Pasch, Peano, and the Serial Definition of Betweenness

Descriptive Geometry (§§ 374–380, pp. 393–399)

§ 374. Distinction between projective and descriptive geometry

f. §374 · p. p. 393

374. The subject which I have called descriptive Geometry is not, as a rule, sharply distinguished from projective Geometry. These two terms, and the term “Geometry of Position,” are commonly used as synonyms. But it seems improper to include in projective Geometry any property which is not unaltered by projection, and it is by the introduction of one such property that I wish to define the subject of the present chapter. We have seen that, in projective space, three points on a line are not such that a definite one of them is between the other two. The simplest possible proposition involving between, in projective Geometry, requires four points, and is as follows: “If a, b, c be distinct collinear points, and d is on ac, but does not belong to the segment (abc), nor yet coincide with a or c, then, with regard to the order abc, c is between b and d.” When we reflect that the definition of the segment (abc) involves the quadrilateral construction—which demands, for its proof, a point outside its own plane, and four pairs of triangles in perspective—we shall admit that the projective method of generating order is somewhat complicated. But at any rate the ordinal propositions which result are unaltered by projection. The elementary sense of between, on the contrary, which is to be introduced in the present chapter, is in general not unaltered by projection [1].

In descriptive Geometry, we start, as before, with points, and as before, any two points determine a class of points. But this class now consists only of the points between the two given points. What is to be understood by between is not explained by any writer on this subject except Vailati, in terms of a transitive asymmetrical relation of two points; and Vailati’s explanation is condemned by Peano [2], on the ground that between is a relation of three points, not of two only. This ground, as we know from Part IV, is inadequate and even irrelevant. But on the subject of relations, even the best mathematicians go astray, for want, I think, of familiarity with the Logic of Relations. In the present case, as in that of projective Geometry, we may start either with a relation of two points, or with a relation between a pair and a class of points: either method is equally legitimate, and leads to the same results, but the former is far simpler. Let us examine first the method of Pasch and Peano, then that of Vailati.

§ 375. Method of Pasch and Peano

f. §375 · p. p. 394

375. We start, in the former method, with two indefinables, point, and between. If a, b, c be three points, and c is between a and b, we say that c is an ab, or belongs to the class of points ab. Professor Peano has enumerated, with his usual care, the postulates required as regards the class ab [3]. In the first place, the points a and b must be distinct, and when they are so, there always is a point between them. If c is between a and b, it is also between b and a: a itself (and therefore b) is not between a and b. We now introduce a new definition. If a, b be any two distinct points, then $a'$b is the class of all points c such that b is between a and c. Similarly $b'$a will be the class of points d such that a is between b and d. We then proceed to new postulates. If a and b be distinct points, $a'$b must contain at least one point. If a, b, c, d be points, and c is between a and d, b between a and c, then b is between a and d. If b and c be between a and d, b is between a and c, or identical with c, or between c and d. If c, d belong to $a'$b, then either c and d are identical, or c is between b and d, or d is between b and c. If b is between a and c, and c is between b and d, then c is between a and d. This makes in all nine postulates with regard to between. Peano confesses [4] that he is unable to prove that all of them are independent: hence they are only shown to be sufficient, not necessary. The complete straight line (ab) is defined as $b'$a and a and ab and b and $a'$b; that is, (1) points between which and b the point a lies; (2) the point a; (3) points between a and b; (4) the point b; (5) points between which and a the point b lies.

Concerning this method, we may observe to begin with that it is very complicated. In the second place, we must remark, as before, that the phrase “two points determine a class of points” must be expanded as follows: “There is a certain specific relation K, to whose domain belongs every couple of distinct points. K is a many-one relation, and the relatum, corresponding to a couple of points as referent, is a class of points.” In the third place, we may observe that the points of the line only acquire order by relation to the segments which they terminate, and that these acquire order by the relation of whole and part, or logical inclusion. Let a, b be any two points, and consider the class of points ab or b or $a'$b. Let c, d be any two distinct points of this class. Then either ac is a proper part of ad, or ad is a proper part of ac. Here ac and ad may be called segments, and we see that segments whose origin is a and whose limits belong to ab or b or $a'$b form a series in virtue of the transitive asymmetrical relation of whole and part. By correlation with these segments, their extremities also acquire an order; and it is easy to prove that this order is unchanged when we substitute for a any point of $ab'$. But the order still results, as it always must, from a transitive asymmetrical relation of two terms, and nothing is gained by not admitting such a relation immediately between points.

§ 376. Method employing serial relations

f. §376 · p. p. 395

376. Passing now to what I have called Vailati’s theory, we find a very great simplification. We may state the present theory (which is not in every detail identical with that of Vailati) as follows. There is a certain class, which we will call K, of transitive asymmetrical relations. Between any two points there is one and only one relation of the class K. If R be a relation of the class K, $\breve{R}$ is also a relation of this class. Every such relation R defines a straight line; that is, if a, b be two points such that aRb, then a belongs to the straight line ρ. (I use the corresponding Greek letter to denote the domain of a relation; thus if S be a relation, σ is the class of terms having the relation S to some term or other.) If aRb, then there is some point c such that aRc and cRb; also there is a point d such that bRd. Further, if a, b be any two distinct points belonging to ρ, then either aRb or bRa. With this apparatus we have all that we require.

We may do well to enumerate formally the above definition of the class K, or rather the postulates concerning its members—for K itself is not defined. I may remark to begin with that I define the field of a class of relations as the logical sum of the fields of the constituent relations; and that, if K be the class, I denote its field by k. Then the axioms we require are as follows.

(1) There is a class of relations K, whose field is defined to be the class point.

(2) There is at least one point.

If R be any term of K we have,

(3) R is an aliorelative.

(4) $\breve{R}$ is a term of K.

(5) $R^{2}$ = R.

(6) $\breve{\rho}$ (the domain of $\breve{R}$) is contained in ρ.

(7) Between any two points there is one and only one relation of the class K.

(8) If a, b be points of ρ, then either aRb or bRa.

The mutual independence of these axioms is easy to see. But let us first briefly sketch the proof that they give all the required results. Since there is, by (2), at least one point, and since by (1) this point has some relation of the class K, and since by (3) all relations of the class K are aliorelatives, it follows that there is some term, other than the one point, to which this one point has a relation R of the class K. But since $\breve{R}$, by (4), is a relation of the class K, it follows that the term to which the one point is so related is also a point. Hence there are at least two distinct points. Let a, b be two distinct points, and let R be the one relation of the class K between a and b. Thus we have aRb. But we do not have bRa, for if we did, since $R^{2}$ = R, by (5), we should have aRa, which contradicts (3). Thus R and $\breve{R}$ are always different, i.e. each is asymmetrical. Since $R^{2}$ = R, aRb and bRc imply aRc, i.e. R is transitive. Hence the points which have to a the relation R or $\breve{R}$, together with a itself, form a series. Since R = $R^{2}$, aRb implies that there is some point c such that aRc, cRb; i.e. the series generated by R is compact. Since, by (6), $\breve{\rho}$ is contained in ρ, aRb implies that there is some point c such that bRc. Applying the same argument to $\breve{R}$, there is a point d such that dRa. Thus we have ρ = $\breve{\rho}$, and the field of R has no beginning or end. By (8), the field of R is what, in Part IV, we called a connected series, that is, it does not fall apart into two or more detached portions, but of any two of its terms one is before and the other after. By (7), if there be more than one relation of the class K, the fields of two such relations cannot, unless one is the converse of the other, have more than one point in common. The field of one relation of the class K is called a straight line; and thus (7) assures us that two straight lines have at most one common point, while (8) assures us that, if ab, cd be the same line, so are ac and bd. Thus it is proved that our axioms are sufficient for the geometry of a line, while (7) goes beyond a single line, but is inserted here because it does not imply the existence of points outside a single line, or of more than one relation of the class K. It is most important to observe that, in the above enumeration of fundamentals, there is only one indefinable, namely K, not two as in Peano’s system.

§ 377. Mutual independence of axioms

f. §377 · p. p. 396

377. With regard to the mutual independence of the axioms, it is to be observed that (1) is not properly an axiom, but the assumption of our indefinable K. (2) may obviously be denied while all the others are maintained. If (3) be denied, and R be taken to be the symmetrical relation of projective Geometry, together with identity with some term of ρ, we obtain projective Geometry, which is different from the present system, but self-consistent. If (4) be denied, all the rest can be maintained; the only difficulty is as regards (7), for if aRb, and $\breve{R}$ is not a term of K, b will not have to a any relation of the class K, unless indeed it has one which is not $\breve{R}$, which seems to be not contradictory. As regards (5), we may deny either that R is contained in $R^{2}$, or that $R^{2}$ is contained in R. To deny the former makes our series not compact, to which there is no logical objection. The latter, but not the former, is false as regards angles [5], which can be made to satisfy all the other axioms here laid down. (6) will become false if our lines have last terms: thus the space on the left of a plane, together with this plane, will satisfy all the axioms except (6). As regards (7), it is plainly independent of all the rest; it consists of two parts, (a) the assertion that between any two points there is at least one relation of the class K, (b) the assertion that there is not more than one such relation between two given points. If we consider a Euclidean and a hyperbolic space together, all the axioms will be true except (a). If we combine two different classes $K_{1}$, $K_{2}$ of relations of the above kind, such that $k_{1}$ = $k_{2}$, (b) alone will be false. Nevertheless it seems plain that (b) cannot be deduced from the other axioms. As regards (8), it alone is false if we take for K the class of directions in Euclidean space, in which a set of parallel lines all have the same direction. Thus the necessity of all except one of our axioms is strictly proved, and that of this one is highly probable.

§ 378. Logical definition of the class of descriptive spaces

f. §378 · p. p. 397

378. We saw that the above method enabled us to content ourselves with one indefinable, namely the class of relations K. But we may go further, and dispense altogether with indefinables. The axioms concerning the class K were all capable of statement in terms of the logic of relations. Hence we can define a class C of classes of relations, such that every member of C is a class of relations satisfying our axioms. The axioms then become parts of a definition, and we have neither indefinables nor axioms. If K be any member of the class C, and k be the field of K, then k is a descriptive space, and every term of k is a descriptive point. Here every concept is defined in terms of general logical concepts. The same method can be applied to projective space, or to any other mathematical entity except the indefinables of logic. This is, indeed, though grammatically inconvenient, the true way, philosophically speaking, to define mathematical notions. Outside logic, indefinables and primitive propositions are not required by pure mathematics, and should therefore, strictly speaking, not be introduced. This subject will be resumed in Chapter xlix.

§ 379. Parts of straight lines

f. §379 · p. p. 397

379. The two ways of defining the straight line—that of Pasch and Peano, and that which I have just explained—seem equally legitimate, and lead to the same consequences. The choice between them is therefore of no mathematical importance. The two methods agree in enabling us, in terms of two points only, to define three parts of a straight line, namely the part before a ($b'$a), the part between a and b (ab), and the part after b ($a'$b). This is a point in which descriptive Geometry differs from projective Geometry: there we had, with respect to a and b, only two segments of the straight line ab, and these could not be defined without reference to another point c of the line, and to the quadrilateral construction.

The straight line may be regarded either as the class of points forming the field of a relation R, or as this relation itself. For the sake of distinction, it will be well to call the relation R a ray, since this word suggests a sense; $\breve{R}$ will then be the opposite ray. In considering a number of lines all passing through one point O, it will be well to give the name of ray also to the class of points to which O has some relation R, i.e. to those points of a line through O which lie on one side of O. Those on the other side of O will then be the opposite ray. The context will show in which sense the word is used.

§ 380. Definition of the plane

f. §380 · p. p. 398

380. I come now to the plane. Easy as it is to define the plane in projective space, its definition when the line is not a closed series, or rather, when we wish to call coplanar some pairs of lines which do not intersect, is a matter of some difficulty. Pasch [6] takes the plane, or rather a finite portion of the plane, as a new indefinable. It is, however, capable of definition, as, following Peano, I shall now show.

We need, to begin with, some new axioms. First, if ρ be any straight line, there is at least one point not belonging to ρ. Next, if a, b, c be three points not in one straight line, and d be a point of bc between b and c, e a point of ad between a and d, then be will meet ac in a point f and e will be between b and f, f between a and c. Again, a, b, c, d being as before, if y be a point between a and c, then ad and bf will intersect in a point e between a and d and between b and f [7]. We now define what may be regarded as the product (in a geometrical sense) of a point and a figure. If a be any point, and k any figure, ak is to denote the points which lie on the various segments between a and the points of k. That is, if p be any point of k, and x any point of the segment ap, then x belongs to the class ak. This definition may be applied even when a is a point of k, and x is a straight line or part of one. The figure ak will then be the whole line or some continuous portion of it. Peano now proves, by purely logical transformations, that, if a, b, c be distinct non-collinear points, a(bc) = b(ac). This figure is called the triangle abc, and is thus wholly determined by its three defining points. It is also shown that, if p, q be points of the segments ab, ac respectively, the segment pq is wholly contained in the triangle abc. After some more theorems, we come to a new definition. If a be a point, and k any figure (i.e. class of points), $a'$k is to denote all the points between which and a lies some point of k, that is, as Peano remarks, the whole shadow of k if a be an illuminated point. Thus if a, b, c be non-collinear points, $a'$(bc) will represent the class of points beyond bc and bounded by ab, ac produced. This enables us to define the plane (abc) as consisting of the straight lines bc, ca, ab, the triangle abc, and the figures $a'$bc, $b'$ca, $c'$ab, $b'c'$a, $c'a'$b, $a'b'$c [8]. It is then easy to show that any other three points of the plane define the same plane, and that the line joining two points of a plane lies wholly in the plane. But in place of the proposition that any two lines in a plane intersect, we have a more complicated proposition, namely: If a, b, c, d be coplanar points, no three of which are collinear, then either the lines ab, cd intersect, or ac, bd do so, or ad, bc do so.

Footnotes