Logical Constants, Variables, and Relation to Pure Logic¶
Definition of Pure Mathematics (§§ 6–10, pp. 5–9)
§ 6. And employs variables¶
f. pom-§6 · p. p. 56. Mathematical propositions are not only characterized by the fact that they assert implications, but also by the fact that they contain variables. The notion of the variable is one of the most difficult with which Logic has to deal, and in the present work a satisfactory theory as to its nature, in spite of much discussion, will hardly be found. For the present, I only wish to make it plain that there are variables in all mathematical propositions, even where at first sight they might seem to be absent. Elementary Arithmetic might be thought to form an exception: 1 + 1 = 2 appears neither to contain variables nor to assert an implication. But as a matter of fact, as will be shown in Part II, the true meaning of this proposition is: “If x is one and y is one, and x differs from y, then x and y are two.” And this proposition both contains variables and asserts an implication. We shall find always, in all mathematical propositions, that the words any or some occur; and these words are the marks of a variable and a formal implication. Thus the above proposition may be expressed in the form: “Any unit and any other unit are two units.” The typical proposition of mathematics is of the form “φ(x, y, z, …) implies ψ(x, y, z, …), whatever values x, y, z, … may have”; where φ(x, y, z, …) and ψ(x, y, z, …), for every set of values of x, y, z, …, are propositions. It is not asserted that φ is always true, nor yet that ψ is always true, but merely that, in all cases, when φ is false as much as when φ is true, ψ follows from it.
The distinction between a variable and a constant is somewhat obscured by mathematical usage. It is customary, for example, to speak of parameters as in some sense constants, but this is a usage which we shall have to reject. A constant is to be something absolutely definite, concerning which there is no ambiguity whatever. Thus 1, 2, 3, e, π, Socrates, are constants; and so are man, and the human race, past, present and future, considered collectively. Proposition, implication, class, etc. are constants; but a proposition, any proposition, some proposition, are not constants, for these phrases do not denote one definite object. And thus what are called parameters are simply variables. Take, for example, the equation ax + by + c = 0, considered as the equation to a straight line in a plane. Here we say that x and y are variables, while a, b, c are constants. But unless we are dealing with one absolutely particular line, say the line from a particular point in London to a particular point in Cambridge, our a, b, c are not definite numbers, but stand for any numbers, and are thus also variables. And in Geometry nobody does deal with actual particular lines; we always discuss any line. The point is that we collect the various couples x, y into classes of classes, each class being defined as those couples that have a certain fixed relation to one triad (a, b, c). But from class to class, a, b, c also vary, and are therefore properly variables.
§ 7. Which may have any value without exception¶
f. pom-§7 · p. p. 67. It is customary in mathematics to regard our variables as restricted to certain classes: in Arithmetic, for instance, they are supposed to stand for numbers. But this only means that if they stand for numbers, they satisfy some formula, i.e. the hypothesis that they are numbers implies the formula. This, then, is what is really asserted, and in this proposition it is no longer necessary that our variables should be numbers: the implication holds equally when they are not so. Thus, for example, the proposition “x and y are numbers implies (x + y)$^{2}$ = $x^{2}$ + 2xy + $y^{2}$” holds equally if for x and y we substitute Socrates and Plato [1]: both hypothesis and consequent, in this case, will be false, but the implication will still be true. Thus in every proposition of pure mathematics, when fully stated, the variables have an absolutely unrestricted field: any conceivable entity may be substituted for any one of our variables without impairing the truth of our proposition.
§ 8. Mathematics deals with types of relations¶
f. pom-§8 · p. p. 78. We can now understand why the constants in mathematics are to be restricted to logical constants in the sense defined above. The process of transforming constants in a proposition into variables leads to what is called generalization, and gives us, as it were, the formal essence of a proposition. Mathematics is interested exclusively in types of propositions; if a proposition p containing only constants be proposed, and for a certain one of its terms we imagine others to be successively substituted, the result will in general be sometimes true and sometimes false. Thus, for example, we have “Socrates is a man”; here we turn Socrates into a variable, and consider “x is a man.” Some hypotheses as to x, for example, “x is a Greek,” insure the truth of “x is a man”; thus “x is a Greek” implies “x is a man,” and this holds for all values of x. But the statement is not one of pure mathematics, because it depends upon the particular nature of Greek and man. We may, however, vary these too, and obtain: If a and b are classes, and a is contained in b, then “x is an a” implies “x is a b.” Here at last we have a proposition of pure mathematics, containing three variables and the constants class, contained in, and those involved in the notion of formal implications with variables. So long as any term in our proposition can be turned into a variable, our proposition can be generalized; and so long as this is possible, it is the business of mathematics to do it. If there are several chains of deduction which differ only as to the meaning of the symbols, so that propositions symbolically identical become capable of several interpretations, the proper course, mathematically, is to form the class of meanings which may attach to the symbols, and to assert that the formula in question follows from the hypothesis that the symbols belong to the class in question. In this way, symbols which stood for constants become transformed into variables, and new constants are substituted, consisting of classes to which the old constants belong. Cases of such generalization are so frequent that many will occur at once to every mathematician, and innumerable instances will be given in the present work. Whenever two sets of terms have mutual relations of the same type, the same form of deduction will apply to both. For example, the mutual relations of points in a Euclidean plane are of the same type as those of the complex numbers; hence plane geometry, considered as a branch of pure mathematics, ought not to decide whether its variables are points or complex numbers or some other set of entities having the same type of mutual relations. Speaking generally, we ought to deal, in every branch of mathematics, with any class of entities whose mutual relations are of a specified type; thus the class, as well as the particular term considered, becomes a variable, and the only true constants are the types of relations and what they involve. Now a type of relation is to mean, in this discussion, a class of relations characterized by the above formal identity of the deductions possible in regard to the various members of the class; and hence a type of relations, as will appear more fully hereafter, if not already evident, is always a class definable in terms of logical constants [2]. We may therefore define a type of relations as a class of relations defined by some property definable in terms of logical constants alone.
§ 9. Applied mathematics is defined by the occurrence of constants which are not logical¶
f. pom-§9 · p. p. 89. Thus pure mathematics must contain no indefinables except logical constants, and consequently no premisses, or indemonstrable propositions, but such as are concerned exclusively with logical constants and with variables. It is precisely this that distinguishes pure from applied mathematics. In applied mathematics, results which have been shown by pure mathematics to follow from some hypothesis as to the variable are actually asserted of some constant satisfying the hypothesis in question. Thus terms which were variables become constant, and a new premiss is always required, namely: this particular entity satisfies the hypothesis in question. Thus for example Euclidean Geometry, as a branch of pure mathematics, consists wholly of propositions having the hypothesis “S is a Euclidean space.” If we go on to: “The space that exists is Euclidean,” this enables us to assert of the space that exists the consequents of all the hypotheticals constituting Euclidean Geometry, where now the variable S is replaced by the constant actual space. But by this step we pass from pure to applied mathematics.
§ 10. Relation of mathematics to logic¶
f. pom-§10 · p. p. 810. The connection of mathematics with logic, according to the above account, is exceedingly close. The fact that all mathematical constants are logical constants, and that all the premisses of mathematics are concerned with these, gives, I believe, the precise statement of what philosophers have meant in asserting that mathematics is à priori. The fact is that, when once the apparatus of logic has been accepted, all mathematics necessarily follows. The logical constants themselves are to be defined only by enumeration, for they are so fundamental that all the properties by which the class of them might be defined presuppose some terms of the class. But practically, the method of discovering the logical constants is the analysis of symbolic logic, which will be the business of the following chapters. The distinction of mathematics from logic is very arbitrary, but if a distinction is desired, it may be made as follows. Logic consists of the premisses of mathematics, together with all other propositions which are concerned exclusively with logical constants and with variables but do not fulfil the above definition of mathematics (§1). Mathematics consists of all the consequences of the above premisses which assert formal implications containing variables, together with such of the premisses themselves as have these marks. Thus some of the premisses of mathematics, e.g. the principle of the syllogism, “if p implies q and q implies r, then p implies r,” will belong to mathematics, while others, such as “implication is a relation,” will belong to logic but not to mathematics. But for the desire to adhere to usage, we might identify mathematics and logic, and define either as the class of propositions containing only variables and logical constants; but respect for tradition leads me rather to adhere to the above distinction, while recognizing that certain propositions belong to both sciences.
From what has now been said, the reader will perceive that the present work has to fulfil two objects, first, to show that all mathematics follows from symbolic logic, and secondly to discover, as far as possible, what are the principles of symbolic logic itself. The first of these objects will be pursued in the following Parts, while the second belongs to Part I. And first of all, as a preliminary to a critical analysis, it will be necessary to give an outline of Symbolic Logic considered simply as a branch of mathematics. This will occupy the following chapter.
Footnotes