Complex Numbers and Spatial Coordinate Systems

Dimensions and Complex Numbers (§§ 356–360, pp. 375–380)

§ 356. The definition of dimensions is purely logical

f. §356 · p. p. 376

356. There are very many ways of generating multiple series, as there are of generating simple series. The discussion of these various ways is not, however, of great importance, since it would follow closely the discussion of Part IV, Chapter xxiv. Instances will meet us in the course of our examination of the various Geometries; and this examination will give opportunities of testing our definition of dimensions. For the present, it is only important to observe that dimensions, like order and continuity, are defined in purely abstract terms, without any reference to actual space. Thus when we say that space has three dimensions, we are not merely attributing to it an idea which can only be obtained from space, but we are effecting part of the actual logical analysis of space. This will appear more clearly from the applicability of dimensions to complex numbers, to which we must now turn our attention.

§ 357. Complex numbers and universal algebra

f. §357 · p. p. 376

357. The theory of imaginaries was formerly considered a very important branch of mathematical philosophy, but it has lost its philosophical importance by ceasing to be controversial. The examination of imaginaries led, on the Continent, to the Theory of Functions—a subject which, in spite of its overwhelming mathematical importance, appears to have little interest for the philosopher. But among ourselves the same examination took a more abstract direction: it led to an examination of the principles of symbolism, the formal laws of addition and multiplication, and the general nature of a Calculus. Hence arose a freer spirit towards ordinary Algebra, and the possibility of regarding it (like ordinary Geometry) as one species of a genus. This was the guiding spirit of Sir William Hamilton, De Morgan, Jevons and Peirce—to whom, as regards the result, though not as regards the motive, we must add Boole and Grassmann. Hence the philosophy of imaginaries became merged in the far wider and more interesting problems of Universal Algebra [1]. These problems cannot, in my opinion, be dealt with by starting with the genus, and asking ourselves: what are the essential principles of any Calculus? It is necessary to adopt a more inductive method, and examine the various species one by one. The mathematical portion of this task has been admirably performed by Mr Whitehead: the philosophical portion is attempted in the present work. The possibility of a deductive Universal Algebra is often based upon a supposed principle of the Permanence of Form. Thus it is said, for example, that complex numbers must, in virtue of this principle, obey the same laws of addition and multiplication as real numbers obey. But as a matter of fact there is no such principle. In Universal Algebra, our symbols of operation, such as + and ×, are variables, the hypothesis of any one Algebra being that these symbols obey certain prescribed rules. In order that such an Algebra should be important, it is necessary that there should be at least one instance in which the suggested rules of operation are verified. But even this restriction does not enable us to make any general formal statement as to all possible rules of operation. The principle of the Permanence of Form, therefore, must be regarded as simply a mistake: other operations than arithmetical addition may have some or all of its formal properties, but operations can easily be suggested which lack some or all of these properties.

§ 358. Algebraical generalization of number

f. §358 · p. p. 377

358. Complex numbers first appeared in mathematics through the algebraical generalization of number. The principle of this generalization is the following: Given some class of numbers, it is required that numbers should be discovered or invented which will render soluble any equation in one variable, whose coefficients are chosen from the said class of numbers. Starting with positive integers, this method leads at once, by means of simple equations alone, to all rational numbers positive and negative. Equations of finite degrees will give all the so-called algebraic numbers, but to obtain transcendent numbers, such as e and π, we need equations which are not of any finite degree. In this respect the algebraical generalization is very inferior to the arithmetical, since the latter gives all irrationals by a uniform method, whereas the former, strictly speaking, will give only the algebraic numbers. But with regard to complex numbers, the matter is otherwise. No arithmetical problem leads to these, and they are wholly incapable of arithmetical definition. But the attempt to solve such equations as of $x^{2}$ + 1 = 0, or $x^{2}$ + x + 1 = 0, at once demands a new class of numbers, since, in the whole domain of real numbers, none can be found to satisfy these equations. To meet such cases, the algebraical generalization defined new numbers by means of the equations whose roots they were. It showed that, assuming these new numbers to obey the usual laws of multiplication, each of them fell into two parts, one real, the other the product of some real number and a fixed number of the new kind. This fixed number could be chosen arbitrarily, and was always taken to be one of the square roots of −1. Numbers thus composed of two parts were called complex numbers, and it was shown that no algebraic operation upon them could lead to any new class of numbers. What is still more remarkable, it was proved that any further generalization must lead to numbers disobeying some of the formal laws of Arithmetic [2]. But the algebraical generalization was wholly unable (as it was, in truth, at every previous stage) to prove that there are such entities as those which it postulated. If the said equations have roots, then the roots have such and such properties; this is all that the algebraical method allows us to infer. There is, however, no law of nature to the effect that every equation must have a root; on the contrary, it is quite essential to be able to point out actual entities which do have the properties demanded by the algebraical generalization.

§ 359. Definition of complex numbers

f. §359 · p. p. 378

359. The discovery of such entities is only to be obtained by means of the theory of dimensions. Ordinary complex numbers form a series of two dimensions of a certain type, which happen to occur as roots of equations in which the coefficients are real. Complex numbers of a higher order represent a certain type of n-dimensional series, but here there is no algebraical problem concerning real numbers which they are required to solve. As a matter of fact, however, the algebraical generalization, as we have seen, does not tell us what our new entities are, nor whether they are entities at all: moreover it encourages the erroneous view that complex numbers whose imaginary part vanishes are real numbers. This error is analogous to that of supposing that some real numbers are rational, some rationals integral, and positive integers identical with signless integers. All the above errors having been exposed at length, the reader will probably be willing to admit the corresponding error in the present case. No complex number, then, is a real number, but each is a term in some multiple series. It is not worth while to examine specially the usual two-dimensional complex numbers, whose claims, as we have seen, are purely technical. I shall therefore proceed at once to systems with n units. I shall give first the usual purely formal definition [3], then the logical objections to this definition, and then the definition which I propose to substitute.

Let n different entities, $e_{1}$, $e_{2}$, …… $e_{n}$, which we may call elements or units, be given; and let each be capable of association with any real number, or, in special cases, with any rational or any integer. In this way let entities $\alpha_{r}e_{r}$ arise, where $\alpha_{r}$ is a number, and $\alpha_{r}e_{r}$ differs from $\alpha_{s}e_{s}$ unless r = s and $\alpha_{r}$ = $\alpha_{s}$. That is, if either the numerical or the non-numerical parts of $\alpha_{r}e_{r}$ and $\alpha_{s}e_{s}$ be different, then the wholes are different. Further, let there be a way of combining $\alpha_{1}e_{1}$, $\alpha_{2}e_{2}$, …, $\alpha_{n}e_{n}$, for each set of values $\alpha_{1}$, $\alpha_{2}$, …, $\alpha_{n}$ to form a new entity. (The class whose members are $\alpha_{1}e_{1}$, $\alpha_{2}e_{2}$, …, $\alpha_{n}e_{n}$ will be such an entity.) Then the combination, which may be written as

a = $\alpha_{1}e_{1}$ + $\alpha_{2}e_{2}$ + $\alpha_{3}e_{3}$ + … + $\alpha_{n}e_{n}$,

is a complex number of the nth order. The arrangement of the component terms $\alpha_{1}e_{1}$, $\alpha_{2}e_{2}$, …, $\alpha_{n}e_{n}$ may or may not be essential to the definition; but the only thing always essential is, that the combination should be such that a difference in any one or more of the numbers $\alpha_{1}$, $\alpha_{2}$, …, $\alpha_{n}$ insures a difference in the resulting complex number.

§ 360. Remarks on the definition

f. §360 · p. p. 379

360. The above definition suffers from the defect that it does not point out any one entity which is the complex number defined by a set of real numbers. Given two real numbers, a, b, the two complex numbers a + ib, b + ia are determinate; and it is desirable that such determinateness should appear in the general definition of complex numbers of any order. But the e’s in the above definition are variables, and the suggested complex number is only determinate when the e’s are specified as well as the α’s. Where, as in metrical Geometry or in the Dynamics of a finite system of particles, there are important meanings for the e’s, we may find that complex numbers in the above sense are important. But no special interpretation can give us the complex number associated with a given set of real numbers. We might take as the complex number the class of all such entities as the above for all possible values of the e’s; but such a class would be too general to serve our purposes. A better method seems to be the following.

We wish a complex number of the nth order to be specified by the enumeration of n real numbers in a certain order, i.e. by the numbers $\alpha_{1}$, $\alpha_{2}$, … $\alpha_{n}$, where the order is indicated by the suffix. But we cannot define a complex number as a series of n real numbers, because the same real number may recur, i.e. $\alpha_{r}$ and $\alpha_{s}$ need not be different whenever r and s are different. Thus what defines a real number is a one-many relation whose domain consists of real numbers and whose converse domain consists of the first n integers (or, in the case of a complex number of infinite order, of all the integers); for the suffix in $\alpha_{r}$, indicates correlation with the integer r. Such one-many relations may be defined to be the complex numbers, and in this way a purely arithmetical definition is obtained. The n-dimensional series of complex numbers of order n results from arranging all complex numbers which differ only as to (say) $\alpha_{r}$ in the order of the real numbers which are $\alpha_{r}$ in the various cases.

In order that complex numbers in the sense defined by Stolz should have any importance, there must be some motive for considering assemblages of terms selected out of continua. Such a motive exists in a metrical space of n dimensions, owing to a circumstance which is essential to the utility, though not to the definition, of complex numbers. Let a collection of entities (points) be given, each of which has to each of the entities $e_{1}$, $e_{2}$, … $e_{n}$ a numerically measurable relation (distance), and let each be uniquely defined by the n relations which it has to $e_{1}$, $e_{2}$, … $e_{n}$. Then the complex number a will represent one of this collection of entities, and the elements $e_{1}$, $e_{2}$, … $e_{n}$ will themselves be terms of the collection [4]. Thus there is a motive for considering the numbers a, which in the general case is practically absent [5]. But what is essential to observe, and what applies equally to the usual complex numbers of Algebra, is this: our numbers are not purely arithmetical, but involve essential reference to a plurality of dimensions. Thus we have definitely passed beyond the domain of Arithmetic, and this was my reason for postponing the consideration of complex numbers to this late stage.

Footnotes