APPENDIX¶
ON THE NECESSARY CONNECTIONS — BETWEEN EXISTENTIAL ACTS
§ 1. “It is moved, therefore it is” (« Movetur ergo est »)¶
The formula that serves as the title of this first part is similar to the Cartesian adage: “I think, therefore I am” (« cogito ergo sum »). Already some years ago [1] we attempted to detect the sense that Descartes attributed to these words of his. We concluded: this proposition is not a truncated syllogism, nor is it the conclusion of a syllogism, but reports a simple intuition of the intellect: “When, however, we notice that we are thinking things, it is a certain first notion that is concluded from no syllogism; nor, when someone says, I think, therefore I am or exist, does he deduce existence from thought through a syllogism, but recognizes it as a thing known through itself by a simple intuition of the mind, as is evident from this: that if he deduced it through a syllogism, he ought previously to have known that major premise everything that thinks, is or exists.” Rather, this universal and necessary proposition is known from internal experience, which intuitively detects necessity. He continues by saying: “Whereas surely he rather learns it from this: that in himself he experiences that it cannot be that he should think unless he exists” [2].
And man detects this necessity in that very internal experience of his, which is expressed through the formula: I who think necessarily am; so in the very first formula that expresses the famous adage in the Discourse on the Method itself (A. & T. VI, 32, 17): « Il fallait nécessairement, que moi, qui le pensais, fusse quelque chose » (“It was necessary that I, who thought it, should be something”).
Therefore it is a first principle, indeed, for Descartes, the unique first principle. The word “therefore” (« ergo ») expresses nothing other than the necessity of the nexus between actual thought and the actual esse, which is presupposed, of the subject. In the mode by which he arrives at this cognition, he then also detects a universal noetic truth; the text from the Second Replies proceeds thus: “for such is the nature of our mind that it forms general propositions from the cognition of particulars.”
A) The first principle “I think, therefore I am” or “I who think necessarily am” expresses therefore not only the objectivity of human “esse,” but also the mode by which we arrive at this cognition of this substantial esse; for cogito expresses a certain accidental esse, “sum” expresses the substantial esse of the subject that thinks, whose objectivity is detected in our reflection in the necessity of its relation to that accidental esse.
Yet the same truth, as a certain first principle, that is, immediate and known through itself (per se notum), is found in Aristotle and St. Thomas (cf. the same chapter in Théorie du jugement). We perceive that we sense and understand, and then “in that” or “from that” or “through that” which we perceive, we perceive that we are. In this formula the word “to understand” (or “to sense”) indicates the actuality of our operation, the word “to be” (« esse ») the actuality of the soul or substance itself. This “to perceive” is also called “to experience,” as in Descartes; and this indicates that we perceive these things in a singular case, and that in this reflexive process no syllogism intervenes. Moreover, we perceive or experience the actuality of the soul as presupposed (at least by nature) to the actuality of thought. And in reflection we detect not only the order of this nexus, but also its necessity. Therefore that “I,” whose existence is thus detected, is a noumenal “I,” not merely a phenomenal one; this holds also of Descartes.
The position of Aristotle and St. Thomas as to essentials is the same as the position of Descartes. In St. Thomas as well this “experience” is such that there is associated with it an intellective intuition of the nature and necessity of this nexus. Thence immediately we can pass to the universal proposition: everything that thinks, is. Yet St. Thomas in similar fashion (otherwise than Descartes) establishes a more universal truth. He considers not our thought alone, but activity in general. Thence his more universal principle: “action follows upon actual being” (« agere sequitur ad esse in actu »), or: “everything that acts is an actual being” (« omne quod agit est ens actu »). Where by the way we note: to act belongs to supposits, and esse (which is substantial esse) is prior by nature to acting.
These things we were establishing previously; in the present study we wish to add certain other principles that have their origin from external perception, and examine them noetically and compare them with the noetics of the principle “I think, therefore I am.”
B) The principle “I think, therefore I am” leads immediately to the universal proposition “everything that thinks, is.” This affirms a necessary and therefore universal nexus, a nexus between two actualities, between the substantial esse of the subject and the accidental esse of any thought of its, and indeed in such a way that the esse of thought is certainly known by us first, but substantial esse is ontologically presupposed.
A similar proposition we find in Aristotle and St. Thomas for bodies, namely “everything that is moved, is” (« omne quod movetur, est »). This proposition has a similar structure. For it affirms a necessary nexus between the substantial esse of the subject that is moved, and motion, which is its accidental esse. One actuality, namely substantial esse, is ontologically presupposed, but, according to their doctrine, the other actuality, motion itself, is known by us first, and indeed as an actuality; indeed these two “esse” and their nexus seem to be known by us in a similar mode as the principle “I think, therefore I am.”
In Physica V, 1 (225a25 ff.), where Aristotle distinguishes motion strictly so called from other mutations (generation and corruption), there is established the principle τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς μὴ τόδε οὐδαμῶς [ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι] ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν κινεῖσθαι. Substance is treated, τόδε, and concerning it it is said: if it is not an actual being, it cannot be moved (not even per accidens). Which is rendered by St. Thomas (In V Phys., lect. 2, no. 8): “that which simply is not this something, cannot be moved.” From this formula, through contraposition, another, equivalent formula is immediately understood: that which is moved, necessarily is being simply; and in the commentary he repeats the argument “it is impossible that what is not should be moved,” which is considered as a principle known through itself.
These things are said of all motion. Another consideration of Aristotle, which directly regards local motion, may briefly be recalled. εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τόπῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ· εἴη γὰρ ἄν που (225a31–32: “if everything that is moved is in a place, but what is not is not in a place; for [if it were] it would be somewhere”).
This is briefly developed and explained by St. Thomas, where (loc. cit., no. 9) he says that this argument holds not only of local motion, but, in the theory of Aristotle, consequently of all motion, because other motions presuppose local motion. (Cf. also Simplicius, In Phys., ed. Diels, 817 ff.).
Literally the same things are found in the parallel place in Metaphysics XI, c. 11. In the commentary of St. Thomas there are certainly variations, but the doctrine and explanation remain the same. We note one text in the commentary (no. 2370) that explains Aristotle's clause (1067b29 ff., in Phys. 225a25), saying: “that which is non-being in act simply, that is, according to substance, it in no way happens to be moved.” Thence it is clear: that a thing may be moved there is required, as a condition sine qua non, that it be an actually existing substance; the existential act that is motion presupposes (at least prior by nature) the substantial existential act of the subject.
Note. This principle, as universally admitted, is presupposed in Physica VIII, c. 1, in St. Thomas, lect. 1 and 2, and indeed, as Aristotle explicitly says, even independently of the theory of motion from Book III. Note moreover: this is accustomed to be applied by St. Thomas to solve problems of great moment that occur in the analysis of creation.
Just as therefore there is universally admitted the principle “action follows upon being” (« agere sequitur esse »), or “what acts is an actual being,” so we can establish that other similar principle: “being moved follows upon being” (« moveri sequitur esse »), or “what is moved is an actual being” (« quod movetur est ens actu »). Each is established as a first principle, immediate, known through itself; each has this peculiar feature: that it affirms a necessary nexus, not between quiddities, but between two existential acts, two esse. The principle “what acts is an actual being,” as we saw, is more universal than the Cartesian principle “what thinks is,” but agrees with this principle in that this too establishes a necessary nexus between two esse. And each is an Aristotelian principle.
C). According to our authors there exists also another agreement between these principles, namely in the process according to which we arrive at their cognition. This agreement is also most worthy of attention. Aristotle describes this process in Metaphysics IX, c. 3. There is repeated what we already read in Physica V, 1: that actuality which is “being moved” presupposes the actuality of its subject, that is, of substance. The first actuality that becomes known to us as actuality is motion itself; indeed motion seems to be described as actuality by excellence: this being understood, consequently we detect other actualities, among which here is specifically named the actuality of the subject of motion, that is, that which in the subject, substance, is required so that it may be the subject of motion, insofar as motion is an actuality. Behold his words (loc. cit., 1047a30–b2): ἐλήλυθε δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι, διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄλλας δέ τινας κατηγορίας, οἷον διανοητὰ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὰ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα, κινούμενα δὲ οὔ, τοῦτο δέ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσονται ἐνεργείᾳ. τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἔνια δυνάμει ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν [3].
Actuality therefore is detected (first by the senses) in the subject that is moved, and is there primarily motion itself, which as actuality is also first understood. Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on this place excellently says that ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν κινήσει θεωρεῖται [4], where θεωρεῖται seems to regard not sight alone, but rather intellection.
Then the name “actuality,” energeia, is extended to other actualities; and this because the notion is extended. Excellently St. Thomas notes (In IX Metaph., lect. 3, ed. Cathala, no. 1805) “for since names are signs of intelligible conceptions, we first impose names upon those things which we first understand, although they be posterior according to the order of nature.” The final words, underlined by us, specially regard our case, in which that which is posterior according to nature, namely motion, is known as actuality prior to the substantial esse of the subject; and therefore in St. Thomas and in Aristotle, this process of cognition of actuality is immediately enunciated of this case, because in it it is read intuitively. So too Alexander (loc. cit., lines 24 ff.), by whom we are also referred to Physica V, 225a25 ff. In such a manner therefore, according to our authors, we arrive at forming an “intelligible conception” of actuality, first in motion, which we observe, then in its observed subject, and then, in natural reflection, at the understanding of the relation (and natural order) between both actualities. Prior in cognition is the understanding of motion; posterior is the understanding of the actuality of substance, which nevertheless is prior by nature and is known as prior. This relation is known as necessary; thence in Physica V it is explicitly posed as impossible that non-being should be moved. And this cognition of necessity is the sign of objective intellection.
This cognition is universally attributed to the human race in individual texts. There nevertheless it must be supposed that this truth is known and applied in actu exercito (as occurs in so many principles), not in actu signato, which is found only after philosophical analysis, after dialectical inquiry, as is expounded here in Aristotle [5].
In detecting therefore the principle concerning the necessity of the existence of the subject that is moved, the process of our mind is similar to that which leads to the principle “I think, therefore I am.” At the end of this process of the mind there results an intuition that can be expressed by the formula “this is moved, therefore it is” (« hoc movetur, ergo est »). Just as in “I think, therefore I am” the actuality of thought becomes known to us first, and in it (or under it) the actuality of the thinking subject, so in perceiving motion (the motion of this subject), as an actuality, in natural and spontaneous reflection we recognize the actuality of its subject. And in both cases this second actuality (of the subject) is to be considered prior by nature, as the condition of possibility of the other; it is known as more profound, as fundamental. One actuality (of thought or motion) is another esse, that is, another mode of being (alius modus essendi) than the other actuality (of the soul, of that which is moved), that is, the esse of substance itself, that is, the mode of being simply. The prior mode of being is “in another” (« in alio »); the other is “through itself” (« per se »). And, which is of decisive moment, these relations become known to us as necessary relations, and indeed between actualities themselves, modes of being, not directly between quiddities; modes of being themselves contain nothing quidditative in themselves (“esse is not a form but an act”). They are indeed acts of “quiddities,” of forms, or quasi-forms.
And from such an intuition of the necessity of these relations we proceed to universal judgments. Just as from “I think, therefore I am” we proceed to the universal “everything that thinks is” (or more universally relative to the subject “everything that acts is an actual being,” which is the formula of St. Thomas), so, in the case of the relation between motion and its subject, from the intuition “this is moved, therefore it is” we proceed to the universal “everything that is moved is” or “everything that is moved is an actual being.” In St. Thomas there is also another universal formula, namely “acting follows upon (that is, presupposes) actual being”; so too we can say “being moved (or undergoing) follows upon being” or: just as “everything that acts is an actual being,” so too “everything that undergoes is an actual being.”
Further Comparison of Both Processes.
To one inquiring analytically into the noetic mode of proceeding of our mind, certain differences between the two cases also present themselves.
St. Thomas says of “I think, therefore I am”: I can think that I am not, just as I can think that I was not; but the former I cannot assert by affirming; behold his words (Q. D. de Veritate, q. 10, a. 12, ad 7):
“To think that something is not can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that these two fall simultaneously into apprehension; and thus nothing prevents someone from thinking that he is not, just as he thinks that he once was not … In another
way, so that assent is given to this apprehension; and thus no one can think that he is not with assent: for in this, that he thinks something, he perceives that he is.”
The reason for this impossibility is clear: while I think (and, pretending my non-existence, I think) I am conscious of the actuality in which I perceive that I myself actually am; and through natural and spontaneous reflection I understand (at least in actu exercito) the necessity of this relation and in necessity its objectivity. Thence while I think (even my non-existence) I cannot mentally affirm, “think with assent,” that I am not.
In the case of the existence of the subject that is moved, the matter stands otherwise. I can “think with assent” that a certain thing is not (even if in fact it exists) if its motion is unknown to me, and this ignorance is not, as in the prior case, excluded. But this is a difference of lesser moment; yet it indicates something to which attention must be paid.
The objects in both cases are existential acts. Even while we speculate in the abstract concerning these relations, we have in mind not so much the essences, quiddities, of the terms, as their existential acts; concerning these we speculate as concerning objects that are supposed actually to exist, even if in fact they do not actually exist. So also in the prior case: if I think concerning another man and concerning him suppose “he thinks,” by that very fact I ought to attribute “esse” to him: “he thinks, therefore he is.” And then the case is entirely the same as the other: “this is moved, therefore it is.” In these principles we speculate not concerning essences, concerning quiddities, but concerning existential acts [6].
Comparison of Both Cases with Quidditative Principles.
The first principles that the human mind detects regard mathematical relations (cf. Théorie du jugement, passim). Let us take the simplest among them, the principle that affirms that an extended entity is divisible through figure. The nexus that is here affirmed as necessary is a nexus between two quiddities, between the extension of the extended entity and its divisibility, or (as Descartes says) its “figurability” (cf. Gregorianum, XXX, 1949, pp. 195 ff.). Specifications of this principle lead to geometric axioms. Immediately there appears already the difference between the geometric principle and those two of which we were treating, which regard a nexus not between two essences, quiddities, but between existences, modes of being.
The first mathematical principles also have their origin from the experience of external things, just like the principle of motion. And indeed through the operation that we called intuitive formal abstraction; this in concrete sensitive data (even of the imagination alone) detects two forms (extension and figurability) between which a nexus is present; thence it is abstraction; for we simultaneously understand that other forms (e.g. colors) found in the same subject import nothing; thence it is formal abstraction; this we intuitively understand and spontaneously, thence it is intuitive abstraction. « Le mathématique se détache du fond du réel » (“Mathematics detaches itself from the background of the real”), says Meyerson [7].
In detecting this principle there is no need that the objects in which we detect it through that natural abstraction be actually observed by the external senses; a disposition of the thing in the phantasm, and presented from it in the mind, suffices. Nor in this case must we think of that disposition of the thing as actually existing; a quidditative relation is treated. Conversely, if we understand the principle “what is moved is” from a similar presentation in the phantasm alone, we must conceive the disposition of the thing (that is, the motion of the thing) as existing, as pertaining to the order of actual existence, as was already said above. A mathematical relation holds between essences themselves, quiddities; the relation affirmed in the principle of motion is a relation between existences, modes of being. If we conceive the notion of “motion,” we conceive a certain “mode of being,” a certain continuous successive becoming.
In both cases the nexus affirmed is known as necessary, in the mathematical case as a nexus between forms, in the metaphysical case as a nexus between acts, which are not forms, which themselves contain no quiddity, but certainly regard quiddities; just as “esse is not a form but an act,” so neither are modes of being forms. Because nevertheless in both cases the nexus is known as necessary, the proposition that affirms the disposition of the thing is a proposition per se. To both cases is opposed the case that we called “physical,” in which through observation (with which an intellective intuition of the necessity of the nexus itself is not associated), we know only a material nexus (that is, forms are perceived in the same subject, in the same matter; and the affirmation of this produces only a proposition per accidens). And in this sense the abstraction that leads to “what is moved is” can be called “broadly formal” (« late formalis ») [8]. (Concerning propositions “per se” and “per accidens” and their structure see Théorie du jugement, chs. III and IV).
It is worthwhile that we elucidate this further. In concrete things, whence through formal abstraction we detect these principles which are judgments or propositions per se, we can also find dispositions of the thing that are affirmed only through judgments per accidens. If I think, and in that thought detect my “esse” as necessarily presupposed, I affirm this through the principle “I think, therefore I am.” But in my consciousness I also detect other dispositions of the thing that can only be affirmed through a proposition per accidens. While I think, simultaneously I hear a melody. These acts are joined only through a material nexus; these acts are per accidens in the same subject, and this I understand; therefore this disposition of the thing is affirmed only in a proposition per accidens: I think and I hear a melody. In similar fashion in an object whose motion I observe—which therefore necessarily is, “this is moved, therefore it is”—simultaneously I can observe another act, e.g. that it is red; and this I know and affirm as contingent in a proposition per accidens: this which is moved is red.
From that opposition the character of intuitive formal abstraction shines forth more.
This is therefore the first agreement with discrepancy between both cases, the quidditative and the existential. In a quidditative principle we detect a necessary relation between forms (quiddities), and understanding it we detect the objectivity of the observed nexus, that is, to these relations esse belongs; but there is no need that we represent these forms (their subject) to ourselves as actually existing. In an existential principle there is also detected a necessary, and therefore objective, noumenal relation, not between forms, but between acts of being; and simultaneously there is detected the relative value of these modes of being, of which one is “through itself” (« per se »), the other “in another” (« in alio »), one is “of substance,” the other “of accident,” one is “ens,” the other is “entis ens.” But this we detect whether in those things that are in act, here and now, or in objects that we represent to ourselves as existing. It seems necessary to consider these in the theory of knowledge.
There is also another difference between mathematical cases and those two metaphysical ones. In the prior case, in which there is enunciated the proposition “(every) extended entity is figurable,” the form that determines the subject, extension, is prior by nature to the form of the predicate, and this is immediately understood by us; we intuit figurability flowing from extension. In those metaphysical cases the matter stands in the inverse way; “cogito” is not prior by nature to “sum,” “movetur” not prior to “est.” On the contrary, these substantial “esse” on the part of reality are presupposed before accidental “esse.” They are certainly known by us first, but in this cognition, through that (broadly) formal abstraction, we detect that those substantial “esse” are prior by nature.
All these things are already known in daily life, but there it is cognition “in actu exercito,” not “in actu signato.” This is evident from the mode in which we express these cognitions by other formulas. We can use a causal proposition. In the mathematical case we say well: “this, because extended, is figurable.” But not in those metaphysical cases; it is not well said “because I think, I am,” or “because it is moved, it exists”; “cogito” and “movetur” are not prior by nature. Because nevertheless in our cognition they are prior, we say well “because I know that I think, I know that I am” (this formula is already in Descartes) and also “because I know (or see) that this is moved, I know that this is.” These things are immediately recognized by the non-philosopher; these are a mental experiment that regards the state of our mind antecedently to philosophical analysis. Similarly the things that follow.
A rational proposition in all these cases is deservedly employed: “I think, therefore I am,” “this is moved, therefore it is,” “this is extended, therefore divisible through figure.” For it expresses the priority of the prior member, whether this be according to cognition alone (as in metaphysical cases) or also according to nature (as in the mathematical case). And that “therefore” (« ergo ») indicates not a process of reasoning, but the necessity of the nexus between both members, which we immediately understand in actu exercito, which noetic analysis transforms into actus signatus.
Finally we note: not only St. Thomas, but Aristotle also does not neglect the notions of actuality, of esse itself and of modes of being, that is, of existing; and he admits necessary relations between modes of being, which become known to us intuitively.
In the text from Nicomachean Ethics (IX, 9, 1170a31 ff.) the principle “I think, therefore I am” is affirmed under the form of a causal proposition that attributes priority of cognition to thought: because we sense that we sense and understand that we understand, therefore we sense and understand that we are (cf. the article cited above Le cogito ergo sum etc., pp. 470 ff.) [9].
The principle affirming a necessary relation between motion, as it is an actuality, and the substantial actuality of the subject of motion, is expressed in another way. Once established, it enunciates (commonly with the Greeks): “non-being cannot be moved,” which is equivalent to this enunciation: “what is moved is an actual being.” Where he explains the origin of this principle, he urges the likeness and difference between modes of actuality, between motion and the existence of the subject, and vindicates priority of cognition for motion, and again a certain causal proposition returns: “and therefore” (διό, 1047a32) motion is commonly denied to non-being, which is actuality by excellence (μάλιστα) for us.
“It is moved, therefore it is” is therefore a principle that affirms a necessary nexus known as such by us, and that regards “esse,” the existential order. But in Aristotle and St. Thomas other principles of this character are also found; of these too we shall briefly treat.
§ 2. “This is moved, therefore place is” (« Hoc movetur ergo locus est »)¶
Aristotle, beginning his treatise on place (Physica IV, 1–8), poses three questions concerning place: whether it exists, εἰ ἔστιν, how it exists, πῶς ἔστιν, and what it is, τί ἐστιν. The second question treats of the “mode of being” of place; that is, as Philoponus (In Phys., ed. Vitelli, 501, 16–19) expounds, it asks whether place is something existing through itself or in another. But it is solved simultaneously with the question of “what it is”; similarly Simplicius (In Phys., ed. Diels, 520, 30–32); similarly Themistius (ed. Schenkl, 102, 3–5). Aristotle, as is known, considers place as an accident, for it is a surface, but therefore its existence presupposes the existence of its subject.
The existence of place becomes known to us from that motion which is “translation,” motion according to place. So already in the introductory exposition he affirms (c. 1, 208b1) from the mind of others. Then he affirms the same as his own opinion in c. 2 (209b24–30). At the end of this chapter 2 (cf. 210a12) he completes the reasons establishing that it must be something, but says that difficulties remain to be solved regarding its quiddity (cf. St. Thomas, lect. 3 in fine). Definitively he establishes his opinion affirming that place becomes known to us from the motion of translation in c. 4, 211a12–17, and indeed in such a way that from it as from a principle one can arrive at cognition of quiddity.
Just as from the actuality that is motion we know the actuality of the substance itself that is moved, so from the actuality that is the motion of translation we know the actuality, the existence of place itself.
And Aristotle himself, after establishing the quiddity of place (what it is and how it exists), applies this doctrine where he says (c. 5, 212a31 ff.): “to whatever body, therefore, there is an extrinsic body surrounding it, this is in a place; to whatever not, not.” This case can seem fictitious, but he immediately applies this conclusion to a most real case, to the universe (ibid., 212b14 ff.): “the universe is not anywhere. For that which is somewhere, is itself something, and then another thing must be alongside it in which (is that) which contains” [10].
Familiar is the difficulty that thence arises regarding the motion of the outermost sphere. It is not of this place to treat of its solution. The fact that it is a difficulty and is considered as serious demonstrates in its own way that Aristotle's theory is that which we were expounding. Concerning the difficulty St. Thomas can be read, who devotes to it a long lecture 7 [11]. From it we transcribe only this beautiful text: “as Aristotle said above, place would not be sought except on account of motion, which demonstrates place from this: that bodies succeed one another in one place. Whence, although place is not of the necessity of a body, it is nevertheless of the necessity of a body that is moved according to place” (lect. cit., no. 7).
And thus in the end we can establish: just as concerning motion there is admitted as a principle known through itself and immediately: “this is moved, therefore place is”; so there holds, as a principle deduced concerning being in place: “this is somewhere, therefore (it is and) place actually is.”
The special notion itself of place becomes known to us from special motion, motion of translation. Thence certain quidditative elements enter there: not any actuality whatever is treated, but local motion; thence this principle could be employed for determining the quiddity of place. But in this special case we can also attend, and we do attend, to actualities themselves, and between them we find necessary relations, between motion and the actuality of its subject, and the actuality of that according to which it is moved, namely of place itself. This existential relation also, between motion and the actuality of place, is described by Aristotle as intelligible through itself to us. And this mode of proceeding of our mind seems worthy to be considered in the theory of knowledge.
But another element also is present in these principles, on account of which it ought to be considered in that theory.
Hume is said to have taught that the possibility of a necessary relation between the existence of one thing and the existence of another can in no way be seen by the intellect; thence his theory of causality. So at least Kant expounds and approves the foundation of his theory (Prolegomena, Preface and § 27). Indeed it seems that this must also be extended to substance and accident. Here we have principles in which such a possibility, indeed realization, is intuitively intelligible to us: these relations between actualities, existences, and indeed necessary ones, constitute such objects of our intuition. Let us expound this briefly.
This we find very clearly in that second principle: “this is moved locally, therefore place is.” Place is without doubt something distinct from motion and from the subject that is moved; it is separated from it, as Aristotle says. Motion is a fluent actuality, a fluent existence. And that other thing is presupposed as necessary, and indeed as an actuality, something that in one way or another exists, which we know intuitively from known motion. Motion points, as with a finger, to another existence that is presupposed [12].
But the same is already had in its own way in that prior principle: “this is moved, therefore it is.” For in that fluent esse, which is called motion, or from it, we know another esse, the fixed esse of the substance itself that is moved. In or from the one we know the other; and each, prior and posterior, is an existential act, a certain existence; and the relation between both acts is known by us as necessary, in this sense, that “being moved” necessarily presupposes the “being” of that which is moved. One “esse” again indicates another; the prior is “esse in alio,” the other “esse per se.” Just as in “cogito ergo sum.”
In these two cases motion, an existential act, reveals to us the necessity of another existence (of the subject of motion, and, in motion of translation, of place itself). The quiddities of which they are modes of being do not become known to us in this way, only existences; that we may know quiddities, further inquiry, often not easy, is required, but independently of existences that must be presupposed it is established. In such a manner therefore the existence of another from a given existence can be known, and indeed as necessarily presupposed.
Hume inquired only into the problem of (efficient) causality and there posed his question: how is it possible from one existence to know another; and the question itself suggests impossibility. But in this case too, in similar fashion, one existence from another existence can be known, can be intuitively established. For we shall have the principle:
§ 3. “This is moved, therefore another, moving, exists” (« Hoc movetur, ergo aliud, movens, existit »)¶
This principle, which is the principle of causality insofar as it regards motion, is found by man in a similar mode as those prior principles. It is detected from motion, from any motion whatever, even from local motion alone, indeed even from that motion which in modern mechanics is called inertial motion. It is detected in any motion whatever, account being had of the intelligibility of being, of existence. Motion is of itself an actual esse; necessarily it must be intelligible. If, however, pure “being moved,” abstracted from all other reality (except place, if local motion is treated, and except the subject in all motion) is considered, it certainly has intelligibility, but of itself alone it is not totally intelligible; thence if it is given in fact, there is demanded something other than pure being moved itself, something that ought to supply the deficient intelligibility. We notice that this process is not syllogistic; that which we were calling the principle of the intelligibility of being, of that which is, is nothing other than the description of the very nature of the intellect, which seeks intelligibility in every being. More on these matters can be seen in: Théorie du jugement, ch. VII, § 7, 1st ed., pp. 246 ff., 2nd ed., 243 ff.; Reality and Judgment, pp. 206 ff.; Cosmologia, 4th ed., Note VIII on the history of the notion of impetus, Note IX on the principle of inertia; Filosofia della natura inorganica, pp. 126–128.
That Aristotle admits a moving cause, other than being moved itself, there is no need that we should say here; likewise that he considers this as known through itself. That he demands the existence of a moving cause seems also to be subject to no doubt. Let it suffice here to praise one text. In his well-known exposition of the modes in which “act” is prior to “potency,” in Metaphysics IX, c. 8, from line 1049b18, he begins to speak concerning order in time, therefore concerning order in existence, and says (1049b23–27): ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος… ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἔστιν.
For every origin of actual being from potency he demands an efficient cause, and that this must be in act he affirms as something clear through itself. Then he repeats these things specifically concerning motion: he demands something that moves, κινοῦν, and concerning this it is established that it must exist in act: τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἔστιν [13].
Aristotle also, by a simple intuition of the intellect, in or from that existence which is “being moved,” intuits the existence of another, of the mover. These things too are Aristotelian, and can be expressed by the formula: “this is moved, therefore a moving cause exists.”
The doctrine of St. Thomas on this point is also most familiar; he demands a moving cause, and indeed actually existing: what acts is an actual being. Let it suffice here to transcribe a few words from his commentary on this place (no. 1848): “for it is always necessary that that which is potential being should be actual being by an agent that is actual being … And so always than that which is in potency there is something prior that moves, and the mover is in act.” Thus from one existence another is detected, and simultaneously the ontological order between these existences.
From this entire consideration it is clear that this principle of causality does not indicate what that existing agent is which is the efficient cause of motion. This must be investigated further, and this investigation can be difficult.
From this it can be deduced that another presupposition found in Hume and other philosophers is erroneous; they suppose, namely, that the notion of causality, and the principle itself, arises in us from the repeated observation of the constant succession of phenomena. In such a supposition we would first find a determinate phenomenon constantly preceding another phenomenon; thence would arise the notion of cause and effect, from their relations as constantly prior and posterior, and the conviction of necessity. That the notion of a moving cause does not arise in this way, nor the cognition of the principle of causality, is clear from our analysis; the intellection of the principle and of its value is had independently of any observation of the order of phenomena; and therefore it leaves indeterminate the answer to the question what is that determinate existing thing that moves. The principle of causality, insofar as it regards the existence of the mover, requires only that this be other than the mobile, insofar as it is moved, but otherwise leaves it indeterminate; thence further inquiry must be made. It is true indeed that we in this further investigation can, indeed often ought to, employ the observation of the order of priority among phenomena.
A splendid historical specimen of such a process leading to the cognition of that agent which is the moving cause is found in the mode by which Newton, from the observation of planetary motions, found as the cause of attraction the sun (and for the moon’s motion our earth), then universal gravitation. Concerning this history what we wrote in Théorie du jugement, ch. XI, § 3, no. 3 B, 1st ed., pp. 318–324, 2nd ed., pp. 314–318; Reality and Judgment, pp. 264–269 can be read.
And then other questions remain that regard efficient causality, namely relative to the quiddities of cause and effect; for to understand the effect the existence of any cause whatever does not suffice, but relations between the quiddities of cause and effect must also be given; and in this question the adage “action follows upon being” returns in a second sense. But this question is not of this investigation. Here we only inquire into the relations that hold between existences, existential acts, and these we find expounded even in Aristotle.
There is also another error into which those who follow Hume in his doctrine regarding the origin of our affirmation of the principle of causality almost necessarily fall. Hume, where he treats of the necessity that we (undeservedly, as he says) attribute to the principle, places this necessity in the acting cause itself with respect to the effect, that is, the cause of itself necessarily produces the effect; and this is done consequently if the principle has the origin they attribute to it. But if it arises in the mode described above, this necessity must be asserted: given motion, it is necessary that a cause exist; but there is no need that this be a “necessary cause”; it can be a free cause, and nevertheless it satisfies the requirement of the necessary principle of causality; but it does not assert that this cause is a “necessary cause.”
We have therefore, even in Aristotle, the principle: “this is moved, therefore a moving cause exists,” which establishes necessary relations between existences; these are relations between acts, but not directly between forms. Let us conclude what has been said through a text of Aristotle from a book among the latest of his works, from Book XII of the Metaphysics (c. 6, 1071b28): πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ τι αἴτιον. If therefore something is moved, an actual efficient cause must necessarily be given. And let us observe, in this too nothing is asserted except the necessity of the actuality of the cause; the principle does not indicate what precisely the agent is that is the cause; it is some cause in act: ἐνεργείᾳ τι αἴτιον. And moreover: from the known existence of the effect the existence of the cause is necessarily inferred, not vice versa.
§ 4. On Finality in Motion¶
Here, as it seems to us, at least some mention, although brief, must be made of the final cause in those things that are moved; the continuity of motion without the influx of finality cannot be understood, and this imports a necessary relation between existential acts. There can be compared what we expounded at length in Cosmologia on motion and its proper attributes, especially, for this consideration of ours, what is had in nos. 155, 158, 161, and Notes XIII (on motion as an existential act) and XIV (on motion, an imperfect act, and operation, a perfect act) in 4th ed., pp. 527–532).
The unity of continuous motion can only be had from the end, which therefore is not merely a boundary (πέρας) but moreover an intended end (τέλος). Thence motion strictly so called belongs to those things that are only means to an end, τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος (Metaph. IX, 6, 1048b18 sq.).
That intended boundary as to be produced, not in the abstract alone, is presupposed; it is, according to the doctrine often repeated, “posterior in genesis, but prior by nature” than motion (cf. texts in Cosmologia, no. 158). As to be produced (not as already produced) it is prior; indeed it is the principle of motion itself, and as such exercises influx and is necessarily presupposed. During motion it is not actuated (except imperfectly), but in reality is to be produced; that into which motion tends is the actuality of the boundary. It can be said that the end is “intentionally” in act in motion.
These things are expressed through an adage, at first sight rather strange, according to which that which is moved is imperfect and “proceeding toward its principle,” τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀτελὲς καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἴον (Phys. VIII, 7, 261a13); a similar adage in Metaphysics (IX, 1050a7–9): ἅπαν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος). Because the boundary of motion, τέλος, is ἀρχὴ, exercising influx on motion, there must be present a necessary relation between motion, the actuality of mover and mobile, and that actuality into which it tends.
We have therefore a necessary relation between two actualities, just as in the three prior cases; but in those it was immediately detected by the human intellect, and therefore was commonly accepted, but in this case a longer analysis regarding the unity of motion is prerequired. It can be expressed: “this is moved, therefore it tends toward a boundary to be produced”; or: “this is moved, therefore the boundary intentionally exists.” A longer analysis is required, but after it it is directly understood, as a necessary relation between two actualities; this relation indicates the intentional nature of motion, to which corresponds the intentional activity of the agent.
We add a text from the commentary of St. Thomas on this place from Metaphysics IX (lect. 8, no. 1857): “Everything that is made going to an end, goes to a certain principle. For the end for the sake of which something is made, is a certain principle. For it is prior in the intention of the agent, because for its sake generation takes place.”
And therefore efficiency itself as such is not understood, unless understood as directing the mobile to this end. “Every agent acts for an end” (« Omne agens agit propter finem »). And this is detected specially in motion strictly so called, which otherwise would lack the unity of continuity that it possesses.
Recapitulation.¶
In Aristotle (and St. Thomas) certain principles are found that regard motion strictly so called, and which, after noetic analysis, can be expressed by these formulas:
This is moved, therefore it exists;
This is moved by translation, therefore place exists;
This is moved, therefore an efficient cause exists;
This is moved, therefore it tends toward an end to be produced.
The last differs from the others in this: that in those the mobile subject, place, and efficient cause are presupposed as existing, while on the contrary the end, prior indeed by nature, but to be effected or attained through intermediate motion, exists only intentionally. But this too must be understood in the existential order. The actuality of subject and place and cause is presupposed; the actuality of the boundary follows; thence the last adage can be expressed: this is moved, therefore it tends toward a perfection to be actuated, which during motion intentionally exists.
All these formulas establish a necessary relation between actualities, just like the first principle of Descartes: “I think, therefore I am, or exist.” They also, like the Cartesian formula, indicate the process according to which the human mind detects these principles. In all it is also established in similar fashion: the antecedent of the immediate illation expressed by such a formula is prior in our cognition; its consequent is that which is ontologically prior (even in adage 4 regarding the end).
This priority relative to our cognition is expressed more explicitly (but less vigorously) through the formulas: “because I know that this is moved, therefore I know that this exists.” And so on. This Descartes also already applies in his principle.
As we said, these formulas result from specially instituted noetic analysis. But the truths themselves that they express are present in the human mind, and are affirmed, and applied, and justified, independently of such specially instituted analysis. Then they are expressed in another way; for example, the first: “non-being cannot be moved” or in a positive way: “what is moved, is a being” (Aristotle describes this as commonly admitted). Thence noetic analysis does nothing other than reduce these truths from actus exercitus into actus signatus.
The formulas therefore have this in common, that that which is known by us first, is ontologically posterior. And in this they differ, as was noted above, from those first principles that regard essential, quidditative relations. So the principle “this is extended, therefore figurable.” There “figurability,” which is attributed to the extended entity as a proper attribute, flows from “extension,” and is posterior to it both “by nature” and “in cognition.” Perhaps the difference found here between quidditative principles and existential principles will be universal; but to affirm that we do not venture. The things we have seen seem to demand an examination of such relations, both in noetics and in metaphysics, where they seem to be too much neglected. Certain other matters we briefly sketch here.
§ 5. Certain Other Existential Relations¶
From the things described above, certain other necessary existential relations result [14].
We saw: 1) the notion of “place” becomes known to us from the motion of translation; then from this very actuality, which is motion, there is understood the actuality, existence, of that which is place; 2) after the notion of place and its nature is acquired, we arrive, with Aristotle and St. Thomas, at the notion of “where” (« ubi »), even for a resting body, and at the adage “this is somewhere, therefore (it is and) place is.” Or it is said: “things that are not, are not anywhere.” “To be somewhere” is a predication in the line of existence [15].
But from the analysis of those things regarding “where” we find that besides two existing entities, place and that to be placed, there is required contact of the located with place, that it may be verified: “it is there.” This contact is a determination in the pure line of existence. In the line of quiddity it is certainly supposed that place and the located are extended, but otherwise nothing. The contact itself that is moreover required is purely existential. And it is a variable determination, for the located can be now in this place, then in another.
In similar fashion there results not only the “presence” of two bodies to each other, but also the distance of things in nature. For distance there are required two existing bodies that touch a third intermediate existing extended entity. These things are treated at length and breadth in Cosmologia, where there is also established the adage: from such a twofold contact among three existing entities there results not only real distance, but also immediately results; this we called the principle of the immediate (or instantaneous) resultant of distance [16].
If these things are examined more accurately, a new relation is detected, hitherto not yet formulated, among these elements. We were saying: from contact between two existing extended entities arises “presence.” But we were supposing (and implicitly this we always fully understand) that these two existing entities simultaneously exist, that is, simultaneously in duration, “in time.” If one exists actually after the other, that “local” contact cannot arise. Thence these existences must be given simultaneously in duration, and this is (by nature) pre*supposed, prior to local contact, and indeed *necessarily.
In similar fashion in the case of distance. There are not only supposed three existing extended entities, but there is necessarily presupposed also: that these three exist simultaneously in duration, even those two that are distant, even if their distance is enormous. This is not something that we know from experience alone; it is something that we intuitively understand. This we understand so well that we do not think it necessary that this be explicitly enunciated; the understanding is present in actu exercito, not in actu signato. And thus we find a necessary relation between two “accidental esse”: “to be in place” (or “to be distant”) on the one hand, and “to be simultaneously in time” on the other hand; and simultaneity in time is necessarily prerequired that the other “accidental esse” may be given. (Concerning how the order among durations, “to be simultaneous” or “to be one after another,” arises from the sole inception of the existences of bodies, see Gregorianum, 1953, pp. 6–16).
These things follow even in the doctrine of localization held by the author of the theory of relativity, Einstein [17]. For he himself establishes that local relations among bodies are nothing other than relations of mutual contact. And the same is always admitted in the calculations of mechanics, which consider bodies and their situations and motions in a coordinate system; parts of this coordinate space are touched by bodies placed and moved there; exactly as occurs in our spatial imagination, as occurs in the ether of Lorentz: from these contacts locations arise there, and distances are (tacitly) supposed to arise immediately, without an interval of time. Whoever holds such an origin of local relations supposes (at least tacitly) the existence of place and located, and indeed the simultaneous existence even of those that are distant, according to the things expounded above. In the places cited above we already concluded that Einstein, in his denial of the objectivity of simultaneity in distant things, deviates from this correct explanation of his of the origin of local relations.
Now we add: from the same theory of localization, which implicitly contains the principle of the simultaneous existence of those things that are in contact with parts of this “space,” other statements of Einstein are also excluded. For he says that the notion of simultaneity is primitive only relative to our sensible perceptions themselves. In his theory of localization there is implicated the notion of the simultaneity of objects (not of their perceptions alone), both those present and those absent; and indeed as a primitive notion. (Cf. the article cited above from Gregorianum, 1953).
Bodies therefore (and events in them) cannot be distant unless (by nature) they first exist simultaneously. This principle of simultaneous coexistence we can express in a similar mode as the principles expounded above, saying:
These two bodies have a local relation (whether of presence or of distance), therefore they exist simultaneously.
Local relations are existential relations, like the relation of simultaneity in time. And the local relation necessarily presupposes the temporal relation. The relation of simultaneity, however, uniquely depends upon the inception of the existence of individual bodies (see the article recently cited).
We were saying that in this case there is found a necessary relation between two “accidental esse,” namely “to be in place” on the one hand, and “to be simultaneously in time” on the other. In local relations themselves we can already indicate another such relation. That “accidental esse” which is “to be in place” not only presupposes, as was already said above, the “substantial esse” of the things touching each other, but moreover supposes that those objects, bodies, are actually extended. We think (with very many Scholastics) that this “to be extended” is an accidental existential act, distinct from the existence of the body itself. And because, as was said, that contact (or “to be in place,” presence or distance) may be possible, an actually extended body is required, therefore this accidental esse which is “to be extended” is necessarily prerequired. And this is another necessary relation between two accidental existential acts.
A universal relation between existential acts we already described in our work Théorie du jugement (ch. X, § 5). There the way is described according to which St. Thomas seems to establish the conditions under which the testimony of our senses is justified, which report the actual existence of objects concerning whose objectivity (possible existence) it is already intellectively established. There the adage of Aristotle and St. Thomas is employed, which is briefly enunciated in their words ποιοῦντες γιγνώσκουσιν, facientes cognoscunt (“by making they know”; Metaph. IX, 1051a32, St. Thomas, lect. 10, no. 1894) [18].
Such is the structure of the decisive element in this doctrine. In the nature of things there are very many proper attributes of bodies whose objectivity is already intellectively known, from necessary, understood, quidditative relations; concerning their actuality it is not yet therefore established. And moreover there is thus known to us the nature of diverse actions that we can exercise upon such bodies, and the effects of these actions. Such an action we can exercise in our representation, upon represented objects; but an actual action only upon actual matter, whose existence is presupposed. The actuality of action, however, we know through reflection upon those things that are “present in the soul.” Thence, just as in actual “cogito” we detect actual “sum,” in an existing accident the existence of substance, so in the actuality of action upon external things we detect the actuality of this matter. It is again a necessary relation between the actuality we experience and the existence of another object. This relation we previously expressed in this way (op. cit., p. 300; 2nd ed., p. 296; English trans., p. 251): “I make, therefore the matter of the factible thing is present” (« facio ergo materia rei factibilis adest »).
For many particulars we refer to the same work. As was already said, St. Thomas in such a manner seems to justify universally our cognition of the actuality of external objects, perhaps Aristotle too. It is certain that both, even Aristotle, apply the truth expressed in our adage to distinguish a perception worthy of the name from an illusion (see op. cit.).
And in this case too, as in the cases examined above, the necessary relation is between an actuality known to us first, and another that is prior by nature, and is attained in it [19].
§ 6. Aristotle on the Existential Act¶
Frequently we read that Aristotle excessively neglects, indeed almost does not recognize, the act of existing; and the same is said of the Greek commentators; but that seems to be erroneous. True it certainly is that St. Thomas, on the occasion of the data of revelation, greatly developed this doctrine; but he developed those things that were present in Aristotle, and not merely in germ.
That that opinion is erroneous, both for Aristotle himself and for the commentators, already follows from what we wrote previously concerning purely existential acts that we encountered in establishing cosmology from its foundations [20].
These things are confirmed from what we saw above, in which Aristotle expounded first principles regarding modes of being themselves, and established nexuses between these actualities. In these cases, where a necessary relation—and indeed of determinate “direction”—is established between motion and its subject, between motion and its efficient cause, between local motion and its condition, that is, place, this relation holds and is enunciated primarily of actualities themselves, of acts of being themselves and their modes of being. This we were also finding in the adage that expresses the principle of Descartes, and that describes its origin: in that, or from that, which we perceive that we sense and understand, we understand that we are.
These things are also enunciated by Aristotle in the text to which we already alluded above (Physica VIII, c. 1, 251a8–16) and are premised by him as universally admitted principles from which subsequently one can safely reason. And that is decisive in his reasoning that then, from line 16, follows.
In that place (line 10) he asserts as a principle: ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ὑπάρχειν τὰ πράγματα τὰ δυνάμενα κινεῖσθαι καθ᾽ ἑκάστην κίνησιν. That is derived from his definition of motion (Book III), but, as he then asserts, independently of his analysis is commonly admitted. Things, πράγματα, that are mobile by motion strictly so called, must actually be present, ὑπάρχειν, that they may be moved; so the alterable for alteration, the mobile according to place for local motion; one specific instance is named: and “the combustible before it is burned,” καυστὸν εἶναι πρὶν κάεσθαι; but there he adds also that the thing that is the efficient cause of combustion, καυστικὸν πρὶν κάειν, must be; not only must the combustible exist, but also the burner. And each (at least by nature) before combustion; and this priority is established not for essences, quiddities alone, but for existences; for he needs this as a necessary element for the argumentation that immediately begins. There without doubt relations between existential acts themselves are established [21].
Let us attend further to one thing that is not without moment. Aristotle here (as elsewhere and always implicitly) has in mind concrete cases in which he reads those existential relations; not singular concrete cases, but concrete with quidditative data, such as local motion, or alteration, or (even more concretely) combustion. The same holds, although not explicitly said, of subjects with their quidditative determinations. But in this concretion he reads intuitively the relation that joins two actualities to each other; it is an abstractive intuition worthy of the name, just as we have when in a concrete body we know that its divisibility through figure flows uniquely and necessarily from the attribute that we call “extension,” indeed can so define it, as was already indicated above. In a similar process therefore, in an object specifically, quidditatively concrete that is moved by specific motion, we detect the nexus between two existential acts, with the necessity of this relation (its intelligibility), between the existential act of the substantial object (the mobile) and the accidental act that is continuous successive becoming; thus we know also the diversity between these two “modes of being.” Thus (as in “cogito ergo sum,” or “we understand that we understand, and therefore we understand that we are”) we detect the notions of substance and accident, as diverse modes of being—in itself and in another—through abstraction from the quidditative concrete; so according to the well-known deduction of the categories of St. Thomas, we detect the diversity among diverse modes of “being in another” from modes quidditatively diverse of predicating.
Finally, where the question is raised concerning the care that Aristotle had in investigating acts of existence, immediately we think of his “metaphysics of mutability,” which is the answer to the metaphysics of the all-embracing immutability of being of Parmenides. And it is not, like mechanism, a partial answer, but total and peremptory. It seeks the answer to the question how something can be changed, that is, become, that is, arrive at an existence that it does not have.
It must certainly be said: in the specific solution of the problem, or problems, regard must be had to quidditative data. These alone were regarded by the ancients; after Parmenides it had to be inquired how the constitution of a being that can become, as such, can be intelligible. Regard must be had therefore to quidditative data, almost as in the problem of place (cf. what was said above) the answer to the question πῶς ἔστιν is not found except after the answer to τί ἐστιν.
In solving these questions there is not only found the notion of “potency of being,” but there must also be investigated the twofold function (quidditative and existential) of “material form” [22]. And that this is most difficult is historically evident. And there the greatest difficulty is in the second function, whence it must be understood how material forms are and become, what their “modes of being” are. And this question is regarded by Aristotle himself.
By the way let it be noted in this context: in constructing science, and in judging its nature, consideration of both functions of form, that which regards quiddities, and that which regards the “esse” of these quiddities, will even now be necessary; but, so far as I know, this distinction is never considered, or rather never explicitly, in actu signato, enunciated. The duty of investigating quidditative data falls to those which today are called “physical sciences” by excellence; the duty of natural philosophy will be to deduce from these data how objects are beings, and how they become. Let this be said not only relative to substances, but also to those things that regard accidents, qualities, and others. But let both not be perfectly separated, nor can that, as is historically established, be done, on account of the continuity found between diverse sciences.
And here we approach the ultimate problem that in this investigation ought at least to be outlined, the problem that regards the mode by which we know existential acts. The data of the solution are already contained in what was expounded above.
§ 7. On the Concept of Being Itself (De conceptu ipsius esse)¶
In the things expounded above we were detecting that diverse necessary relations (habitudes, as St. Thomas says) are given not only between quiddities, but also between existential acts, and indeed as direct connections between them. The former are often called relations between concepts (and between the things they represent); of the others, as such, scarcely or not even scarcely is discourse accustomed to be made. Can these relations, as known by us, also be called habitudes between concepts? The likenesses that (simultaneously with dissimilarity) are present between specimens of both classes seem to intimate this.
Yet for some years past a certain opposition has been established between “existentialistic metaphysics” and “essentialistic metaphysics” (the prior is said to be the metaphysics of St. Thomas), and indeed such that in the prior the possibility of a “concept” of esse itself must be denied, “esse” itself would not be “conceptualizable.” This position has its origin from two books of the most celebrated E. Gilson [23], who most acutely, in an exposition both historical and systematic, describes this opposition between the two metaphysics. And many things surely in that exposition are to be praised; but there is danger lest the relations between “esse” and “quiddity” be excessively dissolved. Especially because there is present a certain obscurity, which Gilson himself describes as « un centre d’obscurité qu’il nous faut traverser pour atteindre l’existence » (L'être et l'essence, p. 248). Thence greater light to illuminate this center of darkness is desired. The things expounded above can contribute to this.
Let us begin from the question whether “ipsum esse” is “conceptualizable”; and indeed especially in the doctrine of St. Thomas, which is primarily treated.
The term “concept” today is often restricted to the first operation of our mind, and its “word”; we ourselves have done this. In St. Thomas, however, the terms “conceptus,” “conceptum,” “conceptio” occur (the last perhaps more frequently) to indicate also the second operation of the mind and its “interior word” [24].
In De Potentia, q. 8, a. 1, he establishes the distinction of the “conception of the intellect” a) from the “thing understood,” b) “from the intelligible species by which the intellect is made in act,” c) “from the action of the intellect,” of which it is the “term” and “as it were a certain thing constituted by it.” And this conception is found not only in the first operation of the intellect, but also in the second: “for the intellect by its action forms the definition of a thing, or also an affirmative or negative proposition. This conception of the intellect in us, however, is properly called a word.” Cf. ibid., q. 9, a. 5, where, in both cases, this word is called this “conceptum” or “conceptus”; cf. also De Veritate, q. 4, a. 2.
That conception is said also of judgment is evident also from the term “common conceptions of the soul” which he borrows from Boethius, and which embraces both primitive notions and primitive judgments, which is often employed. And these common conceptions of the soul can be “known through themselves,” whether to all or to the learned alone. It is the well-known doctrine of St. Thomas.
The difference, however, between the nature of both operations of the mind can be enunciated thus: the first operation regards quiddity, the second regards esse [25], which correspond to “quiddity” and “to be” (to exist) found in things; and indeed in such a way that judgment adds nothing quidditative to the “disposition of the thing” (from the first operation) that it affirms. Concerning “disposition of the thing,” a technical term in St. Thomas, cf. op. cit., ch. II, § 5.
Thence it is clear that that “conception of the mind,” which is had in judgment, as a constitutive element through which alone it is distinguished from the word of the first operation, contains the affirmation of “esse” itself. And in this sense at least, in the terminology of St. Thomas, “esse” is “conceptualizable.” And this conception must be presupposed so that those judgments can be formed that affirm relations between existential acts, diverse modes of being.
But there is also another difference between the sense that St. Thomas attributes to the term “concept” and that which many moderns at least seem to attribute to it. For these only employ the term for the notion of an external thing, not for the cognition (even without affirmation) of those things “which are in our soul.” And for these authors conceptual cognition seems to be of lesser value, is nothing other than the concept of a “thing,” « d’une chose », of an “object.” And they forget the love toward the senses that, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas (Metaph. I, 1), every man has, or ought to have, toward the senses, also because they are the fountain of science, even abstract, even metaphysical.
But according to St. Thomas even the cognition of those things that are in the soul (whether antecedently or consequently to affirmation) and that are known, not through a “species” but through “presence” or through “essence,” produces a word, a conception of the mind. So in the places cited above (De Pot. 8, 1; 9, 5; De Ver. 4, 2). Let one text suffice here (De Pot. 9, 5): “and as to this it does not differ whether the intellect understands itself or something other than itself.” And most familiar is the doctrine of St. Thomas, according to which the intellect, like other potencies, is known from its acts, and indeed so that both the nature of the acts and of the potencies is known; this holds of the act that attributes “esse,” of judgment, from whose presence we understand its nature, by an apprehensive concept, a word of the first operation of the mind. And this second doctrine is also most familiar, which teaches: other natural intellective cognition in the human mind is not given, except that which is expressed through the interior word. So therefore we understand conceptually “esse” itself, at least as constitutive of the apprehensive conception of the nature of judgment.
But it can be asked whether “ipsum esse” through itself alone, abstracted from the quidditative disposition to which in affirmation it is attributed, whether, I say, this “esse” can be conceived by the mind.
Many propositions concerning this “ipsum esse” are enunciated; as we saw above, principles are also enunciated that assert relations between diverse “esse.” In these propositions the conception of “ipsum esse” seems to be presupposed, or at least detected. Let us take an example from De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9 (concerning this place immediately more). There the term “esse” is described: “this that I say (that is, call) esse”; and such “utterances,” as is rather often said (this is taken from the "principle of Perihermeneias"), “signify” conceptions of the intellect. We read therefore loc. cit.: “this that I call esse is among all things the most perfect” … “this that I call esse is the actuality of all acts and on account of this is the perfection of perfections,” etc.
In such propositions the term “esse” (“this that I call esse”) is the subject and is thus employed as a “noun.” Concerning such a subject it is said in general (Peri Herm. I, lect. 5, no. 5): “verbs of the infinitive mood, when placed in the subject, have the force of a noun”; and the conception that is signified through such a term pertains to the first operation of the mind, simple apprehension. He who utters a noun, or a verb according to itself, “constitutes the intellect as to the first operation, which is the simple conception of something” (ibid., no. 17). In reality there is admitted a conception of esse itself, abstracted from quiddity, as a certain notion. This notion certainly can only be apprehended after the intellect in a preceding affirmation has affirmed a determinate disposition of the thing.
This conception is also called the “ratio essendi,” cognition of which is denied to the senses, although they perceive sensible things that are (Sent. I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6). And it arises through abstraction worthy of the name. So in Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3, where the principle is expounded “our intellect can consider in abstraction that which it knows in concretion,” it is elucidated thus: our intellect is accustomed to do this for form which is in matter, and the angelic intellect for the esse of its essence. Then it is universally affirmed that “the created intellect by its nature is born to apprehend concrete form and concrete esse in abstraction through the mode of a certain resolution.” Therefore in ST I, q. 75, a. 6 concerning the human intellect it is said: “the intellect (in opposition to the senses) apprehends absolute esse, and according to all time.” The words underlined by us describe an apprehensive conception of the notion of abstract esse itself.
Such conceptions of diverse modes of being, abstracted from quidditative content, seem to be present and required in individual affirmations of relations of which we spoke above. And now let us re-read one text already cited above (p. 253) (from In IX Metaph., lect. 3, no. 1805) which treats of motion as actuality first known:
“For since names are signs of intelligible conceptions, we first imposed names upon those things which we first understand, although they be posterior according to the order of nature. Among other acts, however, motion is especially known and apparent to us, which is sensibly seen by us. And therefore upon it there was first imposed the name act, and from motion it was derived to other things. (1806) And on account of this, being moved is not attributed to non-existing things.”
The concept of “ipsum esse,” even non-concrete, seems to be fully recognized. But not therefore must it be said that that concept contains anything quidditative, even as a constitutive element, in itself; it remains in an order that is diverse from the quidditative order. And a metaphysics that attributes quidditative content to this concept is deservedly carped at for “essentialism.” With Brentano it must be said: to affirm, which is “to attribute esse,” remains fundamentally diverse from representation (« Vorstellung »); they pertain to diverse “fundamental classes” [26].
Can a “definition” be given of this concept of “ipsum esse”? If someone asks “what is esse,” this utterance “what” can regard “quiddity,” and then the question can be excluded from the threshold; it has no meaning, no quidditative element is included there. But there is no need that it be so understood; this can be the intention of the questioner: what is the sense of this term and this concept; or: what is the mode of arriving at this apprehensive concept, at understanding this abstract “esse” itself; and then it is legitimately posed.
Concerning those who always demand a “definition” that something may be understood, it is said (Gilson, L'être et l'essence, p. 284) that they are led by « la raison raisonnante toujours en quête de définitions »; and deservedly they are criticized. That cannot even be demanded where quiddities are treated. St. Thomas says (Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3), treating of the “rationes” of the attributes of God: “ratio as here assumed is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends of the signification of some name, and this in those things that have a definition is the definition itself, according as the Philosopher says ‘the ratio that a name signifies is its definition.’ But certain things are said to have a ratio so called, which are not defined, such as quantity and quality and things of this kind, which are not defined, because they are most general genera.” But these have a “ratio” (which is equivalent to a definition in definable things), and this is “that which the intellect apprehends.” So however it also apprehends “absolute esse,” or abstract, or the “ratio essendi,” cognition of which is denied to the senses. In such a case the response to the question “what is that” ought to be excited in determinate cases, through operations of the mind in which this ratio is apprehended.
How therefore do we arrive at the understanding of “esse” itself? We do not detect this “esse” except in judging; the first operation regards quiddity, the second operation regards esse. Judgment says “so it is in reality” (« ita est in re »); the word “so” (« ita ») contains the quidditative “disposition of the thing,” to which in judgment “esse” is attributed; judgment adds nothing new quidditative to this disposition, but only “esse.” What therefore is “esse”? It is answered: that which in affirmative judgment is attributed to the apprehended disposition.
This “esse” we already detect, and its “ratio” then conceive, in first principles known through themselves that treat of quiddities and their necessary relations. And this “esse” is the “esse” of realism, which in such a manner can be “defined” [27], “esse that does not depend upon the activity of our sense or intellect, which remains if we do not think concerning that thing,” that which St. Thomas expresses by saying “so it is in reality.” Here is the sense of the word “esse,” and if we wish to elucidate it more (Gilson examines several historical attempts) from that which is opposed to this sense, it must be said: the opposite is not “nothing,” nor is it “that which is not outside causes,” but is: “that which we only represent to ourselves in this way,” or “which only is thus in apprehension.” And in the same work we noted that the recognition of this “esse” is demanded before (at least by nature) every judgment concerning contingent matter by St. Thomas (op. cit., pp. 148, 267–268; 2nd ed., pp. 145, 264–265; English trans., pp. 132, 224–225). Where quidditative relations are treated, from the reflection that detects this “esse” of realism, we know only that actual esse “belongs” to this disposition, not that it also exercises it. To justify this there is required further reflection, or a series of ordered reflections, concerning which we treat at length and breadth in the cited work (chs. IX–XI). One genus of “actual esse” we easily detect even in exercise; this regards “those things that are in the soul”; such as that which is expressed through “I think, therefore I am” in its Thomistic sense as well (ibid., ch. XII).
And again it must be observed: all these things are not detected in these universal formulas by which we describe them, but only in concrete, determinate cases, through a certain intuitive abstraction. And this is not so accomplished that we first abstract notions and then compare them, but in the apprehended (determinate) complex we understand the nexus between the two, whose “rationes” we thus abstract [28].
If we consider these things in diverse cases, we find judgments and consequently “esse” of diverse values, which have this alone in common, that they arise in a certain reflection of our mind upon its “accepted,” “represented,” “apprehended” data. As was already said, among these reflections a certain necessary order is given, whence one can only be developed after another. And this diversity in reflections and in the judgments to which they lead implies a diversity in modes of being [29].
For diverse modes of being are given, and as diverse are understood by us. They have this in common, that these modes of being in themselves contain nothing quidditative; affirmation and the “esse” that it attributes to the complex apprehended entity remain in an order fundamentally diverse from the quidditative order. Quidditative things are said “to be,” but through an “esse” distinct from them, and “esse” themselves are not, but to them the quidditative belongs.
How therefore are modes of being diverse; and whence does diversity arise? They are diverse, not through differences added to a common mark, but by their whole selves (seipsis totis).
Note. If terms are strictly employed (which is not always done), those things that are not the same are called different if determined through differences that are distinguished from that to be determined; they are called diverse if by their whole selves, not through something distinct to be added, they are not the same. This terminology is derived from Aristotle's exposition in Metaphysics X, 3, 1054b23–26 (cf. St. Thomas, lect. 4, no. 2017 ff.) and also V, 9, 1018a9–14 (St. Thomas, lect. 12, no. 916); so loc. cit., no. 2017 we read: “two things of which one is diverse from the other, need not be diverse through something. For they can be diverse by themselves.”
Elsewhere too this distinction frequently recurs. Where he treats of “modes of being,” St. Thomas always, so far as I know, employs the term “diverse,” and indeed strictly, for according to their whole selves they are not the same if one is not the other.
But then the question must be posed: whence does this diversity proceed? And it must be answered: from quiddities, or quidditative relations, whose “esse” is affirmed in judgment. Let us recall the passage cited above (De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9) where it is said: “This that I call esse is the actuality of all acts.” Thence it cannot be further determined through another added act; thence “esse is not so determined by another as potency by act, but rather as act by potency.” Therefore diversity between modes of being does not (as in things differing quidditatively) arise from an added act, but from the potency to which esse itself is added, that is, from the quiddity or quidditative relations that through esse are actuated [30].
And then St. Thomas finds this mode of determining act through the potency of which it is the act also in forms, that is, in quidditative acts defined through “proper matter” in place of difference. And he concludes: “through this mode this esse is distinguished from that esse insofar as it is of such or such a nature.” (In the last word, “nature” is not a constitutive of esse itself, but is the nature that through esse is actuated) [31].
The diversity of “modes of being” proceeds therefore from quiddities. And therefore again it must be urged: “esse” is not to be separated from essentials; connections are given between both orders, of essence and existence, in reality and in our cognition, which first understands quiddities, and in them and from them esse itself, according to its diverse modes. There is not therefore “essentialism,” reprobated by St. Thomas, in the doctrine that admits that modes of being, existential acts, are so determined through quiddities as act by potency.
And so it is no wonder that St. Thomas according to these principles constructs the system of Aristotelian categories (In III Phys., lect. 5, In V Metaph., lect. 9), or the “division of being” into genera; for being is not divided “univocally as a genus into species, but according to diverse modes of being” (In Phys., loc. cit.). And the directing principle is: “modes of being are proportional to modes of predicating” (ibid.); which is established consequently upon the theory of the general nature of judgment (cf. Théorie du jugement, pp. 69–70; 2nd ed., pp. 68–69; English trans., pp. 61–62). The categories are those into which being is first divided (In Metaph., loc. cit., no. 290), but then further division can be made to modes of being further determined. And those things that are predicated “signify” quidditative entities.
In this construction also, as is clear, there is detected the division into substance and accident, according to the diversity of modes of being, which are “esse in se” and “esse in alio.” And in investigating this diversity, there present themselves certain of the relations between existential acts of which we were treating above.
But others also in this construction are described by St. Thomas; these regard those categories that are denominations, that is, “concretive predications,” drawn from a certain existing reality extrinsic to that of which it is predicated. And among these are found real categories that in their own proper genus require no quiddity, and consequently, in mutation according to these categories, lose no such quidditative reality or acquire a new one, but consist uniquely in diverse modes of being, real certainly. In these categories themselves, diverse modes of being, more determinate, are found and understood. So in “where” (« ubi ») a body, through contact with another and another place, acquires diverse modes of being; now this diversity is purely numerical, and as such is perfectly understood. (Concerning these we treat abundantly in our Cosmologia, in the treatise on "ubi" and on "motion," and in the corresponding notes at the end of the work; these seem to have metaphysical moment). In these cases many Thomists, besides diverse real modes of being, demand moreover something quidditative, intrinsic to the things actuated by these modes of being. This quiddity, however, is superfluous, nor can it be found. That seems to be a consequence of “essentialistic metaphysics.” And the expositions of the celebrated Gilson help to eliminate this. But it must certainly be said: these require the recognition of the mode of being of accidents, which are certainly acts of the substantial subject, but distinct from substantial esse itself.
In these divisions of being we find those connections between existential acts of which this study treats; these divisions in them we fully understand. For they regard relations between “esse per se” and “esse in alio,” between place and the located, between the existence of the effect and the existence of the efficient cause, which regard the categories of action and passion. Concerning temporal relations there was above no explicit discourse, but these were presupposed in individual cases. The terms whose “esse” are recognized as connected in these existential relations are understood to have to exist simultaneously, in individual cases; these temporal relations seem to be most fundamental.
Additions¶
To these brief remarks we were obliged to restrict our exposition relative to “essentialistic” and “existentialistic” metaphysics. Certain other points, in even briefer discourse, we add here.
Among modes of being there are certain ones that have proper attributes analogous to certain proper attributes of essences. Motion strictly so called, whether local motion or alteration, is an existential act, and indeed a fluent esse. This esse has an extension strictly so called, continuous but fluent. This extension, successive duration, follows (say Aristotle, Phys. IV, 11, 219a11, and St. Thomas, lect. 17) magnitude, the permanent quidditative extension of the body, but independently of it can be varied. It is the extension of the existential act itself. This is even more clearly evident in the motion of alteration, whose fluent extension does not presuppose spatial extension in the body, but only intensities, something qualitative. But its duration is extension strictly so called, that is, it has all properties of quantity: parts can be added and subtracted, multiplied and divided [32].
That existential act has therefore, in its own order, proper attributes similar to proper attributes of quidditative extension. But discrepancies are also present. And it is clear that the modern construction of a four-dimensional extension, of which one dimension would be homogeneous with the other three, has no real meaning; on account of the diversity of order. In calculations certainly this construction can be employed.
There is also another something in motion that is analogous to a quidditative proper attribute, just as duration is analogous to permanent extension. And it is its velocity, which itself belongs to first intelligibles. For velocity is in motion what intensity is in quality. Thence it proceeded that mechanism was able to hold its explanation of qualities through local motion alone as true; in the velocity of motion there is had that analogue of intensity that apparently could save phenomena that finally have explanation only in the intensity of qualities.
Thence another proper attribute in motion, even in motion of alteration, follows. This velocity can be varied, in the same motion; in one part of its duration it can be other than in another part. And among these variations of the greatest moment are those that have a periodic, oscillatory structure. It is a variation in fluent esse itself that corresponds (according to De Potentia 7, 2, ad 9) to that quidditative entity of which it is the fluent esse. Its principle was already considered in the Middle Ages by Nicole Oresme [33], who recognizes the analogy between the intensity of a permanent quality and the velocity of motion, whether local or of alteration; and constructs “configurations according to temporal duration,” that is, in fluent esse itself, and thus admits qualities of their own kind, structural, in this fluent esse, which are analogous to heterogeneous permanent extended entities.
Such periodic, oscillatory structures are found in sounds. St. Thomas (In II de Anima, lect. 16) with Aristotle holds that sound, in opposition to other proper sensibles, does not have a “fixed and resting esse in the subject.” Thence sound in act has a fluent esse, and according to variation in this esse, that is, according to one velocity and another, diverse qualities in sound arise.
The same today is to be applied to rays of light according to their colors. Every motion has unity from the end, and these motions in light (qualitative certainly) seem to have their own unity also relative to their diverse “configuration.” Which has expression in the modern theory of “photons.” Concerning these cf. the passage cited from Cosmologia, 4th ed., pp. 516 ff. All these things seem to invite metaphysicians themselves to further investigation.
Permanent qualities (other than sound in act and a ray of light) are diversified also from diverse modes of being that they admit. Their greater and lesser intensity seems to depend upon the mode by which they are, that is, are in the subject in a more or less perfect mode. And the corresponding perfection is then found in the very essence of the quality, not in the essence specifically taken—this remains the same—but in the intensity of this specifically determinate quality. So, unless I am mistaken, the famous “hard” text of St. Thomas (ST II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 3) is to be understood.
But besides these modes of being, stable acts more or less perfect, such qualities admit also fluent acts of being, motions of alteration (with their velocities) through which (under the influx of the efficient cause) intensity becomes more perfect (or less perfect). The relation between the quidditative order and the existential order here seems to be intelligible and clear.
From existential acts there can also flow structures in things that imitate essences. Thus through existential contact between two existing continuous entities (it is contact whence “where” flows) there arises an aggregate, one per accidens, which is an intelligible imitation of the continuous, that is, of that which has intrinsic, per se, essential unity, in which parts are only beings in potency, whose total (continuous) extension results not from a mode of being (contact) but from an intrinsic quidditative form, quantity. This imitation can be so perfect that it is most difficult to decide what in such a case is realized. Indeed theoretically it is so great that in the history of philosophy, from this likeness, the famous antinomies of the continuum arose. Descartes (in conversation with Burman, Oeuvres, ed. Adam & Tannery, V, p. 164) denies all difference between both cases.
We add: similar imitations arise where, for accidental unity, in the existential order, physical forces also cooperate, and the difficulty of deciding between both cases can be maximal, as is evident from cosmology.
In all these matters there seems to be present abundant occasion, from concrete cases (according to the constant method of St. Thomas), to inquire into the relations between essences and modes of being, so that to each order its own may be attributed.