Relativity of Space and the Form of Externality¶
Chapter IV: Philosophical Consequences — Form of Externality (§§ 180–193, pp. 178–187)
§ 180. What is the relation to experience of a form of externality in general?¶
f. §180 · p. p. 178180. In the present chapter, we have to discuss two questions which, though scarcely geometrical, are of fundamental importance to the theory of Geometry propounded above. The first of these questions is this: What relation can a purely logical and deductive proof, like that from the nature of a form of externality, bear to an experienced subject-matter such as space? You have merely framed a general conception, I may be told, containing space as a particular species, and you have then shown, what should have been obvious from the beginning, that this general conception contained some of the attributes of space. But what ground does this give for regarding these attributes as à priori? The conception Mammal has some of the attributes of a horse; but are these attributes therefore à priori adjectives of the horse? The answer to this obvious objection is so difficult, and involves so much general philosophy, that I have kept it for a final chapter, in order not to interrupt the argument on specially geometrical topics.
§ 181. This form is the class-conception, containing every possible intuition of externality; and some such intuition is necessary to experience¶
f. §181 · p. p. 178181. I have already indicated, in general terms, the ground for regarding as à priori the properties of any form of externality. This ground is transcendental, i.e. it is to be found in the conditions required for the possibility of experience. The form of externality, like Riemann’s manifolds, is a general class-conception, including time as well as Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces. It is not motived, however, like the manifolds, by a quantitative resemblance to space, but by the fact that it fulfils, if it has more than one dimension, all those functions which, in our actual world, are fulfilled by space. But a form of externality, in order to accomplish this, must be, not a mere conception, but an actually experienced intuition. Hence the conception of such a form is the general conception, containing under it every logically possible intuition which can fulfil the function actually fulfilled by space. And this function is, to render possible experience of diverse but interrelated things. Some form in sense-perception, then, whose conception is included under our form of externality, is à priori necessary to experience of diversity in relation, and without experience of this, we should, as modern logic shows, have no experience at all. This still leaves untouched the relation of the à priori to the subjective: the form of externality is necessary to experience, but is not, on that account, to be declared purely subjective. Of course, necessity for experience can only arise from the nature of the mind which experiences; but it does not follow that the necessary conditions could be fulfilled, unless the objective world had certain properties. The ground of necessity, we may safely say, arises from the mind; but it by no means follows that the truth of what is necessary depends only on the constitution of the mind. Where this is not the case, our conclusion, when a piece of knowledge has been declared à priori, can only be: Owing to the constitution of the mind, experience will be impossible unless the world accepts certain adjectives.
Such, in outline, will be the argument of the first half of this chapter, and such will be the justification for regarding as à priori those axioms of Geometry, which were deduced above from the conception of a form of externality. For these axioms, and these only, are necessarily true of any world in which experience is possible.
§ 182. What relation does this view bear to Kant’s?¶
f. §182 · p. p. 179182. [1] The view suggested has, obviously, much in common with that of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Indeed the whole of it, I believe, can be obtained by a certain limitation and interpretation of Kant’s classic arguments. But as it differs, in many important points, from the conclusions aimed at by Kant, and as the agreement may easily seem greater than it is, I will begin by a brief comparison, and endeavour, by reference to authoritative criticisms, to establish the legitimacy of my divergence from him.
§ 183. It is less psychological, since it does not discuss whether space is given in sensation,¶
f. §183 · p. p. 180183. In the first place, the psychological element is much larger in Kant’s thesis than in mine. I shall contend, it is true, that a form of externality, if it is to do its work, must not be a mere conception or a mere inference, but must be a given element in sense-perception—not, of course, originally given in isolation, but discoverable, through analysis, by attention to the object of sense-perception [2]. But Kant contended, not only that this element is given, but also that it is subjective. Space, for him, is, on the one hand, not conceptual, but on the other hand, not sensational. It forms, for him, no part of the data of sense, but is added by a subjective intuition, which he regards as not only logically, but psychologically, prior to objects in space [3].
This part of Kant’s argument is wholly irrelevant for us. Whether a form of externality be given in sense, or in a pure intuition, is for us unimportant, since we neglect the question as to the connection of the à priori and the subjective; while the temporal priority of space to objects in it has been generally recognized as irrelevant to Epistemology, and has often been regarded as forming no part of Kant’s thesis [4]. If we call intuitional whatever is given in sense-perception, then we may contend that a form of externality must be intuitional; but whether it is a pure intuition, in Kant’s sense, or not, is irrelevant to us, as is its priority to the objects in it.
That the non-sensational nature of space is no essential part of Kant’s logical teaching, appears from an examination of his argument. He has made, in the introduction, the purely logical distinction of matter and form, but has given to this distinction, in the very moment of suggesting it, a psychological implication. This he does by the assertion that the form, in which the matter of sensations is ordered, cannot itself be sensational. From this assumption it follows, of course, that space cannot be sensational. But the assumption is totally unsupported by argument, being set forth, apparently, as a self-evident axiom; it has been severely criticized by Stumpf [5] and others [6], and has been described by Vaihinger as a fatal petitio principii [7]; it is irrelevant to the logical argument, when this argument is separated, as we have separated it, from all connection with psychological subjectivity; and finally, it leaves us a prey to psychological theories of space, which have seemed, of late, but little favourable to the pure Kantian doctrine.
§ 184. And maintains that not only space, but any form of externality which renders experience possible, must be given in sense-perception¶
f. §184 · p. p. 181184. We have a right, therefore, in an epistemological inquiry, to neglect Kant’s psychological teaching—in so far, at any rate, as it distinguishes spatial intuition from sensation—and attend rather to the logical aspect alone. That part of his psychological teaching, which maintains that space is not a mere conception, is, with certain limitations, sufficiently evident as applied to actual space; but for us, it must be transformed into a much more difficult thesis, namely, that no form of externality, which renders experience of diversity in relation possible, can be merely conceptual. This question, to which we must return later, is no longer psychological, but belongs wholly to Epistemology.
§ 185. Externality should mean, not externality to the Self, but the mutual externality of presented things¶
f. §185 · p. p. 181185. What, then, remains the kernel, for our purposes, of Kant’s first argument for the apriority of space? His argument, in the form in which he gave it, is concerned with the eccentric projection of sensations. In order that I may refer sensations, he says, to something outside myself, I must already have the subjective space-form in the mind. In this shape, as Vaihinger points out (Commentar, II. pp. 69, 165), the argument rests on a petitio principii, for only if sensations are necessarily non-spatial does their projection demand a subjective space-form. But, further, is the logical apriority of space concerned with the externality of things to ourselves?
Space seems to perform two functions: on the one hand, it reveals things, by the eccentric projection of sensations, as external to the self, while, on the other hand, it reveals simultaneously presented things as mutually external. These two functions, though often treated as coordinate and almost equivalent [8], seem to me widely different. Before we discuss the apriority of space, we must carefully distinguish, I think, between these two functions, and decide which of them we are to argue about.
Now externality to the Self, it would seem, must necessarily raise the whole question of the nature and limits of the Ego, and what is more, it cannot be derived from spatial presentation, unless we give the Self a definite position in space. But things acquire a position in space only when they can appear in sense-perception; we are forced, therefore, if we adopt this view of the function of space, to regard the Self as a phenomenon presented to sense-perception. But this reduces externality to the Self to externality to the body. The body, however, is a presented object like any other, and externality of objects to it is, therefore, a special case of the mutual externality of presented things. Hence we cannot regard space as giving, primarily at any rate, externality to the Self, but only the mutual externality of the things presented to sense-perception [9].
§ 186. Would this be unknowable without a given form of externality?¶
f. §186 · p. p. 182186. This, then, is the kind of externality we are to expect from space, and our question must be: Would the existence of diverse but interrelated things be unknowable, if there were not, in sense-perception, some form of externality? This is the crucial question, on which turns the apriority of our form, and hence of the necessary axioms of Geometry.
§ 187. Bradley has proved that space and time preclude the existence of mere particulars,¶
f. §187 · p. p. 182187. The converse argument to mine, the argument from the spatio-temporal element in perception to a world of interrelated but diverse things, is developed at length in Bradley’s Logic. It is put briefly in the following sentence (p. 44, note): “If space and time are continuous, and if all appearance must occupy some time or space—and it is not hard to support both these theses—we can at once proceed to the conclusion, no mere particular exists. Every phenomenon will exist in more times or spaces than one; and against that diversity will be itself an universal [10].” The importance of this fact appears, when we consider that, if any mere particular existed, all judgment and inference as to that particular would be impossible, since all judgment and inference necessarily operate by means of universal. But all reality is constructed from the This of immediate presentation, from which judgment and inference necessarily spring. Owing, however, to the continuity and relativity of space and time, no This can be regarded either as simple or as self-subsistent. Every This, on the one hand, can be analyzed into Thises, and on the other hand, is found to be necessarily related to other things, outside the limits of the given object of sense-perception. This function of space and time is presupposed in the following statement from Bosanquet’s Logic (Vol. I. pp. 77–78): “Reality is given for me in present sensuous perception, and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it. The real world, as a definite organized system, is for me an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension…. The subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot or point in sensuous contact with the percipient self. But, as all reality is continuous, the subject is not merely this given spot or point.”
§ 188. And that knowledge requires the This to be neither simple nor self-subsistent¶
f. §188 · p. p. 183188. This doctrine of Bradley and Bosanquet is the converse of the epistemological doctrine I have to advocate. Owing to the continuity and relativity of space and time, they say, we are able to construct a systematic world, by judgment and inference, out of that fragmentary and yet necessarily complex existence which is given in sense-perception. My contention is, conversely, that since all knowledge is necessarily derived by an extension of the This of sense-perception, and since such extension is only possible if the This has that fragmentary and yet complex character conferred by a form of externality, therefore some form of externality, given with the This, is essential to all knowledge, and is thus logically à priori. Bradley’s argument, if sound, already proves this contention; for while, on the one hand, he uses no properties of space and time but those which belong to every form of externality, he proves, on the other hand, that judgment and inference require the This to be neither single nor self-subsistent. But I will endeavour, since the point is of fundamental importance, to reproduce the proof, in a form more suited than Bradley’s to the epistemological question.
§ 189. To prove that experience requires a form of externality, I assume that all knowledge requires the recognition of identity in difference¶
f. §189 · p. p. 184189. The essence of my contention is that, if experience is to be possible, every sensational This must, when attended to, be found, on the one hand, resolvable into Thises, and on the other hand dependent, for some of its adjectives, on external reference. The second of these theses follows from the first, for if we take one of the Thises contained in the first This, we get a new This necessarily related to the other Thises which make up the original This. I may, therefore, confine myself to the first proposition, which affirms that the object of perception must contain a diversity, not only of conceptual content, but of existence, and that this can only be known if sense-perception contains, as an element, some form of externality.
My premiss, in this argument, is that all knowledge involves a recognition of diversity in relation, or, if we prefer it, of identity in difference. This premiss I accept from Logic, as resulting from the analysis of judgment and inference. To prove such a premiss, would require a treatise on Logic; I must refer the reader, therefore, to the works of Bradley and Bosanquet on the subject. It follows at once, from my premiss, that knowledge would be impossible, unless the object of attention could be complex, i.e. not a mere particular. Now could the mental object—i.e., in this connection, the object of a cognition—be complex, if the object of immediate perception were always simple?
§ 190. Such recognition involves time¶
f. §190 · p. p. 184190. We might be inclined, at first sight, to answer this question affirmatively. But several difficulties, I think, would prevent such an answer. In the first place, knowledge must start from perception. Hence, either we could have no knowledge except of our present perception, or else we must be able to contrast and compare it with some other perception. Now in the first case, since the present perception, by hypothesis, is a mere particular, knowledge of it is impossible, according to our premiss. But in the second case, the other perception, with which we compare our first, must have occurred at some other time, and with time, we have at once a form of externality. But what is more, our present perception is no longer a mere particular. For the power of comparing it with another perception involves a point of identity between the two, and thus renders both complex. Moreover, time must be continuous, and the present, as Bradley points out, is no mere point of time [11]. Thus our present perception contains the complexity involved in duration throughout the specious present: its mere particularity and its simplicity are lost. Its self-subsistence is also lost, for beyond the specious present, lie the past and the future, to which our present perception thus unavoidably refers us. Time at least, therefore, is essential to that identity in difference, which all knowledge postulates.
§ 191. And some other form giving simultaneous diversity¶
f. §191 · p. p. 185191. But we have derived, from all this, no ground for affirming a multiplicity of real things, or a form of externality of more than one dimension, which, we saw, was necessary for the truth of two out of our three axioms. This brings us to the question: Have we enough, with time alone as a form of externality, for the possibility of knowledge?
This question we must, I think, answer in the negative. With time alone, we have seen, our presented object must be complex, but its complexity must, if I may use such a phrase, be merely adjectival. Without a second form of externality, only one thing can be given at one moment [12], and this one thing, therefore, must constitute the whole of our world. The object of past perception must—since our one thing has nothing external to it, by which it could be created or destroyed—be regarded as the same thing in a different state. The complexity, therefore, will lie only in the changing states of our one thing—it will be adjectival, not substantival. Moreover we have the following dilemma: Either the one thing must be ourselves, or else self-consciousness could never arise. But the chief difficulty of such a world would lie in the changes of the thing. What could cause these changes, since we should know of nothing external to our thing? It would be like a Leibnitzian monad, without any God outside it to prearrange its changes. Causality, in such a world, could not be applied, and change would be wholly inexplicable.
Hence we require also the possibility of a diversity of simultaneously existing things, not merely of successive adjectives; and this, we have seen, cannot be given by time alone, but only by a form of externality for simultaneous parts of one presentation. We could never, in other words, infer the existence of diverse but interrelated things, unless the object of sense-perception could have substantival complexity, and for such complexity we require a form of externality other than time. Such a form, moreover, as was shown in Chapter III., Section A (§ 135), can only fulfil its functions if it has more than one dimension. In our actual world, this form is given by space; in any world, knowable to beings with our laws of thought, some such form, as we have now seen, must be given in sense-perception.
This argument may be briefly summed up, by assuming the doctrine of Bradley, that all knowledge is obtained by inference from the This of sense-perception. For, if this be so, the This—in order that inference, which depends on identity in difference, may be possible at all—must itself be complex, and must, on analysis, reveal adjectives having a reference beyond itself. But this, as was shown above, can only happen by means of a form of externality. This establishes the à priori axioms of Geometry, as necessarily having existential import and validity in any intelligible world.
§ 192. The above argument has not deduced sense-perception from the categories, but has shown the former, unless it contains a certain element, to be unintelligible to the latter¶
f. §192 · p. p. 186192. The above argument, I hope, has explained why I hold it possible to deduce, from a mere conception like that of a form of externality, the logical apriority of certain axioms as to experienced space. The Kantian argument—which was correct, if our reasoning has been sound, in asserting that real diversity, in our actual world, could only be known by the help of space—was only mistaken, so far as its purely logical scope extends, in overlooking the possibility of other forms of externality, which could, if they existed, perform the same task with equal efficiency. In so far as space differs, therefore, from these other conceptions of possible intuitional forms, it is a mere experienced fact, while in so far as its properties are those which all such forms must have, it is à priori necessary to the possibility of experience.
I cannot hope, however, that no difficulty will remain, for the reader, in such a deduction, from abstract conceptions, of the properties of an actual datum in sense-perception. Let us consider, for example, such a property as impenetrability. To suppose two things simultaneously in the same position in a form of externality, is a logical contradiction; but can we say as much of actual space and time? Is not the impossibility, here, a matter of experience rather than of logic? Not if the above argument has been sound, I reply. For in that case, we infer real diversity, i.e. the existence of different things, only from difference of position in space or time. It follows, that to suppose two things in the same point of space and time, is still a logical contradiction: not because we have constructed the data of sense out of logic, but because logic is dependent, as regards its application, on the nature of these data. This instance illustrates, what I am anxious to make plain, that my argument has not attempted to construct the living wealth of sense-perception out of “bloodless categories,” but only to point out that, unless sense-perception contained a certain element, these categories would be powerless to grapple with it.
§ 193. How to account for the realization of this element, is a question for metaphysics¶
f. §193 · p. p. 187193. How we are to account for the fortunate realization of these requirements—whether by a pre-established harmony, by Darwinian adaptation to our environment, by the subjectivity of the necessary element in sense-perception, or by a fundamental identity and unity between ourselves and the rest of reality—is a further question, belonging rather to metaphysics than to our present line of argument. The à priori, we have said throughout, is that which is necessary for the possibility of experience, and in this we have a purely logical criterion, giving results which only Logic and Epistemology can prove or disprove. What is subjective in experience, on the contrary, is primarily a question for psychology, and should be decided on psychological grounds alone. When these two questions have been separately answered, but not till then, we may frame theories as to the connection of the à priori and the subjective; to allow such theories to influence our decision, on either of the two previous questions, is liable, surely, to confuse the issue, and prevent a clear discrimination between fundamentally different points of view.
Footnotes