PART V — COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS AND SYSTEMATIC WORKS¶
On the Intelligible Circle, Geometric Discovery by Division in Act, the Twofold Operation of the Intellect, and the Act of Being
Source Work: Sententia super Metaphysicam, Summa Theologiae, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia et de Veritate (c. 1256–1273) · Switch to Diplomatic Latin · Summary · GEOMETOR Notes
Metaphysics Book V, Lecture 9 — On the Division of Per Se Being into Ten Categories and Being Signified by Propositional Judgment¶
Latin Locus: Metaph. V, lect. 9 · Commentary: Notes on Metaph. V, lect. 9
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 1 · Marietti #885] Here the Philosopher distinguishes in how many ways being is spoken of. And concerning this he does three things. First, he divides being into being per se and being per accidens. Second, he distinguishes the modes of being per accidens, where he says, According to accident indeed, and so forth. Third, the modes of being per se, where he says, According to itself, however. He says, therefore, that one kind of being is spoken of according to itself, and another according to accident. Yet it must be known that this division of being is not the same as that division whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he afterward divides being according to itself into the ten categories, nine of which belong to the genus of accident. Being, therefore, is divided into substance and accident according to the absolute consideration of being, just as whiteness itself considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But being according to accident, as it is taken here, must be grasped by comparing the accident to the substance. And this comparison is signified by the verb is, when it is said, “a man is white.” Hence this whole, “a man is white,” is a being per accidens. Thus it is clear that the division of being according to itself and according to accident is taken according as something is predicated of something either per se or per accidens. The division of being into substance and accident, however, is taken according to the fact that something in its own nature is either a substance or an accident.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 2 · Marietti #886] Next, when he says, According to accident, he shows in how many ways being per accidens is spoken of; and he says that it is spoken of in three ways: the first of which is when an accident is predicated of an accident, as when it is said, “the just is musical.” The second is when an accident is predicated of a subject, as when it is said, “the man is musical.” The third is when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when it is said, “the musical is a man.” And because he has already shown above how a cause per accidens differs from a cause per se, he therefore now consequently makes manifest being per accidens through a cause per accidens.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 3 · Marietti #887] And he says that just as in assigning a cause per accidens we say that the musical builds, because being musical happens to belong to the builder, or conversely—for it is evident that for this to be this, that is, for the musical to build, signifies nothing else than for this to happen to belong to this—so it is also in the aforesaid modes of being per accidens, when we say that a man is musical, predicating an accident of a subject; or that the musical is a man, predicating a subject of an accident; or that the white is musical, or conversely, namely that the musical is white, predicating an accident of an accident. For in all these cases, to be signifies nothing else than to happen to belong. The one indeed, namely when an accident is predicated of an accident, signifies that both accidents happen to belong to the same subject; the other, however, namely when an accident is predicated of a subject, is said to be because to a being, that is, to the subject, the accident happens to belong. Yet we say that the musical is a man because to this, namely to the predicate, there happens to belong the musical, which is placed in the subject. And there is, as it were, a similar account of predication when a subject is predicated of an accident and when an accident is predicated of an accident. For just as a subject is predicated of an accident for the reason that the subject is predicated of that to which the accident placed in the subject happens to belong, so too an accident is predicated of an accident because it is predicated of the subject of the accident. And on account of this, just as it is said, “the musical is a man,” similarly the musical is said to be white, namely because that to which it happens to be musical—that is, the subject—is white.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 4 · Marietti #888] It is clear, therefore, that those things which are said to be according to accident are spoken of in a threefold way: either because both, namely the subject and the predicate, are in the same thing, as when an accident is predicated of an accident; or because that, namely the predicate, such as musical, is in a being, that is, in the subject that is said to be musical, and this is when an accident is predicated of a subject; or because that, namely the subject placed in the predicate, is that in which the accident is present, of which accident that, namely the subject, is predicated. And this, namely, is when the subject is predicated of an accident, as when we say, “the musical is a man.”
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 5 · Marietti #889] Next, when he says, According to itself, he distinguishes the mode of being per se; and concerning this he does three things. First, he divides being that is outside the soul by the ten categories, which is perfect being. Second, he sets down another mode of being, according as it exists only in the mind, where he says, Moreover, to be also signifies. Third, he divides being by potency and act; and being thus divided is more common than perfect being, for being in potency is being only in a qualified sense (secundum quid) and imperfect, where he says, Moreover, to be and being signify. First, therefore, he says that all those things are said to be according to themselves which signify the figures of predication. For it must be known that being cannot be contracted to something determinate in the way in which a genus is contracted to species through differences. For a difference, since it does not participate in the genus, lies outside the essence of the genus. Nothing, however, could lie outside the essence of being so as to constitute some species of being by addition to being; for what is outside being is nothing, and cannot be a difference. Hence in the third book of this work the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 6 · Marietti #890] Hence it is necessary that being be contracted to diverse genera according to a diverse mode of predicating, which follows upon a diverse mode of being; because as many times as being is spoken of, that is, in as many ways as something is predicated, so many times is to be signified, that is, in so many ways is something signified to be. And on account of this, those things into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished according to a diverse mode of predicating. Since, therefore, among the things that are predicated, some signify what a thing is, that is, substance, some of what quality, some how much, and so on with the rest, it is necessary that for each mode of predicating, to be should signify the same: as when it is said, “man is an animal,” to be signifies substance; whereas when it is said, “man is white,” it signifies quality, and so on with the rest.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 7 · Marietti #891] For it must be known that a predicate can stand in a threefold relation to a subject. In one way, when it is that which the subject is, as when I say, “Socrates is an animal.” For Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, which is the particular substance of which all things are predicated.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 8 · Marietti #892] In a second way, according as the predicate is taken from what is in the subject: and this predicate is in it either per se and absolutely as following upon matter, and thus it is quantity; or as following upon form, and thus it is quality; or it is in it not absolutely, but with respect to another, and thus it is relation (ad aliquid). In a third way, according as the predicate is taken from what lies outside the subject, and this in two ways. In one way, so that it lies altogether outside the subject: and if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of habit (habitus), as when it is said, “Socrates is shod or clothed.” If, however, it is a measure of it, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the category is taken either on the part of time, and thus it will be when; or from place, and thus it will be where when the order of parts in place is not considered, whereas when that order is considered it will be position (situs). In another way, so that that from which the category is taken is in some respect in the subject of which it is predicated. And if indeed this is according to its principle, thus it is predicated as acting (agere), for the principle of action is in the subject. If, however, it is according to its term, thus it will be predicated as undergoing (pati), for passion terminates in the undergoing subject.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 9 · Marietti #893] Because, however, certain things are predicated in which the verb is is not manifestly added—lest it be believed that those predications do not pertain to the predication of being, as when it is said, “a man walks”—he therefore consequently removes this doubt, saying that in all such predications something is signified to be. For every verb is resolved into this verb is and a participle. For it makes no difference to say, “a man is recovering,” and “a man recovers,” and so on with the rest. Hence it is clear that in as many ways as predication occurs, in so many ways is being spoken of.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 10 · Marietti #894] Nor is what \ Avicenna says true, namely that predicates belonging to the genera of accident signify substance principally and accident secondarily, such as what I call white and musical. For white, as is said in the Categories, signifies quality alone. Now this name white signifies a subject consequently, inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the manner of an accident. Hence it must consequently include a subject in its notion, for the being of an accident is to be in (inesse). For although whiteness signifies an accident, yet it does so not after the manner of an accident, but after the manner of a substance, and hence it in no way consignifies a subject. For if white principally signified a subject, then accidental predicates would not be placed by the Philosopher under being according to itself, but under being according to accident. For this whole, “a white man,” is a being according to accident, as has been said.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 11 · Marietti #895] Next, when he says, Moreover, however, he sets down another mode of being, according as to be and is signify the composition of a proposition, which the intellect makes in composing and dividing. Hence he says that to be signifies the truth of a thing; or, as another translation better has it, that to be signifies that some statement is true. Thus the truth of a proposition can be called the truth of a thing through its cause; for according as a thing is or is not, speech is true or false. For when we say that something is, we signify that a proposition is true; and when we say that it is not, we signify that it is not true, and this whether in affirming or in negating. In affirming indeed, as we say that Socrates is white, because this is true; in negating, however, as “Socrates is not white,” because this is true, namely his being non-white. And similarly we say that the diagonal is not incommensurable with the side of the square, because this is false, namely for it not to be non-commensurable.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 12 · Marietti #896] Now it must be known that this second mode is related to the first as effect to cause. For from the fact that something exists in the nature of things, there follows truth and falsity in the proposition, which the intellect signifies by this verb is insofar as it is a verbal copula. Yet because something which in itself is non-being is considered by the intellect as a certain being, such as a negation and the like, therefore to be is sometimes predicated of something in this second mode and not in the first. For blindness is said to be in the second mode, from the fact that the proposition in which something is said to be blind is true; yet it is not said to be true in the first mode. For blindness does not have any being in things, but is rather a privation of some being. Now it is accidental to each thing that something should be truly affirmed of it by the intellect or by the voice; for the thing is not referred to knowledge, but conversely. The being, however, which each thing has in its own nature is substantial. And therefore, when it is said, “Socrates is,” if that is is taken in the first mode, it belongs to a substantial predicate; for being is higher in generality than each individual being, just as animal is with respect to man. If, however, it is taken in the second mode, it belongs to an accidental predicate.
[lib. 5 l. 9 n. 13 · Marietti #897] Next, when he says, Moreover, to be, he sets down the distinction of being by act and potency, saying that being and to be signify something expressible or utterable in potency, or expressible in act. For in all the aforesaid terms that signify the ten categories, something is spoken of in act and something in potency; and from this it comes about that each category is divided by act and potency. And just as among things that exist outside the soul something is spoken of in act and something in potency, so too among the acts of the soul and privations, which are beings of reason alone. For someone is said to know both because he is able to use scientific knowledge and because he actually uses it; and similarly a thing is called resting both because rest is already present in it and because it is able to rest. And this holds not only in accidents, but also in substances. For Mercury, that is, the statue of Mercury, we say is in the stone in potency, and the half of a line is said to be in the line in potency; for every part of a \ continuum exists potentially in the whole. And the line is placed among substances according to the opinion of those who posit that mathematical entities are substances, an opinion he had not yet refuted. Grain too, when it is not yet ripe, as when it is in the blade, is said to be in potency. When, however, something is in potency, and when it is not yet in potency, must be determined elsewhere, namely in the ninth book of this work.
Metaphysics Book VII, Lecture 10 — On Parts of the Form vs. Parts of Matter: Bronze Circle and Mathematical Circle in Intelligible Matter¶
Latin Locus: Metaph. VII, lect. 10 · Commentary: Notes on Metaph. VII, lect. 10
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 1 · Marietti #1482] Because the solution set forth above was not in every respect manifest—for he had not yet shown how parts are prior and posterior, nor again had he distinguished the universal composite from the particular, nor even the species from the form—he therefore here explains in detail the solution set forth above. Now this text is divided into two parts. In the first, he explains the solution set forth above; in the second, he teaches how it is to be applied to the question, where he says, One must meet the interrogation, however. The first is divided into two. First, he solves the question with respect to what was asked concerning the priority of parts; second, with respect to what was asked concerning whether the parts of the thing defined enter into the definition, where he says, But the parts of the formula. The first is divided into two. First, he shows how parts are prior to the whole; second, he makes this manifest by an example, where he says, Since, however. First, therefore, he says that what was stated above in the proposed solution is indeed true in itself, yet must be repeated so that what was said may become more manifest. For it is necessary that the parts of the formula, and those into which the formula is divided, be prior to the thing defined—either all of them or some of them. And this is said because parts of the form sometimes belong not to the necessity of the species, but to its perfection; just as sight and hearing, which are parts of the sensitive soul, do not belong to the integrity or necessity of an animal, for there can be an animal without these senses, yet they belong to the perfection of an animal, because a perfect animal possesses these senses as well. And thus it is universally true that those parts which are placed in the definition of anything are universally prior to it.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 2 · Marietti #1483] Yet an acute angle, although it is a part of a right angle, is nevertheless not placed in its definition, but conversely; for the formula of a right angle is not resolved into the definition of an acute angle, but conversely. For one who defines an acute angle uses the right angle in defining it, since an acute angle is an angle less than a right angle. And it is similar with the circle and the semicircle, which is defined through the circle, for it is the half part of a circle. It is similar also with the finger and man, since man is placed in the definition of a finger; for a finger is defined as being such a part of a man. For it was said above that the parts of the form are parts of the formula, whereas the parts of the matter are not. If, therefore, only the parts of the formula are prior, and not those of the matter, it follows that whatever parts belong to the thing defined as matter—namely that into which the thing defined, as a composite, is resolved as into its material principles—are posterior. Whatever, on the other hand, are parts of the formula and of the substance that is according to the formula, that is, parts of the form from which the intelligible account of the thing is taken, are prior to the whole, either all of them or some of them, for the reason stated above.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 3 · Marietti #1484] Next, when he says, Since, however, he expounds what he had said through examples, saying that since the soul of animals is the substance of the animate being according to the formula, that is, the form of the animate being from which the animate being has its proper intelligible account, it is the substance, that is, the form and species, and the what-it-was-to-be for such a body, namely an organic one. For an organic body cannot be defined except through the soul; and accordingly the soul is called the what-it-was-to-be for such a body.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 4 · Marietti #1485] And that this is true is clear from the fact that if anyone rightly defines a part of any animal whatever, he cannot rightly define it except through its proper operation, as when it is said that the eye is the part of an animal whereby it sees. Now the operation itself of the parts does not exist without sense or motion or the other operations of the parts of the soul. And thus it is necessary that one who defines any part of the body make use of the soul.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 5 · Marietti #1486] And because this is so, it is necessary that its parts—namely those of the soul—be prior, either all of them, as in perfect animals, or some of them, as in imperfect animals, to the whole taken together, that is, to that which is composed of soul and body. And it is similar in each other case, because it is always necessary that the formal parts be prior to any composite whatever.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 6 · Marietti #1487] Yet the body and the parts of the body are posterior to this substance, namely the form, which is the soul, since the soul must be placed in its definition, as has already been said. And that which is divided into the parts of the body as into matter is not the substance itself, that is, the form, but the whole taken together, that is, the composite. It is clear, therefore, that the parts of the body are in a way prior to the whole taken together, that is, to the composite, and in a way not.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 7 · Marietti #1488] They are indeed prior as the simple is to the composite, inasmuch as the composite animal is constituted out of them. Yet they are not prior according to the mode in which that which can exist without another is said to be prior; for the parts of the body cannot exist separated from the animal, since a finger in just any condition whatever is not a finger. For one that is severed or dead is not called a finger except equivocally, like a sculpted or painted finger. Rather, according to this consideration such parts are posterior to the composite animal, because the animal can exist without a finger.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 8 · Marietti #1489] Yet there are certain parts which, although they are not prior to the whole animal by this mode of priority, because they cannot exist without it, are nevertheless simultaneous with it according to this consideration; because just as the parts themselves cannot exist without the whole animal, neither can the whole animal exist without them. Now of this sort are the principal parts of the body, in which the form, namely the soul, primarily resides, such as the heart or the brain; nor does it make any difference to the present point whichever of these be of such a kind.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 9 · Marietti #1490] Yet it must be known that this composite, which is animal or man, can be taken in two ways: either as universal or as singular—as universal indeed, such as man and animal; as singular, such as Socrates and Callias. And therefore he says that man and horse and the things that thus exist in singulars, yet are spoken of universally, such as man and horse, are not substance, that is, are not form alone, but are a certain whole taken together, composed of determinate matter and determinate form—not indeed singularly, but universally. For “man” expresses something composed of soul and body, though not of this soul and this body. The singular, however, expresses something composed of ultimate matter, that is, individual matter; for Socrates is something composed of this soul and this body. And it is similar in other singulars.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 10 · Marietti #1491] Thus, therefore, it is clear that matter is a part of the species—and by “species” here we understand not the form alone, but the what-it-was-to-be. And it is also clear that matter is a part of that whole which is out of the species and matter, that is, of the singular, which signifies the nature of the species in this determinate matter. For matter is a part of the composite, and the composite is both universal and singular.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 11 · Marietti #1492] Next, when he says, But of the formula, he shows which parts ought to be placed in the definition. For since it has been shown which parts belong to the species and which parts belong to the individual—because matter taken in common is a part of the species, whereas this determinate matter is a part of the individual—it is manifest that only those parts are parts of the formula which are parts of the species, and not those which are parts of the individual. For in the definition of man are placed flesh and bone, but not this flesh and this bone; and this is because a definitional formula is assigned only universally.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 12 · Marietti #1493] For since the what-it-was-to-be is the same as that whose what-it-was-to-be it is, as was shown above, there will be a definition—which is the formula signifying the what-it-was-to-be—of that alone which is the same as its what-it-was-to-be. Now of this sort are universals and not singulars. For a circle and what it is to be a circle are the same, and similarly the soul and what it is to be a soul. But of those things themselves that are composed of the species and individual matter, such as this circle or any of the other singulars, there is no definition.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 13 · Marietti #1494] Nor does it make any difference whether the singulars are sensible or intelligible. Sensible singulars, indeed, are such as bronze and wooden circles; intelligible singulars are such as mathematical circles. And that certain singulars are considered in mathematics is clear from this, that many things of one species are considered there, such as several equal lines and several similar figures. Now singulars of this sort are called intelligible according as they are grasped without sense through the phantasy alone, which is sometimes called intellect according to that saying in the third book of De Anima: the passive intellect is corruptible.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 14 · Marietti #1495] Now there is no definition of singular circles for the reason that those things of which there is a definition are known through their definition, whereas singulars are known only while they fall under sense or under the imagination—which is here called “intelligence” (intelligentia), because it considers things without sense, just as the intellect does. Yet when singular circles of this sort depart from act, that is, recede from the actual inspection of sense as regards sensible circles, or of the imagination as regards mathematical circles, it is not manifest whether they exist insofar as they are singulars; nevertheless, they are always spoken of and known through the universal formula. For these sensible circles are known even when they are not actually seen, insofar as they are circles, not insofar as they are these circles.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 15 · Marietti #1496] Now the reason for this is that matter, which is the principle of individuation, is in itself unknown, and is known only through the form, from which the universal notion is taken. And therefore singulars are not known in their absence except through universals. Moreover, matter is the principle of individuation not only in sensible singulars, but also in mathematical entities. For one kind of matter is sensible, and another intelligible. \ Sensible matter, indeed, is such as bronze and wood, or any movable matter whatever, such as fire and water and all things of this sort; and by such matter sensible singulars are individuated. \ Intelligible matter, however, is that which exists in sensible things not insofar as they are sensible, just as mathematical entities exist. For just as the form of man exists in such matter, which is an organic body, so the form of a circle or of a triangle exists in this matter, which is the \ continuum, whether surface or body.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 16 · Marietti #1497] He concludes, therefore, that it has been stated how the matter stands concerning whole and part, and concerning the prior and the posterior, that is, of what a part is a part, and how it is prior and how posterior. For the parts of individual matter are parts of the singular composite, and not of the species nor of the form; whereas the parts of universal matter are parts of the species, though not of the form. And because the universal is defined and not the singular, the parts of individual matter are therefore not placed in the definition, but only the parts of common matter together with the form or the parts of the form.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 17 · Marietti #1498] Next, when he says, To the interrogation, however, he adapts the proposed solution to the question noted earlier, saying that through the aforesaid solution one must meet the interrogation when someone asks whether the right angle and the circle and the animal are prior to their parts, or conversely whether the parts into which such things are divided and out of which they are composed are prior. It must be said that one should not answer unqualifiedly. For there is a twofold opinion: some say that the whole species and the form are the same, as that the soul is the same as man; whereas others say that they are not, because man is a composite of soul and body. And according to each opinion one must answer differently.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 18 · Marietti #1499] For if the soul is the same as the animal or the animate being—or similarly if each thing is the same as the form of each thing, as the circle is the same as the form of the circle, and the right angle the same as the form of the right angle—one must answer by determining what is posterior and to what it is posterior; because on this view the parts of matter are posterior to those things that are in the formula, and are also posterior to a certain right angle, namely the common right angle, yet are prior to the singular right angle. For this right angle that is of bronze exists with sensible matter, and this right angle that exists with singular lines exists with intelligible matter; whereas that right angle that is without matter, that is, the common right angle, will be posterior to the parts of the form that are in the formula, yet prior to the parts of matter that are parts of singulars. Nor, according to this opinion, will there be occasion to distinguish between common matter and individual matter; nevertheless one will still not answer unqualifiedly, because it will be necessary to distinguish between parts of matter and parts of form.
[lib. 7 l. 10 n. 19 · Marietti #1500] If, however, the other opinion is true, namely that the soul is something other than the animal, then one will both have to say and have to deny that the parts are prior to the whole, as was determined earlier. For according to this opinion he taught above to distinguish not only between matter and form, but also between common matter, which is a part of the species, and individual matter, which is a part of the individual.
Metaphysics Book VII, Lecture 11 — How Mathematical Species Are Defined Without Sensible Matter Yet Not Without Common Intelligible Matter¶
Latin Locus: Metaph. VII, lect. 11 · Commentary: Notes on Metaph. VII, lect. 11
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 1 · Marietti #1501] In this part he resolves a certain doubt that could arise from the solution of the preceding question. For in solving the preceding question he had distinguished between the parts of the species and the parts of the individual, which is composed of the species and of matter; and therefore he here inquires which are parts of the species and which are not. This part, accordingly, is divided into three parts. In the first, he resolves this doubt. In the second, he shows what remains to be said, where he says, Whether, however, apart from the matter. Third, he recapitulates the things that have been said, where he says, What indeed, therefore, the what-it-was-to-be is. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he raises the doubt. Second, he solves it, where he says, Whatever things indeed, therefore, and so forth. Third, in manifesting the solution he summarizes it, where he says, Now it is plain, and so forth. First, therefore, he says that since it has been stated that the parts of the species are placed in definitions, whereas the parts of the composite of species and matter are not, it is rightly doubted which are parts of the species and which are not parts of the species, but of the composite taken together, that is, of the individual, in which the nature of the species is taken together with the individuating matter itself.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 2 · Marietti #1502] For if this is not manifest, we shall not be able to define anything rightly, because a definition is never of a singular thing, but only of a universal, as was said above; and among universals it belongs properly to the species, which is constituted of genus and difference, out of which every definition consists, for a genus is not defined unless it is also a species. Hence it is clear that unless it is known which part stands as matter, and which does not stand as matter but as pertaining to the species itself, it will not be manifest of what sort the definition to be assigned to the thing ought to be, since a definition is assigned only to the species, and in the definition of the species it is necessary to place the parts of the species and not the parts that are posterior to the species.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 3 · Marietti #1503] Next, when he says, Whatever things indeed, he solves the proposed doubt. And concerning this he does three things. First, he sets forth a solution according to the opinion of the Platonists. Second, he refutes it, where he says, It comes about, therefore, that one. Third, he solves it according to his own judgment, where he says, Wherefore to reduce all things. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he solves the proposed doubt as regards sensible things; second, as regards mathematical entities, where he says, Since, however. First, therefore, he says that in certain things it is manifest that matter is not a part of the species, namely in all those things that manifestly appear to come to be in matters diverse in species, just as a circle is found to come to be in bronze and in stone and in wood. Hence it is manifest that neither bronze nor stone nor wood belongs in any way to the substance of the circle, as though it existed as a part of this species, which is the circle. And this is manifest because the circle is separated from any one of these, whereas nothing can be separated from that which is a part of its species.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 4 · Marietti #1504] Yet there are certain things whose species are not found to come to be in matters diverse in species, but always in the same: just as the species of man, as regards what visibly appears, is found only in flesh and bones. Nothing, however, prevents even these things, which are not seen separated from their proper matter, from standing in the same relation to their matters as those things that can exist in diverse matters and be separated from each of them.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 5 · Marietti #1505] For if we were to suppose that no circles were sensibly seen except of bronze, nevertheless bronze would [not] even so be a part of the species of the circle. And although the circle would not then be separated in act from bronze, yet it would be separated in thought, because the species of the circle could be understood without bronze, inasmuch as bronze would not be a part of the species of the circle—even though it is difficult to remove and separate from one another in thought things that are not separated in act; for this belongs only to those who are able through the intellect to rise above sensible things.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 6 · Marietti #1506] And similarly, if the species of man always appears in flesh and bones and such parts, one must inquire whether these parts belong to the human species and to the formula, that is, to the definition of man, or whether they are not parts of the species, but only the matter of the species, just as bronze is of the circle. Yet because such a species does not come to be in material parts other than these, we cannot easily separate man by the intellect from flesh and bones; for the same reasoning seems to hold here as in the case of the circle, if all circles were of bronze.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 7 · Marietti #1507] Next, when he says, Since, however, he proceeds further in pursuing the opinion touched upon above as regards mathematical entities, saying that because this seems to happen in some cases—namely that the matter is not a part of the species even though the species is never found except in that matter—yet it is not manifest when and in which cases this happens or does not happen, therefore certain thinkers raise a doubt about this not only in natural things, but also in mathematical entities, such as in the circle and the triangle.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 8 · Marietti #1508] For it seems to them that just as \ sensible matter is not a part of the species in natural things, so too \ intelligible matter is not a part of the species in mathematical entities. Now the intelligible matter of mathematical figures is the \ continuum, such as line or surface. And therefore this view holds that the line is not a part of the species of the circle or of the triangle, as though it were not fitting that the triangle and the circle be defined through lines and the continuum, since they are not parts of the species, and that all these stand in the same relation to the circle and the triangle as flesh and bones stand to man, and bronze and stones to the circle.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 9 · Marietti #1509] Now when the continuum, which is the line, is removed from the triangle and the circle, nothing remains except unity and number, because a triangle has three lines and a circle one. And therefore, since they deny that lines are parts of the species, they refer all species to numbers, saying that numbers are the species of all mathematical entities; for they say that the formula of two is the formula of the straight line, because a straight line is terminated by two points.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 10 · Marietti #1510] Yet concerning this there is a certain difference among the Platonists who posit Ideas. For some, who do not posit mathematical entities as intermediates between the species and sensible things, and who say that the species are numbers, declare that the line itself is the dyad (dualitas), because they do not posit an intermediate line differing from the species of the line.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 11 · Marietti #1511] Others, however, say that the dyad is the species of the line, and not the line itself; for the line is a certain mathematical intermediate between the species and sensible things, whereas the dyad is the species itself. And according to them, in certain cases the species and that of which it is the species do not differ, as in numbers, because they said that the species themselves are numbers; hence they said that the dyad and the species of the dyad are the same. In the case of the line, however, this does not happen according to them, because the line already expresses something participating in a species, since many lines are found to exist in one species—which would not be the case if the line itself were the species itself.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 12 · Marietti #1512] Next, when he says, It comes about, therefore, he refutes the aforesaid solution, and sets forth three arguments, the first of which is this. If numbers alone are species, all those things that participate in one number participate in one species. Now there are many things diverse in species that participate in one number; for one and the same number is in the triangle by reason of its three lines, and in the syllogism by reason of its three terms, and in a body by reason of its three dimensions. It comes about, therefore, that there is a single species of many things that are diverse in species. And this happens not only to the Platonists, but also to the Pythagoreans, who likewise posited that numbers are the nature of all things.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 13 · Marietti #1513] He sets forth the second argument where he says, And it happens, which is as follows. If flesh and bones are not parts of the human species, nor lines parts of the species of the triangle, by parity of reasoning no matter is a part of a species. Yet according to the Platonists, in number the dyad is attributed to matter, whereas unity is attributed to the species; therefore unity alone is a species. The dyad, however, and consequently all other numbers, as implying matter, will not be species; and thus there will be only one species of all things.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 14 · Marietti #1514] He sets forth the third where he says, Although thus, which is as follows. Those things are one whose species is one. If, therefore, the species of all things is one, it will follow that all things are one in species, and not merely those that seem to be diverse. Yet it can be said that this third point is not another argument distinct from the second, but an absurdity that follows from the conclusion of the second argument.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 15 · Marietti #1515] Having therefore set forth the reasoning on which the preceding solution rested, and having set forth the arguments against the preceding solution, he concludes that it has been stated that matters concerning definitions involve a doubt, and for what cause. And thus it is clear that through everything said above he wished to show the difficulty of the preceding doubt.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 16 · Marietti #1516] Next, when he says, Wherefore all things, he solves the preceding question according to his own judgment: and first as regards natural things; second as regards mathematical entities, where he says, Concerning mathematical entities. First, therefore, he says that since the aforesaid absurdities follow for those who remove from the species of a thing everything material, whether sensible or not, it is clear from what has been said that it is superfluous to reduce all the species of things to numbers or to unity, and to take away sensible and intelligible matter altogether, as the Platonists did.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 17 · Marietti #1517] For certain species of things are not forms without matter, but are perhaps this in this, that is, forms in matter, in such a way that what results from the form existing in matter is the species; or if they do not exist strictly as form in matter, they stand after the manner of things that have form in matter. For natural things properly have form in matter, and mathematical entities are in a certain way assimilated to them, inasmuch as the proportion of the figure of a circle or of a triangle to lines is like the proportion of the form of man to flesh and bones. And therefore, just as the species of man is not some form without flesh and bones, so the form of the circle or of the triangle is not some form without lines. And therefore the comparison (parabola) that Socrates the Younger used to state concerning the animal is not sound.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 18 · Marietti #1518] Now he seems to call \ Plato himself “Socrates the Younger,” because in all his books Plato introduces Socrates as speaking, on account of his having been his teacher. And he calls Plato’s opinion concerning the materiality of natural species a “comparison” (parabola), because it resembles fables composed to insinuate some doctrine metaphorically; on account of which he said above in the third book that this opinion resembles the opinions of those who fashion gods and hold that their forms are like human forms. Now the aforesaid opinion is not sound because it leads away from the truth, inasmuch as it makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist without material parts, namely without flesh and bones, in the same way in which it is possible for a circle to exist without bronze, which manifestly does not pertain to the species of the circle.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 19 · Marietti #1519] Yet the two cases are not alike. For man does not stand to flesh and bones in the same way as the circle stands to bronze, because the circle is not something sensible according to its intelligible formula, since it can be understood without sensible matter; hence bronze, which is sensible matter, is not a part of the species of the circle. An animal, however, clearly is something sensible, for it cannot be defined without motion, since an animal is distinguished from a non-animal by sense and motion, as is clear in the first book of De Anima. And therefore an animal cannot be defined without bodily parts disposed in some due manner for motion. For a hand is not a part of a man in just any condition whatever, but when it is so disposed that it can perform the work of a hand, which it cannot do without the soul, which is the principle of motion. Wherefore the hand of anyone must be a part of man according as it is animate; according as it is inanimate, however, it is not a part, like a dead or painted hand. Hence it is necessary that such parts as are necessary for performing the operation proper to the species be parts of the species, both those on the part of the form and those on the part of the matter.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 20 · Marietti #1520] Next, when he says, Concerning mathematical entities, he solves the question as regards mathematical entities. For after the solution given concerning natural things, there still seems to remain a doubt concerning mathematical entities. For he had said that since an animal is sensible, it cannot be defined without sensible parts, whereas a circle can be defined without bronze, which is sensible matter. And therefore concerning mathematical entities it is asked why the formulas, that is, the definitions of the parts, are not parts of the formulas of the wholes—for instance, why hemicycles, that is, semicircles, are not placed in the definition of the circle; for it cannot be said that these, namely semicircles, are sensible things in the way that bronze is sensible matter.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 21 · Marietti #1521] Yet he solves this by saying that it makes no difference to the point at issue whether the parts of matter are sensible or non-sensible, because even non-sensible things have a certain intelligible matter. And such matter—namely that which is not a part of the species—belongs to everything that is not in itself identical with its what-it-was-to-be and species, but is a “this something”, that is, some demonstrated particular: as if to say that in everything that is not its own species itself, but is some determinate individual within a species, there must be certain parts of matter that are not parts of the species. For Socrates, because he is not his own humanity itself, but is one having humanity, therefore has in himself material parts that are not parts of the species, but parts of this individual matter which is the principle of individuation, such as this flesh and these bones.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 22 · Marietti #1522] And similarly, in this circle there are these lines, which are not parts of the species. Hence it is clear that things of this sort are not parts of the circle that is universal, but are parts of singular circles, as was said earlier. And on account of this, semicircles are not placed in the definition of the universal circle, because they are parts of singular circles and not of the universal circle. And this holds true both in sensible matter and in intelligible matter, for matter is found in both ways, as is clear from what has been said. If, however, there were some individual that was its very own species—as if Socrates were his very own humanity—there would not be in Socrates any parts that were not parts of humanity.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 23 · Marietti #1523] Next, when he says, Now it is plain, he summarizes the aforesaid solution, exemplifying it in the animal; saying that it is plain that the soul is the primary substance, that is, the form of the animal, whereas the body is the matter, and man or animal is that which consists of both, namely in universal, whereas Socrates and Coriscus are that which consists of both in particular, since the soul is spoken of in two ways, namely in universal and in particular, such as soul and this soul. Now the reason why what is signified after the manner of a whole must be spoken of universally and singularly because the soul is spoken of in two ways is that this holds according to both opinions held by men concerning the soul. For, as was said above, some say that man and animal are the soul, while others say that man and animal are not the soul, but the whole, namely the composite of soul and body.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 24 · Marietti #1524] It is clear, therefore, that according to the opinion which says that man is the soul, the soul is spoken of universally and singularly, such as soul and this soul, and man likewise is spoken of universally and particularly or singularly, namely man and this man. Similarly, according to the opinion which says that man is a composite of soul and body, it follows that if the simple principles are spoken of universally and singularly, the composite too is spoken of universally and singularly: just as if this soul and this body exist—which, when spoken of simply, stand as parts of the composite—then not only the parts, but also the composite, is spoken of both universally and particularly or singularly.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 25 · Marietti #1525] Next, when he says, Whether, however, he shows what remains to be determined hereafter concerning substances; and he states that two things remain to be determined. The first of these is that, since it has been determined that the substance and the what-it-is of sensible and material things are the very parts of the species, it remains to determine whether apart from the matter of such substances, namely material and sensible ones, there exists any substance, in such a way that one must seek some substance of these sensible things other than that which has been determined—just as certain thinkers say that numbers existing apart from matter, or something of the sort, that is, separate species or Ideas, are the substances of these sensible things. And this must be investigated later.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 26 · Marietti #1526] For this investigation is proper to this science. For in this science we endeavor to determine the truth concerning sensible substances for the sake of this, that is, on account of immaterial substances, because theoretical inquiry concerning sensible and material substances belongs in a way to physics, which is not first philosophy, but second philosophy, as was established in the fourth book. For first philosophy treats of primary substances, which are immaterial substances, and it investigates them not only insofar as they are substances, but insofar as they are such substances, namely insofar as they are immaterial. Sensible substances, on the other hand, it investigates not insofar as they are such substances, but insofar as they are substances, or even beings, or insofar as through them we are led by the hand to the knowledge of immaterial substances. The natural philosopher, conversely, treats of material substances not insofar as they are substances, but insofar as they are material and have within themselves a principle of motion.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 27 · Marietti #1527] And because someone might suppose that natural science does not investigate whole material and sensible substances, but only their matters, he therefore removes this misconception, saying that the natural philosopher must consider not only matter, but also that part which is according to the formula, namely the form—and indeed form even more than matter, because form is nature more than matter is, as was proved in the second book of the Physics.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 28 · Marietti #1528] The second point that remains to be determined is how the parts that are in the formula, that is, in the definition, are related—namely whether they are substances existing in act, and also why a definition, though composed of many parts, is a single formula. For it is plain that a definition must be a single formula only, because the thing is one, and the definition signifies what the thing is. By what principle, however, a thing having parts is made one must be investigated later.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 29 · Marietti #1529] Next, when he says, What indeed, he recapitulates the things that have been determined, saying that it has been stated what the what-it-was-to-be is, and how that which is the what-it-was-to-be is predicated universally of all and predicated according to itself. And again it has been stated why for certain things the formula signifying the what-it-was-to-be contains within itself the parts of the thing defined, just as the definition of a syllable contains the letters, and for certain things it does not, just as the definition of a circle does not contain the semicircles. It has also been stated that in the formula of the substance, that is, of the form, parts that are parts of the substance as matter are not placed, because such parts are not parts of that substance, that is, of the form, but parts of the whole composite.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 30 · Marietti #1530] Of this composite, indeed, in one way there is a definition, and in another way there is not. For if it is taken with matter, namely individual matter, there is no definition of it, because singulars are not defined, as was established above; and the reason for this is that such individual matter is something infinite and indeterminate, since matter is rendered finite only through form. Yet the composite taken according to primary substance, that is, according to form, has a definition; for the composite is defined as taken in species, not according to the individual.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 31 · Marietti #1531] Now just as the individual is individuated through matter, so each thing is placed in its species through form; for a man is not a man because he has flesh and bones, but from the fact that he has a rational soul in flesh and bones. Hence it is necessary that the definition of the species be taken from the form, and that only those parts of matter be placed in the definition of the species in which the form primarily and principally resides: just as the formula of man is that which belongs to the soul, since it is from having such a soul that a man is a man. And on account of this, if man is defined, he must be defined through the soul, and nevertheless in his definition must be placed the parts of the body in which the soul primarily resides, such as the heart or the brain, as he said above.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 32 · Marietti #1532] For the substance itself of which matter is not a part is the species, that is, the form inhering in matter, from which form and matter the whole substance is spoken of, that is, is determined and defined. Thus concavity is a certain form, for out of it and the nose are spoken of the snub nose and snubness; and similarly out of soul and body are spoken of man and humanity. For if the nose, which stands as matter, were a part of curvature, then when “curved nose” is said, “nose” would be said twice: once by its own name, and once insofar as it would be included in the definition of the curved (if, that is, it were placed in its definition as a part of the essence of curvature, and not by way of addition, as was said above). Although, however, matter does not belong to the essence of the form, it is nevertheless present in the whole composite substance, just as curvature is in the snub nose, and individual matter too is in Callias.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 33 · Marietti #1533] It was also said above that the what-it-was-to-be of each thing is the same as that whose what-it-was-to-be it is. And this is unqualifiedly true in certain things, such as in primary substances, that is, in immaterial substances: just as curvature itself is the same as the what-it-was-to-be of curvature, provided curvature belongs among primary substances. And he says this because curvature too seems to be a form in matter, though not in sensible matter, but in intelligible matter, which is the continuum itself. Or, according to another reading, which is primary: for there is a certain primary curvature, such as the curvature that exists among the separate species according to the Platonists, in which species it is universally true that each is the same as its what-it-is; whereas the other curvature, which exists in sensible things or in mathematical entities, is not primary, and hence is not the same as its what-it-was-to-be.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 34 · Marietti #1534] And in explaining this he says that by “primary substance” here he means not particular substance, as in the Categories, but that which is not spoken of through one thing being in another as in a subject and matter, that is, those things which are forms not in matter, such as separate substances. Whatever things, on the other hand, stand as matter, or are conceived together with matter, such as composites that include matter in their intelligible formula—in these the what-it-was-to-be and that whose what-it-was-to-be it is are not the same. Nor are they one in things spoken of according to accident, as Socrates and musical are the same per accidens.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 35 · Marietti #1535] Now it must be observed that from the thesis he had laid down—namely that the what-it-is is the same as each thing whose what-it-is it is—he here makes two exceptions, namely things spoken of per accidens and material substances, whereas earlier he had excepted only things spoken of per accidens. Yet not only these must be excluded, but material substances as well. For, as was said above, the what-it-was-to-be is that which the definition signifies. Now a definition is assigned not to individuals, but to species; and therefore individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, lies outside that which is the what-it-was-to-be. Yet it is impossible in the nature of things for a species to exist except in this individual. Hence it is necessary that every thing of nature, if it has matter that is a part of the species pertaining to the what-it-is, also have individual matter that does not pertain to the what-it-is. Thus no thing of nature, if it has matter, is its very what-it-is, but is something having it, just as Socrates is not humanity, but one having humanity. If, however, it were possible for there to exist a man composed of body and soul who was not this man composed of this body and of this soul, he would nonetheless be his own what-it-was-to-be, even though he had matter.
[lib. 7 l. 11 n. 36 · Marietti #1536] Although, however, man apart from singulars does not exist in the nature of things, he nevertheless exists in conceptual thought (in ratione), which pertains to logical consideration. And therefore earlier, where he considered the what-it-was-to-be logically, he did not exclude material substances from having their what-it-is be the same as that whose what-it-is it is; for common man is the same as his what-it-is, speaking logically. Now, however, after he has descended to the natural principles, which are matter and form, and has shown how they stand in diverse relations to the universal and to the particular that subsists in nature, he here excepts material substances existing in the nature of things from what he had said above—that the what-it-is is the same as each thing. It remains, then, that those substances which are subsistent forms alone have nothing whereby they are individuated that lies outside the formula of the thing or of the species signifying the what-it-is; and therefore in them it is unqualifiedly true that each of them is its own what-it-was-to-be.
Metaphysics Book IX, Lecture 3 — How the Name and Notion of Actuality Are Derived First from Sensible Motion¶
Latin Locus: Metaph. IX, lect. 3 · Commentary: Notes on Metaph. IX, lect. 3
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 1 · Marietti #1795] After the Philosopher has above compared potencies with one another, he here begins to show how potency and act stand in relation to the same subject; and this text is divided into two parts. In the first, he excludes the false opinions of certain thinkers; in the second, he determines the truth, where he says, Now for all potencies. The first part is divided into two. In the first, he excludes the opinion of those who say that nothing is possible except when it exists in act; in the second, he excludes the opinion of those who say conversely that all things are possible even if they do not exist in act, where he says, If, however, what has been said is the possible. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he excludes the aforesaid erroneous position; second, he shows what it is to be possible and what it is to be in act, where he says, Now that is possible. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he sets forth the opinion. Second, he refutes it, where he says, For whom the consequences, and so forth. Third, he concludes his intended thesis, where he says, If, therefore, it is not possible. First, therefore, he says that certain thinkers maintained that something is in potency only when it is in act—for example, that one who is not actually building is not able to build, and is able to build only when he is actually building; and they say the same of other things. And the reason for this position seems to be that they supposed all things to happen of necessity according to a certain combination of causes; and thus, if all things come to pass of necessity, it follows that those things which do not come to pass are not possible to be.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 2 · Marietti #1796] Next, when he says, For whom the consequences, he sets forth arguments against the aforesaid position leading to absurdities, the first of which is as follows. To be a builder is to be one able to build. If, therefore, no one is able to do anything except when he is doing it, no one is a builder except when he is building; and it is similar with the other arts, for all arts are certain potencies, as has been said. It follows, therefore, that no one possesses any art except when he operates in accordance with it.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 3 · Marietti #1797] Yet this is shown to be impossible once two things are presupposed: the first of which is that for one who previously did not possess some art, it is impossible that he should afterward possess it unless he learns it or acquires it in some way, namely by discovery.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 4 · Marietti #1798] The other is that if someone possessed some art, it is impossible for him afterward not to possess the same art unless he loses it in some way—either through forgetfulness, or through some infirmity, or through length of time during which one makes no use of knowledge, which is indeed a cause of forgetfulness. Nor can it happen that someone loses an art through the corruption of its object, as sometimes happens when true cognition is lost because the thing has changed—as when someone truly opines that Socrates is sitting, and upon his rising that true opinion perishes. This, however, cannot be said with respect to an art; for art is knowledge not of that which is, but of that which is to be made. And thus so long as the matter lasts out of which the art can make something, the object of the art always exists. Hence an art cannot be lost through the corruption of its object, but only in the ways stated above.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 5 · Marietti #1799] Now from these two premises the Philosopher argues as follows. If someone does not possess an art except when he uses it, then when he begins to use it he possesses the art anew; therefore he must either learn it or acquire it in some way or other. And similarly, when he ceases to use the art, it follows that he lacks the art; and thus he will lose the art he previously possessed, either through forgetfulness, or through some bodily affection, or through time. Both of these are manifestly false. Therefore it is not true that someone possesses a potency only when he operates.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 6 · Marietti #1800] Next, when he says, And as regards inanimate things, he sets forth the second argument, which proceeds with respect to non-rational potencies existing in inanimate things—namely hot and cold, sweet and bitter, and other things of this sort, which are active principles altering the senses, and thus are certain potencies. If, therefore, a potency is present in something only when it acts, it follows that nothing is hot or cold, sweet or bitter, and the like, except when it is being sensed as altering the sense. Now this is manifestly false. For if this were true, it would follow that the opinion of Protagoras was true, which maintained that all the properties and natures of things consist solely in being sensed and opined; from which it followed that contradictories are simultaneously true, since different people hold contradictory opinions about the same thing—an opinion against which the Philosopher disputed above in the fourth book. It is false, therefore, that potency does not exist without act.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 7 · Marietti #1801] Next, when he says, Moreover, indeed, he sets forth the third argument, which is as follows. Sense is a certain potency. If, therefore, potency does not exist apart from act, it will follow that someone does not possess sense—such as sight or hearing—except when he is sensing. Yet one who does not possess sight, when by nature suited to possess it, is blind; and one who does not possess hearing is deaf. Thus, therefore, on the very same day the same person will repeatedly be deaf and blind, which is manifestly false; for the blind man does not afterward become seeing, nor the deaf hearing.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 8 · Marietti #1802] Next, when he says, Furthermore, if, he sets forth the fourth argument, which is as follows. That which lacks potency is impossible to act. If, therefore, someone does not possess potency except when he acts, it will follow that when someone is not acting, it is impossible for him to act. Yet whoever says that something is or will be which is impossible to come about speaks falsely; and this is clear from the very signification of this word impossible, for the impossible means a falsehood that cannot happen. It follows, therefore, that what is not can in no way come to be. And thus such an account of potency will take away motion and generation, because one who is standing will always stand, and one who is sitting will always sit. For if someone is sitting, he will never afterward stand, because while he is not standing he does not possess the potency of standing; and thus it is not possible for him to stand, and consequently it is impossible for him to rise. And similarly what is not white will be impossible to be white, and thus will not be able to be whitened; and similarly in all other cases.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 9 · Marietti #1803] Next, when he says, If, therefore, he concludes his intended thesis, saying that if the aforesaid absurdities cannot be granted, it is manifest that potency and act are diverse. Yet those who maintain the aforesaid position make potency and act to be the same, inasmuch as they say that something is in potency only when it is in act. From this it is clear that it is no small thing that they seek to abolish from nature, for they take away motion and generation, as has been said. Hence, since this cannot be maintained, it is manifest that it is possible for something to be which nevertheless is not, and possible for something not to be which nevertheless is; and similarly in the other categories, that is, predicaments, because it is possible for someone to walk though he is not walking, and conversely possible for one who is walking not to walk.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 10 · Marietti #1804] Next, when he says, Now that is, he shows what it is to be in potency and what it is to be in act. And first he shows what it is to be in potency, saying that that is said to be in potency from which, if it is posited to exist in act, nothing impossible follows: as if it be said that it is possible for someone to sit, if it be posited that he sits nothing impossible comes about; and similarly with being moved and moving, and other things of this sort.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 11 · Marietti #1805] Second, where he says, Now the name comes, he shows what it is to be in act; and he says that this name act, which is used to signify entelechy and perfection—namely form and other things of this sort, such as operations of whatever kind—comes chiefly from motions as regards the origin of the word. For since names are signs of intelligible conceptions, we first impose names upon those things which we first understand, even though they be posterior according to the order of nature. Now among other acts, motion is most known and apparent to us, since it is sensibly seen by us. And therefore upon it the name act was first imposed, and from motion it was derived to other things.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 12 · Marietti #1806] And on account of this, being moved is not attributed to non-existent things, even though certain other predicates are attributed to non-existent things. For we say that non-beings are intelligible or opinable, or even objects of desire, yet we do not say that they are moved; because, since being moved signifies existing in act, it would follow that things not existing in act would exist in act, which is manifestly false. For even though certain non-beings exist in potency, nevertheless they are said not to be precisely because they do not exist in act.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 13 · Marietti #1807] Next, when he says, If, however, after the Philosopher has refuted the opinion of those who say that nothing is possible except when it exists in act, he here refutes the contrary opinion of those who say that all things are possible; and concerning this he does two things. First, he refutes this position; second, he determines a certain truth concerning the consequence of possibles, where he says, At the same time, however, it is plain. First, therefore, he says that if it is true that something is called possible from what follows upon it—according to what has been stated, that the possible is that from which, if it be posited to be, nothing impossible follows—it is manifest that what certain thinkers say cannot be true, namely that everything whatever is possible even if it will never come to be, in such a way that by this position impossibilities are done away with: as if someone were to say that it is possible for the diagonal of a square to be commensurable with its side, though it will never be commensurable, and were to speak in the same way of other impossibilities, without considering that for the diagonal of a square to be commensurable with its side is impossible. Those who maintain this position, I say, in one respect speak truly and in another respect speak falsely.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 14 · Marietti #1808] For there are certain things of which nothing will prevent one from saying that they are possible to be or to come to be, even though they will never exist and will never come to be; yet this cannot be said of all things. Rather, according to what was said above and what we must now presuppose, those things alone are possible to be or to come to be, even though they are not, upon the positing of which nothing impossible follows. Now if it be posited that the diagonal is commensurable, something impossible follows; and therefore it cannot be said that for the diagonal to be commensurable is possible, for this is not merely false, but impossible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 15 · Marietti #1809] Certain things, on the other hand, are merely false, yet not impossible, such as for Socrates to sit or to stand; for to be false and to be impossible are not the same, just as for you to be standing now is false, yet not impossible. The aforesaid position, therefore, is true with respect to some things, because some things are possible even though they are false; yet it is not true with respect to all things, because some things are both false and impossible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 16 · Marietti #1810] Next, when he says, At the same time, however, because he had said that something is judged possible from the fact that nothing impossible follows from it, he shows how possible consequents stand in relation to their antecedents, saying that from the definition of the possible set forth above not only is the preceding position refuted, but at the same time it is also manifest that if the antecedent of some conditional proposition is possible, the consequent too will be possible: as, if this conditional is true, “if a is, b is,” it is necessary that if a is possible, b is possible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 17 · Marietti #1811] Yet for the understanding of this it must be known that possible is spoken of in two ways. In one way, according as it is divided against the necessary, as when we call those things possible which happen both to be and not to be. And when the possible is taken in this way, what is said here does not hold; for nothing prevents the antecedent from being contingent as to being and non-being while the consequent is nevertheless necessary, as is clear in this conditional: “if Socrates laughs, he is a man.”
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 18 · Marietti #1812] In another way, however, possible is spoken of according as it is common both to things that are necessary and to things that happen both to be and not to be, insofar as the possible is divided against the impossible. And it is in this way that the Philosopher speaks here, saying of the possible that it is necessary for the consequent to be possible if the antecedent was possible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 19 · Marietti #1813] For let this conditional be granted to be true, “if a is, b is,” and let the antecedent, namely a, be granted to be possible. Either, therefore, it is necessary that b be possible, or it is not. If it is necessary, the proposed conclusion is established. If it is not necessary, nothing prevents positing the opposite, namely that b is not possible. Yet this cannot stand. For a is posited to be possible; and when it is posited to be possible, it is simultaneously posited that nothing impossible follows from it, since the possible was defined above as that from which nothing impossible follows. Yet b follows upon a, as was posited, and b was posited to be impossible, since to be impossible is the same as not to be possible. Therefore a will not be possible if b, which was impossible, follows upon it. Let b, therefore, be posited to be impossible: if it is impossible, and when a is posited it is necessary that b be, then both the first and the second, namely a and b, will be impossible.
[lib. 9 l. 3 n. 20 · Marietti #1814] Here it must be observed that it rightly follows that if the consequent is impossible, the antecedent is impossible, yet not conversely; for nothing prevents something necessary from following out of an impossibility, as in this conditional: “if a man is an ass, a man is an animal.” Hence what the Philosopher says here must not be understood as meaning: if the first, that is, the antecedent, was impossible, therefore the second too, namely the consequent, was impossible; rather, it must be understood thus: if the consequent is impossible, both will be impossible. Thus, therefore, it is manifest that if a and b stand in such a relation that when a exists it is necessary for b to exist, it necessarily follows as well that if a is possible, b will be possible. And if b is not possible while a is possible, then a and b will not stand in the relation that was posited, namely that b follows upon a. Rather, when a is possible, it must be necessary for b to be possible, if when a exists it is necessary for b to exist. For when I say, “if a is, b is,” this signifies that it is necessary for b to be possible if a is possible—in such a way, however, that b is possible to be at the same time and in the same manner as a is possible; for it is not possible with respect to just any time whatever and just any manner whatever.
Metaphysics Book IX, Lecture 10 — On Discovering Geometric Truth by Dividing Figures in Act (Euclid I.32 and III.31)¶
Latin Locus: Metaph. IX, lect. 10 · Commentary: Notes on Metaph. IX, lect. 10
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 1 · Marietti #1883] After the Philosopher has compared act and potency with respect to the prior and the posterior, he here compares them with respect to good and evil; and concerning this he does two things. First, he says that in good things, act is better than potency. And this is manifest from the fact that what is in potency is the selfsame thing existing in potency to contraries: just as that which is able to recover health is able to fall sick, and is simultaneously in potency to both. And this is because there is the selfsame potency for both—for recovering health and for ailing, for resting and for moving, and for other opposites of this sort. And thus it is clear that something is simultaneously capable of contraries, even though contraries cannot exist simultaneously in act. Taken separately, therefore, of the two contraries the one is good, such as the healthy, while the other is evil, such as the sick; for among contraries one always stands as deficient, which pertains to evil.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 2 · Marietti #1884] Thus, therefore, that which is good in act is solely good. Potency, however, stands similarly related to both, namely in a qualified respect (secundum quid), which is to be in potency, whereas it possesses neither unqualifiedly, which is to be in act. It remains, therefore, that act is better than potency, because that which is unqualifiedly and purely good is better than that which is good in a qualified respect and conjoined with evil.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 3 · Marietti #1885] Second, where he says, It is necessary, however, he shows that conversely in evil things act is worse than potency; and concerning this he does three things. First, he proves the proposed point from the reasoning adduced above: because that which is unqualifiedly evil, and not related to evil merely in a qualified respect, is worse than that which is evil in a qualified respect and related both to evil and to good. Hence, since the potency to evil does not yet possess evil except in a qualified respect (and is at the same time a potency to good, since it is the selfsame potency that relates to contraries), it remains that an evil act is worse than the potency to evil.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 4 · Marietti #1886] Second, where he says, It is plain, therefore, he concludes from what has been said that evil itself is not a certain nature existing apart from other things, which by nature are good. For evil itself is by nature posterior to potency, because it is worse and further removed from the perfection of nature. Hence, since potency cannot exist apart from things, much less can evil itself.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 5 · Marietti #1887] Third, where he says, Therefore not, he draws another conclusion. For if evil is worse than potency, and potency is not found among eternal things, as was shown above, there will not be in them any evil, nor defect (peccatum), nor any other corruption; for corruption is a certain evil. Now this must be understood insofar as they are eternal and incorruptible; for in a qualified respect nothing prevents there being corruption in them, such as with respect to where (ubi), or with respect to something of this sort.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 6 · Marietti #1888] Next, when he says, Now they are discovered, after he has compared potency and act with respect to the prior and the posterior, and with respect to good and evil, he here compares the same with respect to the understanding of the true and the false. And concerning this he does two things. First, he compares them with respect to understanding; second, with respect to truth and falsity, where he says, Since, however, being. First, therefore, he says that diagrams, that is, geometrical constructions, are discovered, that is, become known by discovery according to the disposition of figures in act. For geometers discover the truth they seek by dividing lines and surfaces. Now division reduces into act what was in potency; for the parts of a \ continuum exist potentially in the whole prior to division. If, however, all things were already divided in the manner that the discovery of truth requires, the conclusions sought would be manifest. Yet because in the initial drawing of the figures divisions of this sort exist only in potency, what is sought does not immediately become manifest.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 7 · Marietti #1889] And he makes this known through two examples, the first of which concerns the question: why a triangle is two right angles, that is, why a triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles? And this is demonstrated as follows. (Figure). Let there be a triangle ABC, and let the base AC be produced continuously in a straight line. This base thus produced will therefore make with the side BC of the triangle an angle at the point C; and this angle lying outside is equal to the two interior angles opposite to it, namely the angle ABC and the angle BAC. Now it is manifest that the two angles standing around the point C, of which one is outside the triangle and the other inside, are equal to two right angles; for it has been demonstrated that a straight line falling upon another straight line in whatever way will make either two right angles or angles equal to two right angles. It remains, therefore, that the interior angle at the point C, taken together with the other two that are equal to the exterior angle—namely all three—are equal to two right angles.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 8 · Marietti #1890] This, therefore, is what the Philosopher says: that a triangle is proved to have two right angles because the two angles that stand around a single point, say around the point C, of which one is interior and the other exterior, are equal to two right angles. And therefore when the angle formed outside is brought forth by producing one side of the triangle, it immediately becomes manifest to one who beholds the disposition of the figure that the triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 9 · Marietti #1891] The second example concerns this question: why every angle inscribed in a semicircle is a right angle. And this is demonstrated as follows. (Figure). Let there be a semicircle ABC, and at the point B, wherever it may fall, let an angle be constructed, subtended by the base AC, which is the diameter of the circle. I say, therefore, that the angle B is a right angle. The proof of this is that since the line AC is the diameter of the circle, it must pass through the center. Let it therefore be divided in half at the point D, and let the line DB be drawn. Thus, therefore, the line DB is equal to the line DA, because both are drawn from the center to the circumference; therefore in the triangle DBA the angle B is equal to the angle A, because in every triangle of which two sides are equal, the angles above the base are equal. The two angles A and B, therefore, are double the angle B alone. Yet the angle BDC, since it is exterior, is equal to the two partial angles A and B; therefore the angle BDC is double the partial angle B.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 10 · Marietti #1892] And in like manner it is proved that the angle C is equal to the angle B of the triangle BDC, because the two sides DB and DC are equal, since they are drawn from the center to the circumference; and the exterior angle, namely ADB, is equal to both together, and is therefore double the partial angle B. Thus, therefore, the two angles ADB and BDC are double the whole angle ABC. Yet the two angles ADB and BDC are either right angles or equal to two right angles, because the line DB falls upon the line AC; therefore the angle ABC, which is in the semicircle, is a right angle.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 11 · Marietti #1893] And this is what the Philosopher says: that the angle in a semicircle is demonstrated to be a right angle because three lines are equal—namely the two into which the base is divided, that is, DA and DC, and the third which, drawn from the midpoint between those two, stands upon both, namely BD. And to one who beholds this disposition, provided he knows the principles of geometry, it is immediately manifest that every angle in a semicircle is a right angle.
[lib. 9 l. 10 n. 12 · Marietti #1894] Thus, therefore, the Philosopher concludes that it is manifest that when things are reduced from potency into act, then their truth is discovered. And the cause of this is that understanding is an act; and therefore the things that are understood must exist in act. On account of this, potency is known from act. Hence by making something exist in act men come to know, as is clear in the aforesaid constructions. For in that which is numerically one and the same, act must be posterior to potency according to the order of generation and of time, as was explained above.
Summa Theologiae I, q. 7, a. 1 & a. 3; q. 12, a. 4 — Being Itself as Most Formal of All; the Geometer’s Infinite Line; Apprehending Absolute Being¶
Latin Locus: ST I, q. 7, a. 1 & 3; q. 12, a. 4 · Commentary: Notes on ST I, q. 7, a. 1 & 3; q. 12, a. 4
[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the first article. It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, since it has the character of part and of matter, as is said in Book III of the Physics. But God is most perfect. Therefore He is not infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2] Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Physics, the finite and the infinite belong to quantity. Now in God there is no quantity, since He is not a body, as was shown above. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3] Furthermore, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere is finite according to place; therefore what is this thing in such a way as not to be another is finite according to substance. Now God is this, and not another—for He is neither a stone nor wood. Therefore God is not infinite according to substance.
[I q. 7 a. 1 s. c.] On the contrary, Damascene says that God is infinite and eternal and uncircumscribable.
[I q. 7 a. 1 co.] I answer that all the ancient philosophers attribute the infinite to the first principle, as is said in Book III of the Physics, and this reasonably, considering that things flow forth from the first principle unto infinity. Yet because certain of them erred concerning the nature of the first principle, it followed as a consequence that they erred concerning its infinity. For because they posited matter as the first principle, they consequently attributed a material infinity to the first principle, saying that some infinite body is the first principle of things. We must consider, therefore, that a thing is called infinite from the fact that it is not finite. Now both matter is in a certain way made finite through form, and form through matter. Matter, indeed, is made finite through form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives a form, is in potency to many forms; whereas when it receives one, it is terminated by that form. Form, on the other hand, is made finite through matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; whereas by being received in matter, it becomes determinately the form of this thing. Now matter is perfected by the form through which it is made finite, and therefore the infinite as attributed to matter has the character of something imperfect; for it is as it were matter not having form. Form, however, is not perfected by matter, but rather its amplitude is contracted through matter; hence the infinite as standing on the side of form not determined by matter has the character of something perfect. Now that which is most formal of all is being itself, as is clear from what was shown above. Since, therefore, the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He Himself is His own subsistent being, as was shown above, it is manifest that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
[I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1] And from this the reply to the first objection is evident.
[I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2] To the second it must be said that the boundary of quantity is like its form, a sign of which is that figure, which consists in the termination of quantity, is a certain form regarding quantity. Hence the infinite that belongs to quantity is the infinite that stands on the side of matter, and such an infinite is not attributed to God, as has been said.
[I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3] To the third it must be said that by the very fact that the being of God is subsisting of itself and not received in anything—insofar as it is called infinite—He is distinguished from all other things, and all others are set apart from Him; just as, if there were a subsistent whiteness, by the very fact that it did not exist in another it would differ from every whiteness existing in a subject.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the third article. It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in the mathematical sciences no falsehood is found, since there is no lie in those who abstract, as is said in Book II of the Physics. Now the mathematical sciences make use of the infinite in magnitude; for the geometer in his demonstrations says, “Let such a line be infinite.” Therefore it is not impossible for something to be infinite in magnitude.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2] Furthermore, what is not contrary to the intelligible nature of a thing is not impossible to belong to it. Now to be infinite is not contrary to the intelligible nature of magnitude; rather, both the finite and the infinite seem to be proper attributes of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3] Furthermore, magnitude is divisible to infinity, for the \ continuum is defined in just this way—as that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear in Book III of the Physics. Now contraries are naturally suited to arise concerning one and the same thing. Since, therefore, addition is opposed to division, and increase to diminution, it seems that magnitude can grow to infinity. Therefore it is possible for there to be an infinite magnitude.
[I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4] Furthermore, motion and time derive their quantity and continuity from the magnitude over which motion passes, as is said in Book IV of the Physics. Now it is not contrary to the nature of time and motion that they be infinite, since every designated indivisible in time and in circular motion is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither will it be contrary to the nature of magnitude that it be infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 3 s. c.] On the contrary, every body has a surface. Now every body having a surface is finite, because surface is the boundary of a finite body. Therefore every body is finite. And the same can be said of surface and of line. Nothing, therefore, is infinite in magnitude.
[I q. 7 a. 3 co.] I answer that it is one thing to be infinite according to essence, and another according to magnitude. For even granted that there were some body infinite in magnitude, such as fire or air, it would still not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated to a definite species by its form, and to a definite individual by matter. And therefore, once it has been established from the foregoing that no creature is infinite according to essence, it still remains to inquire whether any created thing is infinite according to magnitude. It must be known, then, that body, which is a complete magnitude, is taken in two ways: namely mathematically, insofar as quantity alone is considered in it; and naturally, insofar as matter and form are considered in it. Now regarding a natural body, that it cannot be actually infinite is manifest. For every natural body has some determinate substantial form; since, therefore, accidents follow upon substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents follow upon a determinate form, among which is quantity. Hence every natural body has a determinate quantity, both as to greater and as to lesser. Consequently it is impossible for any natural body to be infinite. This is also clear from motion. For every natural body has some natural motion. An infinite body, however, could not have any natural motion: neither rectilinear, because nothing moves naturally with a rectilinear motion except when it is outside its proper place, which could not happen to an infinite body, since it would occupy all places, and thus every place indifferently would be its place; nor likewise according to circular motion, because in circular motion one part of the body must be transferred to the place where another part was, and in a circular body posited as infinite this could not occur, since two lines drawn from the center stand farther apart from one another the farther they are extended from the center—so that if the body were infinite, the lines would stand infinitely apart from one another, and thus one could never arrive at the place of the other. The same reasoning holds also regarding a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing exists in act except through its form. Hence, since the form of a quantified thing as such is figure, it will have to possess some figure; and thus it will be finite, for figure is that which is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the geometer does not need to assume that some line is actually infinite, but needs to take some actually finite line from which as much can be subtracted as is necessary; and this he calls an infinite line.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2] To the second it must be said that although the infinite is not contrary to the nature of magnitude in general, nevertheless it is contrary to the nature of every single species of it—namely contrary to the nature of a two-cubit or three-cubit magnitude, or of a circular or triangular magnitude, and the like. Now it is impossible for that to exist in a genus which exists in none of its species. Hence it is impossible for there to be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3] To the third it must be said that the infinite that belongs to quantity, as has been said, stands on the side of matter. Now by division of the whole one approaches toward matter, for parts stand in the character of matter; whereas by addition one approaches toward the whole, which stands in the character of form. And therefore the infinite is not found in the addition of magnitude, but in division alone.
[I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that motion and time do not exist as a whole in act, but successively; hence they have potency mingled with act. Magnitude, however, exists as a whole in act. And therefore the infinite that belongs to quantity and stands on the side of matter is repugnant to the totality of magnitude, though not to the totality of time or motion; for to be in potency belongs to matter.
[I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the fourth article. It seems that some created intellect can see the divine essence by its own natural powers. For Dionysius says in Chapter IV of The Divine Names that an angel is a pure, most clear mirror, receiving, if it is lawful to say so, the whole beauty of God. Now anything is seen when its mirror is seen. Since, therefore, an angel understands himself by his own natural powers, it seems that by his own natural powers he also understands the divine essence.
[I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2] Furthermore, that which is supremely visible becomes less visible to us on account of the defect of our sight, whether bodily or intellectual. Now the intellect of an angel suffers no defect. Since, therefore, God in Himself is supremely intelligible, it seems that He is supremely intelligible to an angel. If, then, an angel can understand other intelligible things by his own natural powers, much more can he understand God.
[I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3] Furthermore, bodily sense cannot be elevated to understand incorporeal substance, because it is above its nature. If, therefore, to see God through His essence is above the nature of every created intellect, it seems that no created intellect could ever attain to seeing the essence of God—which is erroneous, as is clear from what was said above. It seems, therefore, that it is natural to a created intellect to see the divine essence.
[I q. 12 a. 4 s. c.] On the contrary, it is written in Romans VI: The grace of God is life everlasting. Now life everlasting consists in the vision of the divine essence, according to John XVII: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and so forth. Therefore to see the essence of God belongs to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.
[I q. 12 a. 4 co.] I answer that it is impossible for any created intellect by its own natural powers to see the essence of God. For knowledge takes place according as the thing known is in the knower. Now the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is according to the mode of its own nature. If, therefore, the mode of being of any thing to be known exceeds the mode of the knower’s nature, the knowledge of that thing must be above the nature of that knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For there are some things whose nature has being only in this individual matter, and of this sort are all corporeal things. There are others whose natures are subsisting of themselves, not in any matter, which nevertheless are not their own being, but are things having being; and of this sort are incorporeal substances, which we call angels. Of God alone, however, is the proper mode of being such that He is His own subsistent being. To know those things, therefore, that have being only in individual matter is connatural to us, because our soul, through which we know, is the form of a certain matter. Yet our soul possesses two cognitive powers: one which is the act of a bodily organ, and to this it is connatural to know things according as they exist in individual matter—hence sense knows only singulars; while its other cognitive power is the intellect, which is not the act of any bodily organ. Hence through the intellect it is connatural to us to know natures which indeed have being only in individual matter, yet not according as they exist in individual matter, but according as they are abstracted from it by the consideration of the intellect. Consequently through the intellect we can know things of this sort in universal, which is beyond the faculty of sense. To the angelic intellect, however, it is connatural to know natures not existing in matter, which is beyond the natural faculty of the intellect of the human soul according to the state of the present life in which it is united to the body. It remains, therefore, that to know subsistent being itself is connatural to the divine intellect alone, and is beyond the natural faculty of any created intellect whatever, because no creature is its own being, but has participated being. The created intellect, therefore, cannot see God through His essence except insofar as God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect as intelligible to it.
[I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that this mode of knowing God is connatural to an angel—namely, that he know Him through His likeness shining forth in the angel himself. Yet to know God through any created likeness is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above. Hence it does not follow that an angel by his own natural powers can know the essence of God.
[I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2] To the second it must be said that the intellect of an angel has no defect if defect be taken privatively, meaning that it lacks what it ought to have. If, however, it be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is found deficient when compared with God, inasmuch as it does not possess that excellence which is found in God.
[I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3] To the third it must be said that the sense of sight, because it is altogether material, can in no way be elevated to anything immaterial. Yet our intellect, or the angelic intellect, because according to its nature it is in some measure elevated above matter, can be elevated beyond its nature by grace to something higher. And a sign of this is that sight can in no way know in abstraction what it knows in concretion, for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this particular nature. Our intellect, however, is able to consider in abstraction what it knows in concretion; for although it knows things having form in matter, nevertheless it resolves the composite into both, and considers the form itself on its own. And similarly the intellect of an angel, although it is connatural to it to know being as concrete in a definite nature, is nevertheless able to separate being itself by its intellect, knowing that it itself is one thing and its being is another. And therefore, since the created intellect by its own nature is naturally suited to apprehend concrete form and concrete being in abstraction by way of a certain resolution, it can by grace be elevated to know separate subsisting substance and separate subsisting being.
Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6–7 & q. 85, a. 1 — On the Origin of Science from Sensible Things, Turning to Phantasms, and Threefold Abstraction¶
Latin Locus: ST I, q. 84, a. 6–7; q. 85, a. 1 · Commentary: Notes on ST I, q. 84, a. 6–7; q. 85, a. 1
[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the sixth article. It seems that intellectual knowledge is not received from sensible things. For \ Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that the pureness of truth is not to be expected from the senses of the body. And he proves this in two ways. In one way, from the fact that everything that bodily sense reaches is changed without any intermission of time, and what does not abide cannot be perceived. In another way, from the fact that all things that we sense through the body, even when they are not present to the senses, nevertheless leave us subject to their images, as in sleep or frenzy; yet by the senses we are unable to discern whether we are sensing the sensible objects themselves or their false images. Now nothing can be perceived that is not discerned from the false. And thus he concludes that truth is not to be expected from the senses. Now intellectual knowledge is apprehensive of truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not to be expected from the senses.
[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2] Furthermore, Augustine says in Book XII of On Genesis According to the Letter: It must not be thought that the body produces anything in the spirit, as though the spirit were subjected in the place of matter to the acting body; for he who makes is in every way more excellent than that thing out of which he makes something. Hence he concludes that it is not the body that makes the image of the body in the spirit, but the spirit itself that makes it within itself. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
[I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3] Furthermore, an effect does not extend beyond the power of its cause. Now intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things, for we understand certain things that cannot be perceived by sense. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
[I q. 84 a. 6 s. c.] On the contrary, the Philosopher proves in Book I of the Metaphysics and at the end of the Posterior Analytics that the beginning of our knowledge is from sense.
[I q. 84 a. 6 co.] I answer that on this question there was a threefold opinion among the philosophers. For \ Democritus held that there is no other cause of any knowledge of ours except when, from those bodies of which we think, images come forth and enter into our souls, as Augustine says in his Letter to Dioscorus. And \ Aristotle likewise says in the book On Sleep and Waking that Democritus posited knowledge to take place through images and effluxes. And the reason for this position was that both Democritus himself and the other early natural philosophers did not hold that the intellect differs from sense, as Aristotle says in the book On the Soul. Consequently, since sense is modified by the sensible object, they supposed that all our knowledge comes about solely through modification by sensible things—which modification Democritus asserted to take place by effluxes of images. \ Plato, on the contrary, held that the intellect differs from sense, and that the intellect is indeed an immaterial power making no use of a bodily organ in its act. And because the incorporeal cannot be modified by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge does not take place through a modification of the intellect by sensible things, but through participation in separate intelligible forms, as has been said. Moreover, he held sense also to be a certain power operating of itself. Hence neither is sense itself, since it is a certain spiritual power, modified by sensible things; rather, the organs of the senses are modified by sensible things, and from this modification the soul is in a way aroused to form within itself the species of sensible things. And Augustine seems to touch upon this opinion in Book XII of On Genesis According to the Letter, where he says that the body does not sense, but the soul through the body, which it uses like a messenger for forming within itself what is announced from without. Thus, therefore, according to Plato’s opinion, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor even sensible knowledge wholly from sensible things; rather, sensible things arouse the sensitive soul to sensing, and similarly the senses arouse the intellective soul to understanding. Aristotle, however, proceeded by a middle way. For with Plato he held that the intellect differs from sense. Yet he held that sense does not have its proper operation without the cooperation of the body, so that sensing is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite. And he held the same regarding all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, there is nothing unreasonable in sensible objects outside the soul causing something in the composite, Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this: that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of sensible things upon the sense—not by way of efflux, as Democritus held, but by a certain operation; for Democritus also held every action to take place by an influx of atoms, as is clear in Book I of On Generation and Corruption. The intellect, however, Aristotle held to have an operation without the cooperation of the body. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression upon an incorporeal thing. And therefore, to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the mere impression of sensible bodies does not suffice, but something nobler is required, since the agent is more honorable than the patient, as he himself says. Yet not in such a way that the intellectual operation is caused in us by the mere impression of certain higher beings, as Plato held; rather, that higher and nobler agent which he calls the \ agent intellect, of which we have spoken above, renders the \ phantasms received from the senses intelligible in act by way of a certain abstraction. According to this, therefore, on the side of the phantasms the intellectual operation is caused by sense. Yet because the phantasms do not suffice to modify the possible intellect, but must be made intelligible in act by the agent intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a certain way the matter of the cause.
[I q. 84 a. 6 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that by those words of Augustine we are given to understand that truth is not to be expected wholly from the senses. For the light of the agent intellect is required, through which we immutably know the truth in mutable things, and discern the things themselves from the likenesses of things.
[I q. 84 a. 6 ad 2] To the second it must be said that Augustine is speaking there not of intellectual knowledge, but of imaginary knowledge. And because, according to Plato’s opinion, the imaginative power has an operation that belongs to the soul alone, Augustine used the very same reasoning to show that bodies do not impress their likenesses upon the imaginative power, but that the soul itself does so, as Aristotle uses to prove that the agent intellect is something separate—namely because the agent is more honorable than the patient. And beyond doubt, according to this position, it is necessary to posit in the imaginative power not only a passive potency, but also an active one. Yet if we posit, in accordance with the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imaginative power belongs to the composite, no difficulty follows, because the sensible body is nobler than the organ of the animal insofar as it is compared to it as being in act to being in potency, just as the thing colored in act is compared to the pupil, which is colored in potency. Nevertheless it could be said that, although the first modification of the imaginative power occurs through the motion of sensible objects—since imagination is a motion brought about in accordance with sense, as is said in the book On the Soul—there is nonetheless a certain operation of the soul in man which, by dividing and composing, forms diverse images of things, even ones not received from the senses. And with respect to this Augustine’s words may be taken.
[I q. 84 a. 6 ad 3] To the third it must be said that sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is no wonder if intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensitive knowledge.
[I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the seventh article. It seems that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species which it possesses within itself, without \ turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made in act through the intelligible species by which it is informed. Now for the intellect to be in act is understanding itself. Therefore intelligible species suffice for the intellect to understand in act, without its turning to the phantasms.
[I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2] Furthermore, imagination depends more upon sense than the intellect depends upon imagination. Now imagination can imagine in act when sensible objects are absent. Much more, therefore, can the intellect understand in act without turning to the phantasms.
[I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3] Furthermore, of incorporeal things there are no phantasms, since imagination does not transcend time and the \ continuum. If, therefore, our intellect could not understand anything in act unless it turned to the phantasms, it would follow that it could not understand anything incorporeal—which is manifestly false, for we understand truth itself, as well as God and the angels.
[I q. 84 a. 7 s. c.] On the contrary, the Philosopher says in Book III of On the Soul that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm.
[I q. 84 a. 7 co.] I answer that in the state of the present life, in which it is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything in act except by turning to the phantasms. And this is evident from two signs. First indeed because, since the intellect is a certain power making no use of a bodily organ, it would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of any bodily organ if there were not required for its act the act of some power that does use a bodily organ. Now sense, imagination, and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part make use of a bodily organ. Hence it is manifest that for the intellect to understand in act—not only in acquiring knowledge anew, but also in using knowledge already acquired—there is required the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For we see that when the act of the imaginative power is hindered by a lesion of the organ, as in those suffering from frenzy, and likewise when the act of the memorative power is hindered, as in the lethargic, a man is hindered from understanding in act even those things of which he had previously acquired knowledge. Second, because anyone can experience this within himself: that when someone strives to understand anything, he forms certain phantasms for himself by way of examples, in which, as it were, he inspects what he endeavors to understand. And hence it is also that when we wish to make someone else understand anything, we set examples before him, from which he can form phantasms for himself in order to understand. Now the reason for this is that the cognitive power is proportioned to the knowable object. Hence the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is wholly separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body, and through intelligible objects of this sort it knows material things. Of the human intellect, however, which is united to a body, the proper object is a \ quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it ascends also to some knowledge of invisible things. Now it belongs to the intelligible character of such a nature that it exist in some individual, which does not occur apart from corporeal matter—just as it belongs to the nature of a stone that it be in this stone, and to the nature of a horse that it be in this horse, and so on with other things. Hence the nature of a stone, or of any material thing whatever, cannot be known completely and truly except insofar as it is known as existing in the particular. Now we apprehend the particular through sense and imagination. And therefore, for the intellect to understand in act its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. If, however, the proper object of our intellect were a separate form, or if the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from particulars as the Platonists held, there would be no need for our intellect always to turn to the phantasms in understanding.
[I q. 84 a. 7 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the species preserved in the possible intellect exist in it habitually when it is not understanding in act, as was said above. Hence for us to understand in act, the mere preservation of the species does not suffice; rather, we must make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which are natures existing in particulars.
[I q. 84 a. 7 ad 2] To the second it must be said that the phantasm itself is already a likeness of a particular thing; hence imagination does not need any further likeness of the particular, as the intellect does.
[I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3] To the third it must be said that incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known by us through comparison with sensible bodies, of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth from the consideration of a thing concerning which we contemplate the truth; God, moreover, as Dionysius says, we know as cause, by way of excess, and by way of removal; and other incorporeal substances as well, in the state of the present life, we cannot know except by way of removal or by some comparison with corporeal things. And therefore, whenever we understand anything concerning things of this sort, we have need to turn to the phantasms of bodies, even though there are no phantasms of those things themselves.
[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1] We proceed thus to the first article. It seems that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms. For any intellect whatever that understands a thing otherwise than as it is, is false. Now the forms of material things are not abstracted from particulars, whose likenesses the phantasms are. If, therefore, we understand material things by the abstraction of species from phantasms, there will be falsehood in our intellect.
[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2] Furthermore, material things are natural things, into whose definition matter enters. Now nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Yet matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore material things cannot be understood by the abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is what it means to abstract intelligible species from phantasms.
[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3] Furthermore, in Book III of On the Soul it is said that phantasms stand to the intellective soul as colors stand to sight. Now vision does not take place by abstracting certain species from colors, but by colors impressing themselves upon sight. Therefore neither does understanding take place by anything being abstracted from phantasms, but by phantasms impressing themselves upon the intellect.
[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4] Furthermore, as is said in Book III of On the Soul, in the intellective soul there are two things, namely the possible intellect and the agent intellect. Now to abstract intelligible species from phantasms does not belong to the possible intellect, whose office is rather to receive species already abstracted. Yet neither does it seem to belong to the agent intellect, which stands to phantasms as light stands to colors—and light does not abstract anything from colors, but rather flows onto them. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstracting from phantasms.
[I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5] Furthermore, the Philosopher says in Book III of On the Soul that the intellect understands the species in the phantasms. Therefore not by abstracting them.
[I q. 85 a. 1 s. c.] On the contrary, it is said in Book III of On the Soul that as things are separable from matter, so are they with regard to the intellect. Therefore material things must be understood insofar as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, which are the phantasms.
[I q. 85 a. 1 co.] I answer that, as was said above, the knowable object is proportioned to the cognitive power. Now there is a threefold grade of cognitive power. For one cognitive power is the act of a bodily organ, namely sense. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is form according as it exists in corporeal matter. And because matter of this sort is the principle of individuation, every power of the sensitive part is cognizant of particulars alone. Another cognitive power is one that is neither the act of a bodily organ nor in any way joined to corporeal matter, such as the angelic intellect. And therefore the object of this cognitive power is form subsisting without matter; for even though angels know material things, yet they behold them only in immaterial things, namely either in themselves or in God. The human intellect, however, holds a middle place: for it is not the act of any organ, and yet it is a certain power of the soul, which is the form of the body, as is clear from what was said above. And therefore it is proper to it to know form existing individually in corporeal matter indeed, yet not according as it is in such matter. Now to know what exists in individual matter, not according as it is in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter, which the phantasms represent. And therefore it is necessary to say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we arrive at some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, conversely, angels know material things through immaterial ones. Plato, however, attending solely to the immateriality of the human intellect, and not to the fact that it is in a certain way united to the body, posited separate ideas as the object of the intellect, and held that we understand not indeed by abstracting, but rather by participating in things already abstract, as was said above.
[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that abstracting occurs in two ways. In one way, by way of composition and division, as when we understand that one thing is not in another, or is separated from it. In another way, by way of simple and absolute consideration, as when we understand one thing while considering nothing at all about the other. Now to abstract by the intellect things that are not abstract in reality according to the first mode of abstracting is not without falsehood. Yet according to the second mode, to abstract by the intellect things that are not abstract in reality involves no falsehood, as manifestly appears in sensible things. For if we should understand or declare that color does not inhere in a colored body, or is separated from it, there will be falsehood in the opinion or in the statement. If, however, we consider color and its properties while considering nothing about the colored apple, or even express in speech what we thus understand, this will be without falsehood of opinion or of statement; for the apple does not belong to the intelligible nature of color, and therefore nothing prevents color from being understood without understanding anything about the apple. In like manner, I say that those things which pertain to the nature of the species of any material thing—for instance, of a stone, a man, or a horse—can be considered without the individual principles, which do not belong to the nature of the species. And this is what it is to abstract the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasms: namely, to consider the nature of the species without consideration of the individual principles that are represented by the phantasms. When, therefore, it is said that an intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is, this is true if the word otherwise refers to the thing understood. For the intellect is false when it understands a thing to be otherwise than as it is; hence the intellect would be false if it so abstracted the species of a stone from matter as to understand it not to exist in matter, as Plato posited. What is proposed is not true, however, if the word otherwise be taken on the side of the one understanding. For it is without falsehood that the mode of the one understanding in understanding is other than the mode of the thing in existing, since the thing understood exists in the one understanding immaterially, after the mode of the intellect, and not materially, after the mode of a material thing.
[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 2] To the second it must be said that some have supposed that the species of a natural thing is form alone, and that matter is not a part of the species. Yet according to that view, matter would not be posited in the definitions of natural things. And therefore it must be said otherwise: that matter is twofold, namely common, and designated or individual—common, indeed, such as flesh and bone; individual, however, such as this flesh and these bones. The intellect, therefore, abstracts the species of a natural thing from individual \ sensible matter, though not from common sensible matter; just as it abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these bones, which do not belong to the nature of the species, but are parts of the individual, as is said in Book VII of the Metaphysics, and therefore the species can be considered without them; whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones. Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only individual, but also common; yet not from \ common intelligible matter, but only from \ individual intelligible matter. For sensible matter is called corporeal matter insofar as it underlies sensible qualities, namely hot and cold, hard and soft, and the like; whereas \ intelligible matter is called substance insofar as it underlies quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity inheres in substance prior to sensible qualities. Hence quantities—such as numbers, dimensions, and figures, which are terminations of quantities—can be considered apart from sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter; yet they cannot be considered without the understanding of substance subject to quantity, which would be for them to be abstracted from common intelligible matter. They can, however, be considered apart from this or that substance, which is for them to be abstracted from individual intelligible matter. Certain things, finally, can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as being, the one, potency and act, and others of this sort, which can also exist without any matter at all, as is plain in immaterial substances. And because Plato failed to consider what has been said concerning the twofold mode of abstraction, he posited all the things we have declared to be abstracted by the intellect as being abstract in reality.
[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 3] To the third it must be said that colors, existing as they do in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existing as the visual power, and therefore they can impress their likeness upon sight. Phantasms, however, since they are likenesses of individuals and exist in bodily organs, do not have the same mode of existing that the human intellect has, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore they cannot by their own power make an impression upon the possible intellect. Rather, by the power of the agent intellect a certain likeness results in the possible intellect from the turning of the agent intellect upon the phantasms, a likeness which is indeed representative of the things of which they are the phantasms solely with respect to the nature of the species. And it is in this way that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms—not that numerically one and the same form, which previously was in the phantasms, afterward comes to be in the possible intellect, in the manner in which a body is taken from one place and transferred to another.
[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that the phantasms are both illuminated by the agent intellect and, further, intelligible species are abstracted from them by the power of the agent intellect. They are illuminated, indeed, because just as the sensitive part is rendered more powerful from its conjunction with the intellective part, so the phantasms by the power of the agent intellect are rendered fit for intelligible intentions to be abstracted from them. Moreover, the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms inasmuch as by the power of the agent intellect we are able to take into our consideration the natures of species without individual conditions, in accordance with whose likenesses the possible intellect is informed.
[I q. 85 a. 1 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that our intellect both abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and nevertheless understands them in the phantasms, because it cannot understand even the things whose species it abstracts except by turning to the phantasms, as was said above.
Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 7, a. 2 — That Esse Is the Actuality of All Acts and the Perfection of All Perfections¶
Latin Locus: De Pot. q. 7, a. 2 · Commentary: Notes on De Pot. q. 7, a. 2
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1] For Damascene says in Book I of On the Orthodox Faith: That God is, indeed, is manifest to us; yet what He is according to substance and nature is altogether incomprehensible and unknown. Now one and the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore the being of God and His substance or essence are not the same.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2] Yet should it be said that what the very being of God is remains unknown to us, just as His substance does—on the contrary: whether it is and what it is are two distinct questions, to one of which we know how to answer, whereas to the other we do not, as is also clear from the aforesaid authority. Therefore that which answers to whether He is regarding God and that which answers to what He is are not the same; now being answers to whether He is, whereas substance or nature answers to what He is.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3] Yet should it be said that the being of God is known not through itself, but through the likeness of a creature—on the contrary: in a creature there is both being and substance or nature; and since it has both from God, it is assimilated to God in respect of both, inasmuch as an agent produces what is like itself. If, therefore, the being of God is known through the likeness of created being, His substance must likewise be known through the likeness of created substance; and thus we would know concerning God not only that He is, but what He is.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 4] Furthermore, each thing is said to differ from another through its own substance. Through that which is common to all things, however, nothing differs from another; hence the Philosopher also says that being ought not to be placed in a definition, because through it the thing defined would be distinguished from nothing. Therefore the substance of no thing distinct from others is being itself, since being is common to all. Now God is a reality distinct from all other things. Therefore His being is not His substance.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 5] Furthermore, things are not diverse unless their being is diverse. Now the being of this thing is not diverse from the being of another insofar as it is being, but insofar as it exists in such or such a nature. If, therefore, there be some being that does not exist in any nature differing from being itself, it will not be diverse from any other being. And thus it follows, if the divine substance is its own being, that God Himself is the being common to everything.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 6] Furthermore, being to which no addition is made is the being common to all things. Now if God be His very own being, He will be being to which no addition is made. Therefore He will be common to all; and thus He will be predicated of each thing, and God will be mingled with all things—which is heretical, and contrary to the Philosopher saying in the Book of Causes that the first cause governs all things without being mingled with them.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 7] Furthermore, to that which is altogether simple nothing predicated in concretion is fitting. Now being (esse) is of this sort, for being seems to stand to essence as white stands to whiteness. Therefore it is unfittingly said that the divine substance is being.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 8] Furthermore, \ Boethius says: Everything that is participates in that which is to be, in order that it may exist; whereas it participates in something else, in order that it may be something. Now God is. Therefore besides His being there is in Him something else whereby He has it that He is something.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 9] Furthermore, to God, Who is most perfect, that which is most imperfect must not be attributed. Now being is most imperfect, like prime matter: for just as prime matter is determined through all forms, so being, since it is most imperfect, has to be determined through all the proper categories. Therefore, just as prime matter is not in God, so neither ought being to be attributed to the divine substance.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 10] Furthermore, that which is signified after the manner of an effect does not belong to the first substance, which has no principle. Now being is of this sort, for every being has its being through the principles of its essence. Therefore it is unfittingly said that the substance of God is being itself.
[q. 7 a. 2 arg. 11] Furthermore, every proposition in which the same thing is predicated of itself is self-evident. Now if the substance of God be His very own being, the same thing will be in the subject and in the predicate when it is said, “God is.” Therefore it will be a self-evident proposition—which seems to be false, since it is demonstrable. Therefore the very being of God is not His substance.
[q. 7 a. 2 s. c. 1] On the contrary, Hilary says in his work On the Trinity: Being is not an accident in God, but subsistent truth. Now that which is subsistent is the substance of a thing. Therefore the being of God is His substance.
[q. 7 a. 2 s. c. 2] Furthermore, Rabbi Moses says that God is a being not in an essence, and living not in a life, and powerful not in a power, and wise not in a wisdom. Therefore in God essence is not other than His being.
[q. 7 a. 2 s. c. 3] Furthermore, each thing is properly denominated from its own \ quiddity; for a name properly signifies substance and quiddity, as is held in Book IV of the Metaphysics. Now this name He Who Is is among all others the most proper name of God, as is clear in Exodus IV. Since, therefore, this name is imposed from the act of being (esse), it seems that the very being of God is His substance.
[q. 7 a. 2 co.] I answer that in God His being and His substance are not distinct. For the evidence of this, we must consider that whenever several causes producing diverse effects share in producing one effect alongside their diverse effects, they must produce that common effect by virtue of some higher cause of which it is the proper effect. And the reason for this is that, since a proper effect is produced by a given cause according to its own proper nature or form, diverse causes having diverse natures and forms must have diverse proper effects. Hence if they concur in some one effect, that effect is not the proper effect of any one of them, but of some higher cause in whose power they act. Thus it is evident that things of diverse temperaments concur in heating—such as pepper, ginger, and the like—even though each one of them has its own proper effect distinct from the effect of another; hence the common effect must be traced back to a prior cause of which it is the proper effect, namely fire. Similarly, in celestial motions, the individual spheres of the planets have their own proper motions, and together with these they share one common motion, which must be the proper motion of some higher sphere revolving them all according to the diurnal motion. Now all created causes share in one effect, which is being (esse), even though each has its own proper effects wherein they are distinguished. For heat causes a hot thing to be, and a builder causes a house to be. They concur, therefore, in this: that they cause being; yet they differ in this: that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must, therefore, be some cause higher than all, by whose power all things cause being, and of which being is the proper effect. And this cause is God. Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds from it according to the likeness of its nature. It is necessary, therefore, that being (esse) itself be the substance or nature of God. And on account of this it is said in the Book of Causes that an intelligence does not give being except insofar as it is divine, and that the first of effects is being, and nothing else was created before it.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that being (ens) and to be (esse) are spoken of in two ways, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics. For sometimes esse signifies the essence of a thing, or the act of being; whereas sometimes it signifies the truth of a proposition, even in things that have no being—just as we say that blindness is, because it is true that a man is blind. When Damascene says, therefore, that the being of God is manifest to us, the being of God is taken in the second way, and not in the first. For in the first way the being of God is identical with His substance; and just as His substance is unknown, so also is His being. In the second way, however, we know that God is, because we conceive this proposition in our intellect from His effects.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 2] And through this the solution to the second and third objections is evident.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that the divine being, which is His substance, is not common being, but is a being distinct from every other being. Hence through His very own being God differs from every other being.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that, as is stated in the Book of Causes, the very being of God is distinguished and individuated from every other being by the very fact that it is being subsisting of itself, and not accruing to some nature that is other than being itself. Every other being, however, that is not subsistent must be individuated through the nature and substance that subsists in such being. And in these things it is true that the being of this thing is other than the being of that thing through the fact that it belongs to another nature—just as, if there were a single heat existing of itself without matter or a subject, by that very fact it would be distinguished from every other heat, even though heats existing in a subject are distinguished only through their subjects.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 6] To the sixth it must be said that common being is that to which no addition is made, yet it does not belong to its intelligible nature that no addition can be made to it; whereas the divine being is being to which no addition is made, and it belongs to its very nature that no addition can be made to it; hence the divine being is not common being. Thus likewise in common animal, no addition of the difference rational is made in its own notion, yet it does not belong to its notion that addition cannot be made to it; for that belongs to the notion of irrational animal, which is a specific kind of animal.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 7] To the seventh it must be said that the mode of signifying in the expressions imposed by us upon things follows our mode of understanding; for spoken expressions signify the conceptions of the intellect, as is said at the beginning of On Interpretation. Now our intellect understands being in the manner in which it is found in lower things from which it draws knowledge, in which being is not subsistent, but inherent. Reason, however, discovers that some subsistent being exists; and therefore, even though what is called being (esse) is signified after the manner of concreation, nevertheless the intellect in attributing being to God transcends the mode of signifying, attributing to God that which is signified, yet not the mode of signifying.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 8] To the eighth it must be said that the saying of Boethius is understood of those things to which being belongs by participation, not by essence; for that which exists through its own essence, if we attend to the full force of speech, ought rather to be said to be being itself than to be that which is.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 9] To the ninth it must be said that what I call being (esse) is among all things the most perfect: which is evident from the fact that act is always more perfect than potency. Now any designated form whatever is not understood to exist in act except through the fact that being (esse) is posited. For humanity or fieriness can be considered as existing in the potency of matter, or in the active power of an agent, or even in the intellect; yet by having esse, it is made actually existent. Hence it is evident that what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and on account of this it is the perfection of all perfections. Nor must it be supposed that to what I call esse something is added that is more formal than it, determining it as act determines potency; for esse of this sort is essentially other than that to which it is added in order to be determined. Now nothing can be added to esse that is extraneous to it, since nothing is extraneous to it except non-being, which can be neither form nor matter. Hence esse is not determined by another as potency is determined by act, but rather as act is determined by potency. For even in the definition of forms their proper matters are placed in the stead of a difference, as when it is said that the soul is the act of a physical organic body. And in this way, this being is distinguished from that being insofar as it belongs to such or such a nature. And on account of this Dionysius says that although living things are nobler than merely existing things, nevertheless to be (esse) is nobler than to live: for living things do not merely have life, but together with life they simultaneously have being as well.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 10] To the tenth it must be said that the order of ends corresponds to the order of agents, in such a way that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent, and other ends correspond proportionally in due order to other agents. For if one considers the ruler of a city, the commander of an army, and a single soldier, it is clear that the ruler of the city is first in the order of agents, at whose command the commander of the army goes forth to war; and under him is the soldier, who fights with his hands according to the ordering of the army commander. Now the end of the soldier is to strike down the enemy, which is further ordered to the victory of the army—the end of the commander—and this is further ordered to the good estate of the city or kingdom, which is the end of the ruler and king. Being (esse), therefore, which is the proper effect and end in the operation of the first agent, must hold the place of the ultimate end. Now although the end is first in intention, it is nonetheless last in execution, and is the effect of the other causes. And therefore created being itself, which is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent, is caused through other principles, even though the first being that causes it is the first principle.
[q. 7 a. 2 ad 11] To the eleventh it must be said that a proposition may be self-evident in itself and yet not self-evident to this or that person—namely when the predicate belongs to the intelligible nature of the subject, and yet the nature of the subject is unknown to someone; just as, if someone did not know what a whole is, this proposition, Every whole is greater than its part, would not be self-evident to him, for propositions of this sort become known once their terms are known, as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. Now this proposition, “God is,” so far as concerns itself, is self-evident, because the same thing is in the subject and in the predicate; yet with respect to us it is not self-evident, because we do not know what God is. Hence with us it stands in need of demonstration, though not with those who behold the essence of God.
Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 10, a. 6 — Whether the Human Mind Receives Knowledge from Sensible Things and on First Indemonstrable Principles¶
Latin Locus: De Ver. q. 10, a. 6 · Commentary: Notes on De Ver. q. 10, a. 6
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1] For between things that do not share in matter there can be neither action nor passion, as is clear through \ Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and through the Philosopher in the book On Generation and Corruption. Now our mind does not share in matter with sensible things. Therefore sensible things cannot act upon our mind so that any knowledge from them should be impressed upon our mind.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2] Furthermore, the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said in Book III of On the Soul. Now the \ quiddity of a thing is perceived by no sense. Therefore the knowledge of the mind is not received from sense.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3] Furthermore, \ Augustine says in Book X of the Confessions, speaking of the knowledge of intelligible things and how it is acquired by us: There, he says, they were—namely the intelligible objects in our mind—even before I had learned them, though they were not in memory. Therefore it seems that intelligible species are not in the mind as received from the senses.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4] Furthermore, as Augustine proves in Book X of On the Trinity, the soul cannot love anything except things known. Yet before someone learns a given science, he loves it, as is clear from the fact that he seeks it with great study. Therefore, before he learns that science, he possesses it in his knowledge; consequently it seems that the mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 5] Furthermore, Augustine says in Book XII of On Genesis According to the Letter: It is not the body that makes the image of the body in the spirit, but the spirit itself makes it within itself with a wonderful swiftness that is ineffably far removed from the slowness of the body. Therefore it seems that the mind does not receive intelligible species from the senses, but itself forms them within itself.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 6] Furthermore, Augustine says in Book XII of On the Trinity that our mind judges concerning bodily things according to incorporeal and eternal standards. Now standards received from sense are not of this sort; therefore it seems that the human mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 7] Furthermore, if the mind receives knowledge from sensible things, this can only be insofar as a species received from sensible things moves the possible intellect. Yet such a species cannot move the possible intellect. For it does not move it while still existing in the imagination, since while existing there it is not yet intelligible in act, but only in potency, whereas the intellect is moved only by what is intelligible in act, just as sight is moved only by what is visible in act; likewise neither does it move the possible intellect as existing in the \ agent intellect, which is receptive of no species—otherwise it would not differ from the possible intellect; likewise neither as existing in the possible intellect itself, because a form already inhering in a subject does not move the subject, but in a way rests within it; nor again as existing of itself, since intelligible species are not substances, but belong to the genus of accidents, as \ Avicenna says in his Metaphysics. Therefore in no way can it come to pass that our mind receives science from sensible things.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 8] Furthermore, the agent is nobler than the patient, as is clear through Augustine in Book XII of On Genesis According to the Letter and through the Philosopher in Book III of On the Soul. Now the receiver stands to that from which it receives as patient to agent. Since, therefore, the mind is far nobler than sensible things and the senses themselves, it will not be able to receive knowledge from them.
[q. 10 a. 6 arg. 9] Furthermore, the Philosopher says in Book VII of the Physics that in coming to rest the soul becomes knowing and prudent. Yet the soul could not receive science from sensible things unless it were in some way moved by them. Therefore the soul does not receive science from sensible things.
[q. 10 a. 6 s. c. 1] On the contrary, as the Philosopher says and as is proved by experience, where one sense is lacking, one science is lacking, just as the blind lack the science of colors. Yet this would not happen if the soul received science from another source than through the senses. Therefore it receives knowledge from sensible things through the senses.
[q. 10 a. 6 s. c. 2] Furthermore, all our knowledge originally consists in the knowledge of first indemonstrable principles. Now the knowledge of these arises in us from sense, as is clear at the end of the Posterior Analytics. Therefore our science arises from sense.
[q. 10 a. 6 s. c. 3] Furthermore, nature does nothing in vain, nor does it fail in necessary things. Now the senses would have been given to the soul in vain unless through them it received knowledge concerning things. Therefore our mind receives knowledge from sensible things.
[q. 10 a. 6 co.] I answer that concerning this question the opinion of the ancients was manifold. For some posited that the origin of our science is wholly from an exterior cause separate from matter; and this view is divided into two schools. For some, such as the Platonists, posited that the forms of sensible things exist separate from matter and are thus intelligible in act, and that through participation in them by \ sensible matter individuals in nature are produced, while through participation in them human minds possess science; and thus they posited the aforesaid forms to be the principle both of generation and of science, as the Philosopher recounts in Book I of the Metaphysics. Yet this position was sufficiently refuted by the Philosopher, who showed that the forms of sensible things must not be posited save in sensible matter, inasmuch as natural forms cannot even be understood in universal without sensible matter, any more than the snub can be understood without a nose. And therefore others, not positing separate forms of sensible things, but intelligences alone—which we call angels—posited the origin of our science to come wholly from separate substances of this sort. Hence Avicenna maintained that just as sensible forms are not acquired in sensible matter save from the influence of the active intelligence, so neither are intelligible forms impressed upon human minds save from the active intelligence, which is not a part of the soul, but a separate substance, as he posits; nevertheless the soul needs the senses as exciting and disposing it toward science, just as lower agents prepare matter to receive a form from the active intelligence. Yet this opinion also does not seem reasonable: because according to it there would be no necessary dependence between the knowledge of the human mind and the sensitive powers, whereas the contrary manifestly appears—both from the fact that when a sense is lacking, science of its proper sensibles is lacking, and also from the fact that our mind cannot consider in act even the things it habitually knows except by forming certain \ phantasms, whence even when the organ of imagination is injured, consideration is hindered. Moreover, the aforesaid position destroys the proximate principles of things if all lower beings immediately obtain both intelligible and sensible forms from a separate substance. Another opinion belonged to those who posited the origin of our science to come wholly from an interior cause; and this view is likewise divided into two schools. For some posited that human souls contain within themselves the knowledge of all things, yet through union with the body this aforesaid knowledge is darkened; and therefore they said that we need the senses and study in order that the hindrances to science might be removed, declaring that learning is nothing else than remembering—just as it also manifestly appears that from the things we hear or see we remember things we knew previously. Yet neither does this position seem reasonable. For if the union of the soul with the body is natural, it cannot be that natural knowledge should be wholly hindered by it; and thus, if this opinion were true, we would not suffer complete ignorance of those things of which we lack the sense. This opinion would, however, harmonize with that position which holds that souls were created before bodies and afterward united to bodies, for then the composition of body and soul would not be natural, but would accrue accidentally to the soul itself—an opinion judged worthy of rejection according to both faith and the teachings of the philosophers. Others, again, said that the soul is to itself the cause of science: for it does not receive science from sensible things as though likenesses of things reached the soul in any way through the action of sensible objects; rather, at the presence of sensible objects the soul itself forms likenesses of sensible things within itself. Yet neither does this position seem wholly reasonable. For no agent acts except insofar as it is in act; hence if the soul forms the likenesses of all things within itself, it must already possess those likenesses of things in act within itself, and thus this view reverts to the preceding opinion, which holds the science of all things to be naturally implanted in the human soul. And therefore, above all the aforesaid positions, more reasonable is the judgment of the Philosopher, who posits that the science of our mind is partly from within and partly from without—not only from things separate from matter, but also from sensible things themselves. For when our mind is compared to sensible things that exist outside the soul, it is found to stand toward them in a twofold relation. In one way, as act to potency: insofar, namely, as the things that exist outside the soul are intelligible in potency, whereas the mind itself is intelligible in act; and in accordance with this there is posited in the soul an agent intellect, which makes things intelligible in potency to be intelligible in act. In another way, as potency to act: insofar, namely, as in our mind the determinate forms of things exist in potency alone, whereas in things outside the soul they exist in act; and in accordance with this there is posited in our soul a possible intellect, to which it belongs to receive the forms abstracted from sensible things and made intelligible in act through the light of the agent intellect. Now this light of the agent intellect in the soul proceeds, as from its first origin, from separate substances and chiefly from God. And according to this, it is true that our mind receives science from sensible things; nevertheless the soul itself forms the likenesses of things within itself, insofar as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are rendered intelligible in act so that they may be received in the possible intellect. And thus also, in the light of the agent intellect, all science is in a certain way originally implanted in us, through the mediation of the universal conceptions that are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect, through which, as through universal principles, we judge concerning other things and foreknow them within those very principles—so that in this respect even that opinion holds truth which posits that we previously possessed in knowledge the things that we learn.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 1] To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that sensible forms, or forms abstracted from sensible things, cannot act upon our mind except insofar as they are rendered immaterial through the light of the agent intellect, and are thus made in a certain way homogeneous with the possible intellect upon which they act.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 2] To the second it must be said that a higher and a lower power operate concerning the same thing not in the same manner, but the higher more sublimely; hence even through the form received from things, sense does not know the thing as efficaciously as the intellect does: rather, sense is led by the hand through it to the knowledge of exterior accidents, whereas the intellect penetrates to the bare quiddity of the thing, separating it from all material dispositions. Hence the knowledge of the mind is said to take its origin from sense not because sense apprehends everything that the mind knows, but because from the things that sense apprehends the mind is led by the hand to further truths, just as sensible things when understood also lead by the hand to the intelligible truths of divine things.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 3] To the third it must be said that the statement of Augustine is to be referred to the foreknowledge whereby particulars are foreknown in universal principles; for in this sense it is true that the things we learn were previously in our soul.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 4] To the fourth it must be said that before someone acquires a given science he can love it insofar as he knows it by a certain universal knowledge, knowing the utility of that science, either by sight or in any other way whatever.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 5] To the fifth it must be said that the soul is to be understood as forming itself in this sense: that through the action of the agent intellect the forms rendered intelligible form the possible intellect, as has been said, and also insofar as the imaginative power can form shapes of diverse sensible things, which appears chiefly when we imagine things that we have never perceived by sense.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 6] To the sixth it must be said that the first principles whose knowledge is innate to us are certain likenesses of uncreated truth; hence insofar as we judge concerning other things through them, we are said to judge of things through unchangeable standards, or through uncreated truth. Nevertheless, what Augustine says there is to be referred to higher reason, which cleaves to contemplating eternal things—and although it is prior in dignity, its operation is nonetheless posterior in time, because the invisible things are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, Romans I, 20.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 7] To the seventh it must be said that in the reception whereby the possible intellect receives the species of things from the phantasms, the phantasms stand as an instrumental or secondary agent, whereas the agent intellect stands as the principal and primary agent. And therefore the effect of the action is left in the possible intellect according to the condition of both, and not according to the condition of one of them alone; and therefore the possible intellect receives forms as intelligible in act by the power of the agent intellect, yet as likenesses of determinate things from the cognition of the phantasms. And thus forms intelligible in act do not exist of themselves, nor in the imagination, nor in the agent intellect, but solely in the possible intellect.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 8] To the eighth it must be said that although the possible intellect is unconditionally nobler than the phantasm, nevertheless nothing prevents the phantasm from being nobler in a certain respect—namely insofar as the phantasm is in act the likeness of such a thing, which belongs to the possible intellect only in potency. And thus in a certain way it can act upon the possible intellect by virtue of the light of the agent intellect, just as color can also act upon sight by virtue of bodily light.
[q. 10 a. 6 ad 9] To the ninth it must be said that the rest in which science is brought to perfection excludes the motion of material passions, yet not motion and passion taken in a general sense, according as any receiving whatever is called being acted upon and being moved; for it is in this sense that the Philosopher says in Book III of On the Soul that understanding is a certain being acted upon.