminate between Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces . For this purpose, spatial measurement is required: metrical Geometry, with its quantitative tests, can alone effect the discrimination. For all application of Geometry to physics, also, measurement is required; the law of gravitation, for example, requires the determination of actual distances. For many purposes, in short, projective Geometry is wholly insufficient: thus it is unable to distinguish between different kinds of conics, though their distinction is of fundamental importance in many departments of knowledge.
Delbœuf and Recent French Geometrical Speculation
98. M. Delbœuf’s four articles in the Revue Philosophique contain much matter that has already been dealt with in the criticism of Lotze, and much that is irrelevant for our present purpose. The only point, which I wish to discuss here, is the question of absolute magnitude, as it is called—the question, that is, whether the possibility of similar but unequal geometrical figures can be known à priori .
The Axiom of Free Mobility
144. We require, then, at the very outset, some criterion of spatial equality: without such a criterion metrical Geometry would become wholly impossible. It might appear, at first sight, as though this need not be an axiom, but might be a mere definition. In part this is true, but not wholly. The part which is merely a definition is given in Euclid’s eighth axiom: “Magnitudes which exactly coincide are equal.” But this gives a sufficient criterion only when the magnitudes to be compared already occupy the same position. When, as will normally be the case, the two spatial magnitudes are external to one another—as, indeed, must be the case, if they are distinct, and not whole and part—the two magnitudes can only be made to coincide by a motion of one or both of them. In order, therefore, that our definition of spatial magnitude may give unambiguous results, coincidence when superposed, if it can ever occur, must occur always, whatever path be pursued in bringing it about. Hence, if mere motion could alter shapes, our criterion of equality would break down. It follows that the application of the conception of magnitude to figures in space involves the following axiom : Spatial magnitudes can be moved from place to place without distortion; or, as it may be put, Shapes do not in any way depend upon absolute position in space.
The Axiom of Dimensions /home/runner/work/bertrand-russell/bertrand-russell/docsrc/foundations_of_geometry/ch_03/sec_b3-en.rst:7: (INFO/1) Enumerated list start value not ordinal-1: “II” (ordinal 2)
158. We have seen, in discussing the axiom of Free Mobility, that all position is relative, that is, a position exists only by virtue of relations . It follows that, if positions can be defined at all, they must be uniquely and exhaustively defined by some finite number of such relations. If Geometry is to be possible, it must happen that, after enough relations have been given to determine a point uniquely, its relations to any fresh known point are deducible from the relations already given. Hence we obtain, as an à priori condition of Geometry, logically indispensable to its existence, the axiom that Space must have a finite integral number of Dimensions. For every relation required in the definition of a point constitutes a dimension, and a fraction of a relation is meaningless. The number of relations required must be finite, since an infinite number of dimensions would be practically impossible to determine. If we remember our axiom of Free Mobility, and remember also that space is a continuum, we may state our axiom, for metrical Geometry, in the form given by Helmholtz (v. Chap. I. § 25): “In a space of n dimensions, the position of every point is uniquely determined by the measurement of n continuous independent variables (coordinates). ”
The Axiom of Distance /home/runner/work/bertrand-russell/bertrand-russell/docsrc/foundations_of_geometry/ch_03/sec_b4-en.rst:7: (INFO/1) Enumerated list start value not ordinal-1: “III” (ordinal 3)
162. We have already seen, in discussing projective Geometry, that two points must determine a unique curve, the straight line. In metrical Geometry, the corresponding axiom is, that two points must determine a unique spatial quantity, distance. I propose to prove, in what follows, (1) that if distance, as a quantity completely determined by two points, did not exist, spatial magnitude would not be measurable; (2) that distance can only be determined by two points, if there is an actual curve in space determined by those two points; (3) that the existence of such a curve can be deduced from the conception of a form of externality, and (4) that the application of quantity to such a curve necessarily leads to a certain magnitude, namely distance, uniquely determined by any two points which determine the curve. The conclusion will be, if these propositions can be successfully maintained, that the axiom of distance is à priori in the same double sense as the axiom of Free Mobility, i.e. it is presupposed in the possibility of measurement, and it is necessarily true of any possible form of externality.